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THE WORKS OF

ORESTES A. BROWNSON

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HENRY F. BROWNSON.

VOLUME IX.

CONTAINING THE SPIRIT-RAPPER AND CRITICISMS OF SOME RECENT THEORIES IN THE SCIENCES.

DETROIT:
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THE SPIRIT-RAPPER; AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY.

PREFACE.

If the critics undertake to determine, by any recognized rules of art, to what class of literary productions the following unpretending work belongs, I think they will be sorely puzzled. I am sure I am puzzled myself to say what it is. It is not a novel; it is not a romance; it is not a biography of a real individual; it is not a dissertation, an essay, or a regular treatise; and yet it perhaps has some elements of them all, thrown together in just such a way as best suited my convenience, or my purpose.

I wanted to write a book, easy to write and not precisely hard to read, on the new superstition, or old superstition under a new name, exciting just now no little attention at home and abroad; and I chose such a literary form as I—not, properly speaking, a literary man—could best manage, which would afford me the most facilities for bringing distinctly before the reader the various points to which I wished to direct his attention. If the critics think that I have chosen badly, they are at liberty to bestow upon the author as much of the castigation which, in his capacity of Reviewer, he has for many years been in the habit of bestowing upon others, as they think proper. I have thought it but fair to give those whom I may have offended by my own criticisms in another place, an opportunity to pay their debts and wipe off old scores.

The book, though affecting some degree of levity, is serious in its aims, and truthful in its statements. There is no fiction in it, save its machinery. What is given as fact, is fact, or at least so regarded by the author. The facts narrated, or strictly analogous facts, I have either seen myself, or given on what I regard as ample evidence. The theory presented as their explanation, and the reasoning by which it is sustained, speak for themselves, and are left to the judgment of the reader.

The connection of spirit-rapping, or the spirit-manifestations, with modern philanthropy, visionary reforms, socialism, and revolutionism, is not an imagination of my own.

icine, and took my degree, less with a view to professional practice, in which I never engaged, than with a view to general science. After taking my degree as doctor of medicine, I resumed and extended my college studies, entered largely into the study of natural history, physical geography, zoölogy, geology, mineralogy, and indeed all the 'ologies, then so fashionable that one must have a smattering of them if he would woo successfully his sweetheart. I paid some attention to Gall and Spurzheim's new science of phrenology, when Spurzheim visited this country, where he died, and was much interested in it till I had the misfortune to listen to a course of lectures in its exposition and defence, by George Combe, the great Scottish phrenologist. That course upset me, and I have since abandoned phrenology, save so far as I find it taught by Plato in his Timæus, and only laughed at its pretensions and its adherents.

I was arrested, for a moment, by Boston transcendentalism, but I could not make much of it. Its chiefs told me that I was not spiritual enough to appreciate it, and that I was too much under the despotism of the understanding to be able to rise to those empyrean regions where the soul asserts her freedom, and sports with infinite delight in all the luxury of the unintelligible. I thought they talked metaphysics, what neither their hearers nor themselves could understand; and finding myself very little enlightened by their intelligible unintelligibility, their dark utterances, and their Orphic sayings, I gave them up, and returned to my laboratory.

About 1836, I made the acquaintance of Dr. P——, or, as he claimed to be, the Marquis de P——, a native of one of the French West India Islands, but brought up and educated at Paris, where he had been a Saint-Simonian, and a chief of the *savants* of the new religion. The decision of the French courts in 1833, that Saint-Simonism was not a religion, and therefore that its chiefs were not priests, and entitled to a salary from the state, dispersed the new sect, and he soon after came to the United States, and commenced, though with a very imperfect knowledge of our language, and very little facility in speaking it, a course of lectures in several of our eastern cities, on Mesmerism, or, as he preferred to call it, animal magnetism. His appearance was by no means prepossessing, and his manners, though unpretending, were very far from indicating that exquisite grace and polish which are supposed, for what reason I know not, to

be peculiar to the Frenchman; but he was a serious, earnest-minded man, who in several branches of science had made solid studies. I knew him well, and esteemed him much.

At that time I had paid not much attention to mesmerism. I had heard of Mesmer indeed, of his extraordinary pretensions, and the wonderful phenomena which he professed to produce by his rod and tub; but I had supposed that the matter had been put at rest for all sensible persons by the famous report of the French Academy in 1784, signed, among others, by Bailly the astronomer, and our own Franklin. I supposed that every scientific man acquiesced in the conclusion of that report, that the extraordinary phenomena exhibited by magnetism were to be ascribed to the imagination, and that from the date of that report magnetism had ceased to occupy the attention of the scientific. I was therefore surprised, nay, scandalized, to find a man of real science, and, as I wished to believe, of real worth, professing faith in what I had been led to regard as an exploded humbug, and which, at the very best, could have no practical utility beyond illustrating the deceptive power of the imagination, and the sad consequences which might result to those weak-minded people who become dupes to their own disordered fancy.

Dr. P—— assured me that I was mistaken both as to the bearing and as to the effect of the famous report of the French Academy. That report, he said, concedes the reality of the mesmeric phenomena, and only declares that the assertion of Mesmer, that they are produced by means of a subtle fluid analogous to electricity or magnetism, was not proven or demonstrated by the experiments the commission witnessed; which gives no uneasiness to any animal magnetist in our day, because now no one pretends to explain those phenomena by means of such a fluid. It is true, he said, the commission, in their published report, assert that the phenomena are to be explained by the imagination; but in a private report, addressed to the king, they say, that "it is impossible not to recognize in them a *great power* which agitates and subjects the patients, and of which the magnetizer appears to be the depositary." This, contended Dr. P——, is by no means compatible with the theory which ascribes them to the imagination, for that theory supposes the cause that produces them to be in the magnetized, since it is to their imagination, not to that of the magnetizer, that they are to be ascribed; but in this secret report, the

power which produces them is assumed to be in the magnetizer, "of which," it says, "he who magnetizes seems to be the depositary." For these, as well as other reasons, he said, the report of the Academy was not regarded by magnetists as any authority against animal magnetism as understood and practised at the present time.

Moreover, he assured me, that the report of the Academy had not settled the question, or seriously checked the cultivation or the progress of animal magnetism. It had at no moment ceased to be studied and practised, chiefly for its therapeutic effects, and, as he proved to me, was at the time firmly held and practised by large numbers of the most upright, benevolent, learned, and scientific members of the medical profession in France, Germany, and Great Britain. It had continued to make progress, and was now very generally held and respected on the continent of Europe. If I would not be behind my age, if I would not remain ignorant of a very curious and interesting class of phenomena, I must, he insisted, investigate and make myself acquainted with animal magnetism. I should do it as a lover of science; I should do it more especially as a lover of my race, as a friend of humanity; for I might rest assured that animal magnetism is the most facile and powerful means ever yet discovered of solacing, and to a great extent curing, a thousand ills that flesh is heir to.

My curiosity, I confess, was excited, and I resolved to investigate the subject. Dr. P—— had picked up, somewhere in Rhode Island, a somnambulist, an honest, simple-minded young woman, of no great strength of intellect, and very little education or knowledge. She was sickly, and suffering from some nervous affection. He had found her very susceptible to the mesmeric influence, and he made her the subject of numerous experiments. He had brought her, in the winter of 1836–7, to Boston, and there exhibited her to his class. Spending that winter in the same city, I consented one afternoon to be present at his experiments. There were some twenty or thirty gentlemen present on the occasion, mostly lawyers, physicians, ministers, and literary and scientific gentlemen of distinction, all disbelievers in mesmerism, and on the alert to detect the least sign of deception or complicity.

The doctor introduced his patient, who took her seat in an arm-chair placed in the centre of the room, and, without any visible sign from Dr. P——, was in a few minutes ap-

parently fast asleep. Her breathing was regular, her pulse natural, and her sleep sound and tranquil. Was it sleep? It was, as far as we could ascertain, and sleep accompanied by complete insensibility. We resorted to every imaginable contrivance to awaken her. One tickled her nose with a feather, another shook her with all his might, another discharged a pistol close to her ear, another stuck pins and needles into her flesh,—all without the least effect. There was no quivering or shrinking, no muscular contraction, and to the rudest proofs she was as insensible as a corpse. We all exhausted our inventive powers in vain, and stood astounded, unwilling to trust our own senses, and yet unable to detect the least conceivable deception or collusion. We none of us knew what to think or say. We were taken all aback.

Various written questions, after we had given over trying to awaken her, were handed to Dr. P——, which he put to her mentally, without a word or sign that we could any of us discern, and to which she instantly answered. One question was, the time of the day; she answered, and answered correctly, much more so than most gentlemen's watches present. To the question put she answered, and so far as any of us knew, or could ascertain, with perfect accuracy. The doctor at length told her he thought she had slept long enough, and would do well to wake up. Instantly she was wide awake, and apparently unconscious of all that had passed. She remained awake for some time, when Dr. P—— said to her, "I will you to go to sleep again for just fifteen minutes, and then to wake up." Instantly she dropped asleep. One or two of the company took the doctor into a different part of the room, got him into an angry discussion, and made him forget the order he had given. I stood by the somnambulist holding my watch in my hand, and to my astonishment, precisely at the expiration of fifteen minutes, she awoke. Various other experiments were tried, various severe tests were put;—some of them with complete success, others, indeed, proved total failures; and after a session of about three hours the party broke up and went to their several homes, some two or three converted, the greater part satisfied that there was and could be no collusion or deception, and yet wholly sceptical as to the alleged magnetic power.

CHAPTER II.—GUESSES.

It is no easy matter to give full credit to the reality of the mesmeric phenomena, or to admit the alleged facts, and when forced to do so by a mass of testimony which it is impossible to resist, nothing is more natural than that we should suggest various hypotheses to account for them. Of all these hypotheses no one, to those who have been eye-witnesses to the mesmeric phenomena, is less satisfactory than that which attributes them to a species of juggling or sleight-of-hand, or to collusion between the magnetized and magnetizer. Whatever may be the jugglery or connivance in particular cases, or whatever be the real solution of the problem, we must, as a general rule, admit the good faith of the parties. The man who could produce by address or skill, by art, the wonderful phenomena produced by the mesmerizer, who could so successfully elude the scrutiny of the most acute and intelligent witnesses, and so effectually deceive the senses of all classes, would have no motive to practise mesmerism, for he could produce more excitement, and gain more notoriety, and more money as a professed juggler. It is very easy for those who have never seen the mesmeric phenomena, to set them down as a mere cheat, which they, if present, could very easily have detected, but it is very possible that they who have witnessed them are as able to detect an imposition as would be these critics themselves, and are far better judges than they are, not having seen them, unless we are to suppose that the blind can in some cases see better than those who have eyes. Among the innumerable witnesses of these phenomena there may be as careful and as intelligent observers as those who emit their oracles with solemn gravity on matters of which they confessedly know nothing. Academicians and members of royal and scientific societies are no doubt very respectable personages, but they are not always the best observers in the world. I would trust "Jack" to distinguish between a seal or horse-mackerel and the sea-serpent, much quicker than I would Professor Owen or Professor Agassiz. Learned academicians and members of scientific societies, whether of Paris or London, Berlin or Philadelphia, are the easiest people in the world to impose upon. A clever lad could pass off upon them a sucker for a pike, and a crawfish for a lobster. But they need not judge all the world by themselves. Human testimony is not yet become

wholly worthless. There is a cloud both of competent and of credible witnesses in almost every country, to the reality of the mesmeric phenomena, and to the good faith, the simplicity, and trustworthiness of both mesmerizers and mesmerized. Whatever be the agent that actually produces these extraordinary phenomena, we must seek it elsewhere than in mere jugglery, sleight-of-hand, trickery, or fraud.

I do not give the results of my first experiments as any thing very wonderful. They would excite little attention now. Mesmerism is much more advanced than it was in the hands of my French friend. It is true, there were rumors even then of far more marvellous phenomena, strange stories of clairvoyance or second-sight were whispered, and strange revelations of an invisible world, not recognized by received science, were hinted; but my friend would not heed them. He was a rationalist, and would not hear of any thing not explicable on natural principles. But what I witnessed convinced me of the reality of the magnetic sleep, and of the subjection of the somnambulist to the will of the mesmerizer, or that one person can, under certain circumstances, exercise an absolute control over the organs of another, and render the somnambulist, during the magnetic sleep, absolutely insensible to all save the mesmerizer. Here was certainly a marvellous power; what was it? Was it, as Bailly and Franklin's Report of 1784 asserted, the imagination? Singular effect of imagination that would put a person asleep at another's will, render her completely insensible—dead to all the world but the mesmerizer; make her go to sleep and wake up at the time specified, answer questions only mentally put, and with a promptness and an accuracy wholly impossible in her normal state! A very inexplicable imagination that, and itself not less puzzling than the mesmeric phenomena themselves.

"No, it is not imagination," insisted Dr. P——, "any more than it is a magnetic fluid, as asserted by Mesmer. It is the will of the magnetizer operating immediately on the will of the somnambulist, and through that on her organs. Or rather, it is the spiritual being in me operating immediately on the spiritual being in her, and therefore these phenomena afford an excellent refutation of materialism, and reveal a great and glorious law of human nature, recognized, though misconceived, in all ages and nations; a mighty law, but hitherto denied to human nature, and sup-

posed to be something lying out of our sphere, superhuman, and even supernatural. Modern science began by denying the mysterious facts recorded in history, but it is beginning to accept them, and to show that they are all explicable on the principles of human nature."

"What strikes me as most remarkable in the mesmeric phenomena," said Mr. Winslow, a rather grave minister of the extreme left of the Unitarian denomination, who had joined Dr. P—— and myself on our way to my lodgings, "what strikes me as most remarkable in the mesmeric phenomena is, not the kind of power they reveal, but the degree. Every man who has been accustomed to public speaking, if he has observed, is conscious of a kindred power."

"To put his audience asleep," interposed Jack Wheatley, a young lawyer, who was usually one of my companions while in the city, "but not always to make them submissive to his will."

"It is a mysterious power," continued Mr. Winslow, "which the orator seems to have over his audience, a power of which he is conscious, but which is wholly unintelligible to himself."

"But very intelligible to his hearers," interposed Jack.

"You are impertinent, sir," replied the minister, with offended dignity. "Sometimes when I have attempted to preach, I have found myself, though perfectly familiar with my subject, hardly able to say a word. My ideas dance around and before my mind like summer insects, but at such a distance, and with such rapidity, that I strive in vain to seize them. If I do succeed in saying something, my words penetrate not my hearers; they as it were rebound, and affect only myself."

"Indeed!" interjected the incorrigible Jack.

"Other times," continued Mr. Winslow, not heeding Jack's exclamation, "my ideas seem to come of themselves, to flow without effort, and to clothe themselves, without any thought or intervention of mine, in the most fitting words. I find myself elevated above myself; I am in intimate relation with the minds of my hearers. It seems that an electric current passes from them to me and from me to them, making us as it were one man. I speak with their combined force added to my own, and each of them hears and takes in my words with the united understanding of all."

"There may be something in that," said Jack. "You know, Doctor," turning to me, "that I have no more religion than a horse, and am seldom serious for five consecutive minutes in my life. Well, being in the country the other evening, on a visit to a crochety old aunt, whose very cat would not dare to purr or to wash her face on Sunday, and finding it exceedingly dull, I took it into my head to seek a little amusement or diversion by attending a Methodist prayer-meeting, or conference, held in a school-house close by. I seldom go to meeting, but once-in-awhile I like to attend a Methodist evening gathering. I sometimes find plenty of fun. The performances this evening had begun before my arrival, for, as usual, I was rather late. On entering I found the house crowded almost to suffocation. Ten or a dozen men, women, boys, and girls, were down on their knees, all screaming at once from the very top of their lungs, and the rest of the brethren and sisters were groaning, shouting, clapping their hands, in glorious confusion. I worked my way along to a vacant spot which I spied just before a blazing fire. Turning my back to the fire, and holding aside the skirts of my coat so that they should not get scorched, I stood and looked for some minutes on the scene before me. At first I was struck with its comical character, and was much amused; soon, however, I grew serious, became sad, and then indignant, that beings in human shape, and endowed, I presumed, with the faculty of reason, should make such fools of themselves. I inwardly resolved that for once I would 'speak in meeting,' and that as soon as there should be a pause or a lull, so that I could stand some chance of making myself heard, I would give them a piece of Jack Wheatley's mind. In a word, I resolved to give them a downright scolding, and to tell them plainly what fools they were to suppose that they could please God by acting like so many bedlamites or howling dervishes.

"Well, after some fifteen or twenty minutes, there came a slacking up, and I opened my mouth. I remembered what my old rhetoric master had taught me, though how I came to is a puzzle, and resolved to begin in a modest and conciliatory manner. It would not do to shock them in the outset. I must first gain their ears and their good-will. So I began with a grave face and a solemn tone, and made some commonplace remarks on religion, and the duty to love and worship God, meaning (after my preliminary re-

marks, intended to gain the jury) to bring in, with crushing effect, my rebukes. But the brethren did not wait. Mistaking me for a pious exhorter, they cried out almost at my first words, "Amen!" "Glory!" "Bless the Lord!" "Go on, brother!" Will you believe it? Instantly I caught the enthusiasm, became possessed by the *genius loci*, entered in spite of myself into the spirit of the meeting, and gave a most magnificent methodistical exhortation. The brethren and sisters were edified, were enraptured, and when the time came for the meeting to break up, the leader requested me to close the performance with prayer, which I did with great fervor and unction. The spell lasted till I got out of the house into the open air."

"So Saul was among the prophets," remarked Mr. Winslow, as Jack concluded. "I am not surprised, for something similar occurred to myself when I first began to preach. There is, I believe, something infectious in these Methodist gatherings, and a wise man often finds himself acting in them as a fool acteth."

"Few wise men, I should think, ever go near them," I remarked.

"I know not how that may be," replied Mr. Winslow, "but there are few men that are always wise, or who never find themselves doing a foolish action. Even the greatest and wisest of our race sometimes unbend, and prove that there are points in which they are united to ordinary humanity. There is in this secret and invisible influence, to which I refer, of one man over another what has long arrested my attention. Often have I known both speaker and hearers electrified by a few commonplace words, carried away, it would seem, by a force not their own; now melted into tears; now inflamed with a pure and unearthly love; now maddened with rage; now fired with a lofty enthusiasm, swelling with heroic emotions, and panting to do heroic deeds. In these moments man is more than man a higher than man possesses him, and he becomes thaumaturgic, works miracles, removes mountains, stops the course of rivers, heals the sick, casts out devils, moves, speaks, and acts a god. I call it the demonic element of human nature, and I think, if these mesmeric phenomena turn out to be real, they will be found to have their explanation in this mysterious and even fearful element, which the older theologians called faith, and superstition looks upon as supernatural."

"That there is some analogy between animal magnetism and the class of facts to which you refer, or which you have in your mind," observed Dr. P——, "I do not deny. But, after all, what is the power which produces them? To resolve one class of facts into another, equally if not more mysterious, is not to explain them."

"But what more, my dear Doctor," I asked, "do you yourself do? There are here two distinct questions: Is there really such a class of extraordinary phenomena as you mesmerizers assert? and if so, what is the agent or efficient cause in producing them? As to the first, I am so far satisfied as to concede that the remarkable phenomena asserted may be real; but I have not seen enough to warrant any sound induction as to their cause or general law. I must continue my observation of facts much longer, and extend it much further, before I proceed to any induction in the case. You say they are produced by the will of one acting immediately on the will of another, and through that on the organs of the person magnetized, by virtue, as you allege, of a law of human nature. Yet you do not tell us what this law is, or what is the nature of that which my reverend friend calls the demonic power of man."

"In no case does it belong to man to answer similar questions," replied Dr. P——. "We in no case know the essences of things. All that men are able to do is to observe phenomena, and from them to infer or affirm that there is and must be an agent or power which produces them. Can you tell me what is gravitation? All you can tell me is, that bodies fall or tend to the centre of the earth, and what are the laws and conditions of that tendency. What is electricity? You cannot tell me. You can only tell me that there is a certain class of phenomena, which you can trace to a certain invisible and imponderable agent, and to that invisible and unknown agent, that 'occult power,' as an earlier philosophy would have called it, you give the name of electricity. All you can know of it is, its existence, the laws by which it operates, the means by which you can avail yourself of it, get power over it, avert it from your house or barn when it breaks forth in the thunder-gust, or use it to drive your machinery, to convey your messages, or to solace your pain. Science calls it a fluid, but what it is in itself science knows not, for it has seen it only in its operations or effects. So with this power, or law of human nature, to which I ascribe the magnetic phenomena. All I pretend to tell is, that the

law is a reality, and all I pretend to demonstrate is, that we may avail ourselves of it, and use it for the most useful and noble purposes. This is enough. All we need to know is its existence, or the purposes to which it may be applied, and how we can apply it or render it serviceable. Let man know that he has it, and then let him learn how to use it."

"But after all, I am a little frightened at the supposition of this power," remarked Mr. Winslow. There is something fearful in this complete subjection of one, soul and body, to the will of another. The somnambulist is, during the mesmeric trance, the slave of the mesmerizer, as much so as was the genie to the possessor of the wonderful lamp, and he may do with him or her what he pleases. Is there not danger here? May he not use his power in a base way, to gratify his passions, his lusts, his hatred, or his revenge, and with complete impunity, since the somnambulist retains no consciousness or recollection on returning to the normal state, of what passed during the magnetic slumber? Let animal magnetism become generally known and practised, and who could know when or where he was safe? Any one of us might at any moment fall a victim, or be made the blind instrument of the basest and most malignant passions of others."

"Those are idle fears," replied Dr. P——; "none but virtuous men can exercise the power, or if others can, they can exercise it only for honest and benevolent purposes."

"That, if true, would be reassuring," I observed; "but for myself, I revolt at the bare idea of being so completely in the power of another, however honest or well-disposed he may be. I choose to be my own, and not another's."

CHAPTER III.—FURTHER EXPERIMENTS.

Dr. P—— continued his lectures, private instructions, and experiments for some months, and very soon they began to produce their natural effect. No people are more disposed to run after every novelty, or are naturally more fond of the marvellous than the Anglo-Americans. They live in a constant state of excitement, and are always craving some new stimulant. They have been transplanted from the old homestead, are without ancestors, traditions, old associations, or fixed habits transmitted from generation to generation through a long series of ages. They have descended, in

great part, from the sects that separated in the seventeenth century from the Anglican Church, which had in the sixteenth century itself separated from the Church of Rome, and to a great extent broken with antiquity. They are a new people,—in many respects a child-people, with the simplicity, freshness, impressibility, unsteadiness, curiosity, caprice, and waywardness of children. They must have their playthings, and they no sooner obtain a new toy than they tire of it, throw it away, and seek another. Yet are they richly endowed, and they possess in the highest degree many of the nobler virtues of our nature. They are a poetical and imaginative, as well as a reasoning and practical people. They have a robust and not unkindly nature, —are susceptible of deep emotions, and capable of heroic deeds. They treat few subjects with absolute indifference, and seldom fail to give any one who has, or professes to have, something to say, a tolerably fair and patient hearing. Whoever is able to touch their fancy, stir their feelings, excite their curiosity, or their marvellousness, is pretty sure of having them run after him—for a time.

Animal magnetism soon became the fashion, in the principal towns and villages of the Eastern and Middle States. Old men and women, young men and maidens, boys and girls, of all classes and sizes, were engaged in studying the mesmeric phenomena, and mesmerizing or being mesmerized,—some declaring themselves believers, some expressing modestly their doubts, the majority, while half believing, loudly declaring themselves inveterate sceptics. Jack Wheatley very soon became a famous mesmerizer—for sport. He laughed at the whole concern, and yet he was the most successful of the mesmerizers, and his *subjects* always behaved with great propriety, seldom, if ever, failing him, or disappointing the wondering spectators. Mr. Winslow, after hesitating a while, began to try experiments himself, and found that he had a wonderful magnetic power, especially over the young misses and spinsters of his congregation. He found by actual experiment, often repeated, and fully attested, that he could mesmerize without being in the same room with his subject, without any previous communication of his intent, and even persons with whom he had no acquaintance, and had never spoken. More than once he had thrown a young lady in the adjoining room into the magnetic slumber. Of this there could be no doubt. He knew well his own intention, and hundreds of witnesses

were ready to depose to the fact of the slumber. At first he tried this experiment only upon those who had been previously mesmerized, but he afterwards tried it with brilliant success on others.

But the marvel did not stop here. Mr. Winslow soon found that he could magnetize material objects, which in turn would magnetize persons. He wished to mesmerize a young lady, without communicating to her his wish. He mesmerized a glass of water, which was handed her by a person ignorant of what he had done, and of his intention. She drank of it, and in a very few minutes sank into a profound magnetic slumber, and exhibited the phenomena usually exhibited in artificial somnambulism. When I first heard of this experiment I laughed at it, for it seemed to me a wholly inadmissible fact. I could conceive it possible for mind to act on mind; for the will of the magnetizer to affect the will of the magnetized; but it was repugnant to all received science to suppose that mind or spirit can, without some natural medium, operate on material objects. But from what I subsequently saw and did myself, and what I was assured of by others, both competent and credible, I became convinced that I must admit it, or reject all human testimony.

Mr. Winslow, once become a mesmerizer, very soon left Dr. P—— far behind. In pushing forward his investigations, he found that he could not only throw persons, not indeed every one, but one in twenty-five or thirty, into the mesmeric sleep, render them insensible, dead as it were to all the world except himself, but that he could develop in them, or superinduce upon them, a marvellous physical strength. I saw him place a weak and sickly boy in a chair on the platform of his lecture room, and so nerve his arm that not two of the strongest men could move it. He would, by his mental operation, so nail the chair to the floor that no force applied to it could raise it. He would throw the boy by the same operation upon the floor, render his whole body, neck, legs, arms, fingers, and toes, rigid, and stiff as a crowbar; then suddenly relax all his limbs, and render him as flexible as a reed—now fill him with rage, make him rave furiously, rush through the audience as one possessed, overthrowing every thing and every one in his way—now recall him, soothe his rage, make him cry and weep as if afflicted with the deepest and most inconsolable grief, and now dry at once his tears, and break forth into the wildest and maddest joy.

These were singular phenomena. Whence this apparently superhuman strength? That certainly was no effect of complicity, for the boy exhibited a physical strength far surpassing that of both mesmerizer and mesmerized in their normal state. It could not be the effect of imagination. "For how," said Mr. Winslow, "can you explain by imagination the effect produced on material objects? You see that I can magnetize a glass of water or a bunch of flowers. Do you pretend that these are endowed with imagination; are not only sensitive, but also intellectual, and even volitive? Have the most common material objects sense, intellect, and will? Imagination, highly excited, may indeed develop and concentrate the strength which one has, but how impart a strength which one has not?"

"I have been studying these wonderful phenomena," said Mr. Increase Mather Cotton, a rigid puritan minister of high standing, and who had accompanied me to see Mr. Winslow's experiments, "and I think I see in them the works of the devil."

"Why, sir," replied Mr. Winslow, "I do these things myself. My patients move and act, are paralyzed, laugh, cry, weep, rage, foam, run, fly, fight, or make love, at my will. Do you think I am the devil?"

"Be not too confident," replied Mr. Cotton. "You may yet find that, if not the devil yourself, that it is a devil, and a very base and wicked devil, that moves you, and uses you as the instrument of his malice."

"I have no belief," answered Mr. Winslow, "in devils or demons, as separate and intelligent beings."

"I know very well, sir, that you are a Sadducee, and believe in neither angel nor spirit, although you would fain pass for a Christian minister," replied, with a severe tone, the stanch puritan, whose great ancestor had taken so conspicuous a part in Salem witchcraft.

"You do me wrong, Mr. Cotton," replied Mr. Winslow. "I am a Christian, and no Sadducee. I believe in the Christian religion as firmly as you do. I do not deny angel or spirit. By *angel* I understand what the word itself imports, a messenger, and by *spirit*, a power, force, or energy. But I do not suppose that I am to understand by either an order of beings distinct and separate from man. I concede the spiritual power or energy, but it is the power or energy of the human being; I grant the demonic character of these phenomena, but the force that produces them is the demonic

force of human nature itself. There are no personal angels, and no personal devils or demons."

"And no personal God, you will say next, I presume," replied Mr. Cotton with a sneer.

"God is personal in me, in the human personality," proudly answered Mr. Winslow. "Personality is a circumscription, a limitation; and God, since he is infinite, incapable of circumscription, cannot be personal in himself. He can be personal only in creatures, and consequently, only in such creatures as have personality, that is, men."

"Your notion of personality is of a piece with your whole miscalled theology," replied Mr. Cotton. "Personality is the last complement of rational nature. If the nature is rational, that is, capable of intelligent and voluntary activity, and complete, it is a person, and if infinite, an infinite person. Your argument is a mere sophism, founded on a false definition of personality. A little philosophy or common sense would be of great service to such *Christian* ministers as you are."

"Let us not," I interposed, "get involved in a theological discussion. We are to investigate this subject as men of science, not as theologians. We have here a scientific subject, and science leaves theologians to their speculations, without presuming to intervene in their interminable, useless, and wearisome disputes. If your theology is true, it can never be in conflict with science."

"If your science be true, or really be science," retorted Mr. Cotton, "it can never be in conflict with theology. I do not attempt to deduce my science from my theology, but I make my theology the mistress of my science. Whatever is inconsistent with it, I know beforehand cannot be genuine science, or true philosophy."

"That may or may not be so," I replied; "but I am no theologian. I am an humble cultivator of science, and I consider myself free to push my scientific investigations into all subjects independently, without restraint, without leave asked or obtained either from you or my friend Mr. Winslow. All history has its superstitious and marvellous side. Science has heretofore denied the reality of that side of history, and regarded the marvellous facts with which ancient and mediæval history is filled, as never having really taken place, or as the result of fraud, trickery, or imposture, exaggerated by the credulity, the ignorance, the wonder, and the disordered imaginations of the multitude. These

mesmeric phenomena may throw a new light on that class of facts; they may even relieve history from the charges which have been brought against it, and rehabilitate the ages that we have condemned, so far at least as the facts themselves are concerned, though not necessarily as to the theories by which they were in past times generally explained. I am myself at present bewildered. I am not willing to admit the facts, but I am unable to deny them. if they must be accepted, I incline to the view of my friend Mr. Winslow, and am disposed to assume that there is in human nature a law not hitherto well understood, a mysterious power, what he here calls the demonic power of human nature, the limits and extent of which science has not as yet explored."

"There is something mysterious in man," remarked Mr. Sandborn, a Universalist minister present. "I remember, some years ago, that one summer I was very much out of health. I suffered much from a bowel complaint, which brought me very low. But my mind was exceedingly active, and I seemed to myself to have not only more than my ordinary intellectual power, but also at my command a mass of information on a great variety of subjects which I was sure I had never acquired in the course of my ordinary studies. I seemed familiar with several physical sciences which I had never studied, and with facts, real facts too, which I had never learned. While I was in this state I was visited at my residence in the village of Ithaca, New York, by a young friend, a brother minister, residing some eighteen or twenty miles distant. He saw my state, and urged me to go out and spend a few weeks with him at his boarding-house. The pure breezes, he said, from the hills would do me good, revive my languishing body, and restore me to health. I accepted my young friend's invitation, and the next morning we took the stage, and after some three hour's drive were set down at his lodgings. We were hardly seated in his library, when a servant brought him a letter which had been taken from the post-office during his absence. I saw a slight blush on his face as he took the letter, and instantly comprehended that it was from his 'ladye love,' although I was entirely ignorant that he was paying his attentions to any one, or that he had any matrimonial intentions. Asking my permission, he broke the seal, and read his letter in my presence. When he had done, I said to him,

"'You have there a letter from your sweetheart, the young lady to whom you are engaged to be married.'

"'How do you know that?' he asked in reply.

"'O that is evident,' I replied. 'I see it in your face. Let me see the letter, and I will tell you her character.'

"'I would rather not,' he answered.

"'I do not wish to read it,' said I, 'I only wish to look at the handwriting.'

"'But can you tell a person's character by seeing his handwriting?'

"'Certainly, nothing is easier,' I replied, although I had never tried, or even heard of such a thing before.

"He then handed me the letter. I fixed my eye on the writing for a moment without reading a word of the letter, and I saw, or seemed to see, standing before me, at some six or eight feet distant, a very good-looking young lady, a little below the medium size, with an agreeable expression of face, apparently about eighteen years of age, as plainly as I see any one of you now in this room. I proceeded quietly and at my ease to describe her to my friend. I told her age, described her size, her height, her complexion, the color and texture of her hair, the colors and quality of her dress, indeed her whole external appearance, even to a hardly perceptible mole on her right cheek. My friend, you may well suppose, listened to me with surprise, astonishment, and wonder, and several times interrupted me with the question 'Are you really the devil?' He agreed that my description was accurate, and far more so than he could himself have given.

"I then proceeded, to my friend's equal astonishment, to describe her moral and intellectual qualities, her disposition, her education, her tastes, her habits, &c., all of which he declared were correctly described, as far as he himself knew. I had never previously seen or heard of the young lady, who lived in another State, and was actually at the moment some hundred and fifty miles distant. But this was not all. My friend married the young lady in the course of two or three months, and two years afterwards I called at his house, and was introduced to a lady whom I instantly recognized as the one whose image I had previously seen before me.* There is something in all this, and analogous facts related and well attested by others, that I cannot explain."

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* A literal fact, in the experience of the author.

We all agreed that the case was remarkable, and apparently inexplicable, on any known principles of received science.

CHAPTER IV.—AN EXPLOSION.

Dr. P—— having accomplished his object in visiting this country, and being invited home by his family, took his leave of us in the summer of 1840, and returned to the West Indies. I have not seen him since. But he left behind a large number of disciples, and we had no lack of mesmerizers, and mesmerizers to whom he was a mere child. Some of these made mesmerism a trade, and gave public lectures and experiments as a means of gaining notoriety and filling their pockets. Others made their experiments in private circles, and from curiosity, or in the interests of science, and not unfrequently by way of amusement. Mr. Winslow devoted much time to a series of experiments intended to prove the reality of what he called the demonic element of human nature. He wished to be able to accept and explain the miracles recorded in sacred and profane history on natural principles, without the recognition of the supernatural. Jack Wheatley continued his experiments, apparently more in jest than in earnest, and was remarkably successful. He had no theory on the subject, said nothing of the use to which mesmerism might be applied, and never speculated on the cause of the mesmeric phenomena. He contented himself with producing them, and leaving others to use or explain them as they saw proper.

A year had passed without my seeing Jack. In the winter of 1840–41, while on a visit to Boston, I met him one day accidentally in the street, and was startled at his altered appearance. His look was wild and oppressed, his face was pale and sallow, his youth and bloom were gone, and his body was wasted to a skeleton. He made as if he would avoid me, and with reluctance and a certain timidity replied to my greeting.

"Why, Jack, what is the matter?"

"Don't you see? I see her night and day," he replied with a shudder, as if he beheld some strange and horrible vision from which he would avert his looks, but could not.

"See what?" said I. "I see nothing."

He trembled all over, and seemed unable to speak. See-

ing that he had either lost his wits, or was fast losing them, I took his arm in mine, and with gentle violence led him to my lodgings, at no great distance, conducted him to my room, and induced him to repose himself on the sofa. I closed the door, and seated myself by his side. I took his hand, and caressed his forehead and temples as if he had been a child. He seemed soothed. "Tell me, Jack," said I, in a voice almost as gentle and affectionate as that of a mother, "tell me what has happened."

"I am lost, I am damned."

"Say not that. As long as life lasts no one is lost, and nothing is irreparable."

"Life no longer lasts. I do not live. I killed her."

"No, no. But of whom do you speak?"

"You did not know. I never told you. You seemed to be a cast-iron man, as Miss Martineau says of Mr. Calhoun, and disposed to put every sentence in your crucible, and subject it to your retorts and blowpipes."

"But Mr. Calhoun has a heart, as I have had ample occasion to prove."

"I was always light and trifling, careless, gay, and joyous, yet I truly and deeply loved."

"And none the less deeply and truly because gay and joyous."

"But you know nothing of love?"

"No man is always wise."

"But you will laugh at me."

"My dear Jack, there are few hearts without some little romance, in some hidden or unhidden corner. There are not many persons unwilling to listen to a story of true and genuine love."

"I was young and foolish, but I loved one, and one whom I thought every way worthy, a thousand times worthy, of my love. I felt myself infinitely her inferior, and unworthy even to kiss the ground on which she had trodden."

"That is easily comprehended."

"Now you are laughing at me."

"No, I am not. But you may leave something to my imagination, if not to my experience. I do not doubt that she whom you loved had all imaginable charms, all conceivable graces, and all possible and impossible perfections."

"But my Isabel *was* the most beautiful, sweet, amiable, and glorious creature that ever gladdened the earth with her presence."

"Unquestionably. He who doubts that his mistress is an angel, is divine, is a goddess, has his liver whole, and I will warrant him sound in wind and limb. The lover never finds his mistress mortal till after the wedding."

"You are incorrigible. You promised not to laugh at me. Indeed, indeed, Doctor, I do not deserve to be laughed at."

"I own it, my dear Jack, and nothing is farther from my heart than to laugh at you. But do tell me what has happened. I am really grieved to see you so afflicted."

"Well, I loved Isabel, and had the happiness of believing that she returned my love. I gained her consent, and that of her parents and my own, and we were only waiting till I was fairly established in my profession to be married. Notwithstanding Shakspeare's *dictum*, the course of our true love *did* run smooth. There never was a lover's quarrel between us, and there were no obstacles interposed by friends, enemies, or fortune. My acquaintance accidentally formed with you brought me into company with Dr. P——, and interested me in animal magnetism. In mere sport, as a pastime, I began trying my mesmeric powers on one and another of my young friends. Capital fun we found it. None of us dreamed of there being any harm in it, or that we might not sport with it as we pleased without any unpleasant consequences. I know not how it was, but I proved to be a powerful magnetizer, although I was said not to have the right sort of temperament for a mesmerizer. My experiments rarely failed, and were almost always unusually brilliant.

"One evening at a friend's house, where some ten or a dozen of my companions and acquaintances were assembled, I mesmerized a boy about twelve years old. I found him completely under my control, and perfectly docile to all my intentions. His behavior was admirable. I asked him mentally a large number of questions which it was certain that in his normal state he could not answer, and which he answered explicitly, with surprising accuracy. He had never been taught music, and in his normal state could not distinguish even one tune from another. I willed him to seat himself at the piano, and play for us a favorite waltz of Mozart. He obeyed, and performed it with accuracy, with spirit, a delicacy of touch, and brilliancy of effect, which none of us had ever heard equalled, or even approached. I then mentally ordered him to sing us, to his own accompani-

ment, one or two songs from Fra Diavolo, which were then in fashion. He obeyed. We were all surprised, and began talking among ourselves of the apparent miracle, when, to our still greater astonishment, he commenced playing of his own accord a strange piece, which none of us knew or had ever heard, and which, for its wild and unearthly character, for its brilliancy, depth, and pathos, surpassed all that we had ever conceived of music. We were all entranced. Here was some agency not the boy's, not mine, not that of any one present. Such strains had never had mortal composer.

"I knew not what to think, and so contrived not to think at all, but enjoyed the music, and looked no farther. *Carpe diem*, you know, was my philosophy. I saw I had a brilliant subject, and I resolved to make the most of him. I had heard of the marvellous powers of clairvoyance and second sight exhibited by some somnambulists. I blindfolded the boy, and gave him a letter. He read it with ease. I placed another at the back of his neck, he read that also: I placed another, folded up, on the back of his head. He told me who was the writer, described his appearance, his complexion, size, and character, with more accuracy than I could have done, although the writer was well known to me, and must have been a total stranger to the boy. I took the boy with me on a journey, that is, mentally. We stopped at Providence, went on to Stonington, took the steamer for New York, landed and went up Broadway, down the Bowery, and through several other streets. He named the hotels, churches, and other public buildings we passed, and read the signs over the shop doors. We went up the Hudson, to Albany, from there to Utica, Rochester, Niagara Falls, and then returned, and on our way back stopped at your house in Genesee county, with which you know I am familiar. We went into the library, and the laboratory, in each of which he named and accurately described the principal objects. Having come back, we took an excursion into the other world, of which he told us strange things, which none of us believed, for we were all Unitarians, Universalists, or unbelievers, and his revelations seemed to favor what is called Orthodoxy.

"My betrothed was present at all these experiments. She was greatly excited. Time and again she wished that I would mesmerize her. She wished this much more after she had heard the boy describe what he saw in the other

world. I know not why, but I shrunk from complying with her wish. I saw no harm in others being mesmerized, and I had, without any scruple, mesmerized young ladies by the dozen; but some how or other I could not bear to have my Isabel mesmerized, or even to mesmerize her myself. I instinctively felt that there would be something indelicate in it, something hardly modest, and that it would be a sort of desecration. She was modest, retiring, even timid, but her curiosity was excited, and she would brook no denial."

"A true daughter of Eve. Women are timid creatures, but will brave Satan himself to gratify their curiosity, or their passions."

"That now is malicious."

"Never mind; go on."

"I was at length obliged to consent, but only to magnetize her at her father's house, and at first only in presence of her mother or her sister. She yielded very readily to the mesmeric influence, and became a remarkable clairvoyant. She had, when in the magnetic slumber, not only a clear view of remote terrestrial things, of which she had no previous knowledge, and which were equally unknown to me, but also of heaven and hell, and revealed to me strange things of angels and spirits, of the state of departed souls, good and bad, and of their intercourse with the living. We both became deeply interested, and took every opportunity to make our investigations. We were left much alone, and she remained in the mesmeric state from one to two hours almost every day or evening. If I was unable to visit her, she would, though I knew it not, invite some female friend to mesmerize her, for gradually she seemed to wish to live only in the mesmeric state, and appeared restless and uneasy when out of it. Her physical system began to suffer. She complained, when awake, of a universal lassitude. The bloom faded from her cheek, her eye assumed a wild, lustreless glare, and her motions were heavy and languid. She was listless, absent, forgetful, taking little or no interest in anybody or any thing. I beheld her, as you may well believe, with great anxiety and alarm.

"One evening, about two months ago, I visited her. I found her alone, and in a few minutes threw her into the mesmeric sleep, for it was only in that state that her mind retained its strength and brilliancy. She was attacked with convulsions and spasms as I had never seen her before. I hastened to awake her. It was too late! I had killed her;

and that countenance which had been so dear to me, which had so often beamed on me with the sweet smile of love, now bore only the expression of fear, horror, rage, and anguish. It was the face of a demon. It froze my blood to behold it.

"I had my own grief to bear, I had to endure the tortures of my own remorse and utter despair, and to face the grief, silent, but deep, of her father, and the rage of her mother, who cursed me, cursed me as only a mother in the violence of her wrath and grief can curse. How I lived through that dreadful night I know not. The relations agreed to conceal the circumstances of Isabel's death. I followed her to the tomb, and returned to my own home, blasted, withered, worse than dead.

"All this was bad enough, but worse followed. The day after the funeral, while sitting alone in my office, I saw, at a few feet from me, partly behind me, a grayish appearance, without any sharply defined outline. I looked at it for a moment, and it assumed then the well-known form of her I the day before followed to the grave, and, horror of horrors, with that fearful expression of face with which she had died. It came nearer to me, I receded; it followed, I rushed into the street; it pursued, I turned aside my face, it turned as I turned, so as to be always within my view. From that day to this has it haunted me; I have scarcely a moment's respite. Day or night, light or dark, with my eyes opened or closed, always does it stand before me, and glare on me with that terrible look. I cannot sleep; I cannot eat; I have no rest. The only few moments of quiet I have had are those since I have been with you in this room. I do not see it now. O, it was a sad day for me when I chose animal magnetism for a plaything!"

I was much affected by Jack's sufferings. I was not surprised at the fatal effects of mesmerism on the young lady; for death, I had been assured, is no unfrequent result of what the physicians who practise it call its injudicious use. The form which haunted him gave me no uneasiness, as it was, in my opinion, clearly a case of hallucination, a species of monomania, well known to the physicians of our lunatic hospitals, and our writers on mania or insanity. The shock my young friend had received had probably produced some slight lesion of the brain, and the imagination gave shape to the deceptive appearance, as in dreams we see often reproduced, following us, preceding us, or dancing around us,

the shapes and images which had deeply impressed us when awake. But I was fond of poor Jack, and my great anxiety was to console him, and to prevent what might be only a temporary hallucination from becoming a confirmed insanity. Finding him better when with me, I persuaded him, with the consent of his family, who understood very little of his case, and feared for his reason, to accompany me to my home in Western New York, and to place himself under my care.

He remained very much depressed for several months, but gradually his appetite returned; he was able to get some sleep, and his health began to improve. The vision did not entirely leave him, especially when alone, or not with me, but its visits became less and less frequent, and less and less appalling. The expression of the face gradually became less horrible, and more human, but still indicated great suffering and profound grief. In the course of a year, however, he seemed to have recovered, and returned to Boston. But in proportion as he seemed to be regaining his health and peace of mind, as far as peace of mind he could hope to have, a very singular change began to come over me.

I had spent my time, since leaving college, in literary ease and scientific pursuits. I had had few strong or violent passions to trouble me, and few things had wounded me very deeply. I had had, it is true, my little romances, but not being of a sentimental turn, and having a strong constitution and most excellent health, they had hardly rippled the surface of the ordinarily smooth current of my life. I had pursued science as a pastime. I took an easy, pleasant interest in it, but had no passion for it. I had no enthusiasm, and found in the pursuit only a gentle excitement, as in reading one of James's novels, which, by the by, are the best of all novels, for you can take them up or lay them down when you please. Spare me, I always say, those much-be praised works of fiction which deal with strong and violent passions, which produce in the reader a painfully intense interest, and which, when you once begin reading them, you cannot lay down till you have read to the end. I avoid reading such a novel, as I avoid a night's debauch.

But now a change came over me. I became restless, and had an intense longing to explore the secrets of things, and to look within the veil with which nature kindly shrouds her laboratory. I longed to make myself acquainted with the primal elements of being, and to be able to command

them; I burned to enlarge not only my knowledge, but my forces. I would be able to raise the tempest on the deep, to fly through the air, to wield the lightning, to leave and enter my body at will, to succor my friends or overwhelm my enemies at a distance. I would read the stars, comprehend their influences, and command their courses. I envied the old Chaldean sages, the mighty magicians of the East, and the wizards and weird sisters of the North. Why should it not be literally true that mind is omnipotent over matter? Is not man called the lord of this lower creation? Why then should he fear, or not be able to exercise his lordship? Had we not seen the wonders of science? Had not man learned to make the lightnings his steeds, and flames of fire his ministers? What are the mighty forces of nature? May not man seize them, use them, and wield their might at his pleasure?

Such thoughts were new to me, still more new were those intense longings. The horizon of human power seemed to enlarge around me, and I seemed to rise in the majesty and might of my nature. I was becoming, as it were, a new man. The ethereal fire within had hitherto slumbered. It was now kindled, and its flames aspired to their native heaven. I would no longer be the puny thing I had been. Henceforth I would be a man; a man in the full and lofty sense of the word. Now suddenly my soul seemed to grow, and to become too large for my body, against which it beat as the prisoner beats his head against the walls of his prison-house. I knew not then the source or nature of these feelings, and I cherished them as precious intimations of my affinity with the Origin and Source of all things. At times I was elated; my eye glowed with an unwonted fire, and sparkled with an unearthly brilliancy; my step was elastic, and my whole frame seemed to have received new youth and buoyancy, and to be in some measure withdrawn from the ordinary laws of gravitation. It seemed as if all the great forces of nature flowed into me, and became subject to my will. Nothing was impossible to me.

CHAPTER V.—SOME PROGRESS.

Hitherto I had neither been magnetized myself nor magnetized others. I had read the principal works which had been written in French and English on the subject, and had witnessed and carefully analyzed the experiments made

by my friends; but now I madly resolved to make experiments for myself.

A portion of the winter of 1841–2 I spent in Philadelphia, and as my acquaintance was principally with the Hicksite Quakers, Unitarians, Swedenborgians, Universalists, and open unbelievers in all religion, I was, as a matter of course, thrown into the very circles where animal magnetism, as well as all conceivable novelties and absurdities, were the order of the day. My friends and associates were nearly all philanthropists and world-reformers. There were among them seers and seeresses, enthusiasts and fanatics, socialists and communists, abolitionists and anti-hangmen, radicals and women's-rights men of both sexes; all professing the deepest and most disinterested love for mankind, and claiming to be moved by the single desire to do good to the race. All agreed that hitherto every thing had gone wrong; all agreed in denouncing all forms of religion and government that had hitherto obtained amongst men; all agreed in declaiming against the clergy of all denominations, in manifesting their indignation against all political and civil rule, and whatever tended in the least to restrain the passions of individuals or the multitude, in asserting the wonderful progress of the human race during the last hundred years, and in predicting that a new era was about to dawn for the world; but beyond this I could find scarcely a point on which any two of them were not at loggerheads.

I cannot say that the differences I found among these excellent people when it concerned their philanthropic projects or their various schemes of world-reform, edified me much, but I was charmed with their disinterestedness, with their zeal, and their superiority to the restraints of popular prejudice, and what they stigmatized as conventionalism. I was above all delighted to observe the new importance assumed in behalf of woman; and it was a real pleasure to hear a charming young lady, whose face a painter might have chosen for his model, in a sweet musical voice, and a gentle and loving look, which made you all unconsciously take her hand in yours, defend our great grandmother Eve, and maintain that her act, which an ungrateful world had held to have been the source of all the vice, the crime, the sin and misery of mankind, was an act of lofty heroism, of noble daring, of pure disinterested love for man. Adam, but for her, would have tamely submitted to the tyrannical order he had received, and the race would never have known

how to distinguish between good and evil. How, with the sweet young lady—I see and hear her now—sitting on a stool near me, laying her hand in the fervor of her argument on mine, and looking up with all the witchery of her eyes into my face, how could I fail to be convinced that man is cold, calculating, selfish, and cowardly, and that the world cannot be reformed without the destruction of the male (it might be called the *mal*) organization of society, the elevation of woman to her proper sphere, and the infusion into the government and management of public and private affairs, of some portion of the love, the daring, the enthusiasm, and disinterestedness of woman's heart? There was nothing to be said in reply.

But alas! unhappy Saint-Simonians; you believed also that the evils endured by the race were owing, in great measure, to the fact that society had hitherto been organized and governed by men as distinguished from women, and therefore without the female element. You would in your reorganization of the world, avoid this sad mistake. You could not agree on the definitive organization of mankind till you had obtained the voice of woman. But how obtain that from woman, the slave of the old male organization? A *père suprême* you had found, but a woman to sit by his side as *mère suprême*, and to exercise with him equal authority, you found not, and could proceed no further. You selected twelve apostles, and sent them forth in search of a *mère suprême*. They searched France, England, Germany, Italy, all Europe, even to the harem of the Grand Turk, but they found her not, and returned and reported their ill-success. Then fear and consternation seized you; then fell despair took possession of your souls; then you saw all your hopes blasted, and you separated and dissolved in thin air. Perhaps, if you had sent your apostles to the United States, to Philadelphia or Boston, you might have succeeded, and Père Enfantin not have vanished from Paris, the capital of the world, to waste himself as an engineer in the service of Mehemet Ali.

It was a real pleasure to find these men of advanced views, and these women of burning hearts and strong minds, who had outgrown the narrow prejudices of their sex, all substituting the love of mankind for the love of God. They all agreed that philanthropy was the highest virtue, and the only virtue. Charity was an obsolete virtue, no longer in use, and not suited to our advanced stage of human prog-

ress. That taught us to love man in God, but we have learned to love God in man; that is, man himself, without any reference to God. This was charming, and emancipated us from our thraldom to priests, and all old-fashioned religion. What was better still, I found that even this noble philanthropy received a very liberal interpretation, and did not interfere at all with those pleasant passions and vices, called anger, spite, envy, &c. It was only a love of man in the abstract, the love of mankind in general, which permitted the most sublime hatred or indifference to all men in particular. Wonderful nineteenth century! I exclaimed; wonderful seers and seeresses, and most delightful moralists are these modern world-reformers!

In this pleasant and delightful circle mesmerism attracted its full share of attention. I met it in almost every circle where I happened to be present. It seemed to take the place of cards, music, and dancing. One evening I was at a friend's house, where were collected some twenty-five or thirty gentlemen and ladies, or perhaps I should say, ladies and gentlemen, mainly on my account, for I was, in a small way, something of a lion, and our people are great in lionizing whenever they have an opportunity, as Dickens, Kossuth, Padre Gavazzi, and others hardly less worthy can abundantly testify. Indeed, our people are democrats only from envy and spite. In their souls they are the most aristocratic people in the world, and would be so avowedly, only they have no legitimate aristocracy. Democracy has its origin in the feeling,—since I am as good as you, and since I can not be an aristocrat, you shall be a democrat with me.

In this private party there were two or three somnambulists, and twice that number of mesmerizers. My friend, Mr. Winslow, from Boston, was present, and also Mr. Cotton, who was in the city on some business pertaining to holding a world's convention in London for evangelizing France, Italy, and other benighted countries of Europe. Mr. Winslow was in high spirits. He was sure that he was making out his proofs that there is a demonic element in human nature, never once reflecting, that if demonic it is not human.

"I am," said he, "on the point of rehabilitating history. Miracles, divinations, sorceries, magic, the black arts, which suprise us in all history, sacred and profane, and which are either denied outright, or ascribed to supernatural agencies, I think I shall be able to accept, as facts, as real phe-

nomena, and explain on natural principles. I think I have in mesmerism an explanation of them all."

"So you imagine that with mesmerism you may take your place with the magicians of Egypt, and enter into a successful contest with Moses," said Mr. Cotton. "You forget that those magicians were discomfited, and at the third trial were obliged to give up and acknowledge themselves beaten. 'The finger of God is here.'"

"Moses was a superior mesmerizer, and he mesmerized for a good, and they for a bad purpose, which makes all the difference in the world," replied Mr. Winslow.

"But these magicians, then, could exercise the mesmeric power up to a certain point, and for evil; I thought it was a doctrine of mesmerizers, that none but virtuous and honest men could mesmerize, and these only for a good and honest purpose," said Mr. Cotton.

"I am not," said I, "particularly interested in explaining what the Germans call the night-side of nature, or the marvellous deeds recorded in sacred and profane history, I would be able to do those deeds, reproduce those wonderful phenomena, and exert myself a power over the primordial elements or primitive forces of nature, be they spirits, be they what they will. I am tired of being pent up within this narrow cage, and of being the slave of every external influence. I would master nature; ride upon the whirlwind and direct the storm. There may, for aught I know, be an element of truth in the marvellous machinery of the Arabian Nights Entertainments, and something more than the extravagances of an oriental imagination in those tales of magic, of good and evil genii. What, if the tale of Aladdin's Lamp were true? Who dare say that the river and ocean gods, the naiads, the dryads, hamadryads, Pan and his reed, Apollo and his lyre, Mercury and his wand, the supernal and infernal gods of classic poetry, were all mere creatures of the poetic imagination? Perhaps even the *diablerie* of modern German romance, of Hoffman, Baron de Fouqué, and others, has more of reality than most readers suspect."

"All the gods of the gentiles were devils," replied Mr. Cotton, "and to a considerable extent I concede the reality you intimate. There are good angels and bad, and both have intercourse with mankind. The air swarms with evil spirits, with devils, fallen angels, endowed with a more than human intelligence, and a more than human power. These are under a chief called Lucifer, Beelzebub, Satan, who seeks to

seduce men from their allegiance to God, to make them receive him for their master, to put him in the place of God, and to pay him divine honors. It was this fallen angel, the prince of this world as St. Paul calls him, and the prince of the powers of the air, who everywhere and unceasingly besieges the Christian, and against whom we have to be constantly on the guard, that the ancient gentiles literally worshipped as God, and it is these evil spirits, these powers of the air, that swarm around us, and infest all nature, that ancient classic poetry celebrates, and that your modern philosophers would persuade us were mere poetic fancies."

"The powers or forces themselves, I concede," said Mr. Winslow, "but I do not recognize their personality, nor their superhuman character."

"Perhaps," said I, "Mr. Winslow is a little too hasty in supposing them to be the innate power or force of human nature. This power exerted by the mesmerizer may well be natural and yet not be human. It may be one of the mighty forces of universal nature, which the mesmerizer has the secret of using or bringing to bear in the accomplishment of his own purposes. In mesmerism, perhaps, we may find the key to the mysteries of nature, and the secret of rendering practically available all the great and mighty powers at work in nature's laboratory, so that a man may learn to strengthen himself with all the force of the entire universe."

"The power you speak of," said Mr. Wilson, an ex-Unitarian parson, and who passed for a transcendentalist, "I believe to be very real. We sometimes ascribe it to the will, and it is true that under certain relations the will has great energy, and is well-nigh invincible. Yet it is not, I apprehend, so much the energy of the will itself as of faith, which brings the will into harmony with the primordial laws of the universe, and strengthens it by all the forces of nature. 'If ye had faith as a grain of mustard seed,' said Jesus, 'ye could say to this mountain, be removed and planted in yonder sea, and it should obey you.' I am far from being able to prescribe the limits of full, undoubting, and unwavering faith. Faith is thaumaturgic, always a miracle-worker, and if we could only undertake with a calm and full confidence of success, I have little doubt but the meanest of us might work greater miracles than any recorded in history. 'If ye believe, ye shall do greater works than these.'

"There is more in this power of faith than received philosophy has fathomed. By it one's eyes are opened, and one seems to penetrate the profoundest mysteries of the universe, even to the essence of the Godhead. We may mark it in all our undertakings. Whatever we attempt, nothing doubting, we are almost sure to accomplish. Let me, as a public speaker, desire to produce a certain effect, and let me have full confidence that I shall succeed, and I am sure not to fail. Let me utter a sentiment, with my whole soul absorbed in it, confident that it is going right to the hearts of my hearers, and it goes there. Whenever I am conscious in what I am saying, of this calm, undoubting faith, I am sure of my audience. I no sooner open my lips than I have them under my control, and I can do with them as I please. When I have felt this faith in what I was about to utter, I have felt, before uttering it, its effect upon the assembly, and my whole frame has been sensible of something like an electric shock, and it seemed that my audience and I were connected by a magnetic chain. In conversing with a friend, in whom I have full faith, and to whom I can speak with full confidence, I have felt the same. Our souls seem to be melted into one, to move with one and the same will, and each to be exalted and strengthened by the combined power of both. Then rise we into the upper regions of truth, far above the unaided flight of either. Heaven opens to us, and we behold the hidden things of God. Something the same is felt also when one goes forth in love with nature, and yields to her gentle and hallowing influences. We inhale power with her fragrant odors, become conscious of purer, loftier and holier thoughts and feelings, and form stronger and nobler resolutions."

"All that," said Mr. Cotton, "is common enough, but it is easily explained by sympathy and imagination."

"But," Mr. Wilson replied, "what, then, is the power of sympathy or imagination? That is a question I cannot answer. I yield to the power, enjoy it, and question it not. Begin to question it, and it is gone. I know well that philosophers call the power I speak of under one aspect, love, under another, sympathy, under another, imagination, under still another, faith, but what it is in itself they cannot tell me. Be it what it will, it is demonic, supernatural, an element in human nature, of which men in all ages have had glimpses, but of which none of us have as yet had any thing more. The history of our race everywhere bristles with

prodigies. These prodigies were once regarded as miracles, and supposed to be wrought by the finger of God; now an unbelieving age treats them as impostures, cheats, fabrications, proving only people's love of the marvellous, their natural proneness to superstition, and the ease with which they can be gulled by the crafty and the designing. I believe them, for the most part, real. I believe that there are times when man has a power over the elements, and can make the spirits obey him. Who knows but the time may come, perhaps is now near, when the law by which this power operates will be discovered, and this power, which has hitherto been irregular and transient in its manifestations, will become common and regular, and therefore bear the marks of a fixed and permanent law of nature?

"But, call it what you will, it is not identical with the human will, nor in my opinion is it, strictly speaking, a property of human nature. It is an overshadowing, an all-pervading power, identical, most likely, with that Power which creates, and manifests itself in the universe. We can avail ourselves of it, not because it is ours, but by placing ourselves in harmony with it, within its focal range, and suffering its rays to be all concentred in us."

"That is substantially my own view," remarked Mr. Winslow, "and I regard mesmerism as revealing the regular and permanent means by which we can avail ourselves of that creative and miracle-working power. I do not pretend that man is thaumaturgic in himself, as distinguished from the Being from whom his life emanates, but by virtue of his union with the Fountain of All Force."

"I think," said Mr. Sowerby, an ex-Methodist elder, "that by magnetism, we shall be able to explain the operations of the Holy Ghost, and the mysteries of regeneration."

"More likely," interrupted Mr. Cotton, "the operations of Satan, and the Mystery of Iniquity."

"Yes, but in a sense thou dost not mean," interposed Obediah Mott, a Hicksite Quaker. "Thou knowest how difficult it is for thee to explain the Popish miracles, many of which thou knowest come exceedingly well attested. Mesmerism will show thee, that they were wrought by mesmeric influences."

"But I have no wish to explain Popish miracles on a principle that would take from Christian miracles all their value. I hate popery, but I love the Gospel more."

The conversation was continued for some time, in the small

circle around me. In another part of the room they had got a somnambulist, and were making various experiments. When the larger part of the company had dispersed, I requested Mr. Winslow to try if he could not mesmerize me. He did not think he should succeed. He thought I had not the sort of temperament to be magnetized; that I had too strong a will, too robust a constitution, and quite too vigorous health. It would at any rate require far more mesmeric power than he had to subdue me. However, he would try, and do what he could.

I seated myself in an arm-chair, with my feet to the south, and Mr. Winslow began with his passes. The first ten minutes he produced not the slightest effect, for I resisted him by the whole force of my will. At length I closed my eyes, and resigned myself to his influence. I now became aware of his passes, though they were made without actually touching me. It seemed as if slight electric sparks were emitted from the tips of his fingers, producing a slight, but agreeable, and as it were a cooling sensation. I felt slight spasmodic affections at the pit of my stomach, which gradually became violent. My arms made involuntary motions, and my legs and feet felt light and flew up as he extended his passes over them. I had not the least inclination to sleep, but found that he was actually exerting an influence over my body greater than at all pleased me. I tried, and found that I could arrest his influence if I willed, and that he had power over me only so long as I offered no voluntary opposition. I alternately yielded and resisted, and found that he had no power to overcome my own will. He operated for about an hour, with no other effects than those I have mentioned, and gave up the task of putting me to sleep as hopeless. The most remarkable thing about it, that I recollect, though it did not much strike me at the time, was, that although my eyes were closed, I saw or seemed to see distinctly, slight luminous appearances at the ends of his fingers as he made his passes. These luminous appearances were in rapid motion, and seemed of a bluish tinge edged with yellowish white.

There was nothing in the experiment that could establish the reality of the mesmeric influence to bystanders, but there was enough to satisfy me that it was neither jugglery nor imagination. I could easily see from the experiment, that upon persons differently constituted from myself, less accustomed to self-control, and to the quiet analysis of their own

feelings, much greater and more striking effect must have been produced.

I never submitted myself to an experiment of the sort again. I found that in my own case it was quite unnecessary, and that I could do all that the mesmerized could without being thrown into the somnambulic state. I commenced from that time to practise mesmerism myself. I entered upon a course of experiments which carried me much further than the masters I was acquainted with. I found, that while no machinery for magnetizing was absolutely indispensable, yet passes with the hand were serviceable, and that the tub and rod of Mesmer, which had been discarded, were of great assistance. Metallic balls, properly prepared, and magnetized, and placed in the hand of the person to be affected, as practised by the electro-biologists, very much facilitated the process. I was thus brought back to Mesmer, and induced to reject the doctrine of the ultra-spiritualists, who would have it that the effects are produced by the simple will acting on the will of the person to be mesmerized. There was certainly a fluid in the case, whether electric, magnetic, or as the Baron Reichenbach would say, *odic*, and whether it is to be regarded as efficient cause or only as an instrument, as maintained by a recent French author, who seems to have studied the whole subject with rare patience, and yet rarer good sense.

CHAPTER VI.—TABLE-TURNING.

The point to which I at first directed my attention was to ascertain the power, which, by means of mesmerism, I might acquire over the elemental forces of nature. I found that with or without actual contact I could at will paralyze the whole body of another, subject it in great measure to my own will, and force it to obey my bidding. I could render it preternaturally weak and preternaturally strong. I found also that I could produce all these effects at a distance, by means of magnetized inanimate objects. For instance, I would magnetize a bunch of flowers, and a person knowing nothing of what I had done, who should take them up and smell of them, would exhibit all the usual phenomena of the mesmerized. Here it was evident that the mesmeric power, whatever it might be, could act directly on matter, and lodge itself in a material object. It was clear then that the mesmeric phenomena had a real objective cause, and therefore

could not be the effects either of imagination or hallucination. Here was a most striking and important fact, and one which entirely refuted the ultra spiritualism of the majority of mesmerizers.

My experiments in clairvoyance and second sight were equally surprising in their results. The theory of those who conceded the facts was, that in some inexplicable way, the somnambulist uses the brain of him with whom he or she is *en rapport*, and therefore is restricted in the clairvoyant power to the images already in that brain. I mesmerize, say a young woman. In her mesmeric state she becomes clairvoyant. She can see with my organs of vision whatever I myself can see, or have seen, but nothing else. She can tell my most secret thoughts and intentions, or those of any one with whom she is *en rapport*, but nothing more. She can answer correctly any question the answer to which is known to the interrogator, but not questions the answer to which is unknown to him. But repeated and well-attested experiments prove to the contrary. Nothing is more common than for her to answer correctly questions equally unknown to herself and to those with whom she is placed in communication, and in cases where it is certain the answer could not be known by any human means to either. The magnetic power was, then, clearly a medium of knowledge distinct from the brain or mind of the magnetizer, or individual with whom the magnetized is *en rapport*.

What tends to confirm this is the surprising fact that persons mesmerized by a mesmerized glass of water, or bunch of flowers, manifest equally a superhuman knowledge. I passed one day by a boarding-school, and threw over the wall, unseen myself, a bunch of flowers which I had mesmerized. One of the young ladies saw it, picked it up, smelled it, and placed it in her bosom. Almost instantly she became strangely affected, seemed bewitched, acted as one possessed. But what it is important to note is, that she saw and described, as was clearly proved, things with perfect accuracy, which none of the inmates of the school, and neither she nor I, had any human means of knowing. She had learned no language but English, and yet could understand and answer readily in any language in which she was questioned, could and did foretell events, with all the particulars of time and place when they would happen. Moreover, the poor girl herself complained of feeling herself under a foreign power, and one which made her say and do things to which she felt, even at the moment,

the greatest repugnance. It was clear, then, that the mesmeric power was not a mere blind force, but acted from intelligence and will, and an intelligence and will foreign to mine, for how could I lodge my intelligence and will in a bunch of flowers, and render them there more powerful than in myself? Clearly the force was not exclusively material, unless matter can be endowed with intelligence and will.

I was somewhat puzzled, it is true, but I was resolved to continue my experiments, and wrest from nature, if possible her last secret. I soon found that it was not necessary to operate with others; that I had the clairvoyant power myself. With a slight effort I could throw myself into the mesmeric state. As soon as I found myself in this state I seemed no longer master of myself. I suffered in entering into it, and on coming out of it, convulsions more or less violent. While in it, I felt oppressed at the pit of my stomach, and my organs of speech seemed to be used by another. When I spoke, it was clear to me that I heard a voice at the pit of my stomach, speaking the words, and I was perfectly conscious of struggling not to say things which, nevertheless, were uttered by my organs. If in this state I sat down to write, my arm and pen seemed seized upon by a foreign power, and moved and guided without any agency of mine. What I wrote I knew not, and had never had in my mind till it came off the end of my pen, and I read it as written down. Evidently the power was distinct from me, and operated by a will not my own.

But I was not at all pleased to find myself subject even momentarily to a foreign power. I did not choose to let another use my organs, and to suffer my own will to lie in abeyance. The question arose, whether the same power could not be made to operate without using my organs. If I could mesmerize a material object, and by that mesmerize persons, why might I not mesmerize by it other material objects, and make them serve as organs to this power? I tried the experiment. I mesmerized a bunch of flowers and laid them on a table in my room, with the will that they should communicate to the table their mesmeric virtue. Immediately the table began to move, and to dance around the room, to raise itself from the floor, to balance itself on two legs, then on one leg, to come to me or remove from me as I willed. I was delighted. I found the force could be communicated to the table. I wished to ascertain whether this power was intelligent or not. I required the table, if it

could understand me, to give two raps with one of its feet. Immediately it did so. Then I required it, by the same sign, to tell me, whether it understood me by virtue of the mesmeric force. It gave the sign. Then I requested it to tell me, in the same way, whether this mesmeric force is one of the forces of nature, like electricity or magnetism, or whether it is a spirit. There was no answer. Is it, I asked, a spirit? No answer. If not a spirit, let the table, I said, strike with one foot. No movement. I went to the table, and found it, as it were, nailed to the floor. I could not move it. I am a strong man, of far more than ordinary physical strength, and was then in its full possession. The table was a light card-table, but with all my strength, repeatedly put forth, I could not so much as raise one end of it. This was extraordinary. I sat down on the sofa at a little distance. Immediately I began to hear slight raps, apparently under the table. Very soon they became louder, and seemed to be sometimes on the table, and sometimes under it; sometimes they seemed to come from a corner of the room, and sometimes from under the floor. I knew not what to make of them, but I felt no alarm, and remained calm and undisturbed, in the full possession of all my faculties. In some six or eight minutes they ceased, and then I saw the bunch of flowers which still lay on the table, taken up without visible agency, and carried and placed in a porcelain vase on the mantle-shelf. I was sure I was surrounded by invisible and mysterious agencies, but I began to apprehend that I was in the condition of the magician's apprentice, sung by Goethe, who had overheard the word by which the master evoked the spirits, but had forgotten or had not learned that by which he dismissed them. I however retained my equanimity, and felt that I had gained at least something.

The next day I tried my experiments anew. This time I merely mesmerized the table. It soon began to move, raising itself about six inches from the floor, and whirling round like a dancing dervish. It seemed animated by a capricious or rather a mocking spirit, and it was some time before I could make it behave with a little sobriety. But I had spent the greater part of the night in consulting an old work on magic, which some years before I picked up on one of the quais of Paris. It was written chiefly in characters and hieroglyphics, which at first I could not decipher; but at length I stumbled upon what I found to be

a key to their meaning, and which was scarcely any meaning at all. However, I obtained one or two significant hints, and I went armed with a new power. I held a long dialogue with the table, which, however, I shall not record. I ascertained the origin of the raps, how to produce them, and how to read them. But this was but a trifle. I would have the power visible to my eyes, submissive to my orders, and speak to me in plain and intelligible language, properly so called. I obtained a promise that this should come in due time, but that for the present I must suffer the force to remain invisible, and be content with a language of mere arbitrary signs.

I was informed that I was on the eve of gratifying my most secret and ardent wish, and that I should have, in full measure, the knowledge and power I craved. But I was not yet prepared, inasmuch as I craved them for an irreligious end. I was moved by no noble motive. I was moved by curiosity, and the love of power, for my own sake, not from love and sympathy with mankind. I was not in harmony with the great principles of nature, and did not seek the real end of the universe. I needed purification, a sublimation of my affections, and an elevation of my aims. I had devoted myself to the physical sciences, which was all very well, but I had neglected moral science, which was not well. I had only partially imbibed the spirit of the age, and took no part in the great movements of the day; felt no interest in the great questions of social amelioration and progress. I had no sympathy with the poorest and most numerous class, and made no efforts to emancipate the slave, or to elevate woman to her proper sphere in social and political life. I did not properly love my race, and had no due appreciation of humanity. I had great talents, great abilities, and might, if I would, make myself the Messiah of the nineteenth century.

But what had I done? What good cause could boast of having had me for its friend and advocate? Had I aided the Moral-Reform Association? Had I raised my voice in behalf of the Abolitionists? Had Owen or Fourier found me a coadjutor in time of need? Had I risked my popularity in defending new and unpopular sects, those prophets of the future? Or had I given my sympathy to those noble spirits everywhere moving society, and risking their lives to overthrow the tyranny of church and state, to conquer liberty, and to raise up the down-trodden millions of

mankind? No, no; I had done nothing of all this. I might have been kind or useful to this and that individual, and sympathized with suffering when immediately under my eyes, and removable or mitigable by my individual effort; but I had not sympathized with humanity, and labored to relieve the poor and destitute, to enlighten the ignorant and superstitious of remote and neglected regions. The age is philanthropic, and love is the great miracle-worker of our times. In love you place yourself in harmony with the source of all things, make yourself one with God, and possessor of his omnipotence. Learn to love, associate yourself heart and soul with the movement party of the times, and you will soon render yourself capable of receiving an answer to your questions and your wishes.

It must not be supposed that all this was told me at once, or in plain, direct terms. It was told me only a little at a time, and in a very indirect and cumbersome mode of communication. It required several weeks daily communing with my mesmerized table, and in spelling out the raps with which I was favored. But though it reproved me, I was still delighted. The power was good, and this accorded with my previous conviction. I regarded the power which, by mesmerism, was brought into play, as one of the primordial laws or elemental forces of nature, and as nature was good, as it worked always to a good end, of course I could hope to avail myself of it only in proportion as I myself became good and devoted to the end to which nature herself works. God will work with and for us, only as we work with and for him; that is, for the end for which he himself works. As to the intelligence apparently possessed by this force, that was in harmony with what of philosophy I had. Is not God infinite, universal intelligence? and is he not the original and similitude of the universe? What, then, is the universe itself but an emanation of infinite and universal intelligence. All creatures participate their creator, for they are nothing without him, and therefore all that exists must participate intelligence, or be a participated intelligence, and, of course, the higher the order of existence, the greater and more comprehensive its intelligence. All nature bears evidence that its laws are the laws of reason, and that its primitive forces are intelligent forces. How, then, should this force not be intelligent, and if intelligent, far more intelligent than I?

I resolved to prepare for placing myself in immediate re-

lation with infinite power and intelligence. I thought I caught a glimpse of a deeper significance in the words, "ye shall be as gods," than had been generally suspected, and I began to think in real earnest that my sweet lady-friend in Philadelphia, who had so eloquently and lovingly defended Eve in eating the forbidden fruit, was quite right, and that her disobedience was really a brave and heroic act. Man could really become as a god, but the priests had invented the prohibition to prevent him. The god of the priests, then, could not be the true God, and Satan, instead of being regarded as the enemy, should be, as the author of *Festus* seems to teach, loved and honored as the friend of man. A new light seemed to break in at once upon my mind. The world had hitherto worshipped a false god; it had called evil good, and good evil; it had enshrined in its temples the enemy of man, and chained to the Caucasian rock that god Prometheus, who was the true and noble friend and benefactor of the race.

CHAPTER VII.—A LESSON IN PHILANTHROPY.

FULL of my new resolution, I immediately set myself at work to carry it into effect. The safest and most expeditious way of doing it, I thought, would be to place myself at once in communication with some prominent and well-instructed philanthropist. Accordingly, I started forthwith for Philadelphia, to consult the beautiful and fascinating young lady, who, in my previous visit, had so warmly and energetically defended the eating of the forbidden fruit at the suggestion of that first of philanthropists, as a brave, heroic, and disinterested act. She, of all my acquaintances and friends, was unquestionably the one best fitted to complete my initiation into the mysteries of philanthropy, and to inspire and direct me in my efforts at world-reform.

This lady, whom, out of respect to the great Montanus, who claimed to be the Paraclete or Comforter, and professed to have the power of working miracles very much of the character of those wrought by our modern mesmerizers and spiritualists, I must be permitted to call Priscilla, had some years before touched my fancy, and if the truth must be confessed, had made more than an ordinary impression on my heart. She had often visited me in my waking dreams, as a lovely, though flitting vision. She was at my last visit at least twenty-five years old, but as fresh and as blooming

as at seventeen, when first I had the pleasure of meeting her. She was a sweet lady, with a lovely and graceful figure, exquisitely moulded, regular and expressive features, and as learned, as brilliant, as fascinating, and as enthusiastic as the celebrated Hypatia of Alexandria, who stirred up the zeal of the good monks of Nitria, gave so much trouble to Saint Cyril, and spread such a halo around expiring paganism. She had been sent by the Abolition Society as a delegate to the great Anti-Slavery World's Convention at London, and being denied a seat in that illustrious body, because a woman, she had turned her attention to the question of woman's rights, and, after travelling a few months on the continent, had returned home well instructed in Godwin's *Political Justice*, and a devout believer in Mary Wolstonecroft. She was liberal in her views, and very far from being a "one-idea" woman. Her mind was large and comprehensive, and her heart was capacious and loving enough to embrace and warm all classes of reformers, white, red, black, religious, moral, political, social, and domestic.

The morning after my arrival in the City of Brotherly Love, I called on Priscilla at her residence in Arch Street, as I supposed with her mother. I found her surrounded by some ten or a dozen reformers, variously dressed; some in petticoats, some in trousers; some with and some without beards; the majority appearing to be of what grammarians call the epicene gender. She greeted me kindly, and requested me to be seated; she would be disengaged in a few moments. I took a seat, and amused myself as well as I could in studying the interesting group before me, and considering the sort of materials that go to the making up of a world-reformer, and the charming associates I was likely to have in my new career. Having listened to their several reports, heard their suggestions, and given them her directions, Priscilla soon dismissed them with a sweet smile, and a graceful salute with her hand, that would have done credit to the grace and dignity of an empress. She then seated herself near me, and welcomed me most cordially and affectionately to Philadelphia. My visit was an unexpected pleasure, but all the more welcome. "But," she exclaimed, looking me more closely in the face, and struck with my changed and careworn expression, "what in the world, my friend, has happened to you?"

I was about to reply, when I observed that we were not alone. An exceedingly meek and submissive-looking man, if

man he could be called, had just entered the room, and seemed to be hesitating whether to advance or retreat. I looked inquiringly at Priscilla.

"O, it is only my husband," she replied. Then turning, with her sweet face to him, with an indefinable charm in her soft musical tones, said, "You may leave us, dear James. This gentleman and I would be alone."

He quietly retreated through the door he had entered, gently closed it, and went away without speaking a word, or betraying the least sign of discontent.

"But, my dear madam," said I, "this takes me by surprise. I was not aware that you had a husband."

"Possibly not; yet I have been married these five years."

"What! you were married when I was in the city last year and had the pleasure of meeting you, and having that most pleasant and instructive conversation with you?"

"Most assuredly."

"This alters my plan. I had made up my mind,—"

"Not to marry me yourself?"

"Pardon me, my dear madam, but I own that I had dreamed of something of the sort."

"You might have done worse. I could have made you a good wife, but you would never have made me a good husband."

"Why not? I am not precisely a man to be slightly rejected."

"That may be; and had you proposed in season, I might not have rejected you. I am glad, however, that you did not, for I might have loved you, and you alone, and then I should never have become a philanthropist, and devoted all my sympathies and energies to the emancipation of my sex, and to the development and progress of my race. You would have engrossed all my thoughts and affections, and have been my tyrant."

"But if I had loved you in return, and laid my own heart at your feet?"

"That would have made the matter worse. In loving me you would only have loved yourself, and sought only your own pleasure. Men usually love only to sacrifice her they love to themselves; while woman, when she loves, is ready to sacrifice herself to her beloved. Man's love is selfish; woman's is disinterested."

"Women are disinterested creatures, and never exact any return for their love!"

"They are more disinterested than you believe. There is nothing that a true woman will not do for him she loves. She will abandon herself without reserve to his wishes, go through fire and water, nay, hell itself, for him, and take delight in damning her own soul, to please him."

"That is because her love is an instinct, a blind passion, a sort of madness or frenzy, not a sober, rational affection."

"Perhaps so; but it is rather because her love is love. Unhappily, woman feels, she does not reason, or if she reasons, it is only in the interest of her feeling. Reason is cold, calculating; love is warm and self-sacrificing. It is heedless of consequences."

"And therefore is the better for having reason or prudence for a companion."

"It is clear that you have never loved."

"Perhaps not; but at any rate I think I could have loved you very much in your own fashion."

"That is not improbable, at least, as far as it is in your calculating nature; for I have been thought to have my attractions, and it would not be difficult to make any man my slave—unless I loved him. Yet you would always have loved me as a master, and have always held me in subjection. There are natures born to command. You would never have loved me as my dear James loves me, and never have been the meek, submissive, quiet, dear good man that he is. His love is not tyrannical, and it imposes no burden on me. He interferes with none of my plans, restrains none of my movements, and is satisfied with feeling that he is my husband and belongs to me, without once presuming to think of me as his wife and as belonging to him."

"That is charming, and must, no doubt, entirely satisfy your heart."

"That is my own affair. But I will tell you that it does not, and that it does."

"But that is a riddle; pray rede it."

"It does not satisfy the deep want of the heart to love, for no woman can love, with all her heart, a man she can make her slave, or who does not maintain himself as her master. But as I would not become any one's slave, as I would not that any man should engross all my affections, and compel me to live all my life in love's delirium, it satisfies, and more than satisfies me. It leaves me free to be a philanthropist, and does not compel me to give up to one what was meant for mankind. If my husband engrossed

all my affections I should be happy and contented at home, and should never seek relief in going abroad."

"And should it not be so?"

"Consult the parsons and old-fashioned moralists, and they will tell you that it should. But I am a philanthropist. My James loves me sincerely, warmly, disinterestedly, consults my wishes, does whatever I require of him, has full confidence in me, is proud of me, and never doubts that whatever I do is perfect. That is enough."

"But do you return his love with a disinterestedness and generosity equal to his own?"

"Why should I? It is enough for him that I permit him to love me, and to call himself my husband. For myself, I remain free to be a philanthropist. I cannot give my heart to any individual. I reserve its deepest and holiest affections for mankind."

"But mankind, without individuals, is an abstraction, a nullity; and to love the race, without loving individuals, is worse than loving a statue or a shadow."

"Ah! my dear friend, I see that you have not studied the profound philosophy of Plato, and are still a nominalist, and therefore an egoist. You are still a psychologist, stuck fast in the slough of individualism."

"It may be so, my dear Priscilla, but I am willing and even anxious to be liberated and set right. I have resolved, let come what will, to be a philanthropist, and to become a word-reformer; and it is to solicit your instructions and assistance to this end that I have visited your city, and sought my interview with you this morning."

She shook her head and looked doubtingly.

"Do not doubt it," I said, "I am serious, never more serious in my life. I am on the verge of important discoveries, and perhaps well-nigh within reach of a more than human power. But it is necessary that I at first become a philanthropist, unite myself with the movement party of the age, and take a decided and an active part in the great philanthropic reforms now so widely agitated, and live henceforth for mankind, and not for myself alone."

"Is this true?"

"Most assuredly; as true as that I am here present."

Slowly conviction seemed to fasten on her mind as she saw my serious and earnest manner, and indeed my agitation, as I rose from my chair and stood before her. A brilliant joy suddenly sparkled from her large, liquid, deep blue eye,

and radiated over her whole face. Springing from her seat, and seizing me by both my hands, "This is too much," she exclaimed. "This I had wished, had prayed for, but had not dared hope." Her eyes filled with sweet tears, and, as if overcome with her emotions, she sunk into my arms, and rested her head upon my shoulder. I pressed her to my breast. But she instantly recovered herself, and we both resumed our seats. After a few moments' silence, Priscilla, with an animated and contented look, exclaimed:—

"Now, my dear, dearest friend, I have hope. The good work will now go bravely on. Pure, noble, and strong-minded women to co-operate with me, I have found, but a man, a full-grown man, with a clear head, and a well-balanced mind, heretofore found I not. The men who have been ready to embark with me, are dwarfs, pigmies, simpletons, needy adventurers, cheats, knaves, or crack-brained enthusiasts, with but one idea in their heads, and that only half an idea. Drill them as I may, I can make nothing of them."

"But," said I, maliciously, "is not your dear James a philanthropist and reformer?"

"My dear James is my husband," she said, with dignity and spirit. "But you are slow to comprehend these things. The great and glorious work of regenerating man and society, cannot be carried on either by man alone or by woman alone. The two must be united and co-operate, or there can be no spiritual, as there can be no natural, offspring. But in regeneration, in the palingenesia, it is not at all necessary that they be husband and wife after the flesh. Married and made one in spirit they must be, but not married and made one flesh. Man and woman are each other's half, and they must be brought together to make a complete, active, and productive whole. But the relation of husband and wife is a purely domestic relation, and looks solely to a domestic end. If each finds the complementary half in the other, both are satisfied, contented, and neither has any wish or motive to look beyond the circle of the purely domestic affections."

"That is, they who find their bliss at home have no need and no temptation to go a-roaming."

"Precisely."

"Then it is unhappiness, discontent, uneasiness, want, at home, that makes men and women turn philanthropists, and take to world-reform?"

"Yes; and herein you learn the deep philosophy of life, and the significance of that religion of sorrow, of which Carlyle speaks so touchingly, and which the world has professed for two thousand years, but which it has never understood. Hear my favorite poet:—

'The Fiend that man harries is love of the Best;
Yawns the pit of the Dragon lit by rays from the Blest;
The Lethe of nature can't trance him again,
Whose soul sees the Perfect, which his eyes seek in vain.

'Profounder, profounder man's spirit must dive;
To his aye-rolling orbit no goal will arrive;
The heavens that now draw him, with sweetness untold,
Once found,—for new heavens he spurneth the old.

'Pride ruined the angels, their shame them restores;
And the joy that is sweetest lurks in stings of remorse.
Have I a lover who is noble and free?—
I would he were nobler than to love me.

'Eterne alternation, now follows, now flies,
And under pain, pleasure, under pleasure, pain lies.
Love works at the centre, heart-heaving alway,
Forth speed the strong pulses to the borders of day.'

"The 'love of the Best' is our innate and deathless desire of happiness, our being's end and aim. Happiness is ever the coy maiden, that still woos us onward, and flies ever as pursued,

'Man never is, but always to be blest.

In this deep ever-recurring want of the soul for happiness, the source of all our pain and sorrow, is the spring and motive of all our activity, and in activity is all our life and joy. Hence, 'under pain pleasure, under pleasure pain lies.' All our life and joy have their root in pain and sorrow, in this eternal craving of the soul to be what we are not, and to have what we have not. The pain and sorrow spur us on, and lead us to acquire and possess. But no possession satisfies us. The most coveted is no sooner obtained than it is loathed and cast away.

The heavens that now draw him, with sweetness untold,
Once found,—for new heavens he spurneth the old.'

"Love dies in the wooing. The acquiring is more than the possessing. All possessing leaves the heart empty,—an

aching void within, which nothing fills or can fill. This aching void will not let us rest, will not leave us in repose, which is only another name for inaction, death, but compels us to exert ourselves, to struggle with all our strength and energy to make new acquisitions. In this struggle, in these efforts, humanity is developed, and the progress of the race carried on."

"Carried on, my dear Priscilla, towards what? Sings not your poet,

> 'Profounder, profounder man's spirit must dive,
> To his aye-rolling orbit no goal will arrive?'"

"That is the glorious secret, my dear friend. The end of man is not the possession, but the pursuit, of happiness, or rather eternal progress and growth. By the fact that the pain, the want, the aching void, remains eternally, there is and must be eternal activity, therefore eternal development and progress of humanity."

"But as that development and progress leave us as far as ever from happiness, or fixed and durable good, I see not in what consists their value."

"Their value is obvious. Good is relative to the end of a being, and consists in going to the end for which it exists. Progress being our end, of course our good must consist in making progress. This progress is the progress of the race, and is effected by the activity of individuals, and to it all the activity of individuals, whether what is called vicious or virtuous, alike contributes."

"If all our activity, our vices, and crimes, as well as our virtues, contribute to this progress, or to the realization of our destiny, I do not see any great call for us to be world-reformers. Moreover, our destiny seems to be any thing but a cheering one. Your poet-philosophy is apparently very sad. If we are destined to chase forever a happiness that flies us, a good that recedes as we advance, all exertion seems to me as idle, as useless as that of the child striving to grasp the rainbow."

"So it may seem to you, for you are, as yet, not a philanthropist. You are still affected by your egoism, and unable to appreciate any activity that does not bring something solid and durable to the individual. Here is the rock on which all old-fashioned morality splits. Individuals are nothing in themselves; they are real, substantial, only in humanity. The race is every thing. Individuals die, the

race survives. Men and women have no substantiality of their own. They are merely the bubbles that rise on the surface of the broad ocean of humanity, burst, disappear, and become as if they had not been. Foolish bubbles, ye forget your own nothingness, and would arrogate to yourselves all the rights and prerogatives, glory and happiness of humanity. The race is not for individuals; individuals are for the race. They are simply the sensations, sentiments, and cognitions of the race, in which it manifests its own inherent virtuality, and through which it is developed and carried forward in its endless career through the ages,—through which it grows and realizes its own eternal and glorious destiny. The progress you are to seek is not the progress of individuals, for individuals have, properly speaking, no progress; but the progress of the race, which is and can be effected only by the activity of individual men and women."

"Still, I do not comprehend the work there is for world-reformers."

"Why, you are stupid, Doctor. All activity, whether called vicious or criminal, is good, for it aids progress. But nothing is vicious, criminal, or sinful, except that which represses the free activity of individuals, and thus hinders the development and growth of the race. It was, therefore, not a friend, but an enemy, that imposed upon our first parents the prohibition to eat the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. It was a friend, not an enemy, that inspired Eve with the thought and the courage to disregard that prohibition, to reach forth her hand and pluck the fruit, and having eaten thereof, to give it also unto her husband. The fable was invented by priests and governors as a means of imposing their system of restraints, of establishing their restrictive policy, to which they have adhered, as old-fogie politicians adhere to protection. They have always had a horror of free trade, as incompatible with their monopoly, and have made it their study to repress our native activity, to keep us cabined, cribbed, and confined, within the narrow enclosure of their hidebound systems, of their immoral, contracted, galling, and senseless conventionalism. They will not allow nature, humanity, fair play. They brand, as from the enemy of souls, all free activity. The heart must move according to their rules, and love or hate as they bid; the mind must run only in the grooves which they have hollowed out, and never dare search beneath their solemn

shams, or send sharp and piercing glances into the artificial world they have built up around us. We must repress our purest and noblest instincts, and crucify our sweetest and holiest affections. Everywhere restraint, repression, tyranny. The church tyrannizes over the state; the state tyrannizes over man and society; man and society tyrannize over woman, making her a puppet, a toy, or a drudge. Here, my dear, dear friend, behold your work, and that of your fellow-reformers. Go forth and break down this vast system of tyranny. Emancipate the state from the church, man and society from the state, and woman from man and society."

"But some government, some restraint is necessary to keep our appetites, passions, and lusts within bounds, and to maintain peace and order in the community."

"Alas! my friend, how hard it is for you to cease to be an egoist, and to learn to be a philanthropist. Know, that philanthropy seeks no individual, no exclusive good, and does not consist in loving and seeking the welfare of our fellow men and women. It is the love of man, not men, and seeks the welfare of the race, not of individuals. The welfare of the race consists in progress, which is effected only by free activity. All free activity is good, virtuous, right. Virtue is in action, not in non-action, which is death, the wages of sin. The only good is free activity, and every conceivable good is included in that one word, LIBERTY."

"But liberty, if not sustained and regulated by authority, may degenerate into license."

"Still, *mon pauvre ami*, in bondage to the law, and ignorant of the glorious liberty of the children of God. Away with your legal cant! By the deeds of the law no flesh ever was or ever will be justified. Long had the world groaned in this ignoble bondage, but know you not that it was to set them free that the Liberator came? O, liberty! sweet, sacred liberty! how I love thee! My heart and soul pant for thee as the thirsty hind pants for brooks of water. My flesh cries out for thee. Thou art my God, and to thee I consecrate my life, my love, and on thy altar I offer myself a living holocaust."

"Is there really no difference between liberty and license?"

"Be not the dupe of words. You seek to be a philanthropist. Philanthropy, I tell you again and again, is the love of man, mankind, humanity. Who that loves human-

ity would repress any thing human? If man is the supreme object of your love, how can you distrust any human tendency, or fear any human activity?"

"Suppose, my dear Priscilla, who speak to me as one inspired, I should forget myself so far as not to remember James, and proceed to make love to his wife?"

"She would say you have a very short memory, and no very great sagacity. She would most likely know how to oppose her activity to yours."

"And thus surrender her doctrine; for in such case her activity would overcome mine, or mine would overcome and restrain hers."

"Not necessarily. There would be a struggle of opposing forces, a free activity on both sides, and whatever the result, a development and progress of humanity. But all this is folly. There can be no love passages between us. We understand each other on such matters. United, married, if you will, in spirit, we are, or if not, must be, but we have no leisure or inclination for dalliance, which would be foreign to our mission. Our thoughts, I trust, yours at well as mine, rise higher, and move in a serener atmosphere. But be not disheartened. Our relation is, and must be, purely spiritual."

"I did but ask the question, my dear Priscilla, in order to see if you were prepared to carry out your doctrine to its legitimate conclusion."

"That was foolish. No true woman ever stops half way in her principles, or shrinks from carrying them out, by a cold and cowardly calculation of consequences. She leaves that to masculine virtue. When once women adopt a principle, they are prepared to follow it to its last results, without counting the sacrifice. You men cannot do this. You are always hesitating, deliberating, craving the end, but afraid to grasp it, compromising with your reason and your conscience. Recollect Macbeth, and Lady Macbeth, as painted by Shakspeare, who knew man's heart and woman's too. Here is the reason why you always stop half way in your reforms, or never do more than patch a piece of new cloth on to an old garment, which only makes the rent worse. Hence your need of woman's straightforward logic, her disinterestedness, her singleness of heart, her constancy of purpose, and her invincible courage."

"But perhaps, my dear lady, women are not seldom rash, and what you commend in them is the effect of narrowness

of view, and not of that clear and enlarged comprehensiveness, that 'many-sidedness,' to use a Germanism, which is desirable in a true and trustworthy reformer. Perhaps she lacks prudence, and may not use sufficient caution in adopting her principles, and thus may adopt false principles, and find ruin where she imagines she is to find only safety."

"It is safer to trust her instincts than man's reason. Yet I deny not the danger to which you allude, and therefore it is that it is never safe to trust her to act alone. Hence the necessity, in all our movements for reform, of the strict union of man and woman. She needs him as a drag on her too great rapidity of motion, and to temper her zeal with his prudence, and he needs her to inspire him with courage, energy, and love. Either is only a half without the other, and both must be united, as I have already told you, to form a complete and productive whole."

"I think I now understand what is meant by philanthropy. I have the idea, but as a pure idea it amounts to nothing. We must realize it, or reduce it to practice. Our great work is to remodel the world according to this idea. But how is this to be done?"

"That is undoubtedly the most difficult question, although our difficulties will not end even there. When we have ascertained what we are to do, and how it is to be done, we have still the difficult task to do it. But courage, *mon ami*. Once started, reforms are carried forward by their own momentum, and, like popular rumor, grow as they go onward. For myself, I am not exclusive, and have no special plan of my own. I listen to all sorts of plans, and countenance all sorts of reforms. None of them commend themselves in all respects to my understanding any more than to my taste. But all seem to me to be inspired by the same spirit, and in different ways to work to one and the same end. There is a diversity of gifts. All see not truth under the same aspect; none, perhaps, see it under all aspects at once, and each sees it under some special aspect. We must tolerate them all; for to attempt to bring them all into order, and to compel them all to think alike, and to work after one and the same manner, or in one and the same method, is absurd, and if successful, would only establish in another, and perhaps in an aggravated form, the very system of tyranny and repression we are laboring to demolish. You know something already of our reformers, and the most prominent are now in the city, holding conventions. We have repre-

sentatives from all the Northern and Middle States, and several English and Continental philanthropists. Some of them, I cannot say how many, will meet at my house this evening, and you must meet with them. You will find their conversation interesting and instructive, and perhaps you will become acquainted with some who will give you valuable hints, although, to confess the truth, I have no very high opinion of any of them, taken individually. Be sure and not fail me; come early, at seven o'clock."

So saying, she rose, gave me her hand, *au revoir*, and I departed to my lodgings, charmed with the sweetness and fascinated by the manner of Priscilla, rather than enlightened by her philosophy or convinced by her reasons.

CHAPTER VIII.—A LESSON IN WORLD-REFORM.

When I returned in the evening, I found Priscilla in high spirits, more radiant and fascinating than ever. Her company were slowly assembling in her luxuriously, and even elegantly, furnished rooms. Among the earlier arrivals were my friend, Mr. Winslow, and strange enough, my Puritan acquaintance, Mr. Cotton, who had recently become a resident of Philadelphia, and pastor of a Presbyterian church in that city. Others were announced, some whom I knew, but more whom I knew not. The majority were from the middle and upper classes, although all classes of society had their male or female representatives. The principle on which they came together was universal philanthropy, and whoever was a philanthropist, and had an idea, or the smallest fraction of an idea, had the *entrée*, unless he had African blood in his veins. All were of course abolitionists, or friends of the blacks, and therefore excluded studiously the negroes from their social gatherings. Generally speaking, all professed universal democracy, and hence were very exclusive in their feelings, and aristocratic in their tone and bearing; that is, so far as aristocracy consists in a consciousness, not of one's own worth, but of the worthlessness of his brother. The company was too large to have only one centre, and gradually separated into groups according to their special tastes and tendencies. In the centre of each group was some male or female reformer, distinguished from the rest by superior knowledge, volubility, or impudence, and regarded as the oracle of his or her own set, for however loud people's profession of democratic equality, nature will show itself, and

every set of them will have its chief, honored as my Lord or my Lady.

Mr. Winslow had been dismissed from his parish, and having no other means of getting his living, he had followed the example of Mr. Sowerby, and devoted himself to lecturing and experimenting on mesmerism. He was urging upon Priscilla the importance of forming mesmeric circles in all the cities, towns, and villages, of the Union. The first thing to be done was to organize a philanthropic Ladies' Aid Society, for the purpose of supporting a mesmeric travelling agent or missionary, whose business should be to form these circles or associations, instruct some member of each in the art of mesmerizing, and serve as their common centre and bond of union. If no one more worthy were found he would himself consent to accept, for a moderate salary, such agency, or to be such missionary. These circles formed, and affiliated visibly and invisibly to each other, would become a powerful body, and exert a moral influence which both the church and the state, politicians and clergymen, would be obliged to respect. In this way he was sure all the elementary forces of nature herself could be brought to bear on the great and glorious work of world-reform.

Mr. Edgerton, a New England transcendentalist, a thin, spare man, with a large nose, and a cast of Yankee shrewdness in his not unhandsome face, was not favorable to this plan. "I dislike," he said, "associations. They absorb the individual, and establish social despotism. All set plans of world-reform are bad. Every one must have a theory, a plan, a Morrison's pill. No one trusts to nature. None are satisfied with wild flowers or native forests. All seek an artificial garden. They will not hear the robin sing unless it is shut up in a cage. The rich undress of nature is an offence, and she must be decked out in the latest fashion of Paris or London, and copy the grimaces of a French dancing-master, or lisp like an Andalusian beauty, before they will open their hearts to her magic power. Say to all this, Get behind me, Satan. Dare assert yourselves; plant yourselves on your imperishable instincts; sing your own song of joy, your own wail of grief; speak your own word; tell what your own soul seeth, and leave the effect to take care of itself. Eschew the crowd, eschew self-consciousness, form no plan, propose no end, seek no moral, but speak out from your own heart; build as builds the bee her cell, sing as sings the bird, the grasshopper, or the cricket."

"So," said Mr. Merton, a young man, with a fine classic head and face, who seemed to have been drawn hither by mere curiosity, "so you think the nearer men approach to birds and insects the better it will be for the world."

"I never dispute," replied Mr. Edgerton. "I utter the word given me to utter, and leave it as the ostrich leaveth her eggs. Men should be seers, not philosophers; prophets, not reasoners. I never offer proof of what I say. I could not prove it, if asked. If it is true, genuine, the fit word, opportunely spoken, it will prove itself. If it approves not itself to you, it is not for you. You are not prepared to receive it. It is not true for you. Be it so. It is true for me, and for those like me. Fash not yourself about it, but leave us to enjoy it in peace."

"But are we to understand," replied Mr. Merton, "that truth varies as vary individual minds?"

"Sir, you will excuse me. I am no logician, and eschew dialectics. Truth is one, it is the whole, the all, the universal being. It is a reality in, under, and over all, manifesting itself under an infinite variety of aspects. Every one beholds it under some one of its aspects, no one beholds it under all. Each mind in that it is real, is itself, is a manifestation of it, but no one is it in its integrity and universality, any more than the bubble on its surface is the whole ocean. Under each particular bubble lies, however, the whole ocean, and if it will speak not from its diversity, its bubbleosity, in which sense it is only an apparition, an appearance, a show, an unreality, but from what is real in it, from its real substantial self, it may truly call itself the whole ocean. So, under each individual mind lies all truth, all reality, all being; and hence, in so far as they are real, all minds are one and the same. Men are weak, are puny, differ from one another because they seek to live in their diversity, and to find their truth, their reality, in their individuality. Let them eschew their individuality, which is to their reality, their real self, only what the bubbleosity of the bubble is to the ocean, and fall back on their identity, on the universal truth which underlies them. If they will be men, real men, not make-believes, strong men, thinking men, let them be themselves, sink back into their underlying reality, on the one man, and suffer the universal over-soul to flow into them, and speak through them without let or impediment."

"We must," said another transcendentalist, sometimes called the American Orpheus, "return to the simplicity of

childhood. 'Except ye be converted and become as a little child, ye shall in no wise enter into the kingdom of heaven.' The man who thinks, Rousseau has well said, is already a depraved animal. All learning is a forgetting; science and wisdom are gathered from babes and sucklings. We are not prepared as yet to talk of world-reform. We must *be* before we can *do*; be men before we can do men's work. All *being* is in *doing*; rather all *doing* is in *being*. Ideas are the essences, the realities of things. Seek ideas. They will take to themselves hands, build them a temple, and instaurate their worship. Seek not ideas from books; they are lies. Seek them not of the learned and grey-haired; they have lost them. Be docile and childlike; seat yourself by the cradle, at the feet of awful childhood, and look into babies' eyes."

"What we want to cure the evils of society," broke in Mr. Kerrison,—a tinker, I believe,—a small man in a snuff-colored frock coat, with sharp grey eyes, lank cheeks, a short nose, a pointed chin, and squeaking voice, "is a Children's Protection Society; a society that shall protect children from the indelicacy, the cruelty, and inhumanity of their brutal parents. There is nothing more shocking to our finer sensibilities, or more outrageous to true philanthropy, than to see a full-grown woman, tall and stout, with a red face, fiery eyes, and a harsh voice,—or a full-grown man, yet taller and stouter, stern and awful in his look, terrible in his anger tones,—seize a poor helpless little boy or girl,—yes, or girl,—not more than three or four years old it may be, and taking him or her across the knee, strike on the very seat of her or him, blow after blow, till the poor little thing screams with pain and agony. It is indelicate, cruel, barbarous. How would the father or mother like to be treated in the same way? It blunts the delicate sensibility of the child, sours his temper, hardens his heart, develops and strengthens all his harsh and angry feelings, and prepares him to be, when he grows up, as bad as was his father or his mother."

"Our friend," added Mr. Silliman, an amiable young minister, a Unitarian, I believe, or, as he said, a preacher of the religion of humanity, "has, I think, gone to the root of the matter. The evils of individuals and of society have their origin in the harsh, cruel, unfeeling, and indelicate manner in which parents bring up their children. Children should never be restrained, should never be crossed; they should

always be caressed by the soft, delicate hand of love, be surrounded by sweet and smiling faces, by lovely and attractive images, live in communion with fresh and fragrant nature, and find life all one fairy day."

"Young America," interposed Mr. Merton, "will thank you both, I have no doubt. The abolition of corporal chastisement will meet the decided approval of our little folks, and perhaps of our patriots. It is questionable whether this flogging of children is not an infringement upon equal rights. I do not see what the father in my town, universal democrat as he was, had to reply to the question put to him the other day by Young America. A little rascal, some ten or twelve years old, had done some mischief, for which his father flogged him. Young America bore it with heroic fortitude, as if the honor of his country and of the race was at stake in his person, and when it was over, with the calm and dignified air of a man and a freeman, folded his arms across his breast, looked up to his father, and asked,—'Father, is not this a free country?' 'Yes.' 'By what right, then, do you flog me?'"

"Parents," said a cross-grained old maid, "are wholly incapable of bringing up their children. They have no judgment, no steadiness; at one moment whipping them without rhyme or reason, and the next soothing them with candy, and smothering them with caresses. They impart to them their own tempers, passions, weaknesses, and prejudices. There should be established infant schools at the public expense, where all the children, as soon as twelve months old, should be placed, and brought up by proper persons trained and prepared in normal schools for that purpose."

"You will have to go farther back than that, my good woman," said Mr. Long, an English gentleman just arrived in the country and announced as the prophet of the newness. "Children are born with an inclination to evil, and are hardly born before they manifest vicious tempers and a fondness for doing precisely what they ought not to do. If suffered to have their own way, they would never live to grow up. They must, as they are now born, be restrained and even whipped, for their own good. Here the sins of the parents are visited upon the children. We must begin with the parents. We live in a depraved state, and children inherit vitiated moral and physical constitutions from their fathers and mothers. We must look to this fact, and sternly prohibit all persons of obviously vitiated moral or physical

constitutions from begetting or bearing children. After that we must turn our attention to improving the breed, as our English farmers have done in the case of their horses, oxen, cows, sheep, swine, dogs, and hens."

"That may be rather difficult to manage in a free country," said Dr. Muzzleton, a professor of surgery in a western medical college, "and can hardly be tried, except by the master with his negroes on our Southern plantations. The hopes of philanthropists must rest on something more practical, and less difficult to be accomplished. The philanthropist's dependence is on dietetic reform. The vitiated moral and physical constitution of parents which they impart to their children, comes unquestionably from the use of animal food. It is necessary, therefore, to abolish the use of animal food, and have people feed only on a vegetable diet. Nature shows this in the very construction of the human teeth, which are very different from those of the lion, the tiger, and other carnivorous animals. Carnivorous animals have no grinders, and their teeth are fitted only for tearing. Man has incisors and molars, which shows that he was intended to cut and grind his food."

"But which serve him very well, since he does not usually eat flesh raw, but cooks it," remarked Mr. Merton. "But the antediluvians eat no flesh. They lived on a vegetable diet, were vegetarians, and yet they became so corrupt that the Almighty sent a flood and destroyed them all, with the exception of eight persons."

"Where did you learn that?" asked Dr. Muzzleton.

"From the Bible and tradition," replied Mr. Merton.

All stared, and many broke out into a loud laugh at the joke of citing the Bible and tradition as authority in an assembly of philanthropists and reformers. Dr. Muzzleton looked round with great blandness, and said to Mr. Merton, "You see, my young friend, the majority is against you. I respect the Bible in matters pertaining to another world, but I am speaking now as a man of science, not as a theologian. I leave theology to the clergy," bowing on his right to Mr. Cotton, and on his left to Mr. Winslow.

"I respect the Bible in theology no more than I do in science," said Miss Rose Winter, a strong-minded woman, and a decided reformer, of Jewish descent. "The first thing for all reformers to do is to destroy the authority of the Bible, and emancipate the Christian world from its morality. It is the great supporter of all abuses, and it and the

church are almost our only obstacles to overcome. It sanctions the use of wine and animal food, slavery, and the restitution of the fugitive slave, war and capital punishment. It asserts the divine right of government, and forbids resistance to power. It is the fountain of superstition, and the grand bulwark of priestcraft. It calls woman the weaker vessel, forbids her to speak in meeting, and commands her to be in subjection to her husband. We are fools and madmen to talk of our reforms as long as we regard the Bible as any thing more than a last year's almanac."

"In that I think you are right, my dear lady," said Mr. Cotton, dryly.

"I esteem the Bible a good book," said Mr. Winslow. "It contains more genuine and sublime poetry than any other book I am acquainted with, not even excepting Homer. But I do not accept its plenary inspiration, and I feel bound to believe only the truths I find in it."

"And these," remarked Mr. Merton, "I suppose are only what happens to accord with your own opinions for the time being."

"The Bible," interposed Priscilla, "is a genuine book, and faithfully records the real experience of prophets and seers of old times, and is of no value to us save as interpreted by the facts of each one's own inner life. Much of it is local, temporary, colored by the nation and age that produced it, and is no longer of any significance for us; but what there is in it universal, that is the genuine utterance of universal nature, and true for all persons, times, and places, should be accepted, as we accept every genuine word, by whomsoever uttered."

Mr. Merton shrugged his shoulders and said nothing; Mr. Cotton looked black, was scandalized, and muttered, "Rank infidelity." "And what else," said a very gentlemanly young man, who had been talking nonsense for an hour to a bevy of young ladies in a corner of the room, and apparently indifferent to the great matters under discussion, "and what else did his reverence expect in a company of reformers? Yet we are not really infidels. We have only thrown off the mask, and ceased to be hypocrites. Whatever man's profession, ever since it was said, 'It is not good for man to be alone,' and Eve was brought blushing to his bower, woman has been the real shrine at which he has worshipped. This is our ancestral religion, and true to the religion of my fathers, I make woman my Divinity, and lay my offering at Leila's feet."

"Do not believe him," said a saucy young thing, with a sparkling eye and pouting lips. "He worships only himself. Here I have been this half hour trying to convince him that there is something mystic in woman, and that science and religion, as now organized, are false and mischievous, because they are the product of man's genius alone. I have said all the flattering things I could to make him take up the cause of woman's rights, and he has only laughed at me."

"You wrong me, fair and adorable Leila; woman reigns supreme now, and we are slaves; what more can she ask?"

"She should be elevated to be the equal of man," said Leila.

"Lowered, my Leila would say," replied the young gentleman.

"And placed in the possession of the same political franchises, have the right to vote at all elections, and be declared eligible to any and every office political, civil, or military," continued Leila, without heeding the interruption.

"But that," said Mr. Merton, "would be hardly fair to us men, and would moreover be dangerous to republican liberty. Mademoiselle Leila would of course be a candidate for the Assembly. All the young men would vote for her, because they would secure her good graces, and all the old men would do the same, in order to prove that they are not old, and have not yet lost their sensibility to female loveliness and worth; she would be elected unanimously. In the Assembly she would rise to propose some measure, throw aside her veil, beam forth upon us with all her charms, and for the same reasons all would support her. She would reign as a despot, which, as a republican, I must protest against."

"She might have rivals; all men do not see with the same eyes," sagely remarked a venerable spinster, with a dried and withered form and face, puckering up her mouth, and endeavoring to look killing.

"That is well thought of," said Mr. Merton.

"Besides," added Mr. Winslow, "the votes of the women would be as numerous as those of the men, and might be thrown for a candidate of the other sex."

"And you may trust to the women themselves to see that no one of their own sex has a monopoly of power," added, caustically, Mr. Cotton.

"You are hard upon us women," pleaded Priscilla. "Women have their weaknesses as well as men theirs, but they

can love and admire beauty in their own sex, as much as they do ugliness in men. I do not suppose that placing them on an equality in all respects with men will increase their power as women, but it will increase their power as reasonable human beings. I think woman would lose much of her peculiar power as woman over man, and this I should by no means regret. I would break down the tyranny of sex as I would that of caste or class. I would have men and women so trained, that they could meet, converse, or act together as simple human beings, without ever recurring, even in thought, to the difference of sex."

"That," said the young worshipper of woman, "would be cruel. It would be like spreading a pall over the sun, or extinguishing the lamp of life. Even the garden of Eden

——— was a wild,
And man the hermit sighed, till woman smil'd."

"As long as I remember my mother or my sister," said Mr. Merton, "I would never meet a woman, however high or however humble, without taking note of the fact that she is a woman."

"Things are best as God made them," added Mr. Cotton. "Men and women have each their peculiar character and sphere. Women would gain nothing by exchanging the petticoat for the breeches, or men by exchanging the breeches for the petticoat."

"But I wish," said Leila pontingly, "to be treated as a reasonable being, and that the young gentlemen who do me the honor to address me would treat me as if I had common sense. I do not want compliments paid to my hands and feet, my face, lips, nose, eyes, and eyebrows."

"And yet," said I, "my sweet Leila, they are well worth complimenting."

She smiled, and seemed not displeased.

"I suspect," remarked Mr. Cotton, with his Puritan slyness, "that the young lady finds the affluence of such compliments more endurable than she would their absence."

"I do not deal much in compliments," said Mr. Merton, "but I do not much fancy persons who are always wise, and never open their mouths without giving utterance to some grave maxim for the conduct of life. There is a time to be silly as well as a time to be wise. Life is made up of little things, and he is a sad moralist who has no leniency for trifles. I love myself to look upon a pretty face, and find no

great objection to those pleasant nothings which are the current coin of well-bred conversation between the sexes. Even a gallant speech, a happily-turned compliment, when it brings no blush to the cheek of modesty, is quite endurable."

"I thought you were a parson, Mr. Merton," said Priscilla, "and am surprised to find you so tolerant of what it is said your cloth generally condemns."

"The fair Priscilla may have mistaken my cloth. I am a man, and I hope a gentleman. I love society, and find an exquisite charm in the social intercourse of cultivated men and women. That charm would vanish were they to meet and converse, not as men and women, gentlemen and ladies, but as simple human beings. Could you carry out your doctrine, your sex would, I fear, be the first to suffer from it."

"Perhaps they would," said Priscilla; "but it is woman's lot to suffer, and she was born to redeem the race by her private sorrows. She will not shrink from the sacrifice. You need her at the polls, in the legislative halls, in the executive chair, on the judge's bench, as well as in the saloon, to give purity and elevation to your affections, disinterestedness and courage to your conduct."

"Rather let her be present to infuse noble qualities into our hearts in childhood, and to cherish and invigorate them in our manhood," added Mr. Merton. "Let her mission be by a sweet, quiet, and gentle influence to form us from our infancy for lofty and heroic deeds, and let it be ours to do them."

"I do not like this discussion at all," broke in Thomas Jefferson Andrew Jackson Hobbs, a thorough-going radical, with an unshaved and unwashen face, long, lank, uncombed hair, and a gray, patched, frock-coat, leather trousers, a red waistcoat, and a red bandanna handkerchief tied round his neck for a cravat. "The world can never be reformed by the instrumentality of government, whether in the hands of man or woman. The curse of the world is that it has been governed too much. That is the best government that governs least, and a better is that which governs none at all. We want no government, least of all a government made up of female politicians and intriguers. There never yet was a great crime or a great iniquity, but a woman had a hand in it. The devil, when he would ruin mankind, always begins by seducing woman, and making her his accomplice. We must get rid of all government, break down church and state, sweep away religion and politics, and ex-

terminate all priests and politicians, whether in trousers or petticoats, in broadcloth or homespun, and bring back that state of things which was in Judea, 'when there was no king in Israel, and every man did what was right in his own eyes.'"

"Boldly said," remarked Signor Giovanni Urbini, a leader of young Italy, "but it is hardly wise. The people are not yet, especially in my country, prepared for it. They have so long been the slaves of power, and the tools of superstition, that they would be shocked at its bare announcement. They must have their Madonnas, their San Carlos, their San Filippos, and their capucin frati. But a thorough-going democratic revolution is no doubt needed, and such a revolution will necessarily result in a no less thorough and radical revolution in religion; but this last we had better leave to come of itself. You cannot work with purely negative ideas. You must have something positive, and that must be the positive idea of the age. Kings, princes, nobles, priests, religions in our times are at a discount, and the secret, silent, but irresistible tendency is to bring up the people. Assert, then, boldly everywhere people-king, people-pontiff, people-god. Fling out to the breeze the virgin banner of the PEOPLE. Go forth to war in the name of the people, in the inspiration of the people, and always and everywhere shout THE PEOPLE, THE PEOPLE. Break the fetters which now bind the people, emancipate them from their present masters, assert their supremacy, and establish their power, which of course in the last analysis will be our power over them. They will then re-organize society, religion, and politics, and every thing else, after the best model, and in the way which will best meet our wishes."

"I am decidedly opposed to my friend Urbini's doctrine," frankly asserted M. Beaubien, from the sunny south of France, "I want no king-people, and if I must be tyrannized over, I prefer it should be by one man rather than the many-headed and capricious multitude. The evil under which society groans is individualism, which now exerts itself in universal competition, so highly prized by your foolish and stupid political economists. These evils can be removed by no political or religious revolution, neither by your Luthers nor your Robespierres. They can be removed only by the pacific organization of labor, and the arrangement of laborers in groups and series according to their special tastes and

capacities, on the newly-discovered principle that 'attractions are proportional to destiny.'"

"A better plan," suggested M. Icarie, also from *la belle France*, "is to abolish all private property, all private households, industry, and economy, and have the whole community supported, lodged, fed, clothed, feasted or nursed, and transported from place to place, from house to house, at the public expense."

"Admirable," interposed Mr. Cotton, "but who will support the public, and whence will the public draw its funds?"

"Singular questions," replied M. Icarie. "The public will support itself, and draw the necessary funds from the public treasury, as a matter of course."

"And where does the treasury get them?" asked, with a sneer, M. Le Prohne, a native of the ancient Dauphiny, who towered head and shoulders above all the rest. "All your schemes are idle and absurd; property is robbery; abolish it, and all distinction between *thine* and *mine*, and establish a grand people's bank, and give each one an equal credit on its books."

"And who," sarcastically remarked M. Icarie, "will take care of the bank, and be responsible for its managers, or see that the drafts of individuals are duly honored?"

"Why not," I asked in my enthusiasm, "make an equal division of property among all the members of the community?"

"That would do very well for a start," suggested Mr. Cotton, but he was "afraid that come Saturday night, a good many would demand, like the sailor, that the property be divided again, as they no longer retained their proportion."

This produced a smile, and as it was late, the company broke up and departed. Those who had had an opportunity of bringing forward their views were very much edified; others who had been obliged to listen, or to keep back their own projects, thought the party exceedingly dull, and could not help thinking that the evening had been spent very unprofitably.

There were, indeed, persons there with plans of reform as wise, as deep, and as practicable as those I have taken notice of, and I owe an apology to their authors for my omissions. These omissions are the result of no ill feeling, and of no intentional neglect; and I certainly would

repair them, but as I am pressed for time, and am not writing a history of reformers and projected reforms in a thousand volumes in-folio, the thing is absolutely out of the question. Let it suffice for me to say, that I have by me still some thousand and one of these projects, all of which their authors did me the honor to send me, with their respects, and all of which I examined with all the care and diligence they deserved.

I returned to my lodgings, not so much enlightened or edified by what I had heard as I might have desired, though not much disappointed or discouraged. No plan had been suggested that was not unsatisfactory, and, taken in itself alone, that was not obviously either mischievous or absurd. But under them all I saw one and the same spirit, the spirit of the age, and all were striking indications of a great and powerful movement in the direction of something different from what is now the established order. No one of them would be realized, but it was well to encourage this movement, to join with this free and powerful spirit. Something, as Mr. Micawber was wont to say, "might turn up," and out of the seeming darkness light might at length shine, and out of the apparent chaos order might finally spring forth. I would lend myself to the spirit working, and trust to future developments. With that I undressed, went to bed, and dreamed of Leila, no, Priscilla; no, yes, —it was Priscilla. I was the victorious champion of reform. She was binding my brow with the crown of laurel, when I awoke, and was sad that it was only a dream.

CHAPTER IX.—THE CONSPIRACY.

I SLEPT late the next morning, and it was the middle of the forenoon before I awoke. I arose, made my toilette, drank a cup of coffee, and went to arrange my future plans with Priscilla. I found her sad and apprehensive. She was a true woman, and had no misgivings as to the excellence of the cause she had espoused, but she feared that the conversations of the previous evening might have disheartened me, and made me change my resolution. I set her mind at rest on this point, and assured her that, though I might often change my methods of effecting a resolution once taken, yet nothing could prevent my persistence in it but an absolute conviction of its wickedness, or its utter impossibility. I had wedded myself to the spirit of the age for

better or for worse, and would, if need be, devote myself body and soul to the cause of world-reform.

On hearing me say this, her face brightened up, and shone with a radiance I had never seen it wear before. She seemed perfectly happy, and turned to me with a look of perfect satisfaction. I will not say that at that moment I had not forgotten the lady's husband, and I will not pretend to say what words of misplaced tenderness might have been uttered or responded to, if we had been left to ourselves. She was young, beautiful, fascinating, and I was a man in the prime of life. Happily, as the interview was becoming dangerous, Mr. Merton was announced. This young man, who seemed to have thought beyond his years, had deeply interested me the previous evening. I knew not who he was, whence he came, or why he associated with persons with whom he seemed to have very little sympathy. He was evidently a gentleman, and well educated. His dress was rich but plain, his manners were simple and unpretending. He was tall and well proportioned, with a classical head, a high, broad forehead, large, black eyes, and very thick, dark hair. His features were open and manly, and his voice low, rich, and musical. It was a pleasure to hear him speak. His name was English, but he seemed to be of foreign descent, although I afterwards learned that he was an American, and even a New Englander, but bred and educated abroad. He apologized for calling, but he could not refrain from paying his respects to his fair and amiable hostess of the evening. He hoped that she had enjoyed herself with her guests, and that she had suffered no inconvenience from the heat of the rooms occasioned by so great a crowd. He was most happy also to meet me. He had heard of me, knew and highly esteemed some of my friends, and regretted that he had not previously had the honor of making my acquaintance.

He was requested to be seated, and assured that his call was most agreeable, and that we both hoped to meet him often and cultivate a further acquaintance. The conversation ran on for some time in an easy natural way, on a variety of general topics, till Priscilla, whose soul was absorbed in her philanthropic projects, asked Mr. Merton how it happened that she had the pleasure of meeting him so often among reformers. "You evidently," said she, "are not of us. The quiet remarks, sometimes serious, sometimes sarcastic, which you every now-and-then make, prove that you have no sympathy with us."

"I am not surprised, my dear Madam, at your question," replied Mr. Merton, "yet I too am a reformer, in my way, perhaps not precisely in your way, nor on so large a scale as that on which you and your friends propose to carry on reform. I have not the talent, nor the disposition to engage in any thing so magnificent. I think reform, like charity, should begin at home."

"But not end there," said I.

"Certainly not," he replied; "certainly not with those who have leisure and means to carry it further. But I find that it is more than I can do, by my unassisted efforts, to reform myself, and if I can succeed in saving my own soul, I shall be quite contented. It is, I fear, more than I shall be able to do."

"I see, sir, you are no philanthropist," said Priscilla.

"Perhaps not, I am comparatively a young man, but am quite old-fashioned in many of my notions."

"One of those, I dare say, who have eyes only in the backside of their heads, and live only among tombs," said I, in a tone between jesting and earnest.

"I have not yet sufficiently mastered the wisdom of antiquity to be authorized to cry out against it," he replied. "I make no doubt, however, but you, dear lady, and you my learned friend, are quite competent to reject the old wisdom for the new."

"On the contrary, I am inclined to think that my present tendency is to reject the new for the old, the modern for the ancient. Or, rather, it seems to me that the progress of modern science is rapidly and surely leading us back to the ancient wisdom."

"There were in the old world, as there are in the modern, two wisdoms, the wisdom from above, and the wisdom from below. May I be permitted to ask to which of these you regard modern science as conducting?"

"There has been in regard to these ancient wisdoms," said Priscilla, "much misconception. The world in its nonage was imposed upon, and induced to call evil good and good evil. The wisdom I assume, and am laboring to diffuse, is that which the priests have branded as Satanic. Satan is my hero. He was a bold and daring rebel, and the first to set the example of resistance to despotism, and to assert unbounded freedom. For this all the priests, all rulers, despots, all who would hold their brethren in bondage, have cursed him. I take his part, and hope to live to

see his memory vindicated, and amends made for the wrong which has been done him."

"That is a candid avowal, my fair lady, and one which we seldom, especially among your sex, hear made. I suspect, that Madame Priscilla has listened or will listen to the modern spiritualism, which seems to me to be a revival of demonic worship. May I entreat you, dear lady, to pause and reconsider the conclusion to which you have come? The ancient gentiles deserted the true God, the Creator of heaven and earth, and all things visible and invisible, and followed strange gods, erected their temples and consecrated their altars to devils, to fallen spirits, and I need not tell you how their minds became darkened, and their hearts corrupted. Do not, I entreat you, seek to revive the gross, cruel, and obscene superstitions of the ancient gentiles, on which Christianity has made an unrelenting war from the first."

"I was sure, Mr. Merton, you were a parson. Will you deny it now?" said Priscilla.

"I am not aware that I have said any thing but what any honest Christian or fair-minded man, who really wishes well to his fellow beings, and who has read history, might not very well say. It is not necessary to be a parson, I should hope, in order to have good sense and good feeling."

"I do not see, Mr. Merton," said I, "any tendency to superstition in modern spiritualism. Superstition is in charging to supernatural intervention what is explicable on natural principles."

"That is one form of superstition," replied Mr. Merton, "but there is another, which consists in ascribing effects to inadequate causes, as where one augurs good luck from seeing the new moon over his right shoulder, or bad luck if on the day he sets out on his travels a red squirrel crosses his path. But I interrupt you."

"I believe the spirits which are evoked in our days are real, but that they are the primal forces of nature, and that it is on strictly natural principles that they are called to our aid," I resumed. "There is no superstition in this."

"It is not improbable that the ancient gentiles thought as much. I am by no means disposed to ascribe all the phenomena of mesmerism, table-turning, and spiritual rapping to superhuman or preternatural agency. Satan can affect us only through the natural, but through that he may carry us beyond or drag us below nature. I believe mesmerism,

strictly speaking, is natural, but I believe also that its practice is always dangerous, and that it throws its subjects under the power of Satan. In the so-called mesmeric phenomena there are those which are natural, and those which are Satanic, although in the present state of our science it may not be easy in all cases to distinguish between them."

Here the conversation, which was beginning to interest me, (for I had a lurking suspicion that Mr. Merton was right,) was interrupted by the entrance of Signor Urbini, who gave unequivocal signs that the presence of Mr. Merton was very disagreeable to him. Mr. Merton, probably not wishing to encounter young Italy, or to enter into a contest with him at that time, after a few commonplace remarks, took his leave. Young Italy was full of fire and enthusiasm, but at the same time, well informed, subtile, and clear-headed. He had been implicated in a conspiracy for overthrowing the Austrian government in Milan, and had escaped to England, where he had concerted with the friends of Italy a plan for revolutionizing the whole peninsula. He had come to the United States to enlist as large a portion of our own people as possible on his side, and to obtain pecuniary aid in carrying out his revolutionary projects. For himself he had no religion, and feared neither God nor the devil. At heart, as does every Italian liberal, he despised Protestantism, as a religion; but his chief reliance was on Protestant nations, and he made a skilful and adroit appeal to the Protestant hatred of Popery. Italy was the stronghold of Popery, and if Italy could be wrested from the pope, the whole fabric of superstition and priestcraft would fall to the ground. But this could not be done by any direct attacks on the national religion, or any direct advocacy of the doctrines of the reformation. Out of Italy the appeal might be made to the Protestant feeling, but in Italy, and by all the leaders of the Italian party it must be made solely to the national sentiment as against Austria, and to the love of liberty, the democratic sentiment, as against the pope and the native princes. War must be made on the pope indeed, but ostensibly on him only as temporal prince. Overthrown as temporal prince, and his states declared a republic, and maintained as such, the church, as the upholder of tyranny on the Continent, would be annihilated, and universal democracy, and a purely democratic religion could be established throughout the

world; and civilization, arrested by the Goths and Vandals, who overturned the old Roman Empire, might resume its triumphant march through the ages. Plans were forming to make the democratic revolution as nearly simultaneous as possible in France, Austria, Prussia, and Central Germany; at least to give these countries sufficient employment at home to render them unable to go to the assistance of the pope.

Subsidiary to his purpose, he proposed a grand world's convention, composed of delegates from the whole Protestant world, to be holden as soon as possible at London. It might be assembled ostensibly for the purpose of bringing about a better feeling and closer union of the various Protestant sects, and none but those who could be safely trusted should be initiated into its ulterior objects. Only the managers need know its real purpose, or *modus operandi.* It might form a Protestant alliance, and recommend the formation of Protestant associations in all Protestant states for the protection of the reformation against Popery, the conversion of the pope and his Italian subjects. These associations would have nothing to do but to raise funds, and meet once a year, hear reports, and listen to flaming speeches in praise of the Bible and religious liberty, and against the tyranny, idolatry, and superstition of Popery. Thus they would, without knowing it, prepare the way and furnish the means of driving the foreigner out of Italy, dethroning the pope, establishing the Roman Republic, and spreading liberty throughout the world, and in a way, too, not to alarm the religious sensibilities of the Italians, because those who showed themselves to Italians would have apparently no connection with the Protestant movement.*

The plan of Young Italy, communicated with further details, and which was substantially carried out from 1845 to 1849, when, contrary to all human foresight, Republican —not Imperial—France suppressed the Roman Republic, and restored the pope, struck Priscilla and myself as admirable, and we resolved to give it our hearty support. I hoped, by the new power I had discovered, or was on the point of discovering, to bring an unexpected force to its

*This is in the main historical, and was communicated to the writer through a mutual friend, by a delegate from Connecticut to the World's Convention, alluded to in the text.

aid. The Signore accepted our pledges, enrolled our names, administered to us the oath, and gave us the signs and passwords agreed upon by the government of Young Italy.

When Signor Urbini had taken his leave of us, we, that is, Priscilla and myself, came to a mutual understanding of the respective parts we were to perform. We agreed that it was useless for either to attempt any thing without the other. Our covenant was sealed. Poor Priscilla, little did she foresee what the future had in store for her! But let me not anticipate. We separated, and I returned to my lodgings, intending to leave the next day for my home in western New York. Hardly had I regained the hotel, when I was called upon by the stanch old puritan, Mr. Cotton. I have departed far enough from the stand-point of my puritan ancestors, and have few traces in my moral constitution of my puritan descent; but, I care not who knows it, I am proud of these stern old men, the Bradfords, the Brewsters, the Hookers, the Davenports, and the stout Miles Standish, who came forth into a new world to battle with the wilderness, the savage, and the devil. Stern they were, stout-hearted, and strong of arm, yet not without a touch of human feeling. They had their loves, their affections, and their soft moments, when Jonathan or Ezekiel wooed his Beulah or his Keziah, who blushingly responded to his addresses, and the husband kissed his wife, the mother her boy, if it was not on the Sabbath. Honor to their memory! They did man's work, and earned man's wages, and as well might one of the modern Trasteverini blush for his old Roman progenitors, as I for my old puritan ancestors, who brought with them the bravest hearts and the best laws and the noblest institutions of old England, which they loved so tenderly, though she sent them forth as the Patriarch's wife did Hagar and the dear Ismael into the desert. I liked Mr. Cotton, too, for his great ancestor's sake, for great, O Cotton Mather, thou wast in thy day; hard service didst thou against fiends and witches, and powers invisible; and a noble epic hast thou left us in thy Magnalia. The college thou lovedst so well, and which thou didst cherish in thy heart of hearts, "*pro Christo et ecclesia*," may have ceased to cherish thy memory, and the Second Church, over which thou wast pastor as colleague with thy father, has learned to blush at thy memory, and to imagine it shows its wisdom in calling thee a "learned fool." I, who have as little sympathy with them as with thee, hon-

or thee as one of the worthies of my country, and as one who was not the least among the worthies of my native land in thy day and generation. Men look upon thee as antiquated, and fancy that they have become wiser than thou wast. Would to Heaven they had a little of thy good sense, and of the truth, which thou wast not ashamed to profess and defend!

But this is quite aside from my purpose, and is, artistically considered, a blemish in my narrative. But few are the writers who, if they speak out from warm hearts their true, deep, genuine feelings as they arise, but will violate some canon of art. I love art, but I love nature more. I love a smoothly shaven lawn; I say nothing against your artificial garden, trim and neat, where each plant and shrub grows and flowers according to rule; but the wild forest, with its irregularities, decaying logs, huge trees, fresh saplings, and tangled underbrush, was as a boy, when it was my home, and is now I am a man, much more my delight. By the same token, I love Boston, whose streets were laid out by the cows going through the brushwood to drink, where you cannot find a square corner, or a street a hundred yards in length without a curve, better than the city of Penn, laid out by a carpenter's line and chalk, and presenting only the dull monotony of the chess-board, without the excitement of the game. Yet the city of Penn has its merits. Many a pleasant hour have I spent there, and many a sweet association is entwined in my memory with its rectangles, and its plain, uniform, drab-colored costume. But I have left Mr. Cotton all this time standing. It was unintentional, for I was not displeased to see him. He knew me as the son of an old friend, and he had, both as a friend and as a minister of religion, called to expostulate with me. He was sure that I was imperilling my soul, and he could not answer it to his conscience, if he did not solemnly and yet affectionately warn me of my danger.

I have been sadly remiss in my faith and in my conduct, yet never have I allowed myself to treat with scorn or contumely any professed minister of religion, who addressed me in tones of sincerity and affectionate earnestness. Mr. Cotton, I was sure, meant well, although I knew his expostulations would avail nothing, and his warning be unheeded. I listened with respect, but untouched. At that time my heart was hard. I was laboring under a perfect delusion, and body and soul were under the power of the Evil One.

"You may not believe it, Doctor," said Mr. Cotton, "but I tell you that you are forming a league with the devil. I know you have grown wiser than your fathers were; that you deny the existence of a devil or of evil spirits, but you are wise only in your own conceit, and you are now really dealing with the devil, are plotting to do the devil's work, under pretence of science and world-reform. I have watched you these many months, and I see where you are going. You are also permitting yourself to be seduced by a Moabitish woman, and allowing yourself to be cheated, with your eyes open, out of your five senses by the sparkle of her eye, and the ruby of her lip. Why have you suffered her to bewitch you? Leave her, never see her or speak to her again, or you are a lost man."

I am naturally a very mild-tempered man, and am not and never was very sensitive to wounds inflicted by the tongue; and Mr. Cotton might have abused me or said all manner of hard things against me till he was exhausted, and I could have remained unmoved; but when he alluded to my relation with another, especially since I could not defend it, and called the beautiful, the lovely, the philanthropic Priscilla, a Moabitish woman, and attacked her honor, my blood was up, and I instantly resolved that he should suffer for it. I however kept this to myself, assured him that he was uncharitable, and judged an estimable lady rashly; that my relations with Priscilla were not precisely a matter for his cognizance, as we were neither of us under his parochial charge. I respected him as an old friend of my father's, and as a descendant of one of the greatest men of the early Massachusetts Colony. I had no doubt of his good intentions, and affectionate interest in me and my family; but I was of age, and competent to take care of myself. What I was doing I was doing with my eyes open, calmly, deliberately, and from what I held to be justifiable motives. I was prepared to take the responsibility. Warnings, expostulations, would avail nothing. I was resolved to push my scientific investigations to the furthest limits possible. I would, if I should be able, wrest from nature her last secret, and avail myself of all her mysterious forces. I did not pretend to say whether there were devils and evil spirits or not, although I believed God made all things good, very good; but if there were, I had nothing to do with them, for I invoked mysterious agencies only for a good end, in the cause of philanthropy and human progress.

If they were spirits I was dealing with, they must be white spirits rather than black; and if I studied and even practised magic, I was sure it was not black magic, but white.

"All that is very well said," replied Mr. Cotton, "and yet you know that you are carried away by indiscreet curiosity, by an unholy ambition, and perhaps by lawless lust, and you dare not, alone in your closet, ask the blessing of God on your proceedings. Bear with me. I am an old man, and let my gray hairs plead with you, if not my sacred profession. I know that the young men of our time lose their reverence for religion, and turn up their noses in profound disgust when we speak to them of duty and the solemn responsibilities of life. I know they are impatient of restraint, and burning with a passion for liberty, as they call it. I know they deem it wisdom to depart from the old ways, to forsake the God of their fathers, and to hew out to themselves cisterns, alas, broken cisterns, which will hold no water. But let me tell you, my friend, that they are only sowing the seeds of future sorrow, and will reap only a too abundant harvest. No man in his old age ever regretted that he feared God and practised virtue in his youth."

"All that may be very true, Mr. Cotton, but much of it comes with no good grace from a Puritan who has allowed himself the freedom of his own judgment in religious matters. It is not long since your fathers forsook their fathers' God, and hewed out cisterns for themselves; whether broken cisterns or not, it is not for me to say; certainly they departed from the old ways, followed the new wisdom of their times, and you honor them for it. Perhaps posterity will in like manner honor me and my associates for daring to follow the new wisdom of our times, and to incur reproach for my adhesion to the work of human emancipation. I am enlarging the boundaries of human knowledge, laying open to view the invisible world, and proving that, under the old doctrine of the communion of saints, there is a great and glorious truth, cheering and consoling to us in this life of labor and sorrow. I am freeing the world from the monster, superstition, and delivering the people from their gloomy fears and terrible apprehensions. They shall no longer start and tremble at ghosts and hobgoblins, or be obliged, with the Papists, to cross themselves, or with our New England youth, to whistle Yankee Doodle to keep their courage up, when, after dark, they go by a graveyard.

What torture did not my superstitious fears cause me in my childhood! I never have known what it was to fear any living thing. I have been tried, and have always found my courage and self-possession equal to the occasion, and I could alone face an armed host without trembling; but even now I cannot open the door into a dark room without trepidation, without starting back till reason comes to my aid. I never sit alone in my room reading till twelve o'clock at night, without having a mysterious awe creep over me. I am oppressed by the presence of the invisible, and my very lamp seems to burn blue. All is the sad effect of the frights I received in my childhood, occasioned by the ghost and witch stories which old people would meet together and tell of a long winter's evening. I, a lad, listened with ears erect, and hair standing on end. My blood seemed to freeze in my veins, and I dared not look around me lest I should see the invisible. I was ready to shriek with agony when sent to bed in the dark, and unless watched would throw myself into bed without taking off my clothes, and cover up my head and face in the bed blanket. How terrible was the dark! The impression wears not out with time, and will remain till death. Now I would free the mind from all these idle fears, and save the people, especially children, from these terrible sufferings. It is a good work, and none but white spirits will aid me in it."

"Alas! you seem not to have reflected that the devil, when he would seduce, can disguise himself as an angel of light. Human nature is terribly corrupt, and yet the great mass of mankind ordinarily are incapable of choosing evil, for the reason that it is evil. Evil must be presented to them in the guise of good, or they will not choose it. The devil knows this, and knows the weak side of every one, and he adapts his temptations accordingly. The weak side of our age is a morbid sentimentality, a sickly philanthropy, and the devil tempts us now by appealing to our dominant weakness. He comes to us as a philanthropist, and his mouth full of fine sentiments, and he proposes only what we are already prepared to approve. Were he to come as the devil *in propria persona*, and tell us precisely who and what he is, there are very few who would not say, 'Get behind me, Satan.' Nothing better serves his purpose than to have us deny his existence; to ascribe his influence to imagination, hallucination, to natural causes or influences, or in fine, to good spirits, for then he throws us off our guard,

and can operate without being easily detected. Never was an age more under his influence than our own, and yet they who pass for its lights and chiefs have reached that last infirmity of unbelief, the denial of the existence of the devil. Possessed persons are insane, epileptic, or lunatic persons, and the wonderful phenomena they exhibit are produced by an electric, magnetic, or odic fluid, and are to be explained on natural principles, and such as cannot be so explained, are boldly denied, however well attested, or ascribed to jugglery, knavery, or collusion. The marvellous answers of the ancient oracles are ascribed to knavery, as if the whole world had lost their senses, and could not detect a cheat practised before their very eyes, and so bunglingly, that we who live two thousand or three thousand years after, ignorant of all the circumstances of the case, can detect it, and explain how it was done, without the slightest difficulty. The devil laughs at this. He would have it so. Your natural explanations will hereafter create a suspicion that you are little better than natural fools. But go your way. I see by your incredulous smile that the devil has you fast in his grip. I have done my duty. My garments are clean of your blood; and hereafter, when you are feeling the gnawings of that worm which never dies, and the burning of that fire which is never quenched, say not, that no one had forewarned you."

So saying, he took up his hat and cane, and, slightly bowing, left my room without hearing a word in reply, or giving me a parting greeting. When he was gone, I laughed to myself at his solemn admonition, and renewed my resolution that he should suffer for the manner in which he alluded to my dear Priscilla. He should know whether she was a Moabitish woman or not. Warn me! Pray what had I done? Where was the harm? Was it wrong to investigate the principles of nature, to learn what nature really is, and to call her forces into play, providing they were not applied to a bad end? Could it be a good spirit that would debar us from acquiring science, or a bad spirit that would bid us inquire, to learn our strength, and to use it? Would it be no slight service to relieve the more mysterious parts of science from the reproaches cast upon them? Has it not been computed that more than a million of persons alone suffered as sorcerers and sorceresses, or for dealing with the devil, in the sixteenth century and seventeenth alone? What injury has not been done to genuine science

by the absurd legislation against magic, sorcery, and the so-called black arts generally. No man could rise above the vulgar herd, and produce some ingenious piece of mechanism, but the rabble accused him of magic, and it was lucky if he escaped a criminal prosecution and conviction before the courts of justice. Was not that noble heroine, Joan of Arc, who saved France from becoming an English province, burnt as a witch? Was not Friar Bacon, the father of modern science, and the forerunner of his namesake of Verulam, accused of magic, imprisoned, and thus scientific discoveries and useful inventions postponed for centuries? Had not hundreds of old women, who had nothing of sorcery about them but their poverty, weakness, and imbecility, been dragged before the courts, and hung or burnt as witches? What more lamentable page in our own American history than that of Salem witchcraft? Is it nothing to disabuse the world, to save so many innocent victims, remove so great a hinderance to science and heroic deeds, by bringing the class of facts, superstitiously interpreted, within the bounds of nature and legitimate science? Then, again, what may not be finally obtained for the human race? Are the resources of nature exhausted? They sought once the philosopher's stone, the elixir of life, the fountain of youth; who knows but these may one day, and that not far distant, be found, if not in the shape sought, in others, more simple and convenient?

Thus I resisted the admonitions of the good old man, and confirmed myself in my resolution. I meditated a long time as to my future procedure, and how I could bring my new science, which I trusted soon to complete, to bear on the great revolutionary movement which the active spirits of the day had concerted, and which must soon break out. I could discern my way only dimly, but I trusted the mist would soon clear away, and my method be no longer obscure or uncertain. Monarchy must be overthrown because it upholds religion, and religion because it upholds monarchy, and imposes vexatious restraints. So much was clear, and determined on. Time and events would reveal the rest.

Late in the evening I called at Priscilla's, saw her a moment, whispered a word in her ear, gave her one or two directions, pressed her hand, only as my accomplice, and henceforth my slave. The next morning I left Philadelphia, and returned home a much altered man. My body

was light and buoyant, and I felt as if I was all spirit. I simply greeted my mother, but felt that the strong tie which bound me to her was broken; my sister, whom I had tenderly loved, was indifferent to me, and I hardly deigned to notice her. I went into my laboratory, saw that all was right there; from that I passed into my library to resume my experiments.

CHAPTER X.—MR. COTTON IS PUZZLED.

I PROCEEDED to magnetize my table. It responded as usual. I put my former questions, but could get no answer to them, except that the time for the revelation I solicited was not yet come. I asked, if there was not a more direct mode of communication possible, and was told there was. By speech? Not yet. By writing? Yes. I took a slate and pencil, and placed my hand in the attitude to write. Immediately my hand was moved by an invisible force, and a communication was made in the handwriting and signed with the name of my father, who had been dead some eight or nine years. The purport of it was not much. I did not know but I unconsciously moved the pencil myself. I wished a better test. I placed the slate on the table, laid the pencil on it, and called up the power, whoever or what it might be, to write without my assistance. Very soon the pencil rose fully up, then fell back, then rose again, and after vacillating awhile, it became firm in its position and was moved regularly backwards and forwards, as if directed by the hand of a scribe. At length it flew up to the ceiling, whirled round there for a few seconds, and then placed itself quietly on the slate. I examined the slate, found a communication on it in the handwriting and signed with the name of Benjamin Franklin. The communication consisted of one or two proverbs from Poor Richard, and a commonplace remark about electricity. All this was marvellous enough, but very little to my purpose. It was not worth while taking so much trouble to get what was of no use when got.

I sat down in my great arm-chair a few feet from my table, and fell into a brown study. How long I remained so I do not know, when I was aroused by a great racket in my room. My table was cutting up capers, rising now to the ceiling and now frisking round the room, anon balancing itself on one leg, and then going off into a whirl,

that would have broken the heart of the best waltzer, all to a tune which some invisible hand was playing upon my guitar,—tune I say, but it was rather a capriccio, and a medley of a dozen different melodies, thrown together in the wildest disorder. Very soon this stopped, and then came thundering raps all about my room, making every thing in it jar. I bid them be quiet, and not all speak at once, like a lot of old women at a tea-party. They partially obeyed me. One rapper however continued, but in a more gentle and polite manner. I was willing to have some conversation with him. I asked him who he was? He would not answer. What did he want? To communicate. Very well, I would listen; and he told me I was not a good medium myself, for I held the spirits in awe. Ah, spirits, are you? said I. "Yes." Very well; I shall be very happy to make your acquaintance. "But you must find us other mediums; we cannot speak freely with you."

Close by me lived the Fox family. There were three sisters; one was married, and the other two were simple, honest-minded young girls, one fifteen, the other thirteen. As I passed by their house, I saw them in the yard. I greeted them, and offered them some flowers which I held in my hand. The youngest took them, thanked me with a smile, and I pursued my walk. These were the since world-renowned Misses Fox. In a short time afterwards they began to be startled by strange, mysterious knockings, which they could not account for, and which greatly annoyed them. It is not by any means my intention to follow these girls, in their course since, with whom I have had very little direct communication; but I owe it to them and to the public to say, that they were simple-minded, honest girls, utterly incapable of inventing any thing like these knockings, or of playing any trick upon the public. The knockings were and are as much a mystery for them as for others, and they honestly believe that through them actual communication is held with the spirits of the departed. They are in good faith, as they some time since evinced by their wish to become members of the Catholic Church, which certainly they would not have wished, in this country at least, if they looked upon themselves as impostors, and had only worldly and selfish ends in view. They are no doubt deceived, not as to the facts, as to the phenomena of spirit-rappings, but as to the explanation they give or attempt

to give of them. They have not always been treated, I fear, with due tenderness, and sufficient pains has not been taken to enlighten them as to the real nature of these phenomena.

But who need be surprised at this? Received science rejects every thing of the sort, for it recognizes no invisible world, believes in neither angel nor spirit, and explains every thing on natural principles. Even theologians have to a great extent forgotten the terrible influence, in times past, of demonic agencies, and, if they do not absolutely reject the instances recorded in the Bible, they are disposed to treat all other cases as humbuggery, knavery, deception, or to class them with epilepsy, insanity, hallucination, and other diseases to which we are subject, and to dismiss them, when they cannot be denied, with the physicians, under the heads of mania, monomania, nymphomania, demonopathy, &c. I have before me the *Dictionnaire Infernal* of M. Collin de Plancy, approved by the late archbishop of Paris,—him who fell so gloriously on the barricades, June, 1848, whither he had gone as a minister of charity and peace,—in which, from beginning to end, there is a studied effort to represent all these dark and mysterious phenomena as explicable without any resort to superhuman or diabolical agency. The excellent author seems to write on the supposition that all the world, the physicians, the clergy, the magistrates, the civil and ecclesiastical courts during all past times were merely old grannies, and had no sound doctrine, and no capacity for investigating the truth of facts obvious to their senses. With his mode of reasoning, and with far less violence, I can explain away all the miraculous or mysterious relations in Biblical history. But so strong is the current against Satanic agency in the production of these phenomena, and such the prevailing and shortsighted incredulity of our times, that even those who suspect the true explanation are, for the most part, deterred from the ridicule which would be showered upon them from avowing it.

It is no wonder that no kind, considerate friend was found to take these poor Fox girls by the hand, and attempt to rescue them from their dangerous state. The great mass of those who could have done so, either paid no attention at all to the mysterious phenomena asserted, or looked upon the whole matter as mere humbug. It was easier to crack a joke at the expense of spirit-rappers, than it was to investigate the facts alleged, or to offer the true and proper

explanation. I had foreseen that it would be so, or at least, had foreseen that they, whose duty it is to watch over the interests of religion and morals, were unprepared to meet the phenomena with success; that they would at first deny and laugh, and then vituperate and denounce, but would hardly understand and explain till too late, or till immense mischief had been done. Even now the first stage is hardly passed, and the movement I commenced by a present of flowers to these simple girls has extended over the whole Union, invaded Great Britain, penetrated France in all directions, carried captive all Scandinavia and a large part of Germany, and is finding its way into the Italian Peninsula. There are some three hundred circles or clubs in the city of Philadelphia alone, and the Spiritualists, as they call themselves, count nearly a million of believers in our own country. Table-turning, necromancy, divination becomes a religion with some, and an amusement with others. The infection seizes all classes, ministers of religion, lawyers, physicians, judges, comedians, rich and poor, learned and unlearned. The movement has its quarterly, monthly, and weekly journals, some of them conducted with great ability, and the spirits, through the writing mediums, have already furnished it a very considerable library,—yet hardly a serious effort has as yet been made in this country to comprehend or arrest it. It is making sad havoc with religion, breaking up churches, taking its victims from all denominations, with stern impartiality; and yet the great body of those not under its influence merely deny, laugh, or cry out, "humbug!" "delusion!" Delusion it is. I know it now, but not in their sense.

The public never suspected me of having had any hand in producing the Rapping-Mania; and the Fox girls, even to this day, suspect no connection between the flowers I gave them and the mysterious knockings which they heard; and nobody has suspected Andrew Jackson Davis, the most distinguished of the American *mediums*, of having any relations with me. He does not suspect it himself, yet he has been more than once magnetized by me, and it has been in obedience to my will that he has made his revelations. The public have never connected my name with the movement, and even Priscilla has never known my full share in it. I have had my instruments, blind instruments, in all civilized countries, with whom I have worked, and yet but few of them have known me, or seen me.

My readers may indeed be incredulous as to the influence conveyed by flowers; but I shall satisfy them on that score before completing my confessions. While the Fox girls were annoyed by these mysterious knockings, and were beginning to draw on them the attention of the curious and the credulous, and while Andrew Jackson Davis, as yet only a somnambulist, was dictating his wonderful revelations, and learned doctors were disputing whether he received them from a white or a black spirit, whether he really saw what he professed to see in his clairvoyant state, or only reported to the scribe the lesson which some cunning scamps had previously taught him, and made him commit to memory; my old friend Mr. Cotton was made to suffer a severe penalty for the slighting manner in which he had spoken of Priscilla. Contrary to her usual custom, Priscilla went one Sunday evening to his evening service. On leaving the meeting-house, she mingled in the crowd, and so contrived it as to rub against a granddaughter of Mr. Cotton, an interesting child of some twelve or thirteen years of age, and without anybody observing it. She then turned a little aside, got into her carriage, which was waiting, and drove home. The next day, the young girl, Clara Starkweather, was singularly affected. Every thing she touched seemed to stick fast to her fingers. All the dresses, cloaks, shawls, in the house seemed to have an irresistible propensity to fly to her, and arrange themselves on her back. She went into the kitchen; the poker, shovel, and tongs, pots, kettles, pails, basins, all set to dancing towards and around her, and the frying-pan fastened itself on her head as a cap. Her mother scolded her, and she, poor thing, began to cry, and declared that she did not do it, but that it was done by a strange woman, very beautiful, but very wicked, whom she did not know. The family were all in consternation. Mr. Cotton was called upon to interpose. He concluded that it was a case of witchcraft, or of diabolical obsession. He summoned all the inmates of his family to his study. He was a brave man, and nothing at all loath to come to hand-grip with the devil, for whom, with his orthodoxy, he fancied himself more than a match. "We must," he said, "resist the evil one; we must wrestle in prayer." With that he seated himself before his table, on which lay a splendid edition of the Bible. He opened the book, intending to read a chapter, before making his prayer. But he had hardly opened it before it was violently closed, and rising, seem-

ingly of itself, hit him a heavy blow in his face, which knocked him from his chair, and nearly stunned him, and then rested itself on the top of Clara's head. Mr. Cotton soon recovered from the blow, and stood up, after the manner of his sect, to pray. He had hardly opened his mouth, before there was heard such a knocking behind the walls, against the doors, and under the floor, that every word he attempted to utter was completely drowned. It was impossible to proceed amid such a thundering din and racket, which threatened to pull the house down about their ears. Forthwith out marched from the library shelves a complete edition of Scott's Family Bible. The several volumes drew themselves up on the floor, and proceeded, with great skill and even science, to knock one another down, while various sounds, as of mockery and laughter, were heard from various quarters. The brave old man was fain to resume his chair, when lo! he found himself seated on the heated gridiron. He started up very quick, as may be imagined, but happily received no serious injury.

For attraction now succeeded repulsion. All the objects near Clara, instead of being drawn towards her, were repelled, and moved away from her. Soon one article of her dress after another flew off, and it was with the utmost difficulty that they could keep enough on her to hide her nakedness. This lasted an hour it may be, when all was quiet, and every thing was found restored to its place, and Mr. Cotton himself began to think that all was some optical illusion, and to think that he might have been too hasty in concluding that the devil was engaged in it.

However the annoyances were only suspended, they were not removed. During the following night all in the house were awakened by tremendous knockings heard on the walls and under the floor of the apartment where Clara slept. All rose, and in their night-clothes rushed to her room, and found her lying on her bed sobbing, and apparently in the greatest agony. The bedclothes and her own dresses were scattered all about the room, cut into narrow strips, and entirely ruined. The rappings then were heard in the library. Mr. Cotton took a light, and went into the room, and was not a little surprised to find it occupied with some half a dozen figures of men and women fantastically dressed, all seated, and listening with grave faces to an inaudible discourse from another figure in Genevan gown and band, standing before the table on which Mr. Cotton's great Bible

lay open. Mr. Cotton was a little startled at first, but he summoned up his courage and advanced. He went straight up to the figure in gown and band, who seemed to have usurped his functions, and boldly laid his hand upon his shoulder. Immediately his candle was extinguished, and he received a blow which felled him to the floor. In a moment he recovered, passed into another room, obtained another light, and returned. The phantoms were still there, but he now saw what they were. The seeming minister was a huge folio of theology, moulded into a human shape by pieces of carpet, a coat and trousers of his own, and dressed in his own gown and band. The other figures were volumes from his library, elongated and stuffed out in a similar way, and dressed in clothes belonging to different members of the family. They were stripped, replaced on the book-shelves, and the dresses returned to the several wardrobes where they belonged. There was no more disturbance that night.

The next day, when the family were all at dinner, the table, with every thing on it, suddenly rose to the ceiling, and then suddenly dropped upon the floor with a noise that shook the whole house, but without any other injury, or any thing on it being displaced. In the evening, while they were all seated around the table, listening to a chapter which Mr. Cotton was reading from the Bible, terrible knockings were again heard all through the room, and Clara was seen to be raised as it were by some invisible hand towards the ceiling, and to be borne with great force through the room, and set down standing on her head. Then, after a moment, she rose again and hung suspended to the ceiling by her feet and her head downwards. After an hour the annoyances ceased, and the family were left quiet. The annoyances continued, varying in their character from day to day, for three weeks.

Priscilla sent me an account of them, and I thought my old friend had been sufficiently punished. Moreover, I did not wish too much *éclat* to be given at that time to the fantastic tricks I was playing. Mr. Cotton was sure that it was the work of the devil, that it was witchcraft, and he did not hesitate to accuse Priscilla. He had tried to get the authorities to arrest her as a witch, but in this he had failed; for, although the laws of Pennsylvania, at that time, if not now, recognized witchcraft as a punishable offence, no magistrate in the city could be found who did not look upon witchcraft as imaginary, and suspect the good minister of

being in need of physic and good regimen for entertaining a belief in its reality. I however did not wish Priscilla's name to become associated in the gossip of the day with reported phenomena of the sort, and I sent her an order to discontinue the annoyances, and to restore every thing which had been injured to its previous condition. The night she received my order, the noises ceased, Clara rested quietly, and the family were undisturbed. On rising and going through the house in the morning, no trace of the previous disorder was discovered, every thing was in its place, and the clothing and bedding which had been cut into ribbons, were all restored, and not a mark of injury was to be found on them. Clara was well, and retained no recollection of any thing that had happened to her or to the family during the period she had been so grievously afflicted. Even the family, Mr. Cotton among the rest, began to doubt if they had not been the sport of some strange hallucination, and almost to persuade themselves that the annoyances had had no objective character.

All this may strike many as wholly incredible, but a thousand instances, as well attested as any facts can be, of a similar character, can be adduced. Let me be permitted to relate an instance still more marvellous, which occurred in 1849, at the presbytery or parsonage of Cideville, France, in the Department of the Lower Seine, and which became indirectly the subject of a judicial investigation. The curé of Cideville encountered at the house of one of his sick parishoners, an individual, a Mr. G——, who had the reputation of curing diseases in a mysterious manner. He reproved him severely, and sent him away. Shortly after, Mr. G—— was arrested and condemned for his malpractices in other cases, to two years' imprisonment. The wretched man, recollecting the reproof he had received from the curé, believed that it was owing to him that he had been arrested and sent to prison, and, it is said, he threw out threats of vengeance. One Thorel, a shepherd, a friend and disciple of the Mr. G——, was also heard to say, that the curé would be made to repent of what he had done, and that he (Thorel) would himself see that his master was avenged, and his orders executed.

Two boys, one twelve, the other fourteen, were boarded and educated in the parsonage by the curé. They were sons of honest, pious, and much esteemed schoolmasters of the district, and appeared to have inherited the good quali-

ties of their parents. They were both intended for the priesthood, and were a great comfort to the good curé, who loved, cherished, and instructed them, and perhaps obtained something for their board and tuition to eke out his scanty means of living.

One day there was a public auction, where a great crowd were collected, and these boys were present among the rest. The shepherd, Thorel, was there, and seen to approach the younger of the two, but nothing more was observed. Immediately on the return to the parsonage, a violent hurricane struck it, followed by blows as from a hammer in every part of the house, under the floors, above the ceiling, and behind the wainscoting. Sometimes these blows were weak, short, abrupt, sometimes so violent as to shake the house, and to threaten to demolish it, as Thorel, in a moment of rashness had foretold. The blows were heard at the distance of two kilometres, and a large portion of the inhabitants of Cideville, a hundred and fifty at a time, it is said, surrounded the parsonage for hours, examining it in all directions, and seeking in vain to discover whence the blows proceeded.

This was not all. Whilst these mysterious knockings continued, and made themselves heard on every point indicated, they reproduced the exact rhythm of whatever air was demanded of them; the glass in the windows was broken, and rattled in every direction; the tables were overturned, or were seen walking about; the chairs were grouped together and suspended in the air; the dogs were thrown crosswise over one another or were hung by their tails to the ceiling; knives, brushes, breviaries, flew out by one window and back through another on the opposite side; the shovel and tongs quit of themselves the fireplace and walked alone into the room; the andirons, followed by the fire, recoiled from the chimney even to the middle of the floor; hammers flew in the air, and dropped as slowly and as softly as a feather on the floor; the utensils of the toilet suddenly quitted the chambranle on which they were placed, and as suddenly returned of their own accord; enormous desks rushed one against another and were broken, and one loaded with books approached rapidly and horizontally close to the forehead of M. R. de Saint V——, and, without touching him, dropped perpendicularly upon its feet.

Madame de Saint V——, whose chateau was near to the parsonage, whose testimony cannot be questioned, and who

had witnessed a score of similar experiments, felt herself drawn one day by the corner of her mantle, without perceiving the invisible hand that drew it. The mayor of Cideville received a violent blow on his thigh, and at the cry forced from him by this violence, he received a gentle caress, which instantly relieved him from the pain.

A proprietor, residing fourteen leagues distant, and from whom I hold this relation, came unexpectedly to Cideville, wholly ignorant of the mysterious events which were taking place. After a night spent in the chamber of the boys, he questioned the mysterious knocking, made it strike in different corners of the room, and established with it the conditions of a dialogue. One blow, for example, would say yes, two blows, no; then the number of blows would indicate the number of the letter in the alphabet, &c. This settled, the witness caused to be rapped out his surname and Christian name, and those of his children, his age and theirs, to the year, month, and day,—the name of his commune. &c. All this was done with such rapidity that he was obliged to conjure the rapper to proceed more slowly, that he might have more leisure to verify the answers, all of which he found perfectly exact. What is more striking is, that this gentleman knew nothing at the time of spirit-rapping, then beginning to excite attention in the United States, and it was not till several weeks after that he heard of it.

All this, the sceptics will allege, may be attributed to jugglery, to the cunning and craft of the juggler, divining the thoughts of the interrogator before he had detected them himself. But there was something more still; something which the sceptics will hardly be able to explain. A priest, a vicar of St. Roch, the Abbé L——, came accidentally, and wholly unlooked for, to Cideville. To similar questions he received apparently through his brother, like himself wholly unknown in the place, answers equally prompt and exact, but with this singular difference: In one instance the questioner himself was ignorant, and unable to verify the details of the answer obtained. He was, indeed, told the age and Christian name of his mother and his brother, but he had either never known them or had forgotten them. He however took a note of the answers, and, on his return to Paris, consulted the registers, and found them literally exact. What now becomes of the objection against the previous witness, or the explanation insisted on,

that the answer is given by the brain of the interrogator?

Two landholders from the town of Eu came all express to Cideville. They were told their names, Christian names, the number of their dogs, their horses, &c. But still more astonishing were the phenomena that accompanied the boy believed to have been touched by the shepherd Thorel. He perceived continually near him the *shade*, or appearance of a man, in a blouse, whom he did not know, but whom he identified with Thorel, the first time he was confronted with that person. Even one of the ecclesiastics present, when the boy said he saw the phantom, perceived distinctly behind the lad a sort of grayish column or fluidic vapor, a phenomenon often observed on similar occasions. One day the boy fell into convulsions, then into a sort of ecstatic syncope, from which for several hours nothing could rouse him, and which caused a fear that he was dead. Another time he said that he saw a black hand descending the chimney, and he cried out that it struck him. Nobody could see the hand, but those present heard the blow, and saw its mark on the face of the child, who in his simplicity ran out doors, thinking to see this hand come out the top of the chimney.

At length several ecclesiastics united at the parsonage, and consulted how they might be disembarrassed of the annoyance. One proposed one thing, another proposed another, and a third remarked that he had heard it said that those mysterious *shades* feared the point of a sword. At the risk of a little superstition, they armed themselves with swords, and stabbed with them wherever the noises were heard. But it is difficult to hit an agent in constant and rapid motion, and they were about to desist, when one of them having more skilfully pursued one of the noises than the others, all at once a flame flashed forth, followed by a smoke so dense that they were obliged to open all the windows to escape immediate suffocation. The smoke dissipated, and calm succeeding to so terrible an emotion, they resumed their stabbing, and soon they heard a groan; they continued, the groaning redoubled, and at length they distinctly heard pronounced the word "pardon." "Pardon! yes, certainly, we will forgive you; and more than that, we will pass all the night in praying for you; but on condition that you come to-morrow, in person, and beg pardon of this boy." "Will you forgive us all?" "How many are you?" "We are five, including the shepherd." "We will forgive you all." All then became quiet in the parsonage;

and the rest of that terrible night was spent calmly in prayer.

The next day, in the afternoon, Thorel presented himself at the parsonage. His attitude was humble, his language embarrassed, and he attempted to conceal with his hat certain bloody excoriations on his face. The boy, as soon as he perceived him, exclaimed, "That is the man, that is the man who has followed me this fortnight." He pretended, when questioned, that he came to get a small organ for his master. "Not so, Thorel; you know it is not for that that you have come," he was answered. "But whence those wounds on your face? who has given them?"

"That is no business of yours; I will not tell."

"Tell us, then, what you want. Be frank. Have you not come to beg this boy's pardon? Do it, then. Down on your knees."

"Well, be it so; pardon then," said Thorel, falling upon his knees, and even while begging the lad's pardon, drew himself along, and tried to seize him by his blouse. He succeeded; and from that moment the sufferings of the boy, and the mysterious noises in the parsonage, redoubled. The curé, however, persuaded him to go to the mayor's office. He went, and as soon as he entered it, he fell three times on his knees, without being required, and before all the witnesses, begged pardon; but, at the same time, he drew himself along on his knees, and endeavored to touch the curé, as he had touched the boy. The curé, after retreating to a corner of the room, had, in self-defence, to beat him off with his cane. He avowed that all was to be referred to M. G——, whom the curé had prevented from earning his bread, and that he could easily disembarrass the parsonage of the annoyances that were passing there, if made worth his while.

The curé, in consequence of what had occurred, said, or was reported to have said, that Thorel was a sorcerer, and had practised sorcery on the boy at the parsonage. Thorel brought, in consequence, an action against him for slander. The cause came to trial; the curé pleaded the truth in justification, and was acquitted. On the trial, the facts I have stated, as well as many others of no less importance, were testified to under oath, by a large number of highly intelligent and respectable witnesses, and not one of them can be denied, if human testimony is in any case to be taken as conclusive.

Persons of sceptical and critical disposition may imagine that Thorel was concealed behind the wainscot, but the persons who used their swords had sense enough to ascertain whether that was so or not; besides, to suppose it, were wholly inconsistent with other well-established facts in the case. An hypothesis, to be acceptable, must meet and explain all the facts, not merely a portion of them. It will not do to adopt a theory, and then, after the manner of learned academicians and *philosophical* historians, reject as inadmissible all the details of the case not compatible with that theory. But I have introduced this narrative to prove the credibility of some of my own doings, not to prove that there is such a thing as is commonly called sorcery—to prove the validity of an alleged class of phenomena, not their proper explanation. To this latter point I shall have occasion, before I close, to speak at full length.

The annoyances, I may add, continued at the parsonage for some time, in fine till the bishop removed the boys, and the malice of the persecutors had completed the ruin of the curé. They then ceased, when the original reason for producing them had been answered.*

CHAPTER XI.—WORTH CONSIDERING.

I FAILED for a long time yet to get any new light on the essential nature of the agent with which I was operating, and remained still undecided in my own mind whether it was a spiritual person, superhuman and invisible, or a simple elemental force of nature, placed at the command of every man who knows how to use his own powers. The answers I obtained to my questions were vague, contradictory, and unsatisfactory. I had no doubt that I was doing what in the eyes of ignorance and superstition was called dealing with the devil, and practising what had been denounced, and in former times punished, by the civil law as sorcery or witchcraft. So much was clear and undeniable. But had not all the world misunderstood the real nature of what it had condemned as witchcraft, sorcery, malefice, and magic? Had they not assumed unnecessarily a preternatural agency, and an evil agent, where there was really only a natural, a good, and a benevolent agent?

The bearing of this question on the Christian religion was

* Pneumatologie: Des Esprits, par le Marquis Eudes de M——

very obvious, and I well understood the significance of what Voltaire said, one day, to a theologian, "*Sathan! c'est le Christianisme tout entier*; PAS DE SATHAN, PAS DE SAUVEUR," and I felt that there was truth in what Bayle, the ablest and acutest of all modern authors opposed to Christianity, had said: "Prove to unbelievers the existence of evil spirits, and you will by that alone force them to concede all your dogmas." In any point of view, Christianity was pledged to assert the existence of Satan and his intervention in human affairs, for according to it, Christ was revealed from heaven and came into the world that he might destroy the devil and his works. If there was no devil, the mission of Christ had no motive, no object, and Christianity is a fable.

Moreover, all Christians, whether Catholics asserting the infallibility and authority of the church, or Protestants asserting simply the infallibility and authority of the Bible, were bound to assert the existence of evil spirits, and the reality of demonic obsession and possession, of witchcraft, sorcery, and magic, in the common and opprobrious sense of the terms. As to Catholics, there could be no question. The church plainly and unequivocally recognizes the existence of Satan, as may be gathered from the prayers and ceremonies of baptism, as well as from the significance of the sacrament itself; and not only his existence, but his power over the natural man, and even material objects. Thus when the priest, in administering the Sacrament, breathes gently three times in the face of the child, he exclaims, "Exi ab eo, immunde spiritus, et da locum Spiritui Sancto Paraclito:" Go out of him, impure spirit, and give place to the Holy Ghost, the Paraclete; and also after the prayer *Deus patrum nostrorum*: "Exorcizo te, immunde spiritus, in nomine Patris, et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti, ut exeas, et recedas ab hoc famulo Dei. Ipse enim tibi imperat, maledicte damnate, qui pedibus super mare ambulavit, et Petro mergenti dexteram porrexit. Ergo, maledicte diabole, recognosce sententiam tuam, et da honorem Deo vivo et vero, da honorem Jesu Christo Filio ejus, et Spiritui Sancto; et recede ab hoc famulo Dei, quia istum sibi Deus et Dominus noster Jesus Christus ad suam sanctam gratiam, et benedictionem, fontemque baptismatis vocari dignatus est." The candidate, before receiving baptism, is asked, "Dost thou renounce Satan?" and answers, "I renounce him." "And all his works?" "I renounce them." "And

all his pomps?" "I renounce them." So, in blessing the salt which is used in administering the Sacrament, the priest says, "Exorcizo te, creatura salis, in nomine Dei Patris omnipotentis, et in charitate Domini nostri Jesu Christi, et in virtute Spiritus Sancti, exorcizo te per Deum vivum, per Deum verum, per Deum sanctum," &c. The whole proceeds on the supposition that Satan is to be expelled, dislodged, and the Holy Ghost to be placed, so to speak, in possession, or the grace of Jesus Christ is to be infused, so that the Holy Ghost shall henceforth dwell in the heart of the baptized, instead of Satan, who previously held dominion over it. The church has also her exorcists, and her forms of exorcising of evil spirits.

The Bible is no less clear and explicit on the subject than the church. It teaches that Satan, in the form of a serpent, seduced Eve to eat of the forbidden fruit; it relates the doings of the Egyptian magicians; it forbids necromancy and evocation of the dead, and commands the Jews not to suffer a witch to live; declares that all the gods of the gentiles are devils; tells us that the devil is the prince of this world, that he goeth about like a roaring lion, seeking whom he may devour; bids us resist the devil and he will flee from us. St. Paul speaks of the prince and the powers of the air that besiege us, and against whom we must put on the whole armor of God, and do valiant battle. Moreover it speaks of demoniacs, or persons possessed with devils; and among the marvellous works ascribed to Jesus Christ, is that of expelling demons, or casting out devils. All Christians, then, must admit that there is a devil, and that there are evil spirits, who may, and who do, interfere with men, harass them, and sometimes take literal possession of them. A recent French author, a sincere Christian believer, has felt this. "The question," he says, "at the Christian point of view, is by no means indifferent, but is, as it were, the mother-question, the question of questions. It is no less than to determine whether the Bible and the church have or have not been really mistaken in one of their fundamental principles. For a man filled with Christian desires, and cherishing at the same time a respect for evidence, the question is most grave. It touches the whole of faith, neither more nor less; and as it will not do to admit in the sacred Scriptures, whose language is assumed to be inspired, what is called *manners of speaking*, or *complaisances* for the age, or *remains of ignorance*, we must be permitted to say, that if it

were proved that the Bible in the time of Pharaoh mistook simple and miserable jugglers for real *magicians*, poor charlatans for *enchanters*, a few knavish and lying priests for the false gods of the gentiles, simple mummeries for real *evocations*, delirious cataleptics for spirits of Python, &c.; if it were proved that Jesus Christ, in granting to his disciples the gift, and prescribing to them the rules, of expelling demons, mistook a fact of pure physiology; if it were proved that the church, in instituting exorcism, and prescribing for it precise and learned formulas, and, moreover, practising it for eighteen centuries, has been deceived during all that period,—we should feel that it is all over with Christianity; we should regard it as condemned, and hasten to renounce an authority so little judicious, and so little to be depended upon." Christians may, undoubtedly, dispute as to this or that particular case, and say that the evidence of demonic intervention, in this or that particular instance, is not conclusive; but they cannot, without renouncing their faith, and becoming Sadducees, deny that such intervention is possible, or assert that it is improbable. They must concede its possibility, its probability, and its susceptibility of proof; and therefore when the evidence in any particular instance is sufficient to establish the reality of any other class of facts, they are bound, as reasonable beings, to admit it. To them there is, and can be no *a priori* difficulty, for they already believe in the reality of demonic agents adequate to produce the mysterious phenomena that they are called upon to accept. Hence, in those ages and countries in which nobody doubted Christianity, all men of science, physicians, magistrates, as well as the clergy and the people, readily admitted the demonic character of the phenomena like those produced in our day by mesmerism.

But, if the belief in the reality of demonic intervention is integral in Christianity, the most obvious way of getting rid of Christianity and its restraints would be to deny that reality, and to explain the phenomena commonly held as evidence of such intervention, on physiological and other natural principles. This has been the aim of science, especially medical science, during the last two hundred years. This aim was adopted by the so-called wits and philosophers of the last century, and during this it has begun to be adopted by jurisprudence, and even to be acquiesced in by a large portion of professed Christian ministers.

Literary men, like Sir Walter Scott; founders of new sects, like the late Hosea Ballou, of Boston; neologist theologians everywhere; and that "fourth estate,"—journalism, have all combined to reason, explain, or laugh away, every thing pertaining to demonology, and to make the world believe that there is no devil, that evil spirits are only the creatures of a disordered brain, that apparitions or ghosts are only hallucinations, possession a peculiar kind of madness or insanity, and magic mere charlatanry or sleight-of-hand. All this, for an anti-Christian purpose, was admirable, since even the conservative portion of the clergy seemed to acquiesce in it.

Nevertheless, this could suffice only to a certain extent. It might serve to emancipate the intelligent classes, but could not emancipate the people. The latter half of the eighteenth century—a century of anti-Christian light, philosophy, physical science, and materialism—was more distinguished for the mysterious phenomena, usually called demoniacal, than any other period since the Christianizing of the Roman Empire, with the single exception of the sixteenth century. Weishaupt, Mesmer, Saint-Martin, and Cagliostro, did far more to produce the revolutions and convulsions of European society at the close of that century, than was done by Voltaire, Rousseau, D'Alembert, Diderot, Mirabeau, and their associates. These men had no doubt a bad influence, but it was limited and feeble. It was not they who stirred up all classes, produced that revolutionary madness, that wild ungovernable fury of the people which we everywhere witnessed, and nowhere more than in Paris, the politest and most humane city in the world. The masses were possessed, they were whirled aloft, were driven hither and thither, and onward in the terrible work of demolition, by a mysterious power they did not comprehend, and by a force they were unable, having once yielded to it, to resist.

You feel this in reading the history of those terrible events. It seems to you that Satan was unbound, and hell let loose. The historians of that old French Revolution, such as Mignet, Thiers, Lamartine, Carlyle, all feel that there was something *fatal* in it, and have been led, at least all except the last, to defend it on the ground of fatalism. The royalist and Catholic historians, who oppose it, seem never to seize its spirit. They declaim, denounce, find fault here, find fault there, now with this action and now with that, but they never explain any thing, solve any prob-

lem which comes up, and they leave the whole a mystery, or an enigma.

The same phenomena, only on a reduced scale, were observable in the revolutions of 1848. Everywhere there seemed to be an invisible power at work. Good, honest Father Bresciani, would explain all this by the secret societies. It is in vain. They did much, those secret societies; but how explain the existence of those societies themselves, their horrible principles, and the fidelity of their members in submitting to what they must know is a thousand times more oppressive than the institutions they are opposing? Tell me not that all these revolutionists were incarnate devils; that they coolly, and deliberately, from ordinary human motives and influences, planned and carried out their revolutionary enterprise. There were in their ranks men of the highest intelligence, the purest virtue, and the humanest feelings; men, all of whose antecedents, whose tendencies, whose studies, professions, interests, and, I may say, convictions, placed them in the ranks of the conservatives, were carried away by an invisible force, and shouted out, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, and hurled the brand of the incendiary at temple, palace, and castle, which sheltered them, as if it were not they who did it, but a spirit that possessed them. Men caught the infection, they knew not how, they knew not when, they knew not where. The revolutionary spirit seemed to float in the air, as it undoubtedly did.

Without Weishaupt, Mesmer, Saint-Martin, Cagliostro, you can never explain the revolution of 1789, and without me and my accomplices you can just as little explain those of 1848. There was at work in the former a power that the wits ridiculed, that science denied, philosophy disproved, and the clergy hardly dared assert. There was there the mighty power, whatever it be, which it is said once dared dispute the empire of heaven with the Omnipotent, and which all ages have called Satan, whether it is to be called evil with the Christian, or good with the philanthropist, a person with the believer, or a primitive and elemental force with the mesmerist. France, Europe was mesmerized. So was it again in 1848, though with less terrible external convulsions.

It is impossible to bring the great body of the people of any age to agree with our Voltairian philosophers—to be genuine Sadducees. In the first place, the writings of the

philosophers and academicians do not reach the mass; and, in the second place, there are constantly occurring phenomena which, in their apprehension, give the lie to Sadducism. At the very time when the philosophers of pagan Rome were losing all faith in their national religion, doubting almost the existence of the Divinity and the immortality of the soul, and laughing at augurs and soothsayers, the people were more superstitious than ever. It was then that magicians from Asia and Africa flocked to the Eternal City, and that Isiac, Bacchic, and other Eastern superstitions, with all their impurities and wild fanaticism, in comparison with which the national religion was pure, reasonable, and moral, were introduced, and spread as an epidemic; and the laws of the earlier emperors show how hard and how ineffectually authority labored to suppress them.

The enemies of Christianity may accept the mysterious phenomena, commonly regarded as diabolical, and explain them and the miracles of the Bible and the alleged miracles of the church on natural principles, and if they cannot explain them on any known natural principles, they may make them the basis of an induction of a new natural principle; or, in other words, invent a natural principle to explain them, as Baron Reichenbach has done—a principle, element, substance, or force, which he calls *od*. They may do this, or they may recognize their real spiritual and superhuman origin, but ascribe them to good, not to evil spirits, or what is the same thing, maintain that what the world has hitherto worshipped as good is evil, and what it has been taught to avoid as evil is good. That is, that Satan is God, and God is Satan.

Swedenborg, in founding his New Jerusalem, or New Church, and Joe Smith, in founding the Church of the Latter Day Saints, as Mahomet in the seventh century, virtually adopted the latter course. Swedenborg became, in the later years of his life, a somnambulist, and could throw himself into the state which some mesmerists call sleep-waking, in which he was a clairvoyant, and had the power of second sight. He fancied himself a prophet, and capable of teaching angels as well as men. But he held the power he found himself able to exercise, to be good as well as supernatural.

The same was the case with Joe Smith, an idle, shiftless lad, utterly incapable of conceiving, far less of executing the project of founding a new church. He was ignorant,

illiterate, and weak, and of bad reputation. I knew his family, and even him also, in my boyhood, before he became a prophet. He was one of those persons in whose hand the divining-rod will operate, and he and others of his family spent much time in searching with the rod for watercourses, minerals, and hidden treasures. Every mesmerizer would at once have recogized him as an impressible subject. He also could throw himself, by artificial means, that of a peculiar kind of stone, which he called his Urim and Thummim, into the sleep-waking state, in which only would he or could he prophesy. In that state he seemed another man. Ordinarily his look was dull, and heavy, almost stupid; his eye had an inexpressive glare, and he was rough, and rather profane. But the moment he consulted his Urim and Thummim, and the spirit was upon him, his face brightened up, his eye shone and sparkled as living fire, and he seemed instinct with a life and energy not his own. He was in those times, as one of his apostles assured me, "awful to behold."

Much nonsense has been vented by the press about the origin of his Bible, or the Book of Mormon. The most ridiculous as well as the most current version of the affair is, that the book was originally written as a novel, by one Spalding, a Presbyterian minister in Pennsylvania, and that Joe got hold of the manuscript and published it as a new Bible. This version is refuted by a simple perusal of the book itself, which is too much and too little to have had such an origin. In his normal state, Joe Smith could never have written the more striking passages of the Book of Mormon; and any man capable of doing it, could never have written any thing so weak, silly, utterly unmeaning as the rest. No man ever dreamed of writing it as a novel, and whoever had produced it in his normal state, would have made it either better in its feebler parts, or worse in its stronger passages.

The origin of the book was explained to me by one of Joe's own elders, on the authority of the person who, as Joe's amanuensis, wrote it. From beginning to end, it was dictated by Joe himself, not translated from plates, as was generally alleged, but apparently from a peculiar stone, which he subsequently called his Urim and Thummim, and used in his divination. He placed the stone in his hat, which stood upon a table, and then taking a seat, he concealed his face in his hat above it, and commenced dictating in a sleep-waking state, under the influence of the mysterious power that used or assisted him. I lived near

the place where the book was produced. I had subsequently ample means of investigating the whole case, and I availed myself of them to the fullest extent. For a considerable time the Mormon prophets and elders were in the habit of visiting my house. They hoped to make me a convert, and they spoke to me with the utmost frankness and unreserve.

Numerous miracles, or what seemed to be miracles—such miracles as evil spirits have power to perform—and certain marvellous cures were alleged to be wrought by the prayers and laying on of the hands of the Mormon elders. Some of these were wrought on persons closely related and well known to me personally; and I have heard others confirmed by persons of known intelligence and veracity, whose testimony was as conclusive for me as would have been my own personal observation. That there was a superhuman power employed in founding the Mormon church, cannot easily be doubted by any scientific and philosophic mind that has investigated the subject; and just as little can a sober man doubt that the power employed was not divine, and that Mormonism is literally the synagogue of Satan.

It matters little to the enemies of Christianity, whether the public deny altogether the marvellous phenomena heretofore regarded as diabolical, whether they accept and explain them by means of a primitive force or primordial law of nature, or simply ascribe them to satanic invasion, provided it be held that Satan is a philanthropist, the friend and benefactor of the race, not the enemy; for in any case, Christianity is denied or undermined. But the purely sceptical theory answers only for the few, who, it is to be remarked, never see any of these marvellous phenomena, and who, if they did see them, might be led to embrace Christianity; but it will never suffice for the many, and can never subserve the views of reformers who would operate upon the masses.

It however makes no practical difference which of the other two hypotheses is adopted. For myself, I in some sense adopted both, though, as I have said, I inclined to the naturalistic theory. But even then I had begun to contemplate an ulterior object, which might make it more convenient to adopt the latter hypothesis, for it might become necessary to overthrow Christianity by the introduction, apparently by supernatural means, of another religion—a religion in harmony with the wants of the flesh. It is im-

possible to overthrow a positive religion by a pure negation, or to get rid of Christianity without substituting something positive in its place; for it is to be remarked, that sceptical ages are the most credulous, and that as Christian faith recedes, superstition advances. Hence we see in Scandinavia unmistakable evidences of a revival of the worship of Odin; and only a short time since, the government had to adopt measures to repress it in the north of Norway. In many parts of Germany we see a decided tendency to revive the superstition which Christianity supplanted. When men have no longer religion, they take refuge in superstition; and when they cease to worship God, they begin to worship the devil. The most interesting people to the Englishman Layard that he found in the East, were the devil-worshippers.

But all this is premature. World-reform, as I had sketched it to myself, had for its object unbounded liberty, and was to be accomplished, on the one hand, by the overthrow of all existing governments, and the complete disruption of all political and civil society; and on the other, by the total demolition of the Christian Church, and extirpation of the Christian religion. Of course it would not do to avow all this, for if I did, I should defeat my own purposes. Faith still lurked in many a heart; and the persuasion of the necessity of some kind of government, some kind of political, civil, and even moral restraint was very generally entertained, even by those whom I must make my accomplices, and use as my tools. It was necessary to keep one's own counsel, or to confide it to the smallest number possible. To the world it would do to avow only the design of divorcing religion from politics, and of democratizing the church and society. This might be avowed without shocking the public at large. For this the public mind was in a measure prepared. A pious priest could be persuaded to advocate ecclesiastical democracy, as we have seen in the work of the excellent Rosmini, on the *Five Wounds of the Church.*

A popularizing tendency among Catholics had been much encouraged by that powerful priest, the Abbé de La Mennais, and his enthusiastic associates. It is true, he had fallen under censure, and had been excommunicated, *eo nomine*, by Rome; but the party he formed, though disavowing him, still retained somewhat of his spirit, and followed his tendency. There was a growing party in France,

even among the clergy, who wished to divorce the church from the state, and induce her to abandon the courts, and cement an intimate alliance with the people, and lend her powerful influence to the democratic movements of the day. They had much that was plausible in their favor. The royal and nobiliaire governments of Europe had always labored to convert the dignitaries of the church into courtiers, and to make her their tool for enslaving and fleecing the people. The greatest injury religion had ever received, it had received from courtier bishops, and the tyranny of the state over the church, equally fatal to her and to the people. The real interests of the church would therefore seem to demand of her to make common cause with the people against kings and aristocrats, and in favor of democratic institutions. This conviction was becoming very general among the more earnest and influential Catholic laymen. A corresponding conviction was also becoming general among the great mass of the Protestant populations. It was possible, then, to labor to democratize society without alarming religious convictions; nay, it was possible to enlist them to a great extent in the same work. Nobody, it is well known, helped us on more effectually in Europe than many of the most distinguished among the Catholic clergy and laity. I need only mention Ventura and Gioberti in Italy, Montalembert, Lacordaire, Cormenin, Maret, and Archbishop Affre, in France.

But, after all, great movements are never carried on by simple human means alone, and never get beyond brilliant theories unless inspired and sustained by a superhuman power, either from heaven or from hell. Christianity had taught us the weakness of human nature, and I found that weakness confirmed by experience. Between the power to conceive and to execute there is a distance. Men might form the most brilliant ideals, bring out the soundest, most attractive and perfect theories of reform, but it would avail nothing, unless endued with a power not their own, to realize them in practice. Here was the defect in the plan of Signor Urbini and Young Italy. It was skilfully devised, it had all of human wisdom on its side, but it was ideal, and had no power or energy to realize itself. No man lifteth himself by his own waistbands. Without the Whereon to stand, Archimedes, with all his mechanical contrivances, cannot move the world. It is necessary to have a support outside of man; a source of power which is not

human, and as the world would say, either divine or satanic, to be able to accomplish any thing.

But had I not this very power in the agent I had been experimenting with? What else was this mesmeric agent, whether a primitive, an elemental force of nature, or indeed a superhuman spirit endowed with intelligence and will? Mr. Winslow was, in the main, right. Mesmeric clubs or circles must be formed on all points on which it is necessary to operate, and batteries be erected everywhere, so that anywhere, and at any moment, a mesmeric current may be sent instantaneously through the masses, infusing into them a superhuman resolution and energy, and making them stand up and march as one man. This, then, was the first thing to be done. I would erect my mesmeric batteries in every country in Europe, all connected by an invisible, but unbroken, magnetic chain.

This plan, as far as I thought it prudent, I forthwith communicated to Priscilla, without whose co-operation I could not carry it into effect. She approved it, and was ready to co-operate in any way I wished. The poor lady, I may remark, had no longer any will of her own. She had craved liberty, and had induced me to aid her in establishing it, and was now only my slave, bound to me in chains, which, struggle as she might, she could not, of herself alone, break or unfasten.

CHAPTER XII.—A MISSIONARY TOUR.

The civil and political revolution I wished to effect, had apparently, to a considerable extent, been already effected in my own country, and the principal theatre of my operations must be in the Old World. There is no doubt, that, at bottom, the American system does not differ from the European. It is the same system of repression, and, though it dispenses with kings and nobles, it asserts, with equal emphasis, the necessity of government, of law, and morals. The American, in making his revolution, had no socialistic dreams, no thought of resolving society into its original elements, denying all authority, rejecting all government, abolishing all religion and morality, and leaving every man to do freely whatever seems right in his own eyes, however wrong it may seem in those of his neighbor. The authors of the American Revolution, and founders of the American states and the American Union, were any thing but democrats in the present prevailing sense of the word.

But the progress of ideas and events has so modified the American system, and done so much towards restoring a perfect democracy, where the demagogues have every thing their own way, that the chance of getting up any considerable revolutionary party, except to operate abroad, is not worth counting. Indeed, it is not necessary to hasten the march of things here, which is sufficiently rapid towards that point where democracy resolves itself either into complete individualism or into an absolute social despotism. I saw and felt this, and looked upon my own country as more ready to assist me in my philanthropic or satanic efforts to revolutionize foreign countries than in need of similar efforts on its own account.

Let me not, however, be misunderstood. Let me speak as I think and feel as I lie here confined to my room, from which I am to be removed only to my grave. I love not democracy, which I regard as from below, not from above; but I love as little, perhaps much less, absolute or unlimited monarchy,—your czarism, Cæsarism, or imperialism. I may think it unwise, wrong, wicked even, to attempt to overthrow by revolutionary violence, an absolute government, where it exists, and is not intolerable in practice, for the sake of introducing a republic, or even a constitutional monarchy; but I hold no government a good one, where one man alone represents the will and the majesty of the nation. I demand a government of estates, whenever that is practicable, but always a representative body, with real legislative power, capable of imposing real and effective restraints on the administration. I demand for the nation the means of making known freely and effectively, within the limits of the moral law, its will. I demand the freedom of the press, temperately, and answerable for its abuse (which, however, must be a real abuse), to criticize publicly the acts of political authority, to point out the defects of its policy, and to suggest measures for the public good. I demand a political constitution in which the nation governs through a king or president, and parliament or legislative body or bodies. I am, what is sneered at by your imperialists, a parliamentarian, a constitutionalist, and have no sympathy at all with the Cæsarism of either France or Russia. I am no radical, no revolutionist, no friend of sedition, but I love a wise, prudent, well-regulated liberty, which leaves me all my power to do good, and therefore, necessarily, to some extent, even to do evil; for if you so bind me by the civil

power that I can do no evil, you take from me my manhood, make me an automaton, and deprive me of all power to do good and to acquire merit. Such is my political creed, and therefore let no man dare, because I favor not now the wild radical movements of the age, accuse me of being an enemy to liberty, or a worshipper of Cæsarism, or what is called absolutism.

Not seeing much to be done in my own country, I resolved to go abroad. I required Priscilla to make herself ready to accompany me, and to take her husband along with her. I know not whether this latter request pleased her or not. Woman is woman even when under the power of the Evil One; and that Priscilla loved me, and loved me madly, she hardly pretended to conceal. I had, perhaps, loved her, too, for a moment, when I might do so innocently, and I loved her still as much as remained in me the power to love. But love or lust was not precisely my ruling passion, and I would as soon have taken another with me as Priscilla, could she have served my purpose as well. Even in my worst days I was as much repelled as attracted by a woman who could betray her husband's honor, and I always found a woman, mastered by her passion, and ready to give up all for love, as it is called, a troublesome rather than an agreeable companion. A man wishes to find in the woman of his affections a free soul, moral dignity,—a tender, loving heart, indeed, but with sufficient strength to stand alone. Lads and lasses in their teens have very false notions of love, and this is why love so seldom survives the honeymoon, and why so many complain of unrequited affection and broken hearts.

But I could not do without Priscilla, and I wished her husband to accompany her to avoid scandal, and also to serve as manager, to take charge of all the arrangements in travelling, residing in one place, or in going from that to another, for which he was admirably adapted. I found him far more intelligent, far more of a man than I had been led to suspect from his ready submission to petticoat government. Priscilla had entirely mistaken him, and might one day find him more than her master.

In a couple of months our arrangements were made for the voyage to Europe, and for a longer or shorter residence abroad, as we should find it convenient. We embarked from Boston in one of the Cunard steamers for Liverpool, in May, 1843. We arrived at Liverpool after a pleasant voyage of

thirteen days, and as soon as we could land, and get our baggage through the custom-house, we departed for London, where we proposed stopping for some weeks. Let not the reader fear that I am about to inflict on him a journal of my travels in England and on the Continent. I did not go abroad as a curious traveller, to see other lands, and study the ways, manners, customs, institutions, laws, politics, or religion of other nations. I went for a special object, and to that I confined myself. I could, if I would, tell very little more than I might have learned at home. My mission was not to observe and learn, but to do, and to prepare, and hasten on the grand movement I contemplated.

I did not find in England much remaining to be done, or that I needed to do. I saw very few of her nobility, and I was not even once invited to dine with the queen. The middle classes I found very much like my own countrymen, with very much the same culture, ideas, habits, and pursuits. I found, as at home, a large number of philanthropists, though less thoroughgoing than ours, and narrower, and less comprehensive in their views. The common Englishman is a little insular in his notions, and looks with disdain or pity on all who do not happen to be natives of his own island world. The American is broad and expanded in his views, like his extended prairies and boundless forests. No pent up Utica confines him; the globe is too small for him; and he seriously contemplates forming a joint-stock company for the construction of a railroad to the moon. He thinks it will prove a good speculation. They are both proud, equally proud; but with the Englishman, pride assumes the form of haughtiness, or a low estimate of others; while with the American, it assumes that of a conscious superiority to all the rest of creation.

I did not see much chance of a reform or a democratic revolution in England at present. True, she had at that time a very considerable body of Chartists, and a numerous *canaille*, but these I counted for nothing. No revolution is ever made by the proletarian classes. Wat Tyler, Jack Cade, and the Jacquerie of France have proved that. No people can ever overthrow a government till the government betrays itself. In 1789, and in 1848, in every instance the government, with a few whiffs of grape-shot, might have dispersed the mob and suppressed the revolution. *Quem Deus vult perdere, prius dementat.* I placed no reliance on the democracy of England, yet I did not at all de-

spair of her. She had her Reform Bill of 1832, which in due time would be followed by another, and another, till her House of Commons would come to be regarded as representing population, not an estate. The extension of her commerce and manufactories was compelling Sir Robert Peel, an able man, but a shortsighted statesman, to break up the protective system, establish free trade, and throw the power into the hands of the urban class. I did not need to mesmerize him; he was doing my work as fast as it could be done with safety. Lord John Russell, Lord Palmerston, and their friends, I found had been visited before me. Mr. Gladstone needed a slight manipulation; but I saw that he was an impressible subject, and I foresaw that, when he became Chancellor of the Exchequer, I should have every reason to be satisfied with him. Lord Shaftesbury, then Lord Ashley, I found amply mesmerized by nature and inheritance.

As to aid from England, in carrying on democratic revolutions on the Continent, especially in Italy, if not in France, I might count on it with entire confidence, so far as beginning the movements and getting into trouble were concerned. But I thought possibly I might find her aid like the devil's, which suffices to help one into a scrape, but leaves him to get out the best way he can. She had no interest in helping the reformers to establish democracy, but she was ready enough to throw the Continental states into confusion and anarchy. Hers has of late years been only a half-way genius. Nevertheless, I found in her a few choice spirits, and erected a mesmeric battery, which has since done some service to the cause I had at heart. Priscilla was still more successful among the philanthropic ladies and women with whom she was able to communicate. We made sure, without much difficulty, of Exeter Hall. It was a battery already charged, and served, with skill and ability.

We prepared an agent to visit Liverpool, Manchester, Birmingham and other considerable English towns, and, upon the whole, were very well satisfied with our mother country, and in good spirits left England for Dublin. We were received there with true Irish hospitality. The Liberator was then in his glory, and filled a large space in the eyes of the world. He had obtained the Catholic Relief Bill, and opened to his co-religionists of Great Britain and Ireland a political arena, and was now agitating for the legislative independence of his native country. A few months after he was arrested,

and sentenced to a fine and a year's imprisonment, which virtually put an end to his movement. It broke his heart both as a patriot and as a lawyer. He received us very coolly at first, because we were Americans, and the Americans held negro slaves; but on learning that we were abolitionists and philanthropists, he opened his large heart to us, and bid us a hundred thousand welcomes. We could not, however, make much of O'Connell. He was an admirable type of the general Irish character, and not easily understood. He struck us as a bundle of opposing qualities, not usually thrown together in the same individual. A pious Catholic, he was surrounded by unbelievers, and the patron of the whole herd of philanthropists, whose chief aim was to rid the world of his religion; a man of impulse, as capricious as a child, wily as a village attorney, and subtle as the most crafty lawyer, and acting always upon calculation; a warm-hearted patriot, a genuine lover of his country, yet with a sharp eye to the "rint," and leaving it doubtful to many minds whether he had any higher motives in what he did than to gain personal distinction, and to elevate his family. He however interested us as the inventor of "peaceful agitation," an invention which could have been made only by an Irish lawyer, and it was as a "peaceful agitator" that we chose to think of him. We found his "peaceful agitation" might be turned to good account in the constitutional states of the Continent, and we took care to introduce it into France, when we visited that country, with what effect those who remember the "Reform Banquets" which preceded the revolution of February, 1848, need not to be informed.

From the Liberator, or, as we chose to call him, the Agitator, we went to meet the chiefs of the Young Ireland party, still apparently acting in harmony with him. We formed no great expectations of them. They talked too much, and made too much noise and bluster. We found them in excellent dispositions, but too unsubstantial for our purpose. They were all ablaze, and no heat. The devil, having no creative power, could not himself make much of them, and gave them up in despair. Hence their miserable failure four years later at Slievnamon. Indeed, Ireland was a country by no means to our philanthropic and reforming purpose, and we made no account of her in preparing our revolutionary movements. We however erected a small battery in the west, with a view to some ulterior operations, and which we left in charge of Exeter Hall. It has produced some tem-

porary effect; but inasmuch as it has served to arouse the Popish bishops and clergy to a more diligent discharge of their duties, in regard to the religious and moral instruction of the people in that hitherto somewhat neglected district, it is not certain but it will, in the long run, produce an effect the reverse of that intended. Rome, too, has sent a man after her own heart to look after the Irish church, the present archbishop of Dublin and primate of Ireland; so the philanthropists have not much to hope from Ireland. Pat will sometimes live and talk as an unbeliever, but he has a singular propensity to die a Christian.

From Ireland we visited Edinburgh, Glasgow, the Highlands, and the Hebrides—the Highlands and Hebrides, for the purpose of making observations on the "second sight" of the natives. We were much pleased with Scotland. The Scottish character has many admirable features, and there is not upon the whole a finer race in Europe than the Scotch, when unperverted. We found nothing to do among them. There was no need of mesmerizing them. Their own "*ingenium perfervidum*," a sort of permanent mesmerization, was amply sufficient for all our purposes. Besides, there seemed to be a natural and ample supply of the odic fluid in her own mountains and glens, which were still peopled by brownies and fairies.

CHAPTER XIII.—THE TOUR CONTINUED.

Finding all right in Scotland, we visited Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, the ancient Scandinavia, the land of Odin, and home of the most strongly-marked devil-worship to be found in history. With all my study and experiments, I was far below many mesmerizers I found among the natives of these countries. I found operative the spirit of the old Vikings, the Berserkirs, and the Sagas, which had made the Norsemen the nobility of Europe, and the plunderers of every maritime district, which had precipitated Gustavus Adolphus upon the empire to perish at Lützen, and Charles XII. upon Russian Peter, to meet his fate at Pultowa. It still survives, hardly restrained by the Christian profession, and capable of being kindled up anew, and set to work in all its pristine vigor. Of these northern countries I felt sure, and that I might safely leave them to themselves.

We passed on to St. Petersburg, and had an interview with the czar of all the Russias. We found him one of the no-

blest-looking men in Europe, simple, affable, intellectual, and well-informed. He treated us with distinction on account of our country, with which he said he and his predecessors had always been on friendly terms, and whose unexampled prosperity he saw with pleasure. He could understand our politics, and respected them, for they were based on a principle—a wrong principle he believed—nevertheless a principle, consistently carried out. He believed the Russian system, under which one man governs, is far preferable to ours, under which all govern. However, we might honestly disagree with him. Apparently he was the most bitter as well as the most powerful enemy of our revolutionary plans; but we did not despair of him. He seemed wedded to the *status quo*; but we felt that when once we had destroyed that, we could make him and his legions do our work, for we found him a sort of pope in his own dominions, and not indisposed to supplant the pope of Rome. He was, if a friend to papacy, the enemy of the real pope, and that was enough for us.

The czar, foreseeing the revolutionary movements which would be attempted in western Europe, had for the moment ceased to favor the Panslavic movement which he previously set on foot; but we saw that the impulse had been given, and that ultimately he must return to it, go on with it, or be swept away by it. This Panslavic movement to unite the whole Slavic race, numbering upwards of seventy millions, and holding a territory capable of supporting twice, if not three times that number of inhabitants, under one Slavic government, imperial or republican, would operate, we thought, altogether in our favor; for it would ruin Austria, the chief support of the papacy, and give a decided predominance to the anti-Catholic powers throughout all Europe. We therefore favored it, and took care to form various circles in support of it, as we traversed the Empire from St. Petersburg to Moscow, Nijni Novgorod, Little Russia, to the Black Sea; and also, among the Serbs of Bulgaria, Servia, Bosnia, in European Turkey; Transylvania, the Banat, Croatia, Slavonia, and Bohemia, in the Austrian Empire.

We visited, on leaving Russia and Slavic Turkey, the kingdom of Hungary. There we found Kossuth, and he answered our purpose. Priscilla formed a circle among the Magyar ladies, but it was quite unnecessary. I initiated Kossuth into my plan, and laid my hand on his head, and breathed into his mouth, and left him to take care of the Magyar race. High-

ly delighted, we passed from Presburg to Vienna, where we stayed some weeks. The imperial family and high aristocracy were proof against our arts, but we found the burghers, the *employés* of the government, and especially the students of the University, quite impressible, and we charged them for a revolution.

From Vienna we passed through Cracow to Warsaw, and from Warsaw we went to Berlin. In all these places we found every thing favorable. We passed through the capitals of several of the smaller German states and principalities, stopped a few days in the Grand Duchy of Baden, and then hastened to take up our residence at Geneva, in Switzerland. We did not visit Munich, but sent Lola Montes there, whom Priscilla, at my order, had prepared. She did very well, but not so well as I expected. She used her extraordinary powers too much for her own aggrandizement. She should never have suffered King Louis to have made her a countess. She was too vain and ostentatious.

We arrived in Geneva, late in the autumn of 1844, and made it our principal residence till the spring of 1846. We had made no prolonged stay in Poland, for we found the Poles already mesmerized. Cold and callous as I had become, I yet had a tear for poor Poland, and, let my conservative brethren say what they will, I still weep her fate. I am not affected by the prevailing Russo-phobia, and in the contest now raging between Russia and the Western powers, I believe that she has the advantage on the score of justice, though now that they have been mad and foolish enough to wage war against her, the interests of Europe perhaps demand their success; for if they fail, she becomes quite too powerful. There are traits in the Russian character I like, but I can never forgive the murder of Poland. Catherine, Frederick, and Maria Theresa, in that crime opened the way to modern revolutions, and deprived crowned heads, to a powerful extent, of the sympathy of the friends of justice and order. The Poles had their faults, great and grievous, but the partition of their kingdom by the three powers of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, was a crime that no faults could justify, and, what some would say is worse, a political blunder. Since then, the Polish nobles have been, and will long continue to be, their evil genius.

We did not long remain in Germany, for we found most of the German states already prepared, and already in close communication, after the German fashion, with the powers

of the air. The German genius is mystic, and plunges either into the profoundest depths of Christian mysticism, which unites the soul with God, or into the demoniacal mysticism, which unites it in strictest union with Satan. The German, whatever his efforts, can never make himself a pure rationalist. He has too much religiosity for that. He must worship, and when he worships not God, he worships the devil, and either through the elevating power of the Holy Ghost rises to heaven, or, through the depressing power of Satan, sinks to hell. You never find him standing on the simple plane of human nature, and he is always either superhumanly good or superhumanly wicked. For an Englishman, an American, an Irishman, there is a medium, a possibility of compromise, a sort of split-the-difference character—now saying, good Lord, and now saying, "good devil,"—a *via media* genius, which offends both extremes, and satisfies nobody. I like the German genius better. If the Lord be God, then serve him, if Baal be God, then in Satan's name serve Baal. Be either cold or hot, not lukewarm. *Ernst is das Leben* is the German's motto, and whatever he proposes to do, whether good or evil, he sets about it in downright earnest. There is more to hope, and more to fear from the German or Teutonic race than any other in Europe, for it has very little of the Italian and French, or the English and American *frivolezza*, that curse of modern society.

At Geneva we met Mazzini, a remarkable man, in his way, the very genius of intrigue, and wholly sold to the devil. We also met there the Abbate Gioberti, a Piedmontese, who had been exiled as a liberal by the government of Carlo Alberto, the *ci-devant* Carbonaro. He was a Catholic priest, and though under the censure of the government, and distrusted by the Jesuits, nay, violently opposed by them, he had not at that time, so far as I could learn, fallen under the censure of his church. He was one of the ablest men we met in our European travels, and a fine specimen of the higher order of Italian genius. Though comparatively young, not much over forty, he was deeply and solidly learned, and as a writer on political and philosophical subjects, had, saying nothing of his peculiar views, no superior, and hardly an equal in all Italy, if indeed in all Europe.

Gioberti affected to be an ultramontane, a rigid Catholic, a thoroughgoing papist; yet his sympathies were with the liberal or revolutionary party. He was, first of all, an Ital-

ian, and held that the moral, civil, and political primacy of the world belonged to Italy, and it was because God had, from remote ages, given to her this primacy, that the papal chair was established at Rome. The primacy belonged to the successors of St. Peter in their quality of *Roman* pontiffs, who, as such, were heritors of the Italian *primato*. The papal authority was founded in divine right, but mediately through the divine right of the Italians as heritors of the old Roman sacerdocy, and Italo-Greek civilization. According to him, the papacy did not so much continue the synagogue, as the old Roman priesthood, or rather, the Jewish and pagan priesthoods both meet and become one in the papacy—the summit and representative of the Christian priesthood.

His plan, therefore, was, first of all, Italian unity, not the republican or democratic unity of Mazzini and Young Italy, nor yet a monarchical unity, under a purely secular prince; but a federative union under the moderatorship of the pope made one in the papacy. The Romans, he held, at least from the time of Numa, had been an armed priesthood, and should now resume, under the pope, their old character and mission. Italy thus united, thus organized, under the moderatorship of the pope, could reassert her primacy, and carry on the work of civilization. With her twenty-five millions of inhabitants, the natural superiority of her genius, the moral weight of the papacy, her peculiar geographical position, and the productiveness of her soil, she would be impregnable to attack, and more than able to cope single-handed with any one of the great European powers. In other words, he sought for the pope and the Italians what Nicholas is supposed to seek for the czar and the Russians.

The rock on which he split, and I told him so at the time, was in assuming the intrinsic compatibility of gentilism and Christianity. He wished to combine the antique pagan and the modern Christian spirit, and to train youth to be devout Catholics, and yet, at the same time, proud, daring, and energetic gentiles. He did not agree at all with the Abbé Gaume and the party laboring to exclude the Greek and Roman classics from our colleges and universities; he had no very high opinion of the fathers of the church, with the exception of St. Augustine, and no patience with the mediæval knights and doctors. He waged unrelenting war on the philosophy taught by the Jesuits, and, indeed, upon the whole system of education pursued by those renowned re-

ligious, which, he contended, had practically emasculated the European mind, deprived it of all depth and originality, and of all free and vigorous activity. Its effect had been to produce, in nearly all Europe, a universal *frivolezza*, or frivolity of thought and action.

But he forgot to note, that gentilism and Christianity are directly opposed one to the other. Christianity educates for heaven, gentilism for earth; the former is based on pride, the latter on humility; the one exalts God, the other exalts man. The Gospel teaches us to despise what gentilism honors, and to honor what gentilism despises, and to possess the world by rising above it, and trampling it under our feet. A Christian discipline has for its end, to mortify the flesh, and to make men live as if dead to the world, and to overcome the world by dying, not by slaying; by relying on the wisdom and power of God, not on their own. Gentile discipline trains men primarily for the world, develops the nobility of pride, not the higher nobility of humility—trains men to act, by their own wisdom and sagacity, on men, to be artful and overreaching statesmen, intrepid soldiers, able and invincible commanders. It is obvious to every one that these two systems can never be combined, and made to work harmoniously together. Ye cannot serve God and Mammon.

Taking the gentile standard, taking a Fabricius, a Scipio, a Cato, a Cæsar, instead of a St. Bruno or a St. Francis of Assisi, as a model man; or a Cornelia instead of a St. Clara or a St. Theresa, for a model woman, there can be no doubt of the vast superiority of ancient gentilism over modern Catholicity, or even Christianity itself, and, in this sense, the devout Irishman was right when he said, "Religion has been the ruin of us," and more especially as it regards Catholics. Non-Catholics, as to the empire of this world, display a wisdom, an energy, and a decision, which you seldom find in strictly Catholic states, and the only cases in which so-called Catholic states approach them, is when they put their religion in their pocket, war on the pope, or for purely secular ends, on purely earthly principles. The French Republic, in putting an end to the Mazzinian Reign of Terror, and restoring Pius IX. to his temporal estates, professed no religious motives, and would have failed if it had. It acted from worldly policy, and avowedly for the purpose of watching Austria and maintaining French influence in the peninsula.

The question is not as Gioberti conceives it; it is not a question of the fusion of Christian and gentile virtues, but a question between gentilism and Christianity itself. It is not how to train our youth to be great, noble, energetic, according to the Italo-Greek standard, but whether we are or are not to be Christians. If Christianity be true, there can be no question that our youth should be trained for heaven and not for the world, and taught to be meek, humble, self-denying, unworldly—to die to the world, and live only to God—to prepare themselves for dying and living eternally hereafter in heaven. If so trained, they will not exhibit those traits of character which you so much admire in the great men of pagan antiquity; they will meditate when you will think they should act, pray when you would have them fight, and run to the church when you would have them run against the enemy. But, at the same time, if Christianity be true, there can be no question that the management of earthly affairs on Christian principles and for a Christian end, would be decidedly for the interests of society as well as for the salvation of the soul. "Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things shall be added unto you."

There is an innate and irreconcilable antagonism between Italo-Greek gentilism and Christianity. According to Christianity, the world by wisdom knows not God; and the whole economy of the Gospel is undeniably to discard the wisdom of this world, and to rely solely on the wisdom from above, to trust not ourselves, but God alone. The Gospel reverses all the maxims of gentile wisdom, and blesses what it curses, and curses what it blesses. Gentilism had said, Blessed are the proud, the distinguished, they who are honored and abound in this world's goods; the Gospel says, Blessed are the poor in spirit, that is, they who are humble, lowly-minded, and despise riches and honors. Gentilism had said, Blessed are they who are quick to resent and avenge their real or imaginary wrongs; the Gospel says, Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the land. The former had said, Blessed are they that rejoice; the latter says, Blessed are they that mourn. Gentilism had said, Blessed are they who thirst for fame, for honor, power, and who live in luxury, who eat, drink, and are merry; the Gospel says, Blessed are they who hunger and thirst after justice, Blessed are the merciful, and, Blessed are the clean of heart. Gentilism had said, Blessed is

the man who delights in arms, whom no one dares attack, whom none slander, revile, or persecute, and who, by his force, craft, or wisdom, has triumphed over all his enemies, and subjugated them to his will; the Gospel says, Blessed are the peacemakers, Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice's sake, Blessed are ye when men shall revile you, and persecute you, and say all manner of evil against you falsely for my sake: rejoice and be exceeding glad, for great is your reward in heaven.

The principle of Christianity is humility, meekness, gentleness, forgiveness of injuries, love of enemies, self-denial, detachment from the world, and a delight in living, suffering, and dying for the glory of the cross. In every respect, the principle of gentilism is the direct contradictory. Look at the Gospel as you will, and its direct denial of heathenism everywhere strikes you. Its Author came into the world not in the pride, pomp, and power of an earth-born majesty. He came in the form of a servant, a slave, the reputed son of a poor carpenter, at whose craft he worked with his own hands. The foxes of the earth have holes, and the fowls of the air have nests, but poorer than they, he had not where to lay his head. Of the rich, the proud, the great, and honored, none were with him. His disciples were poor fishermen and publicans. He sought and accepted no earthly honors; and when the people, in a fit of momentary enthusiasm, would make him perforce their king, he withdrew, retired into the mountains, concealed himself, and prayed to his Father. When betrayed by one of his followers, and delivered into the hands of his enemies, he made no resistance; and permitted none to be made. He patiently endures insults, mockeries, and revilings, and opens not his mouth in his defence, when confronted with his accusers before the bar of Pilate, but meekly submits to the unjust sentence pronounced against him, suffers himself to be led unresistingly, bearing his cross, to the place of execution, and to be crucified between two thieves.

Here is the whole spirit, the whole economy of Christianity. If Christianity be from God, this means something, and proves that, if Christians are sincere and in earnest, they cannot adopt or even value the wisdom of the world; and it must always be true, that the children of this world are wiser in their generation than the children of light. Concede the Gospel to be true, and you must own that Christian asceticism is the highest wisdom, and gentile wisdom,

or the wisdom of this world, the sublimest foolishness. This St. Paul well understood, and hence he says, "We preach Christ crucified, to the Jews a stumbling-block, and to the Greeks foolishness; but to them that are called, Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God. The foolish things of the world hath God chosen to confound the wise, and the weak things of the world hath God chosen that he may confound the strong; and base things of the world, and things contemptible hath God chosen, and the things that are not, that he might bring to nought the things which are."

There is no denying this, and hence the error of Gioberti. He would be both a Christian priest and a gentile philosopher, at once a disciple of the Gospel and of the Portico, and he labored with an ability and a subtlety to demonstrate by means of a philosophy, considered apart from the use he made of it, worthy of profound esteem, that this was not only possible, but demanded by the deepest and truest principles of ontological science. I do not think that he was at that time an unbeliever, or that he entertained any doubts of the religion he professed. But he had little of the sacerdotal character or the Christian spirit, and I think he was disgusted with what he considered the weakness, tameness, abjectness, the *frivolezza* of the Catholic populations of France and Italy, and out of patience with seeing them crouching before the haughty infidel, and the domineering heretic or schismatic. He wished to see them men, men of lofty and daring souls, scorning to be trampled on, and indignantly hurling back the invading hosts of barbarians, and boldly and triumphantly asserting the proud prerogatives which belong to them as possessors and guardians of the truth of God. He was right after the wisdom of men, but wrong after the wisdom of God, if Christianity is our standard, and was animated by the spirit of gentilism, not by the spirit of the Gospel. He failed, for he was too pagan for a Christian, and too Christian for a pagan.

The remedy, if remedy is needed, is the return of modern society to real, earnest, living faith in the Gospel. The age is frivolous, because it is educated to be Christian, and is at heart unbelieving. It is not heresy or schism that needs now to be attacked, but unbelief—a moral and intellectual scepticism, which books and schools do not teach us to attack successfully. Here schoolmen, men of routine, with their *probos*, *respondeos*, and *objectiones solvunturs*, stand

us in poor stead. Exquisite polish, gracefully-turned periods, charming pleasantries, pretty conceits, and soft, sweet sentimentality for boys and girls in their teens, will stand us in just as little. It is necessary to abandon routine, the easy habit of speaking *memoriter*, and learn to think, to master, not merely repeat, what others have said, but to master for ourselves the principles involved, and to speak out in a tone of strong, impassioned reasoning, in free, bold, and energetic language, in defence of the Gospel itself.

CHAPTER XIV.—ROME AND THE REVOLUTION.

In June, 1846, the death of Gregory XVI., and the election of Cardinal Mastai and his elevation to the papacy, under the name of Pius IX., summoned us to Rome, the Eternal City. I felt a momentary grief, as I saw the mouldering ruins of pagan Rome, the ancient capital of gentilism, and felt indignation at beholding the diminutive Rome that had supplanted it; but I felt sure that the old gods lingered still in those ruins of the Capitoline and Palatine hills, and that the time was drawing near when we might evoke Jupiter Tonans and the fiery Mars, and the Goddess of Victory, from their slumber of centuries; revive the old Roman spirit, and re-establish the old Republic, so long triumphed over by the barbarism of the cross. Never before had I felt how thoroughly alienated from the Christian world, and assimilated in my feelings to the old gentile world I had become. I was in the capital of the Christian world, the centre of Christian art, and of the most glorious Christian associations for two thousand years, and my heart was touched only at sight of the monuments of pagan antiquity, which time and the still more destructive hand of man had spared.

But we had no leisure for sight-seeing, and still less for sentimentalizing over the ruins of that stupendous superstition of which Rome was the capital, and which had gradually supplanted the patriarchal Christianity, only slightly corrupted, of the primitive Romans. The superficial politicians, Catholic and non-Catholic, regard the papacy as comparatively of little political or social significancy in our times, but whoever looks a little below the surface of things, knows very well that the pope, though weak as to his temporal states, is not only the oldest but the most influential sovereign in Europe. The death of one pope and the acces-

sion of another, is an event which reverberates through the whole civilized world; and the policy of the sovereign pontiff, the feeble old man of the Vatican, with hardly a regiment of guards, has not seldom the preponderating weight in the councils of princes, although unseen, unrecognized—so much the more inexplicable, as there no longer remains a truly Catholic government on the globe, and not a Catholic nation in whose heart lives and breathes the old Catholic faith. Not a nation in Europe would, to-day, for the sake of religion alone, rush to the assistance of the pope; yet the papacy is everywhere, and not a court in Europe but trembles when it thinks of the pope, even weak and unsupported as he is.

All the liberals throughout the world held a jubilee as soon as they heard of the death of the old pope, who had, no one could tell how, held them in check. The whole world seemed to have been suddenly relieved of an invisible burden, and bounded with a wild and frantic joy. The good time that had been a-coming, now could come. This joy grew wilder and more frantic still, when it was known that Cardinal Mastai was the new pope. He was known to be gentle and humane, kind-hearted and pious, and suspected of leaning to liberal views, and of being a Giobertian; and nobody doubted that he would attempt a policy the reverse of Gregory's. We, who were in the secret, knew that he was not the choice of Austria, and had no doubt that he would incline to France, and follow, to no inconsiderable extent, the advice of Count Rossi, the French Ambassador, and one of our friends.

At that time Guizot was at the head of the government of France under Louis Philippe, a Protestant and a quasi-conservative statesman, but with many sympathies with the European liberals. He believed, or professed to believe, that a change in the institutions of the monarchical states in Europe, giving the people a moderate share in the government, was demanded by the exigencies of European society, and if freely offered by authority, and not given as a concession to the people in arms to effect it, would be a wise and beneficial public measure, and in an eminent degree politic too, as it would tend to extract the point from the declamations of the radicals, and prevent, or at least indefinitely postpone, the revolution with which all western and central Europe was threatened. He had urged this policy upon Prussia, perhaps upon Austria, certainly upon the smaller

German states which had not yet adopted the constitutional *régime*, and upon the pope and the other Italian princes.

We were perfectly well aware of Guizot's policy, and knew equally well how to turn it to our account. Your *doctrinaire*, *juste-milieu*, or *via-media* statesmen, who follow expediency, and govern without principle, are generally regarded as wise, prudent, and eminently practical, but they are among the shortest-sighted mortals to be encountered, and are as miserable humbugs as the Genevan banker, M. Necker, who could never understand that government was any thing more than a question of finance, or its administration any thing more than the administration of a joint-stock bank. When there is no serious discontent on the part of subjects, and not the least danger of revolution or insurrection, authority may modify without danger, immediate danger at least, the constitution, in favor of popular power, as the English government did in 1832; but when there is grave discontent, with or without just cause, and a secret conspiracy is forming in behalf of liberal or popular institutions, nothing is less wise or statesmanlike than for authority to make popular concessions with a view of forestalling and disarming it. The disaffected attribute such concessions solely to the weakness and fears of the government, and only rise in their demands, and conspire with the more energy and courage.

The government, in times of general discontent, as was the case in Europe from 1839 to 1848, should either concede all and abdicate itself, or concede nothing, because, if it is to defend itself it needs all its prerogatives and the concentration of all its powers. The advice of Guizot was fitted only to weaken the powers that entertained it, and to render them, in the hour of trial, timid and undecided; and it is only where authority is timid, hesitating, and undecided, that a popular rovolution can ever succeed. The only wise and even merciful way in such times is, to make, on the first outbreak, a free use of canister and the bayonet. There will be no second outbreak, however powerful or well concerted the conspiracy may have been. Napoleon understood this, and his nephew understands it, also, tolerably well. No man understands it better than Nicholas, autocrat of all the Russias, although his single unarmed presence is ordinarily all that is necessary to quell an insurrection in his capital.

There is no doubt that Pius IX., during the first days of his

pontificate, followed, in temporal matters, the advice of the French government, which, as far as I have been able to learn, never, since Philip the Fair, has been guilty of giving the pontiff advice not to his own hurt. France advised the fatal amnesty and some sort of quasi-popular institutions. The former was granted, the latter were promised, and the world was made to believe that for once it had a liberal pope. There was nothing heard but *Evviva Pio Nono!* throughout Rome, Italy, France, England, and the United States. Radicals, Infidels, Protestants, and even the Grand Turk, united in one grand chorus of loud and prolonged exultation. It seemed, to those who saw only the external manifestation, that all hostility to the papacy had ceased, and that all the world were on the eve of becoming Papists. Rome became one perpetual festival. Songs, hymns, processions, benedictions, speeches, addresses, congratulations, became the regular order of the day. Multitudes of Catholics, honest, simple souls, really felt that the day of heresy and schism, of conflict and trial, for the church, was over. Some shrewd old cardinals at Rome took their pinch of snuff, shrugged their shoulders, and retired to their palaces. We, who knew what agencies were at work, laughed in our sleeve, and, with all the chiefs of the liberal party, called upon all the powers which we had prepared, visible and invisible, to aid in increasing the general intoxication, not doubting but the papacy was at its last gasp. For we felt sure that if, by flattery, by enthusiasm, by loud, long, and reiterated shouts of *Evviva Pio Nono!* we could get the pope fairly to enter the path of reform, or what was, we supposed, the same thing for us, make the Catholic world believe he had entered it, it was all over with the papacy, therefore with Christianity, law, and social order.

No doubt some of the enthusiasm manifested was real, but a great deal of it was feigned, for the precise purpose of imposing upon the public. We were not ourselves for a moment deceived. We felt sure that Mastai was a genuine pope, that he could hardly be deceived by the demonstrations which must have been painful to him; which, in fact, gave him no rest, and which, under pretence of unbounded devotion to him, were becoming unmanageable, secretly undermining his throne, and growing into a real conspiracy against his freedom of action. We knew well there must come a point beyond which he could make no further concession, and our plan was to get the Catholic

populations of Europe so committed to the cause we pretended he favored, that when that point was reached, we could turn the popular enthusiasm against him, and he find himself disarmed and powerless to resist it. In this it is well known that we fully succeeded.

We should not have gone so far, and succeeded so rapidly, perhaps, had we not been aided by English politics. Lord John Russell and Lord Palmerston did not disappoint my expectations. At the time of our visit to Rome, the government of Louis Philippe was in the zenith of its glory. The wily monarch seemed to have fully confirmed his throne, and his prime minister was successful in urging upon a large number of princes constitutional reforms, and it seemed likely, for a moment, that the revolutionary party would spend its fury harmlessly under the lead of the sovereigns themselves. But he deeply offended England by the Spanish match, the marriage of the Duc de Montpensier with an infanta of Spain. By this marriage he seemed to have completed his circle of alliances, and to have made himself too powerful for English politics, and was rendering himself still more so by the constitutional reforms he was urging upon German and Italian princes. It was necessary to thwart him, and put an end to his illegitimate reign. Lord Minto was despatched, and other agents instructed to confer with the chiefs of the revolutionary party in Italy, and also in France, and encourage them to insist on reforms effected by the people from below, and to refuse to be satisfied with reforms effected from above by the princes. These chiefs were assured of the sympathy, perhaps they were promised the assistance, of the English government, which makes it a point to support a revolutionary party in every foreign state.

In the mean time, all the batteries we had erected were opened. Exeter Hall, and the Protestant Alliance were in full operation, and I thought it quite certain that a force was accumulated and brought to bear on the Rock of Peter that would shiver it into ten thousand atoms. Our presence was no longer necessary at Rome, and after Easter of 1847, we went to Paris, to fire a train in that city of combustibles. We were not needed there, for having had interviews with the chiefs of the revolutionary party in Geneva, we had already prepared them. They had more than profited by our instructions; they had even improved on them, and stood in closer relation to the Unknown Force than we did ourselves.

All we could do to aid on the revolution which broke out the following February, was to persuade some of the leading Liberals to introduce the "peaceful agitation," reduced to so perfect a system by O'Connell in Ireland, which was done in what were called the "Reform Banquets."

All France at that moment was, in some sense, revolutionary. Guizot, at the head of the government, was a reformer, as I have shown, but only on the condition that authority took the initiative. But, to admit the necessity or propriety of any reforms or changes was a tacit concession altogether to the prejudice of the existing order. After Guizot and his party, came the dynastique reformers, such as Thiers and Odillon-Barrot, who wished the Orleans family to possess the throne, but to deprive the throne of all effective power, and to establish a parliamentary despotism. The watchword of these at that moment was, the extension of the electoral franchise. There were at that time, out of a population of thirty-six millions, only about two hundred thousand electors. After the dynastique reformers, came the Catholic party, led on by the noble, learned, eloquent, and singularly pure-minded Montalembert, a man of principle, of faith and conscience, with whom religion was a living and all-pervading principle. This party consulted, first of all, the freedom and independence of the church, and was comparatively indifferent to the dynastique question. Its drapeau was neither that of Henri V. nor that of the House of Orleans, but religion and social order. The watchword at that time was, Freedom of Education, denied by the monopoly secured to the University which educated in a pantheistic, Voltairian, or an irreligious sense. As the government sustained the University, and denied freedom of education guarantied by the constitution, they opposed the government.

Behind these came the Legitimists, the adherents of the elder branch of the Bourbons, filled with old Gallican reminiscences, and whose watchword was Henri V. They were opposed to the existing government, ready to take active measures to overthrow it, and were ready to support the church, in so far as she demanded nothing for herself, and would lend all her resources to uphold and decorate the throne. They were a set of superannuated old gentlemen, with polished manners and courtly address, decorated with some very respectable prejudices, but wholly ignorant of their times, and incapable of learning. They were a clog

on the Catholic party, and were chiefly answerable for the re-establishment of the Bonapartists and the present Napoleonic Cæsarism in their beautiful country. However, they were opposed to Louis Philippe, and ready to effect a change.

After the Legitimists, who were royalists and opposed to the existing government, came the Republicans, moderate and immoderate; the moderates having for their organ *Le National*, the immoderates *La Réforme*. These, however, were all opposed to monarchy, whether in the elder or younger branch of the Bourbons, and wished the *république*, —some, as Lamartine, Arago, with the Girondins, those phrase-mongers of the old revolution, the *république* of the respectables, of the Bourgeoisie, attorneys, professors, and *hommes de lettres*; others, such as Ledru-Rollin, and the Montagnards, a *république démocratique, une et indivisible*, with Robespierre, Couthon, Saint-Just, Danton, and Marat; while others still, too numerous to mention, wished, with Barbeuf, *La République démocratique et sociale*; and not a few wished no government, no political or social order at all. These were the Subterraneans, reformers after our own hearts, and on whom we chiefly operated, and through whom we brought the odic force to bear on the revolutionary movement.

Aside from all these, but ready to co-operate, for the moment, with any or all of them, as would best serve their purposes, were the Imperialists, the Bonapartists. After the fall of Napoleon, and the restoration of the Bourbons, the Bonapartists had affected liberal, I may say, democratic ideas, and had lent their powerful influence throughout Europe to democratize the public mind; and at the time of which I speak, the chief of the family was very nearly an avowed socialist, and was hand-and-glove with the Subterraneans. They knew well that they could be healed only when the waters should be troubled; and, whether they were troubled by an angel of light or an angel of darkness, was a matter of perfect indifference, unless, indeed, they had more confidence in the latter than in the former.

Add to these parties the intrigues of England, who could not forgive the Spanish match, that crowning act of the Philippine policy, also the illusions we were able to keep up as to the views and intentions of Pius IX., and it required no messenger from another world to announce that France was on the eve of a tremendous convulsion; that the days of

the King of the Barricades were numbered; and that, whatever might be the afterclap, the reigning dynasty must fall, with a crash that would be reverberated throughout all Europe. The only care of our party was to push forward in front the more moderate reformers, more especially the dynastique reformers, while we organized a Subterranean force that would drive them, in the moment of their success, beyond the point at which they aimed, and compel them to accept the *République*, which, if proclaimed at Paris, we felt certain that we could, during the panic which would succeed, fasten upon the nation.

The history of the events that followed is well known, and need not be repeated. The old king, in the moment of peril, proved that he was a true Bourbon, incapable of a wise decision or an energetic act. All at once he had a horror of bloodshed, sacrificed his ministry, called to his council Thiers, Odillon-Barrot, and other dynastiques, who, vainly imagining that their bare names would allay the storm which they still more vainly imagined that they had conjured up, ordered the troops back to their barracks, and gave up the king and his dynasty to the armed and infuriated mob. The king abdicated; the Regency, under the Duchess of Orleans, was scouted; the royal family scampered for their lives towards England, that *refugium peccatorum*; monarchy was abolished; the *République* was proclaimed; a provisional government was organized impromptu, and a convention of delegates, to be chosen by universal suffrage, was ordered to meet and give France a regular political organization.

But a few days elapsed before the movement in Paris was followed by insurrections in Berlin, Vienna, and a large number of the smaller German states. The Italian peninsula was all in a blaze; democracy was in the ascendant in all Europe, except Russia, Spain, Belgium, and Holland. Hungary demanded independence of Austria; the Slavic populations of the Austrian Empire at Prague and Agram were preparing to join in a panslavic movement; Pius IX. was deprived of all freedom of action, and held virtually imprisoned; Naples and Sicily were in full revolt, and the king ready to concede every thing, and, Bourbon-like thwarting every effort of his loyal subjects to protect him; Charles Albert declared himself the sword of the Holy See; the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom rejected Austrian supremacy, and chose him for king. He marched at the head of his

troops, swelled by contingents from all Italy, to drive the barbarians back over the mountains, and to clear the peninsula of every vestige of foreign dominion.

We were elated; we felt that success was sure, and that our grand philanthropic world-reform was on the point of being completely realized. But alas! *homo proponit, Deus disponit.* The spirits had deceived us. Pius IX. displayed a passive courage that we had not counted on, and nothing could induce him to sanction the war against Austria; and in spite of all we could do, it finally leaked out, that he had not sanctioned it, and that the revolutionists had belied him, and entirely misrepresented his principles, conduct, and wishes. Old Radetzky, after retreating before Charles Albert till he had obtained re-enforcements, turned upon his pursuer, defeated him, and drove him, with shame and loss, out of Lombardy. Prince Windischgrätz beat the rebels in Prague; the lazzaroni flogged the republican heroes in Naples, and the people saved the throne, in spite of its weak and pusillanimous occupant. In fine, Cavaignac, after four days of hard fighting, prostrated the Subterraneans of Paris, and became dictator of the republic. We were no longer in the years of grace '91, '92, or '93. The age was not as far gone in unbelief as we had reckoned, and the friends of religion and society were more numerous and more energetic than we had believed.

Our hopes were damped, but not extinguished. We had thus far used the pope, but we could use him no longer, and we must get rid of him, and completely secularize the Roman government. We had used the Italian princes; we must now reject them, and abandon Gioberti for Mazzini. We succeeded in wresting the government entirely from the pope, but he himself escaped us, and fled to Gaëta, which was a serious injury to our cause. The pope in exile is more powerful than in the Vatican. We meant to have confined him in his palace, and held him as a puppet in our hands, and still for a time continued the use of his name; but in this his flight defeated us. We were obliged to proclaim the Roman Republic, and the temporal deposition of the pope, prematurely; but still we hoped, as we took care not to touch his person or his spiritual prerogatives, that we should not lose the sympathy of the Catholic public.

But it was all in vain. Our magic failed us; a more powerful magician than we intervened, and every where the reaction gained ground against us. Austria, whom we thought

we had disposed of, rose Antæus-like from the ground; the Giobertians, predominant in the Subalpine kingdom, would not own us. Florence was deserting us; Venice held out, indeed, but Lombardy was chained by old Radetzky. Great Britain wished us well, gave us good advice, but came not to our aid; and Spain and Portugal, that we thought dead, suddenly started into life against us. Russia, though she loved not the papacy, detested us, and was ready to interpose to bring Prussia to her senses, and to assist Austria. And last of all, the French Republic, which we had been the principal agents in creating, fearing the preponderance of Austria, and anxious to have an outpost in the Eternal City, sent her troops against us.

It was in vain to struggle. I saw clearly that the battle was against us, and that we should never succeed, by political and social revolutions, in effecting our purpose; and I made up my mind at once to have nothing more to do with them. I resolved to return home, and fall back on what I have hinted as an ulterior project. It was in the Autumn of 1849. The abortive attempt to reorganize the German Empire had failed, and not to our regret, since we saw, if reorganized at all, it would not be on democratic principles; the authority of St. Peter was reëstablished at Rome; the Magyars were forever prostrated in Hungary, and our friend Kossuth had taken refuge with his friends the Mussulmans, and France was becoming an orderly government under the Presidency of Louis Napoleon and the conservative majority of the Legislative Assembly. There was nothing more that we could do.

It is true, that many of our friends thought differently from me, and wished to continue the struggle; but I told them that, if they did, they must do so without my active coöperation; that I should leave them to their simple human strength, and they would find all their plans miscarry. The time is not opportune. Christianity has yet a stronger hold on the European populations than you or I had calculated, and the Christian party can no longer be duped and made to fight for us. They thrill with horror now to hear us say, "Christianity is democracy, and Jesus Christ was the first democrat." They are beginning to see, as clearly as we do, that all this is at best absurd, and that our movement is essentially anti-Christian. They see, they admit, they deplore a certain number of political and social abuses; but they believe these abuses more tolerable than the reforms we would effect.

We have given the bishops, the clergy, and the pious laity a horrid fright; and you will see them, almost to a man, before three years expire, exultingly consenting to the reëstablishment of pure Cæsarism, in order to be relieved of their fears of us. Louis Napoleon will succeed in making himself, almost with the unanimous voice of France, proclaimed emperor, with absolute, or virtually absolute power, with no effective check on his arbitrary will; parliamentary government will be scouted, as hardly a step removed from Subterranean democracy; free discussion of public affairs will be closed; the press will be muzzled, and no voice will be heard throughout the empire, save a voice in praise or flattery of the new emperor.

But herein is our consolation and our hope for the future. The new emperor will have to deal with Frenchmen; and he counts without his host, if he thinks he can, for any great length of time, silence thirty-six millions of French voices, or make them all speak one way. Mortal man cannot do it. Satan himself could not do it; and only One, whom we name not here, could do it. Now they are afraid of us, and have had even an excess of talk. They will consent for a time, even as a novelty, to be silent, or shout, as an admirable change, *Vive l'Empereur*, instead of *Vive la République démocratique et sociale,—à bas les Démocrats*, instead of *à bas les Aristocrats*, or *les Aristocrats à la lanterne*, and *à bas les socialistes*, instead of *à bas les rois*. But rely upon it, that after a brief repose, these same Frenchmen will be desirous of *mouvement*, and will by no means be pleased to find themselves doomed to the silence and stillness of death. Then will be our time once more, and perhaps then we may be more successful. Till then I engage no more in political and social reforms. I shall take myself to that which underlies all political and social ideas, and slowly, perhaps, but surely, prepare a glorious future. You will hear from me again, or if not, you will feel the influence of what I shall do.

With remarks like these, I took my leave of my European revolutionary friends. I communicated to Priscilla, who had faithfully served me throughout the time I had been abroad, and powerfully contributed to such successes as we had had, my design of returning home. We were in Paris. She would, perhaps, have rather returned to Rome. She had, in fact, began to droop, and to be weary of the part I had forced her to play. She had, during our stay in Rome,

become a mother, and new feelings and affections had been awakened in her heart. Her husband had treated her kindly, forbearingly, but he had much changed, and no longer favored philanthropy or reform, and it was rumored that he had become devout. Priscilla evidently began to turn to him with something approaching the love and esteem she owed him, and would gladly have broken her *liaison* with me. But I would not hear of it; she must return with me.

CHAPTER XV.—THE ULTERIOR PROJECT.

It may be asked why I wished Priscilla to return with me, against her will, since I had no passion for her, and respected the honor of her husband. I wished it partly from spite, and partly because it was necessary to my purpose. She had induced me, or had had more influence to induce me than any one else, to embark in a cause which I loathed, and which at the same time I felt myself totally unable to abandon, and I wished to make her suffer with me. Then, again, I could do nothing without an accomplice, and that accomplice a woman. I travelled abroad in the character of a simple American gentleman, not as a mesmerizer, a magician, or one who commands invisible powers. Nobody abroad, or even at home, ever suspected me, unless it was good old Mr. Cotton, of any thing of the sort. In all cases when the mysterious force was to be exerted, as long as she was connected with me, I employed Priscilla as my agent. I gave her my orders, which she, without exciting any suspicion against her or myself, seldom failed to execute to the letter.

Even after her own views and feelings began to change, and she felt the slavery and degradation of her position, she dared not disobey me. She stood in awe of my power, and knew well the merciless punishment that awaited her. Often, often has she begged me, with tears and in the deepest agony, to undo my spell over her, and to let her go free. I would not. Had she not declared her spirit eternally wedded to mine? The truth is, I was half afraid to undo the spell, and emancipate her. She knew too many of my secrets, might expose me, and defeat all my plans; and once freed from me, once restored to the empire of reason, she would feel herself bound in conscience to do so; and when a woman once takes it into her head to act from conscience, she

is, whether she have a good or false conscience, as unmanageable as if she were in love. She is as headstrong under conscience as under passion, and of course absolutely uncontrollable, because in either case she uses her reason simply in the service of her feelings. Then, again, I did not like accepting a new accomplice.

Priscilla, not daring to resist, finally persuaded her husband to consent to return home. We crossed the Channel to England, and hastened to embark at Liverpool on board a steamer for New York. We had a stormy passage, and came near being cast away; but at length arrived in port, and soon found ourselves in Philadelphia, after an absence of six years and six months amidst scenes and events of the most exciting character. We were all changed in looks, but still more in feelings. The fire of our enthusiasm was extinct, the freshness and sanguine hopes of youth had fled forever; our labor had been in vain, and there was no bright or cheering prospect before us. I took my leave of Priscilla at the public-house where we stopped. When I saw her faded cheek, her sunken eye and withered form, the wrinkles gathering on her brow, and heard her, in a broken voice, renew her oft-repeated request, and remembered what she was some ten or twelve years before, and thought of what I was too at that time, and what I was now, I had a touch of human feeling, and pressing her hand to my lips—I had not the heart to refuse—I told her I would consider it, perhaps I would, and hurried out of the room, to conceal my emotion, not sorry, after all, to find that I had not wholly ceased to be human.

The next day, I started for my home in Western New York. Home, alas! no longer. The house was desolate. During my prolonged absence, my mother and my only sister had died, and all my family were gone. My library and my laboratory remained as I had left them. They had no charms for me now. I looked out upon the familiar scenes of my childhood; they seemed changed all, and were tame and listless. I met some companions of my earlier life; there was nothing in common between them and me. Their voices sounded strange, and grated on my ears. The sad conviction, for the first time in my life, forced itself upon me, that I was alone, and deeply I felt my loneness. I had lost my childhood's faith, which, though meagre and but a shadow, yet was something. I had no Father in heaven, no brother or sister on earth. I believed in neither angel nor

spirit. All existence, all being, had dwindled into one invisible, elemental, impersonal Force, which indeed I could wield, but to what end?

In my loneness, I felt that the vulgar belief in the devil, in ghosts, and goblins damned, would be a solace. They would be something, and any thing is better than nothing. Better is a living dog than a dead lion. Alas, I had sold myself, and my redemption was far off. Strange enough, I felt something like passion revive in my guilty breast. I felt, I even regretted Priscilla's absence; and it seemed that she was dear to me, and that I could not endure life without her. I pictured her to myself as I had first known her, and I wept as I remembered how for long years I had enslaved her. A voice whispered in my heart, emancipate her. A momentary feeling of generosity possessed me. I summoned her, as I knew how, to my presence. She appeared, instantaneously.

"Priscilla," said I, "I am sad and weary. Life has lost its charms for me, and I care not how soon I die. I have nothing to live for. You are a wife and a mother. I absolve you from your pact; be free; return and devote yourself to your husband, who is worthy of you, and to your boy. I have, and will no longer have, power over you."

A gleam of joy spread over her face, a smile of gratitude played on her lips, and a look of love shot from her eyes, and the place where she stood was vacant. She had vanished; but a chattering, as of a thousand mocking voices, filled my room, and then impish, mocking faces were seen all around, making mouths at me. I cared not for these. I silenced the former, and sent away the latter with a word. I retained my magic force still. But there was joy as well as sorrow in that house in Arch street, Philadelphia. Priscilla, the day of returning to her own house, had been taken ill; her husband was alarmed, and called a physician, who could understand nothing of her case. She grew worse and worse; and during the time I had summoned her to me, she fell into a sort of stupor, a complete trance, and to all except her husband, who had seen her in that state before, and knew that she was subject to trances, she seemed to be dead. The moment I had absolved her, she came to herself, a sweet smile on her face, with the hue of perfect health. She arose in bed, embraced her husband with a warmth and sincerity of affection which he had never before known, and for the first time since his birth looked upon her boy with the glad

joy of a mother's heart. But at this moment her husband was more to her than her babe. She hung on his neck, she pressed him to her heart, she half smothered him with kisses, spoke in the terms and tones of the tenderest and sweetest affection, and it seemed as if she would pour out upon him, in a single moment, the loaded affections of a lifetime. "My dear husband, you must forget and forgive the past. I am yours, yours now, yours alone; heart, soul, and body, forever. The spell is broken. The delusion is gone; take me, take me, dear James, to your heart."

James was a man. He had been dazzled by the beauty and accomplishments of Priscilla, and thought it enough to be accepted as her husband, without much scrutiny into the state of her affections. She had, for a moment, imposed upon him, and he had accepted her notions of woman's rights, philanthropy, and world-reform. But he did not lack good sense; he had even a strong mind, firm principles at bottom, and all the elements of an upright, manly character. A few months' practical experience served to cure him of a good deal of his philanthropy, and to damp the ardor of his zeal for reform. He was, of course, displeased with my intimacy with Priscilla, and he owed me, it must be owned, no good will. But his observation pretty soon satisfied him, that whatever the bond of that intimacy, it was not what directly affected his honor as a husband, and he resolved that he would seem not to regard it. It was a bitter trial to him.

His tour abroad, his observation, and his conversations with gentlemen and ladies, not always of our clique, had opened his eyes to many things, and made him a stanch conservative. He abandoned all the loose notions he had previously entertained, renounced his Quaker quietism, and had become sincerely converted to a real objective Christian faith. His first thought and care were to reclaim his wife, and, if possible, to release her from the mysterious power which I seemed to have over her. He found her as anxious to be released as he was to release her, and he thought he discovered in her, at times, a growing affection for himself. It was a difficult case to manage, but he thought it best to be prudent and discreet, and to avoid every thing that could excite remark, or that he himself might afterwards regret.

Feeling now that he had himself not been entirely free from blame, that he was bound to be forgiving, that Priscilla was really his wife, the mother of his child, and that she

probably was freed, though he knew not how, and did now really love him, he responded with a warmth nearly equal to her own, to her strong expressions of love, frankly forgave her all, and pressed her to his heart as his own, his truly beloved wife. It was for both the happiest moment they had ever known, and in that one moment James seemed to have been compensated for his patience, forbearance, and suffering, for so many years.

Priscilla immediately regained her health and cheerfulness, and resolved, if possible, to recover me from the bondage in which she knew I was held. How she sped in this, and what new trials, if any, awaited her, will appear as I proceed in my narrative.

My own feeling of loneness, of desolation, was not relieved by my release of the woman I had so long held spell-bound, but was aggravated by the constant annoyance of a passion which I had seldom before experienced, or which, without much trouble, I had always been able to subdue. As Priscilla became purified and less unworthy of her husband, and as she seemed the more completely to have escaped me and to be lost to me forever, the more did I feel that I could not live without her, and the more impossible did I find it quietly to endure her absence. I was mad. I called her. The charm was broken, and she came not; I saw only a vague, undefined form, flit before my eyes, and heard only a wild mocking laugh.

Weeks passed, but they seemed ages. Priscilla, in all her loveliness, in all her gracefulness and dignity, in all the brilliancy of youth and beauty, was constantly present to my morbid fancy by day, and to my dreams at night. I was completely unmanned,—wept now as a child over a lost toy, or now raved as a madman. I could not eat, I could not sleep. I could endure it no longer. I sold my house and furniture, disposed of my laboratory and scientific apparatus, packed up my library, and resolved that henceforth I would take up my residence in Philadelphia.

I had no sooner established myself in my new home, than I called in Arch street to see Priscilla. Instead of her I found James. He received me civilly, even kindly, conversed with me of what we had seen abroad, but Priscilla did not appear. No matter, I would call again. Did so; saw Priscilla only in presence of her husband. She was looking well, was affectionate in her tone and manner, but offered me not her hand, and seemed to take care that I

should not so much as touch her dress. Well, said I to myself, be it so. The weakness shall last no longer. I will be myself again, and resume the project I had contemplated. I went home, not cured, but resolved, and immediately commenced my evocation, and communicated my orders to all the circles I had established throughout Europe.

I have already hinted what this new project was. It was clear to me, from my historical reading and my personal observations amid the exciting scenes of the more recent European revolutions, that the grand support of social order, and what I have somewhere called the system of restraint and repression, is Christianity, and that the political and social reformers can never fully carry out their reforms till they have totally rooted out from modern society all belief in the Gospel, and all peculiar reverence for its Author. This is more than hinted by Mazzini and Kossuth, although the latter is a vice-president of the American Bible Society, boldly avowed by M. Proudhon, and stoutly contended for by the German Turnverein and Freimänner. If you concede the Christian idea of God, says Proudhon, you must at once and forever abandon your idea of liberty.

It was equally clear to me, that the attempt, by means of political organizations, and revolutions directed against the papacy, or any church organization, Catholic or Protestant, to root out Christianity from the hearts of the people, must at last prove a failure. After all, there is a natural religiosity in man, and though he will often restrain and mortify it, and act only in view of purely secular ends,—practically live as if there were no God, and no hereafter,—he will almost always return to the order of religious ideas, and adopt or institute some kind of religious worship to which he will subordinate his political ideas, and his secular ends. An Epicurus may deny providence, a Lucretius may sing, in no mean poetry, that it is impossible, "*revocare defunctos*," and even Cicero may laugh at augurs and aruspices, and doubt the immortality of the soul, yet the sentiment of an invisible Force, of a mysterious Power that overshadows us, is universal, and the sceptical philosopher feels an indefinable shudder of awe, perhaps of fear, whenever he finds himself alone in the dark. Everywhere the shades of Acheron wander or flit around and before him.

Even in the midst of our pleasures the thought of the invisible and the supernal intrude unbidden to mar our festivities, and to dash our joy with an indefinable sadness, shame,

and remorse. Even a Voltaire trembles and blasphemes in dying, at the thought of being denied Christian burial, and a Volney, who resolves God into blind nature, and Christianity into astrology or astronomy, prays lustily to the God he disowns, in a storm on Lake Erie. Do what we will, we cannot divest ourselves of the belief or apprehension of invisible powers, who hold our destiny in their hands; and a people absolutely without any religion, or at least superstition, is never to be found.

Never had unbelievers a fairer chance for rooting out Christianity by political and social revolutions, than in the eighteenth century. The laugh was everywhere against religion and the clergy, a decided materialistic and infidel philosophy pervaded literature, possessed the schools, ruled in the courts, and domineered over thought and intellect. There was lukewarmness in the religious, there were scandals among the clergy, there were abuses in the state, and therefore an imperious call for reform. The reformers directed all their movements against religion, and their means were democratic and social revolution. They were strong, they were overwhelming in their power. At their bidding, down went throne and altar, and in ten years the religion they had abolished was reëstablished, the churches they had closed were reopened at the order of the soldier they had made their chief, and for democracy in the state they had an incipient Cæsarism, which, two years later, became a fully developed and perfect Cæsarism. The same result had followed our own movement. In January, 1850, religion was far more vigorous in Europe, than in January, 1840, and democracy at a far greater discount.

It was idle, then, to hope either to destroy political and social authority in the name of absolute unbelief and irreligion, or to root out Christianity by political and social movements. Christianity could be eradicated only by means of a rival religion, and a religion which could appeal to a supernatural origin, and sustain itself by prodigies, or what the vulgar would regard as miracles. I had suspected this from the beginning, and resolved now, that instead of working with the purely secular passions of men, I would make my appeal to their religiosity. Mahomet, in the seventh century, had done this admirably for his time and the East, but had incautiously fixed his superstition in the Koran, and made it unalterable, and therefore incapable of adapting itself to the new face which things might assume

in the vicissitude of events, the development of society, and the progress of the race.

Swedenborg had done better, and so had Joe Smith, but neither had sufficiently provided for the progressiveness of the race, or with sufficient explicitness consecrated the principle of innovation and change, and both had retained too many conceptions taken from the old religion. Yet Swedenborg was to be taken as our starting point, and we were only to avoid his mistakes, the principal of which was a too strict and rigid church-organization.

When I returned from Europe, I found the directions I had given, before going abroad, had been pretty faithfully followed; and mesmeric revelations, through Andrew Jackson Davis, and spiritual communications, through the Foxes, were beginning to attract public attention. The spirits were becoming exceedingly anxious to communicate, and made, as it was supposed, many important revelations. In a few months, spiritual knockings were becoming quite common, and mediums were found in all parts of the country. At first, intercourse with the spirits was obtained only in the somnambulant state, or through the slow and toilsome medium of raps, but at the same time intimations and assurances were given that before a great while a more easy and direct method of communication would be vouchsafed; but, as yet, the public and individuals were not prepared for that more direct method. The spirits were willing, but the mediums were not sufficiently advanced, nor sufficiently spiritualized; and the public was too gross, too materialistic, and too sceptical. As soon as minds should become more refined, spiritual, and believing, open vision would be permitted them, and easy and regular communication would be established, and whoever wished would have as free and familiar intercourse with the spirit-world as with the world of the flesh.

At first the great object was to establish the reality of the spiritual communications. This was to be done by the communication of secrets, either known only to the interrogator, or incapable of being known to the medium in any ordinary human or natural way. Sometimes the spirits played the part of fortune-tellers; sometimes they assumed to be prophets, and ventured to predict future events, but always events which either depended on them, or lay in the natural order, and which a knowledge of natural causes and effects could easily enable them to foresee.

As the spiritual intercourse extended, and believers multiplied, the somnambulic and rapping mediums ceased to be the only mediums. The artificial somnambulic mediums, or mesmerized mediums, disappeared almost wholly, and to the rapping mediums were added writing mediums and speaking mediums, and in some instances the spirits became actually visible to the seers, and telegraphed their messages by visible symbols, and occasionally in words. Spiritual telegraphing, in some one or all of these ways, became, in a few months, common in all parts of the country; and, at the expiration of two years, there were three hundred spiritual circles or clubs in the single city of Philadelphia, and more than half a million of believers in the United States. The epidemic had broken out in the North of England and Wales, had spread all over Norway, Denmark, and Sweden, and northern and central Germany, penetrated France in all directions, and made its appearance even at Rome. In France and Italy, where the population is either profoundly Christian or profoundly infidel, the spiritual manifestation had to adopt more discreet and less startling forms than in our own and some other countries, and to give place at first to doubt whether it was not mere trickery, or explicable on recognized scientific principles; and confined itself, to a great extent, to the phenomena of table-turning, which excited curiosity without alarming conscience. In France, in the most polished, fashionable, and, I may almost say, most Catholic society, table-turning became an amusement.

The next point to be attended to, was the doctrines, the philosophy or religion, that the spirits were to teach. It would not do to attack the Gospel too openly, and it was necessary to undermine, rather than to bombard it. In some respects even, it was advisable to seem to confirm, as it were by one rising from the dead, some portions of Christian belief,—such as the immortality of the soul, and the reality of an invisible spirit-world. The latter was doubted by the free-thinkers; but it was essential to my project that the free-thinkers, in this respect, should be converted, for their conversion and acknowledgment of belief in God and a spirit-world would do much to commend our spiritualism to a large body of silly and ill-informed Christian believers, who, seeing such apparently good effects resulting from it, would conclude that there could be nothing bad in it. By their fruits shall ye know them.

In the American community, to a very great extent, the

belief in the immortality of the soul is supposed to be identical with the belief in the resurrection of the dead, taught by Christianity; and our Unitarians, with their rationalistic erudition, very generally hold that the peculiar and distinctive doctrine taught by our Lord was the immortality of the soul. But the immortality of the soul was believed by the whole ancient world, gentile as well as Jewish; and, though questioned by some ancient and modern sophists, there never has been found a people who, as a body, were ignorant of it, or that denied it. All the ancient, as all modern superstitions recognize it. All believe the soul is imperishable, though many suppose it will be absorbed in the great Fountain of life, as a drop in the ocean—a misinterpretation of the Christian doctrine of union with God in the light of glory, as the ultimate end or final beatitude of the just. The doubt was as to the body, or the *umbra*, the material envelope and companion and external medium of the soul in this life. The gross outward body they believed returned to dust, and mingled with its kindred elements; but this *umbra*, shade, the manes of the dead, which all antiquity carefully distinguished from the soul, was also, for the most part, believed to be imperishable; but its reunion with the soul, I do not find the heathen world ever clearly asserting. In other words, the ancient heathen world, though it retained the primitive belief in the immortality of the soul, had lost belief in the resurrection of the body, and the reunion of soul and body, or at least only retained some traces of it in their doctrine of metempsychosis, or transmigration of souls.

The peculiar Christian doctrine, or the doctrine so insisted on by the apostles, was not the immortality of the soul, which was always presupposed, but the resurrection of the dead, the return to life, not of that which had not ceased to live, but of that which had died, to wit, the body. Hence the article in the Apostles' Creed is not, I believe the immortality of the soul, but, I believe the resurrection of the body, *resurrectionem carnis*, the resurrection of the flesh; and to this belief, it must be remarked, that the spirit-manifestations afford no confirmation, and indeed they virtually contradict it.

The distinguishing trait of Christian morality is charity, which is distinguished from philanthropy or benevolence, as a supernaturally infused virtue is distinguished from a mere human sentiment, but, in the minds of but too many of

those who call themselves Christians, really confounded with it. The spirits were then, under the name of charity, to teach a philanthropic, sentimental, and purely human morality, for in doing so, they would seem to the mass of superficial Christians to be confirming the distinctive trait of Christian morality, and at the same time appealing to the morbid spirit of the age.

Bald, naked Universalism is not popular; but there is a very general disbelief, among the leading men of the times, in the old orthodox doctrines of heaven and hell, of the last judgment, the everlasting punishment of the wicked, or that our eternal state is fixed by that in which we die. Swedenborg had greatly modified these doctrines, and taught that the punishment of the wicked is purely negative; that men are in hell only inasmuch as they are not in harmony with God; and not to be in harmony with God, that is, good, is to be out of the divine protection, and exposed to all the sufferings incident to our abandonment to the natural order of things. He had also recognized different heavens, rising one above another, and different hells, one below another; and had hinted or asserted the possibility of the inhabitants of each improving, and advancing in wisdom and virtue, by their intercourse with the inhabitants of this world. He had himself even instructed angels, and assisted feeble and undeveloped souls. Here were the germs of all that was required. The spirits were to teach that there are different circles in the other world, into which souls are admitted according to their respective tastes and degrees of development, with the chance to rise in due time, if faithful, from the lowest to the highest. In the lower circles, they are improved by intercourse with us, as we are ourselves improved by intercourse with spirits of the higher circle.

The dominant doctrine of our age is that of progress; that the universe started from certain rude and imperfect beginnings, and, by a continued series of developments and transformations, is eternally advancing towards perfection, without however reaching it; and that man, beginning, if not in the oyster or the tadpole, at least in a feeble and helpless infancy, develops and advances towards perfect manhood. This doctrine, which a few facts in natural history, in geology, and anthropology, at first sight seem to favor, is at bottom wholly repugnant to the Christian doctrine of a fixed creed, of final repose or beatitude

in God, of final causes, and the final consummation of all things. So the spirits are to accept it, systematize it, and propose, as the highest reward of virtue, to be placed on the plane of eternal progression.

The age is indifferent, syncretic, and disposed to accept all religions and superstitions as true under certain aspects, and as false under others, and to pronounce one about as good and about as bad as another. The spirits, therefore, make no direct war on any of them. In some places they teach that the Catholic Church is the truest and best of prevailing religions, but that Protestantism is nevertheless a safe way of salvation, and that the spirits do not, in the other world, think so much about differences of churches and creeds, as they did when in this world. In other places they teach that the Catholic Church is false; that it is wicked, the enemy of moral and social progress, and that effectual means should be taken to prevent its extension in the United States. They do not deny the Bible, nor affirm its inspiration, but take, to a great extent, the neological view of it, conceding it to be truthful in many respects, but maintaining it to be unreliable in others. It was very well when men had nothing better, and no surer means of information in regard to the spirit-world.

Such is a brief outline of the new religion, which was intended to supplant Christianity, and to open the way for that "good time a-coming," for which all our philanthropists and reformers are looking, as any one may satisfy himself by reading the *Shekinah*, the *Spiritual Telegraph*, or Judge Edmonds's work, from the prolific press of Partridge & Brittan, New York. This new religion, which, indeed, contains nothing new, and which it certainly needed no ghost from the other world to teach or to suggest, would amount to very little if promulgated on mere human authority, unsupported by any prodigies, mysteries, or marvellous facts; but, communicated mysteriously from alleged denizens of another world, bearing the imposing names of William Penn, George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and Thomas Paine, assumes in the minds of the vulgar a high importance, and can hardly fail to be regarded as overriding Moses and the prophets, our Lord and his apostles. It strikes at the foundation of Christianity itself, and once accepted, it will seem to have a directness and a completeness of evidence that will entirely set aside, in the minds of the spiritualists, that in favor of the Gospel. This is what I intended, and what I hoped.

Having set the so-called spirits in motion, and through them set afloat a system which I fancied would supplant Christianity, whether in its Catholic or its sounder Protestant forms, my work seemed done, and I could retire from my labors. My superintendence was no longer necessary, and whether the agents I employed were really the spirits or souls of the dead, as they themselves asserted, or mere elemental forces of nature, as I was inclined to believe or had wished to persuade myself, became to me a question of no interest. The work would go on of itself now, and in a few years Christianity and the church would be undermined and fall of themselves. Then monarchy, aristocracy, republicanism, all forms of civil government, would crumble to pieces, and universal freedom, leaving every one to believe and do what seems right in his own eyes, will be realized, and all here, as well as those not here, will be placed on the plane of eternal progression—progression towards—what?

CHAPTER XVI.—A REBUFF.

I ASKED not the question, for in fact it did not occur to me; but I asked another question, What shall I do with myself? A grave question this. Do what I would, turn the matter over as I might, there was, now the novelty of the idea had worn off, nothing inspiring in this idea of eternal progression;—this ever learning, and never coming to the knowledge of the truth—this everlasting chase after good, and never coming up with it. Why continue a pursuit which you know beforehand will bring you never any nearer the object than you are, for, as you pursue, it flies. Is not this evil rather than good, hell rather than heaven? Is not this the punishment of Ixion?—That war of the Titans upon the gods, has it not a deep significance? The Titans, the Giants, the Earth-born, *Terræ filii*, would dethrone the gods, the heaven-born, the divine, and were defeated and doomed to punishment, to turn forever a wheel, to roll a huge stone up the steep hill, and just as it is about to reach the summit, have it slip from the hands and roll down with a thundering sound; to a task never completed, and always to be renewed, or to hunger, with food ever in sight, and always just beyond reach; to thirst, standing to the neck in water, and have it recede always as approached with the lips. Is not, after all, this the doom that they

bring on themselves who reject the wisdom from above and follow what my friend Mr. Merton calls the wisdom from below?

I can very well understand progress towards an end, towards a goal that is fixed and permanent, but a progress towards nothing, or towards a movable goal, a goal that recedes as approached, is to me quite unintelligible, and, when I think of it, it seems as absurd as the supposition of an infinite series. Infinite progression is, in reality, an infinite absurdity. The origin and end of all things must be perfect, fixed, and immovable. Every mechanic knows that he cannot generate motion without a something which is at rest, which can cause or produce motion without moving itself. Without the immovable, there is and can be no movable. In like manner, no motion towards what is not immovable, for if the two bodies remain in the same position relative to each other, neither, in relation to the other, has moved.

Progress is morally motion towards an end, and if there is no approximation to the end, there is no progress. As progress is inconceivable without some end, so it is equally inconceivable without a shortening of the distance between the progressing agent and the end. If this distance can be shortened, however little, if not more than a line in a million of ages, it is not infinite, and the progress cannot be eternal. This infinite or eternal progression is, then, only a lying dream.

At the bottom of this idea of progress, which our modern reformers prate about, is the foolish notion that man is born an inchoate, an incipient God, and that his destiny is to grow into or become the infinite God; that he is to grow or develop into the Almighty; that, to be God, is his ultimate destiny; and, as God is infinite, he is to be eternally developing and realizing more and more of God, without ever realizing him in his infinity. The bubble does not burst and lose itself in the ocean, but by virtue of its bubbleosity it grows and absorbs more and more of the ocean into itself.

I cannot understand this eternal absorbing process, which, though always absorbing or assimilating, leaves always the same quantity, physical or moral, to be absorbed or assimilated. It is impossible to be satisfied with such a destiny. To be always seeking and never finding, to be always desiring, craving, and never filled, is not heaven, it is

hell, and the severest hell, in comparison with which the pain of sense, or natural fire and brimstone were a solace. Man is not moved to act by desire. His desire to attain must become hope of attaining, before it can move him, and when you deprive him of that hope, you take from him all courage, all energy, and all motive to act. Desire to possess the beloved, may remain and torment the lover, but it can never suffice to make him continue his pursuit when all hope of success has been extinguished. I do not say love cannot survive hope, but I do say that love's efforts cannot, and it is seldom that even love itself does.

The Christian is stimulated to constant activity, not by charity or love of God alone, but by hope; and the hope of possessing God, of being filled with his love, of reposing in the arms of all-sufficing charity, stimulates onward from grace to grace, and from one degree of perfection to another. Though he finds not yet perfect repose, though he is not yet filled, though he has not yet attained, yet he is upheld, buoyed up and onward by the sure promise, the steadfast hope of attaining, of at last finding repose, rest in the bosom of his love and his God. He may feel the clogs of flesh, he may feel that he is absent from his love, and sigh to reach his home and embrace the spouse of his soul, but he grows not weary, faints not, and knows nothing of the *ennui*, that listlessness of spirit, that disgust of life, and disrelish for every pursuit, which he feels who has no object, no hope, and sees not even in the most distant future any chance of finding that fulness and repose which his soul never ceases in this life to crave. In losing sight of God as final cause, in losing the hope of possessing God as the supreme good, in substituting endless progression for endless beatitude, full and complete, I had lost all stimulus to exertion, all motive to exert myself for any thing.

Why should I act? What had I to gain? Money I did not want; I had more than I could use. Fame I despised. It was a mere word, born and dying in the very sound that made it. Power, I had it. If I had more, it could procure me nothing more than I already possessed. Pleasures? The richest dishes and the most precious wines palled upon my taste. There remained another kind of pleasure; but we can even grow weary of women, and loathe what the morbid senses continue to crave. Still nothing else remained for me. Yet I had outlived love in any virtuous or innocent sense of the word, and early training, and some remains of self-re-

spect, made any other love far more of a torment than a pleasure.

The simple truth was, that I could reconcile myself neither to the philosophy of the Portico nor the philosophy of the Garden, and was alike disgusted with the Cynics and the Academicians. I was a man, and could not live on air, or feed on garbage; I had a soul, and could not satisfy it by living for the body alone, and having no God, no heaven, no hope of beatitude, and no fear of hell, I saw nothing to seek, nothing to gain, and I could only exclaim, *Vanitas vanitatum, et omnia vanitas.* I could not say, with young and thoughtless sinners, in the heyday of their youth, and the full flow of their animal spirits,—"Come on, therefore, and let us enjoy the good things that are present, let us use the creatures as in youth. Let us fill ourselves with costly wine and ointments, and let not the flower of the spring pass by us. Let us crown ourselves with roses before they be withered, and let no meadow escape our riot. Let none of us go without his part in voluptuousness, and let us leave token of our joy in every place, for this is our portion and our lot." For of all vanities I had learned that this was the most empty. Even the devil himself is said to loathe the sensualist, and to find his stench intolerable. Still Priscilla—I had lost her perhaps. That touched my pride. We often grieve that lost, which possessed, was not valued.

CHAPTER XVII.—A GLEAM OF HOPE.

I HAD not seen Priscilla for over a year, and had struggled hard against the madness that possessed me. Finding myself out of work, having completed what I had undertaken, as far as depended on me, I felt that passion, which I even loathed, reviving within me. Nothing would do but I must see my former accomplice again. I called as an old friend, and this time found her alone. She received me with ease, grace, and cordiality.

There are those who believe that a woman who has once lost even the modesty and chastity of thought, can never regain them, and become a truly modest and pure-minded woman. They are greatly mistaken. The Magdalen had fallen lower than that, and yet those were pure tears with which she washed our Lord's feet, and but one purer heart than hers beat in the breasts of those holy women who stood near the cross, and heard the loud cry of the God-man, as he

bowed his head and consummated the world's redemption. The Fountain, which that rude soldier opened with his spear that day, suffices to cleanse from the deepest filth, to wash away the foulest stains, and to make clean and fragrant the most polluted soul. O ye fallen ones, whether women or men, bathe in that fountain! and if your sins be as scarlet, they shall be as white as snow, and if they be red as crimson, they shall be white as wool.

I had never seen Priscilla more beautiful. The bloom had returned to her cheek; her form had regained its roundness, and her complexion its richness. Her eyes were serene and tranquil, and her countenance wore a sweet, pure, and peaceful expression. She had no need to fear me at that moment, for I stood, not repelled, but awed, and felt myself in the presence of virtue, not haughty, austere, and repellant, but lovely, chaste, and affectionate; natural, easy, and wholly unconscious of itself.

"I am glad to see you, Doctor," said she, with a sweet smile. "Sit down. I have been hoping that you would call, but I was afraid that you had entirely deserted us."

"You are changed, Priscilla, since I last saw you; and I should think my presence would now be even more disagreeable than then."

"Not at all. I was never more glad to see you in my life, and I never met you with kinder or more pleasant feelings."

I did not understand this speech, and began to draw, in my own mind, certain very foolish conclusions.

"Yes," she resumed, "I wished to see you, and to see you as I now do, alone. It is of no use referring to what we were for so many years to each other; but I wanted to tell you that I did you no little wrong. You were not innocent, but I was the most guilty. We were both miserable; and you, you, my dear friend, are unhappy still."

"I make no complaint. Nobody has heard me whine or whimper over my own lot. If I have suffered, I have done so in silence."

"That may be. But you have not forgotten our sojourn at Rome in the winter of 1848–9?"

"Forgotten it? no, and shall not, as long as I live."

"Do you remember an old Franciscan monk, that my husband concealed in our house for some weeks?"

"I do."

"He was an old man, nearly fourscore. His head was al-

most perfectly bald, only a few gray hairs escaped from beneath his *calotte*, and partially shaded his temples; his form, which had been tall and manly, was now bent with years, labors, and mortifications; but his feelings seemed as fresh and playful as those of a child; and the expression of his face was calm, sweet, and affectionate. It was a peculiar expression, not often met with, but like that which, you may remember, we one day remarked in the face of Pius IX. It was an expression of exceeding peace and celestial love, of a pure and holy soul shining through a pure and chaste body. The expression is indescribable, but once seen, can never be forgotten, and seems to be that which Italian painters seek to give to their saints, especially to the Madonna.

"This venerable old man had, as you may recollect, been denounced, by the Circulo del Populo, as an obscurantist, an enemy to the republic, and an adherent to the pontifical authority. It was intended to include him in the number of priests and religious massacred at San Callisto. My husband had formed an acquaintance with him, and, having learned his danger, smuggled him into our house, where it was presumed nobody would think of looking for a proscribed priest."

"I remember him; I did not at all like him, and, had I cared much about him, would have betrayed him to the Club; for I had the wish of Voltaire in my heart, that 'the last king might be strangled with the guts of the last priest. But, as he seemed old and harmless, and generally kept out of my way, I let him pass."

"He was a quiet, inoffensive man, and I own I was not sorry that he should escape the cruel death to which philanthropists and sworn friends of liberty doomed so many of his brethren. I was not cruel by nature, and my soul recoiled from the part I was often compelled to take. I thought it was hardly consistent for us, who advocated unbounded freedom of thought and action, to send the dagger to the heart, or coolly sever the carotid artery in the neck of those who chose to think and act differently from us; but I was held then by a force I could not resist."

"You mean, Priscilla, now to reproach me."

"No, my friend, no; I reproach only myself. Had I not originally consented, no power could have held me in that terrible thraldom. The agents you employed have no such power over us against our will; though, when we have once assented to their dominion, it is not always in our own power

alone to reassert our liberty. My husband grew very fond of the venerable old man, and they spent hours, and even days, together. What was the subject of their conversation, I knew not, and did not inquire.

"You returned to Paris, to prevent, if possible, the French from interfering to suppress the Roman Republic, by organizing a new insurrection of the Subterraneans, and by reminding the prince-president of his previous republican and socialistic professions, and making it evident to him that the reëstablishment of the pope would be fatal to the supremacy of the state, whether republican or imperial. During your absence you left me tranquil, and I began, for the first time since my marriage, to enjoy the sweets and tranquillity of domestic life. The good Franciscan would sometimes spend an evening with me and my husband. He was of a childlike simplicity, and of most winning manners, but a man of a cultivated mind, extensive information, and various and profound erudition. He discoursed much on the old Roman Republic and Empire, on the grasping ambition and tyranny of the government, the hollowness of the Roman virtues and the old Roman people, the cruel and impure nature of their religion, and the looseness and profligacy of their manners.

"He sketched then the introduction of Christianity, showed what enemies it had to encounter, why it was opposed, the change it introduced into the moral and social life of the people, its triumphs over paganism, its conversion and civilization of the northern barbarians, and the chastity, peace, and happiness it had introduced into the cottage of the peasant, the castle of the noble, and even the palace of the monarch. His views seemed clear and precise, and his mind seemed to be enlightened, and singularly free from the cant of his profession, and from that credulity, ignorance, and superstition which you and I had been accustomed to associate with the name of monk. To every question I asked, he had a clear and intelligent answer; and he was always able to give a reason, and what appeared a good reason, for whatever judgment he hazarded. He was evidently a man of an order of intellect, ideas, and culture entirely different from any that had fallen under my observation; and I must own that when I listened to him, I was charmed. I seemed to be under the gentle but superior influence of a good spirit. I felt calm and tranquil, and I wished that I too might believe, be pure, holy, a Christian like him.

"Weeks passed on. At length we had a chance to send him in safety to Portici, where the Holy Father then held his court. The evening before he was to leave us, he came into the sitting-room, and sat down by me. 'My dear lady,' said he, 'I leave you to-morrow, and I shall not see you after to-night. You must permit me to thank you for your kindness to the poor old proscribed monk, and your evident desire to procure him comfort; all so much the more commendable in you, since you are a stranger, and not of my religion. I give you my thanks and my blessing; they are all I have to give; and I shall not cease to pray the good God, who is no respecter of persons, to reward you for your goodness, and to grant you his grace.

"'But, my dear lady, I am a priest; I am also an old man, and have not many days to tarry here. Let me speak to you in all sincerity and freedom.'

"'Do so, my father,' said I, as my eyes filled with tears.

"'You are still young and beautiful,' said he; 'you have naturally a kind and warm heart, an enthusiastic disposition, and a sincere love of truth and justice. But, my dear child, your education has been sadly neglected, and you have been trained to walk in a path that leadeth where you would not go. You have fallen among evil counsellors and evil doers, and you are entangled in the meshes of the adversary of souls. This cause, to which you give your heart, soul, and body, is not what you think it. You sought liberty, you have found slavery; you sought love, and you have found only hatred; you sought virtue, disinterestedness, fidelity,—you have found only vice, selfishness, and treachery; you sought peace and social regeneration,—you have found only strife, war, murder, assassination, confusion, anarchy, and oppression. For yourself personally, the only peaceful days you have known for years have been during the last few weeks; and your present peace is disturbed by a mysterious dread, that I need not name or explain to you.

"'Ask yourself, my child, and answer to yourself, honestly, if you have not been deceived, and been acting under a fatal delusion. Ask yourself if it was not a terrible mistake you committed, when you took Satan for the principle of good, and the Christian's God for the principle of evil.'

"'But, *padre mio*, what shall I do? I have a suspicion that what you say is true. I have been a proud, vain, rash, wicked woman. But what shall I do? I am bound in chains; I am damned.'

"'Damned, not yet, my child. As long as there is life, there is hope. Those chains must be broken.'

"'But they are too strong for me.'

"'True, true, my child, but not too strong for the Lion of the tribe of Judah. You must be assisted——'

"At that moment the door was burst open; a gang of ruffians rushed in, and fell upon the aged monk. The old man gave me one look, made rapidly the sign of the cross over my head, as I had dropped on my knees to implore them not to harm him. I might as well have pleaded to my marble jambs. They threw him down. He rose upon his knees, folded his hands across his breast, and with a bright, celestial expression, exclaimed, 'O God, pardon them, and lay not this sin to their charge, for they know not what they do,' —when the leader of the gang plunged a dagger to his heart. His blood flowed out into my face, and over my dress. After a minute, they took up the body, and removed it and themselves from my house. Though protected, to some extent, by our American character, we did not think it prudent to remain longer in Rome, under the Republic; and the next day we started for Paris, where we rejoined you."

"But you never told me of the fate of that old monk before."

"True, why should I? I could not, before we had separated, have spoken of him to you without arousing your indignation, and inducing you to send me again on some of those terrible secret missions on which you had so often sent me, and which I so abhorred. But I can speak calmly now, and without fear; and let me beg you to ask yourself the question the old monk urged me to ask myself. Truth is truth, let it be spoken by whom it may; and there is no reason why we should not follow good advice, because given by a monk, even if monks have been all our lifetime the object of our wrath, or of our derision."

"Priscilla, I have asked myself that question; but it is of no use. I have pledged myself, body and soul, and sworn that, come what might, I would never repent."

"But that oath was unlawful, and cannot bind. He who has your pledge is a deceiver, had no right to ask it, has no right to hold it."

"But I cannot free myself from these chains of death and hell which bind me."

"Such as you have been, such as I fear you are, I am told seldom find mercy; but the deliverance is not impossible. I, worse than you, have found it."

"That is not so certain. You are free, only because I, in a sudden fit of despair, freed you. But I have but to will, and you are as completely in my power as ever."

"That I doubt. Except when you called me to emancipate me, you have exerted no power over me, since the good old priest was received into our house in Rome."

"That is owing to my forbearance."

"Will you swear that? Will you swear that, within twenty-four hours after you had declared me free, you did not use all your art to enthrall me again? Did you not call again and again, within a month, at my house, for that very purpose?"

"But you avoided me, and I could not so much as touch the hem of your robe."

"Very true, for I feared you, and I dare not defy you even now; but I feel very certain that, under the protection of a name at which even devils must bow, I am safe from all your arts."

As she said that I rose, walked once or twice across the room, came up before her, took her hand unresistingly, and placed my hand on her head. I trembled. I was struck dumb, for I perceived at once that I had no power there; and, though I evoked them, no spirits came to my aid. But before I had let go her hand, her husband came into the room, saw us, feared what I might do, drew his dagger, and before Priscilla could stop him, or offer a word of explanation, aimed a blow at my heart. Priscilla attempted to avert it, and so far succeeded, as to change somewhat its direction. It penetrated, however, the chest, reached the lungs, and inflicted a wound which, though it is apparently healed, and I seem to myself to be suffering only from pulmonary consumption, which wastes me away slowly but surely, my surgeon tells me will yet prove the occasion of my death.

The moment James, a man of peace, and not at all given to striking, had struck the blow, he was filled with terror at what he had done. I assured him, for I retained my presence of mind, which I never yet lost in any case in my life, that so far as I was concerned, he need not blame himself, for I deserved the blow, and had long foreseen that sooner or later his hand must deal it; but, had he delayed a moment, he would have found it unnecessary, that his wife was safe from my annoyances, and proof against any art I possessed. Priscilla, as soon as she recovered from her

fright, rather than swoon, told him as much; and we both did all in our power to reassure and console him. But the matter must not be bruited abroad, and he must conceal it for his and Priscilla's sake. It was concluded that I must remain for the present in their house. James did what he could to stanch my wound, aided me to remove to another room, and sent immediately for a surgeon whom we both knew and could trust. For several weeks I lay at their house, nursed with great care and tenderness, till I was able to be removed to my own house. It was rumored that I had been stabbed in the street, but such things not being rare in our cities, it excited very little remark; and suspicion, though it fell on the secret societies known to exist, fell upon no individual in particular, and no pains was taken to ferret out the supposed assassin. The fact was noted in the journals, and was instantly forgotten.

CHAPTER XVIII.—RELIGIOUS MONOMANIA.

I HAD no sooner been removed to my own house, than my old acquaintances and friends came to see me. Mr. Cotton, the stern but well-meaning old Puritan, who had infinitely more mind and heart than Young America, that has learned to laugh at him, had indeed died during my absence abroad. Mr. Winslow and the others whom I have already introduced, remained. Poor Jack had recovered, not his former gayety, but his health and tranquillity, and was entirely freed from the vision which had haunted him, and which I have no reason to believe was any thing more than a simple hallucination, occasioned by a powerful shock to his nerves, producing a diseased state of the imagination. He had returned to Boston, given up mesmerism, confined himself to the law, and had prospered in his profession. When he heard of the accident which had befallen me, he came immediately to see me, and to render me such assistance as his warm heart prompted. He is still my chief nurse, and declares that he will not leave me as long as my life lasts. I have remembered him in my will, and bequeathed him the bulk of my estate, though he knows it not,—a poor compensation for the blight I brought upon his early hopes.

Mr. Merton, returning to the city about the time of my being wounded, lost no time, after my removal to my own house, in renewing our former acquaintance. Mr. Wins-

low, and Mr. Sowerby, and Leila and her admirer, who had become husband and wife, and a sober and sensible couple, were frequently in the sick man's room. Nobody deserted me; and never in my life have I had occasion to complain of ingratitude, or the loss of a friend. The world is bad enough, but after all not so bad as sometimes represented. I have always been treated infinitely better than my deserts; and I have found good sense, warm hearts, and noble virtues, where least I expected them. I have reproaches only for myself. I have done a world of wrong, and no good; and yet I have found myself, from my childhood, surrounded by generous and disinterested affection. People, speaking generally, are far better individually than they are collectively; and many private virtues may be found, even in bands of revolutionists, robbers, and assassins,—virtues which do not rise above the natural order indeed, and have no promise of reward in heaven, but which nevertheless are virtues. My observation has taught me to distrust the censorious, those who rail in good set terms at all mankind or womankind, although no man living was ever further than I am from believing in the sinlessness of the race, or from joining in the modern worship of woman, prompted too often by an innate pruriency unconscious of itself.

As I became able to bear conversation, and to take part in it occasionally, mesmerism and the spirit-manifestations were a frequent topic of discourse. Jack steadily maintained that it was all humbug. There were indeed strange things, some phenomena which he could not explain, but he set his face against the whole movement, had no belief in it, and would have nothing to do with it. There was, though he might be unable to detect it, some cheat or trickery at the bottom.

Mr. Winslow held fast to his belief in the connection between mesmerism and all the marvellous, prodigious, or miraculous facts recorded in history. He accepted those facts substantially as related, but did not accept their usual explanation. The miracles of sacred history, and the marvellous facts of profane history, were to be explained on natural principles, by the mesmeric agent, or by whatever other name we might call it.

Mr. Merton argued that, if the phenomena usually called satanic, obsession, possession, witchcraft, black magic, ghosts or apparitions, clairvoyance and second sight, could be explained without resort to the supernatural, the other class

of facts, the miracles of sacred history, could be also explained without the supposition of the special intervention of divine power. He thought, if we could account for the former without Satan, we could for the latter without the supernatural intervention of God.

Mr. Sowerby held with Mr. Winslow as to the reality of the phenomena, and their natural explanation, but thought they should be divided into two classes, one good and the other bad, as produced for a good or a bad purpose. When produced in a good cause, for a good end, they might be called divine; when in a bad cause, for a bad purpose, they might be called satanic or diabolical. The agent is in both cases the same, and the difference is in the mind or will that employs it.

Dr. Corning, my physician, who was a distinguished manigraph, and had written a work, highly esteemed by the profession, on Insanity, was quite ready to concede the phenomena called spiritual, or rather demoniacal, and thought we were bound to do so, or to give up all human testimony. He also conceded the connection contended for by mesmerists between mesmerism and so-called demonic phenomena,—a connection, in his judgment, very evident, and wholly undeniable; but he contended, with the most eminent manigraphs of France, and indeed with the members of the profession generally, that the marvellous phenomena recorded were those of mania, monomania, theosophania, nymphomania, demonopathy, and all to be explained pathologically. He included them all under the general head of insanity, and regarded their variety only as so many different sorts of madness. He had himself witnessed the greater part of them in his practice, and treated them as symptoms of mania.

"That," said Mr. Merton, "would be very satisfactory, if the limits of madness or insanity were well defined, and if physicians could never mistake, and treat as insane one who is only possessed or obsessed by the devil. To include the marvellous facts of history under the head of insanity, without having first established their pathological character, and settled it that there is no generic or specific difference between them and acknowledged pathological symptoms, is not to explain them. How do you prove that a person, otherwise in perfect health, with no disturbance of the pulse, of the digestive, or any other organs to be detected, who on all subjects speaks rationally, but who tells you that

a spirit has possession of him, speaks through his organs, throws him down, and otherwise maltreats him, is insane? I do not say that such a man is not insane, but how do you prove him insane?"

"Why, he exhibits the symptoms of insanity, for none but an insane man would utter such nonsense."

"Perhaps so, and perhaps not so. He exhibits symptoms of what you are pleased to *call* insanity; but how do you know that you have not called insanity what you ought to call by another name, possession, for instance?"

"I do not believe in possession."

"Precisely, and therefore when you meet what is called possession or obsession, you call it insanity. That is a convenient way of reasoning, and not uncommon with learned physicians and physicists; but it is a begging of the question not its solution. You reason from a foregone conclusion. As you yourself and all the profession treat insanity as a disease, as symptomatic of some lesion or alteration of the physical system, or of the organs on which the manifestations of the mind depend, I should suppose it necessary to establish the fact of such lesion or alteration, before concluding the presence of actual insanity."

"Insanity, in such case, would be found to be very rare."

"Very possibly, and perhaps it is much rarer than is commonly supposed. It is not impossible that a large proportion of those you call insane, and treat as lunatics, are as sound of body or mind as you or I. Where we find, physically considered, all the symptoms of health, we cannot, from purely mental phenomena, infer disease. That the vulgar have often regarded as under the influence of Satan persons who were merely epileptic, cataleptic, or insane, is no doubt very true; but it is not impossible that the learned and scientific have committed not unfrequently a contrary mistake, and regarded as insane, cataleptics, or epileptics, persons who were totally free from all pathological symptoms. How will you, dear Doctor, explain by insanity a case taken from a thousand similar ones, which I chanced to be reading this morning, and which is well attested. Allow me to relate it as given by Dr. Calmeil, one of your own profession, a learned and highly esteemed manigraph, who entertains the same views that you do. Missionaries who now, says M. Calmeil,* cross the seas to

*De la Folie, T. 2, p. 417.

shed the light of faith in the New World, are frequently surprised to meet energumens among their neophytes, whilst they acknowledge that it is seldom that the devil takes possession of the faithful in the mother country. The letter which I am about to report, addressed to Winslow, a celebrated physician, in 1738, by a *worthy* missionary, proves that the delirium of demonopathy may everywhere become the lot of feeble and timorous souls.

"I cannot refuse, at your earnest request," writes the missionary Lecour, "to write you a detailed account of what took place in the case of the Cochin-Chinese who was possessed, and of whom I had the honor to speak to you. In May or June, 1733, being in the province of Cham, in the kingdom of Cochin China, in the church of a burgh called Cheta, about half a league distant from the capital of the province, there was brought to me a young man from eighteen to nineteen years of age, and who was a Christian. His parents told me that he was possessed by a demon. A little incredulous, I might say to my confusion, quite too much so, in consequence of my little experience at that time in such things, of which I had never seen an example, although I had often heard other Christians speak of them, I examined them to ascertain if there were not simplicity or malice in their statement. The substance of what was gathered from them was, that the young man had made an unworthy communion, and after that had disappeared from the village, had retired to the mountains, and called himself only the traitor Judas.

"On this statement, and after some difficulties," resumes the missionary, "I went to the hospital where the young man was detained, fully resolved to believe nothing, unless I saw marks of something superhuman. I began by questioning him in Latin, a language of which I knew he had not the least tincture. Extended as he was on the ground, frothing at his mouth, and violently shaken, he rose immediately on his seat, and answered me very distinctly, *Ego nescio loqui Latine.* I was so astonished and frightened that I withdrew, with no courage to question him any further. . . . .

"However, some days after, I recommenced with some probationary commands, taking care to speak always in Latin, of which the young man was ignorant. Among other commands, I ordered the demon to throw him forthwith upon the floor. I was instantly obeyed, but he was thrown

down with so much violence, all his limbs being stretched out and rigid as a crowbar, that the noise was rather that of a falling beam than of a man. Wearied and exhausted, I thought I would follow the example of the bishop of Tilopolis on a similar occasion. In the exorcism, I commanded the demon, in Latin, to bear him to the ceiling of the church, feet up and head down. Forthwith his body became stiff, he was drawn into the church to a column, his feet joined together, his back set against the column, and, without the aid of his hands, he was run up to the ceiling in a twinkling, as if drawn up by a pulley, without any act or motion of his own, suspended with his feet glued to the ceiling, and his head hanging downwards. I made the demon confess, as I intended to confound and humble him, and to compel him to quit his hold, the falsity of the pagan religion. I made him confess that he was a deceiver, and at the same time compelled him to acknowledge the sanctity of our religion. I held him suspended in the air, his feet adhering to the ceiling and his head down, for more than half an hour, but not having sufficient constancy, so much was I frightened at what I saw, to continue him there for a longer time, I ordered the demon to place him at my feet without harming him. He forthwith cast him down, as a bundle of dirty linen, but without his receiving the least injury. From that day the young man, though not entirely delivered, was much relieved, and his vexations daily diminished, especially when I was in the house, and after about five months he was wholly released, and is now perhaps the best Christian in Cochin China."

"Pass over the effect of the exorcism, if you please," resumed Mr Merton, "and tell me what you think, Doctor, of the facts in this case, which Dr. Calmeil concedes, and which, if he did not, it would not amount to any thing, for this is only one case out of a thousand."

"I will say," replied the Doctor, "with M. Calmeil, that I am very much obliged to the good missionary, for not withholding his account, for he has described, without knowing it, the phenomena of religious monomania."

"It strikes me," replied Mr. Merton, "that Dr. Corning has not well examined the case. That some of the phenomena may be regarded as symptoms of insanity, I do not question, but if I understand insanity, it is a derangement, an access of what properly belongs to one in his normal state, but not the accession of something preternatural. It

may, in some respects, sharpen the senses, revive the memory, and render the faculties, or at least some of them, morbidly active; but I have never understood that it could enable a man to understand and speak a language which he had never learned, and of which, in the full possession of all his faculties, he knew not a word. I can easily understand that in delirium a man may fancy he is possessed, and act on the conviction that he is, but I do not understand how delirium alone can enable a man, however agile, to climb to the ceiling of a church, his back against a column, with his feet fastened together, and without using his hands or arms, and to remain by the simple application of his feet to the ceiling for one half an hour with his head down, carrying on all the time a close controversy in this very inconvenient position, and finally dropping upon the pavement without the least injury. Such a delirium would, to say the least, be very extraordinary, and I suspect the doctor has never found a similar delirium amongst any of his numerous patients who were unquestionably insane. I will venture to say that however striking the delirium, the thing is absolutely impossible without superhuman aid."

"Part of it is hallucination," said the doctor.

"Whose hallucination? The young man's, or the missionary's?" asked Mr. Merton. "Not the missionary's, for there is no pretence that he was insane; and not the young man's, because the question turns not on what he saw, or fancied, or imagined, but on what another person, the missionary, saw."

"Probably the facts are much exaggerated," replied Dr. Corning. "The missionary confesses that he was greatly frightened, and being so, he may, without impeachment of his honesty, have failed to be strictly accurate as to the details."

"Then you question the relation. That alters the case. Let us take, then, the case, also well attested, of the nuns of Uvertet, which, about 1550, caused for a long time so much astonishment in Brandenburg, Holland, Italy, and especially in Germany. The nuns were at first awakened and startled by plaintive moanings. . . . Sometimes they were dragged from their beds, and along the floor, as if drawn by their legs. . . . Their arms and lower extremities were twisted in every direction. . . . Sometimes they bounded in the air and fell with violence upon the ground. . . . In moments in which they appeared

to enjoy a perfect calm, they would suddenly fall backwards and be deprived of speech. . . . Some of them, on the contrary, would amuse themselves in climbing to the tops of trees, when they would descend, their feet in the air and their heads down. These attacks began to lose their violence after a duration of three years. A very singular madness this, which, as the *Dictionnaire des Sciences Médicales* says, 'extended over *all* the convents of women in Germany, particularly in Saxony and Brandenburg, and gained even Holland,' and it might have added, also, Italy. 'All the miracles,' it continues, 'of the Convulsionaries, or of animal magnetism, were familiar to these *nonnains*, who were regarded as possessed. They all foretold future events, leaped and capered, ran up the sides of walls, spoke foreign languages, &c.' You may read the fourteen well authenticated cases recorded by Cotton Mather in his *Magnalia*, and you will find that all these, and similar phenomena, were exhibited by the bewitched or possessed in Massachusetts near the close of the seventeenth century, and known under the name of 'Salem witchcraft,' though only a portion of them occurred in that famous town. Do you include all these under the head of insanity?"

"Cotton Mather was a pedant, vain, arrogant, and ambitious of power, and I did not expect to hear him cited as an authority," replied the doctor, in evident vexation.

"Dr. Mather," Mr. Merton replied, "was one of the most learned and distinguished men in New England in his time, and, though I am of another parish, I respect his memory. I do not cite his opinions; I merely cite him as the recorder of facts which either he himself had witnessed with his own eyes, or which had been confessed or proved before the courts of the colony, and thus far at least his authority is sufficient. But I will ask you to explain on your hypothesis the phenomena exhibited by the Ursuline Nuns of Loudun, France, in the seventeenth century, and the authenticity of which both Bertrand and Calmeil, as well as others, admit were triumphantly vindicated."

"I know the case to which you refer," answered Dr. Corning. "It is the case of a certain number of nuns who took it into their heads that they were bewitched by one Urbain Grandier,' whom they had refused to accept as their director,—a man of a scandalous life, a great criminal, who deserved to be executed as he was, if not for sorcery, at least for his crimes. I see nothing in this case but the usual symptoms of demonopathy, or religious monomania."

"The physicians of the time thought differently, and there were then and there physicians of great eminence who were consulted, and required to make to the authorities twenty-five or thirty elaborate reports on the case. But let us recall some of the facts.

"Shortly after Grandier, a bad priest, was refused by these ladies as their director, he passed by the convent, and threw a bouquet of flowers over the wall, which was taken up and smelt of by several of the nuns. From that moment the disorder commenced. Up to that moment all these ladies were in the enjoyment of the most perfect health, and strictly correct in their deportment. They were all connected with families of distinction and of high birth, and had been carefully brought up, and yielded to none in their education, their intelligence, their piety, their virtues, and their accomplishments.

"After some weeks of silence, in which they had sought relief from their vexations by religious exercises, prayers, fasts, and macerations, without avail, recourse was had to exorcism. The phenomena then assumed gigantic proportions. One religious, lying stretched out on her belly, and her arms twisted over her back, defied the priest who pursued her with the Holy Sacrament; another doubled over backwards, contrived to walk with the nape of her neck resting on her heels; another still, shook her head in the most singular and violent manner. The exorcist says he had *frequently* seen them bent over backwards, with the nape of their neck resting on their heels, walk with surprising swiftness. He saw one of them, rising from that posture, strike rapidly her shoulders and breast with her head. They cried out as the howlings of the damned, as enraged wolves, as terrible beasts, with a force that exceeds the power of imagination. Their tongues hung out black, swollen, dry, and hard, and became soft and natural the moment they were drawn back into the mouth.

"During the intervals of repose, the afflicted ladies sought to return to their religious exercises, to resume their industry and the deportment proper to their rank and their state. But on the arrival of the exorcist nothing was any longer heard but blasphemies and imprecations. Then the nuns would rise, pass their feet over their heads, throw their legs apart, with entire forgetfulness of modesty. Then came what Dr. Calmeil calls hallucinations, which made them attribute their state to the presence and obses-

sion of evil spirits. The abbess, Madame Belfiel, while replying to the questions of the exorcist, heard a living being speaking in her own body, as it were a foreign voice emanating from her pharynx. They all heard a voice distinctly articulated, proceeding from within them, stating that evil angels had taken possession of their person, and indicating the names, the number, and the residences of the demons.

"In the month of August, 1635, Gaston, Duke of Orleans, brother of Louis XIII., wishing to judge for himself of the state of the Ursulines, went to Loudun, and was present at several sessions of the exorcists. The superioress at first worshipped the Holy Sacrament, giving all the signs of a violent despair. The Abbé Surin, the exorcist, repeated the command he had given her, and forthwith her body was thrown into convulsions, running out a tongue horribly deformed, black, and granulated as morocco, and without being pressed at all by the teeth. Among other postures they remarked an extension of the legs, so great that there were seven feet from one foot to the other. The superioress remained in this position a very long time, with strange trembling, touching the ground only with her belly. Having risen from this position, the demon was commanded again to approach the Holy Sacrament, when she became more furious than ever, biting her arms, &c. Then, after a little time, the agitation ceased, and she returned to herself, with her pulse as tranquil as if nothing extraordinary had happened.

"The Abbé Surin himself, while he was speaking to the duke, and about to make the exorcism, was attacked and twice thrown upon his back, and when he had risen and proceeded anew to the combat, Père Tranquille demanded of the supposed demon wherefore he had dared attack Père Surin. He answered with the organs of the latter and as if addressing him: 'I have done so to avenge myself on you.' Was the Abbé Surin insane? or did he simulate delirium?

"The superioress, at the end of the exorcism, executed an order which the duke had just communicated secretly to the exorcist. In a hundred instances it appeared that the energumens read the thoughts of the priest charged with the exorcism. They answered in whatever language they were addressed, in Greek, Latin, Spanish, Italian, and Turkish. They even answered M. de Launay de Razelly in the dialects of several tribes of American savages, very pertinently, and revealed to him things that had passed in America.

Urbain Grandier, when commanded by his bishop to take the stole and exorcise the mother superior, who he said knew Latin, refused, although challenged to do it, to question her in Greek, and remained quite confused. Also, the mother superior remained for some considerable time suspended in the air, at an elevation of about two feet above the ground. In about three months of exorcism the trouble ceased, and the Ursulines were restored, and resumed in peace their pious exercises and their usual labors."

"I see no reason to change my opinion," remarked the doctor, at the conclusion of this recital. "It was a case of monomania, if the facts were as stated."

"The facts," replied Mr. Merton, "are unquestionable. They have all the authenticity that facts can have, and there is not the least ground for suspecting the good faith of the parties. They were all in perfect health, with no symptoms of any disease about them. Now, as insanity, of whatever variety, cannot render a man more than human, I demand, if these facts can all be brought within the humanly possible? Does insanity enable one to assume such difficult postures as are described? Does it enable one to bend over backwards and walk rapidly with the nape of the neck resting on his heels; to have the extraordinary extension of legs mentioned; to read the thoughts of others not expressed; to tell what is passing fifteen hundred leagues off; to understand and speak languages never learned or before heard; and to remain for some time suspended unsupported in the air? And, above all, is insanity or madness cured by exorcisms? No, no, Doctor. The facts in the case, that is, if you take not one or two, but *all* of them, are certainly inexplicable without the presence of a superhuman power."

The doctor was not at all pleased with this conclusion, which he would by no means admit. He said the conversation, if continued, might injure his patient, and giving me a few directions, took his hat and cane and departed, apparently in a very unpleasant humor, and muttering something about superstition, Salem witchcraft, and the absurdity of educated men in the nineteeth century believing in such nonsense.

CHAPTER XIX.—MESMERISM INSUFFICIENT.

INSANITY explains abnormal, but not superhuman phenomena. It is a disease of the body, not of the mind itself. The mind, being a simple spiritual or immaterial substance,

is not susceptible of physical derangement, and mental alienation proceeds from the lesion or alteration of the bodily organs or conditions on which the mind is dependent in its manifestations. It is cured, when curable, by medical, not by purely spiritual treatment; by physic and good regimen, not by exorcisms.

A few days after the conversation I have detailed, my friends being again present, the subject was resumed. Dr. Corning sustained his hypothesis triumphantly by selecting such facts in the cases brought forward as it would explain, and by denying all the rest,—a very convenient and common practice of theorizers,—even out of the medical profession.

Mr. Sowerby, who had made a fortune by mesmerism and spirit-rapping, thought that only a monomaniac would attempt to explain the mysterious phenomena in question by insanity. There was in the cases not a symptom of mania, and the persons affected, in their moments of repose, and even while the affection lasted, were in the normal exercise of their faculties, and indicated no signs of mental alienation, answering always, when answering at all, pertinently, never at random, consecutively, never incoherently, as is the case with the insane. He explained them, not by mental alienation, but by the accumulation or increased activity of a great and all-pervading principle, perhaps the vital principle itself, called the mesmeric or odic principle. He had himself produced phenomena analogous to the most extraordinary recorded in history.

Mr. Dodson, an ex-Universalist minister, mentioned on a former occasion, and who had just published a book on spirit-manifestations, in refutation of Judge Edmonds's work on the same subject,—a great and original thinker, and most profound philosopher,—in his own estimation,—thought that they were all to be explained by phreno-mesmerism, or electro-psychology. He had an original theory, borrowed in part from Gall and Spurzheim, who might, to a certain extent, have borrowed it from the Timæus of Plato, that the back part of the brain is the seat of involuntary motion, instinct, and unconscious consciousness, that the anterior part is the seat of voluntary motion and reflection. The phenomena are artificially produced by psychologizing the subject, or paralyzing the anterior lobe of the brain, and leaving the posterior active, and, naturally, by a person's sitting down quietly and suppressing the ac-

tivity of the frontal brain, and giving free scope to the occipital. There was no devil, and no odic agent in the case. It was all explained by phreno-mesmerism, or by the passivity of some, and the increased activity of other portions of the brain. But he was asked how this could enable a person to foretell future events, to read the unexpressed thoughts of others, to manifest extraordinary physical strength, to understand and speak languages never learned, to tell what is passing in distant places, and to remain suspended in the air in defiance of the laws of gravitation. He said all these were psychological phenomena, or, as Dr. Corning called them, hallucinations, nothing of the sort really taking place.

Mr. Sowerby would not listen to him, and there was almost a quarrel between the two ex-ministers. But their rage being finally mollified by a witticism from Jack, the conversation resumed its pacific character.

"You say, Mr. Sowerby," said Dr. Corning, "that you have produced phenomena analogous to those recorded in history?"

"Certainly," answered Mr. Sowerby.

"And by the mesmeric or odic principle?"

"Undoubtedly."

"What is your evidence of the existence of such a principle? or your proof that such a principle exists?"

"The phenomena I produce or find produced by it."

"So, you take the phenomena to prove the principle, and the principle to explain the phenomena," said Dr. Corning, who could reason as well as anybody when it concerned the refutation of a theory not his own.

"I am not disposed to question the existence of such a principle," said Mr. Merton, "except in the form asserted by Mr. Dodson, or when it is explained as the immediate action of the mind or will of the mesmerizer upon the mesmerized. The fluid asserted by Mesmer, after the animal magnetists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as Wirdig, Fludd, Maxwell, Kircher, Van Helmont, simply revised by Baron Reichenbach with a great show of demonstration, though denied by Deleuze and some other mesmerists, I have no good reason for doubting. I am willing to concede the fact, that this fluid or agent exists and is employed by Mr. Sowerby in his experiments. I am willing to concede that there is a fluid or agent, not electricity, not magnetism, but analogous to them, contended for by

Baron Reichenbach, that pervades a numerous class of bodies, and may be artificially accumulated, or stimulated to increased activity. But suppose this; suppose the mesmerizer, wizard, sorcerer, witch, magician, actually uses it, I must still ask Mr. Sowerby to tell me how he proves it to be the sole principle of the phenomena produced? That in most of the cases recorded, if not in all, there are proper mesmeric or odic phenomena, naturally or artificially produced, is, I think, undeniable. The flowers used by Grandier, in the case of the nuns of Loudun, and the fumigations and sufflations of the old magicians, all prove the resort to magnetism. The rod and tub of Mesmer, and the cumbrous machinery he used, though not indispensable, every magnetizer knows are a useful mean. But as these are only subsidiary, how is it to be demonstrated that mesmerism itself is the sole efficient cause, not merely of some of the accessory phenomena, but of them all? In the phenomena of table-turning, so extensively witnessed, magnetism is not absolutely essential. They began, as all the recent spirit-manifestations, in mesmerism, and at first the table was mesmerized by a circle formed round it, joining their hands and resting them on it."

"The tables are turned," said Dr. Corning, "by the involuntary and unconscious muscular contraction of the hands pressing upon it. This has been proved."

"So says a French Academician, and so also says Professor Faraday, and tables, very likely, may be turned in some such way; but the table is frequently known to turn and cut up its capers without any circle being formed, without any person being near it, or visible hand touching it."

"That is true," said I, "for I have myself seen the most extraordinary phenomena of table-turning when it was certain no pressure, voluntary or involuntary, had been applied to it by any person visible in the room. I have seen a table turn in spite of the efforts of four strong men to hold it still, rise up without any visible agency, fly over the heads of the company, rush with violence from one end of the room to the other, spin round like a top, balance itself on one leg and then on another,—in fine, move along some inches on the floor with the weight of a dozen men resting on it, raise itself from the floor with them, and remain suspended a foot above it, for some minutes."

"There can be no doubt of that," said Mr. Merton. "In Cochin China, we are told on good authority, that in the

time of the predecessors of Gia-long, it was a custom in the province of Xu-Ngué, on certain solemnities, to invite the most celebrated tutelar genii of the towns and villages of the kingdom to games and a public trial of their strength. A long and heavy bark, with eight benches of oars, was placed dry in the centre of a large hall, and the trial consisted in seeing which of these could move it farthest or with the greatest ease. The judges and spectators took their stand at a little distance, and saw, as they called the names and titles of the genii placed on the bark, the huge machine tip one side and then the other, and finally advance and then recede. Some of the genii would push it forward several feet, others only a few inches. But one who made it come and go with the greatest facility, was the tutelar genius of the maritime village of Ke-Chan, worshipped under the name of Hon-Leo-Hanh, whose temple was in consequence thronged with pilgrims, and enriched with votive offerings."

"But conceding," continued Mr. Merton, "that mesmerism plays its part, I wish to know how Mr. Sowerby proves that it alone suffices for the production of the phenomena? Is it not possible that another power steps in, and, either alone or in concurrence, produces them? May it not be that mesmerism only facilitates or prepares the way for the demonic action, produces the state or condition of the human subject favorable to satanic invasion, and therefore is to be regarded rather as the occasion than as the efficient cause of the phenomena?"

"But I admit no devil; I do not believe that there are any demons," said Mr. Sowerby.

"I am aware of that," said Mr. Merton, "but I suppose that, notwithstanding your disbelief, there may be a devil, the prince of this world, as the Scriptures plainly teach. It is possible that there are whole legions of devils, that the air swarms with them, and that they have power to tempt and to vex and harass those they would seduce from allegiance to the Most High. Their non-existence, at least their non-intervention, must be proved before you are entitled to conclude that your mesmeric or odic agent is the sole efficient cause of the phenomena."

"But that," said Mr. Dodson, "would overthrow all the so-called inductive sciences."

"If so, I cannot help it," replied Mr. Merton. "The inductive philosophers have accumulated a mass of rich and

valuable facts by their observations and experiments, for which I am grateful to them; but I set no great store by the ever-changing theories which they imagine or invent to explain these facts. But let this pass. If Mr. Sowerby's mesmeric or odic force does not explain all the phenomena in the case, I presume that he will concede that it is not the sole principle of their production."

"Certainly," replied Mr. Sowerby.

"This odic agent, is it not a simple natural principle or force, and without reason or intelligence?"

"It is in itself unintelligent, I admit."

"But in the phenomena there are evident marks of intelligence, which proceed neither from the mesmerizer nor the mesmerized. How do you explain that?"

"The intelligence is the instinctive or involuntary intelligence proceeding from the back part of the brain," answered Mr. Dodson.

"Back part of whose brain?" asked Mr. Merton.

"The mesmerized or psychologized," replied that philosophic gentleman.

"But there cannot proceed, voluntarily or involuntarily, instinctively or rationally, from the back brain or the front brain, what is not in it, or an intelligence which its owner does not possess. I do not now speak of the intelligence of either the operator or the one operated upon, but of an intelligence of a third party. In the recorded and undeniable phenomena to be explained there appears a third party, which acts intelligently, and gives information unknown to either of the other parties. Take the case of the spectre that appeared to Brutus before the battle of Philippi, or that which appeared to Julian on the eve of the battle in which he fell mortally wounded, and hundreds of similar cases."

"They are mere hallucinations," interposed Dr. Corning.

"What proves the contrary," replied Mr. Merton, "is the fact that they had accurate knowledge of future events, which hallucinations have not. I place no stress on the fact that a prediction was uttered, or seemingly uttered, for that might be a hallucination; the point to be attended to is its literal fulfilment, showing a knowledge of the future not possessed by the individual to whom the prediction was made, nor, supposing mesmerism employed, by the mesmerizer. Here was an intelligent third party.

"There is a very well authenticated case of a domestic in

the German village of Kleische, who, returning one evening from a place near by, where she had been sent of an errand, saw a little gray man, not larger than an infant, who, because she would neither go with him nor answer him, threatened her, and told her, as she reached the threshold of her master's house, that she should be blind and dumb for four days. The prediction was exactly fulfilled. Instances enough are on record of persons afflicted, as they supposed, by evil spirits, who have foretold the day and hour when they would be delivered. In the case of the parsonage of Cideville, which in 1849 made so much noise in France, the agent that rapped was intelligent, for the raps gave distinct and intelligent answers to the questions addressed to it, and communicated facts unknown to the questioner and to all the persons present.

"The ancient pagan oracles may be cited. They did not, I concede, foretell what belongs exclusively to the supernatural providence of God, but they did foretell, clearly and distinctly, events belonging to the natural order, beyond the reach of ordinary human foresight. That many of the responses were false, that many of them were ambiguous and suited to the event, let it turn out which way it might, I by no means deny, but this cannot be said of all of them. The contrary is evident from the great reputation they enjoyed, and the long ages that they were consulted, not by the vulgar only, but by kings, princes, nobles, and philosophers, of the most learned and polite nations of gentile antiquity. Men are deceived, deluded, but never by pure falsehood. It is the truth mingled with the falsehood that deceives or misleads them."

"But the whole," said Jack, "was a system of jugglery, cheatery, and knavery, of the heathen priests."

"I do not defend," replied Mr. Merton, "the ancient pagan superstitions, nor the strict honesty, any more than the immaculate purity, of the ancient priesthoods; but I have learned not to explain great effects by petty causes, like the shallow-pated philosophers of the last century, and the historians of the school of Voltaire, Hume, and Robertson, who had no more comprehension of the real causes and concatenation of events than a respectable goose. All heathenism was founded on delusion, but not a delusion originating with, and kept up by, the trickery and jugglery of priests, who were often greater dupes than any others. No art, craft, jugglery, or fraud, could be carried on for three thousand

years in the bosom of cultivated nations without detection. There were men in ancient heathendom as able and as willing to detect human imposture, as are our modern philosophers, who tell us so gravely in their elaborate works how the priests contrived to work their miracles, and to keep the people in subjection. The only sound philosophy proceeds on the assumption of the general good faith of mankind, or that they dupe and are duped, save in individual cases, without *malice prépense.*

"In these oracles there was a superhuman intelligence, and an intelligence which was neither that of those who consulted nor that of those who gave the response, and it tells you itself why the oracles after the birth of our Saviour and the spread of Christianity, became mute.

> Me puer Hebræus, divos Deus ipse gubernans,
> Cedere sede jubet, tristemque redire sub Orcum;
> Aris ergo dehinc tacitus abscedito nostris.

The Hebrew youth, himself God and master of the gods, had reduced them to silence. Whence this third intelligence? It cannot come from the odic agent, for that is unintelligent."

"I do not agree with Mr. Sowerby," said Mr. Winslow. "I believe all existence is intelligent, and all forces intelligent forces. God is infinite intelligence. He is the principle and similitude of all things, and therefore every thing must, like him, be intelligent."

"That was my view," said I, "or else I should have had no hesitation in explaining a large portion of the mysterious phenomena by the old notion of demonic invasion."

"Yet this view," replied Mr. Merton, "is decidedly untenable. God, in the sense of creator, is the principle of all things, and in the sense that the ideas or types after which he creates them are in his eternal reason, he is their similitude; but it is not necessary to suppose that every creature imitates him in all his attributes, which would suppose that a cabbage has intellect and will, and a granite block is endowed with charity. The infinite intelligence of God supposes that all are created, ordered, and governed by, and according to, intelligence, but not that every creature is intelligent, or an intelligence. We might as well say that every creature is infinite, for God is infinity, as well as intelligence.

"In the phenomena of demonopathy the patient is distinctly conscious of an intelligence not his own. The mother

superior in the convent of Loudun was distinctly conscious that the words spoken by her organs did not proceed from her intelligence, and that they were uttered, not by her will, but against it. There is a thousand times more evidence of this third intelligence, and that it is personal, than Baron Reichenbach has adduced in proof of his odic agent. The nuns of Loudun knew what they did, and they struggled with all their might against the power that afflicted them. They knew as well that their words and actions proceeded from a foreign personality, and not from themselves, as you know that my words and actions do not proceed from you. They held in the greatest horror the blasphemous words their organs were made to utter, and the indecent postures they were made to assume, and sought deliverance by prayer and pious practices. That does not proceed from one's own will, which he holds in horror, and struggles against."

"The will and intelligence was that of Grandier, who mesmerized them. He, by the mesmeric agent, had placed himself in relation with them, and he moved them as a mesmerizer does his somnambulist," said Mr. Sowerby.

"That Grandier persecuted them, and was in some sense near them, is what they uniformly asserted, and what I am not disposed to deny, but that it was he who possessed them, and used their organs, is not to be supposed; because one human being cannot thus possess another, and because the intelligence and will displayed surpassed his own. Grandier, if he afflicted them, did it only by means of a foreign power, foreign both to his personality and theirs, as even Mr. Sowerby contends; but this foreign power must have had, as is evident from the recorded phenomena, intelligence and will of its own."

After a long discussion on this point, which I had hardly for a moment questioned, for I had proved it by my experiments with Priscilla, and with tables and inanimate objects, time and again, though I saw not all that it involved, all except the doctor and Jack agreed that it must be so. The doctor would not make an admission that required him to modify what he had written and published on insanity, and Jack would not hear a word on the subject. His experience was explicable on the assumption of hallucination, and he would not believe anybody had had a more marvellous experience than his own.

"But," said Mr. Merton, "this wonder-working power, if it have intelligence and will, must be a spirit, good or bad,

and, also a superhuman spirit, since the phenomena are superhuman."

"So," said Dr. Corning, "here we are in the middle of the nineteenth century, in this age of science, after so much has been said and written against the folly, ignorance, barbarism, and superstition of past ages, back in the old superstitious belief in demons, good and bad angels, ghosts and hobgoblins, fairies and ghouls, witches and witchcraft, sorcery and magic. Well, gentlemen, I have done. I am inclined to believe there must be a devil, for if there were no devil we could hardly have such poor success in bringing the world to reason, and curing it of superstition."

"There may be more truth in what you say than you suspect," said Mr. Merton. "The devil is the father of ignorance, credulity, and superstition, no less than of false science, infidelity, and irreligion."

CHAPTER XX.—SHEER DEVILTRY.

A FEW days after this last conversation, I was visited by Judge Preston, whom I had slightly known in former years, —a man of very respectable gifts and attainments, and of high standing in the community. He had been a politician, lawyer, legislator, and was now a justice of the supreme court of his native state. He was moral, upright, candid, and sincere, but like too many of his class, as well as of mine, had grown up and lived without any fixed or determinate views of religion. To say he had rejected Christianity, would be hardly just; but he had only vague notions of what is Christianity, and if he did not absolutely disbelieve a future state, he had no firm belief in the immortality of the soul. He rather wished than hoped to live again. He had not long before lost his wife, whom he tenderly loved, and her death had plunged him into an inconsolable grief. He wept, and refused to be comforted. A friend drew him one evening into a circle of spiritualists or spiritists, and after much persuasion, induced him to seek through a medium an interview with his deceased wife. What he saw and heard convinced him, and he soon found that he was himself a medium—a writing medium, I believe.

Judge Preston, in connection with a physician of some eminence, and his friend Von Schaick, formerly a member of the United States Senate, a prominent politician a few years since, and in religion a Swedenborgian, had just pub-

lished a work, of large dimensions as well as pretensions, on spiritualism and spirit-manifestations, very well written, and not without interest to those who would investigate the subject of demonic invasion.

He said that he had called to see me in obedience to an order given him by Benjamin Franklin, who assured him that I could, if I chose, give him some information on the subject of the spirit manifestations, for I had had more to do with them than any man living.

I replied that I was very glad to see him; but, as to the conversation on spirit-manisfestations, I must decline taking part in it myself. I was very weak, and I did not think I could give him any information of importance. He could probably learn much more from the shades of Franklin, William Penn, or George Washington, than from me. George Fox and Oliver Cromwell could tell him many things; Swedenborg and Joe Smith more yet. I advised him to call up the Mormon prophet, who could probably give him more light on the subject than any one who had gone to the spirit-world since Mahomet. I should, however, be most happy to hear him and my highly esteemed friend Mr. Merton, who was present, converse on the subject.

"Mr. Merton," said the Judge, "I perceive is not a believer, and I am not fond of conversing with sceptics."

"Judge Preston," said Mr. Merton, "can hardly call me a sceptic, and I think, were we to compare notes, he would find me believing too much rather than too little."

"It may be so," said the Judge, "but I feel as if I was in the presence of an unbeliever, and an enemy of the spirits."

"We must not place too much reliance on our feelings; and the habit of carefully noting them, and taking them as our guides, is not to be encouraged," answered Mr. Merton. "Our feelings become warped, obscure our perceptions, and mislead our judgment. I certainly do not deny the facts, or the phenomena which you call spirit-manifestations, although I may not, and probably do not, admit your explanation of them, nor the doctrines concerning God, the universe, and man and his destiny, which I find in your book."

"But do you believe that spirits from the other world do really communicate with the living?"

"That there is in many of the phenomena, I say not in all, which you call spirit-manifestations, a real spiritual invasion, I do not doubt; but whether the spirits are the souls

of the departed, or really demons or devils personating them, is a question to which you do not seem to me, from your book, to have paid sufficient attention. You are necromancers, diviners with the spirits of the dead. Necromancers are almost as old as history. We find them alluded to in Genesis. Moses forbids necromancy, or the evocation of the dead, and commands that necromancers shall be put to death. In all ancient and modern pagan nations, necromancy is found to be a very common species of divination. The African magicans found at Cairo practise it even at the present time, as we find testified to by an English nobleman and a French academician, though by a seeing medium, not, as is the case with you, by rapping, talking, and writing mediums. The famous Count di Cagliostro, or rather Giuseppe Balsamo, at the close of the last century, professed to enable persons of distinction to converse with the spirits of eminent individuals, long since dead; and evocation of the dead has long been practised at Paris by students of the University. You are real diviners, attempting, by means of evoking the dead, to divine secrets, whether of the past or the future, unknown to the living. You practise what the world has always called divination, and that species of divination called necromancy. Thus far, all is plain, certain, undeniable, and therefore you do that which the Christian world has always held to be unlawful, and a dealing with the devils. This, however, is nothing to you, for you place the authority of the spirits above that of Jesus Christ, and do not hesitate to make Christianity give place to spiritism. But what I wish you to tell me is, the evidence on which you assert that the invading or communicating spirits are really the souls of men and women who once lived in the flesh?"

"They themselves expressly affirm it, and prove it by proving that they have the knowledge of the earthly lives of the persons they say they are, which we should expect them to have in case they were those very persons."

"The question, you will perceive, my dear Judge, is one of identity—a question with which, as a lawyer and a judge, you must have often had occasion to deal. Is the evidence you assign sufficient?"

"On my professional honor and reputation, I say it is."

"Do you find the spirits always tell the truth?"

"No. I have said in my book they frequently lie."

"Then the simple fact that a spirit says he is Franklin,

Adams, Jefferson, Washington, George Fox, William Penn, or Martin Luther, is not a sufficient proof that he is."

"I concede it. But I do not rely on his word alone. I examine the spirit, and I conclude he is identically Franklin only when I find that he has that intimate acquaintance with the earthly life of Franklin which I should expect to find in case he really were Franklin."

"But that intimate acquaintance does not establish the identity, unless you know beforehand that the spirit could not have it, unless he were Franklin. The spirits, I find by consulting your book, have told you the most secret things of your own past life, and secrets which could by no human means be known to any one but yourself. Yet the spirit who knew these secrets was not yourself, but an intelligence distinct from you. Now, if the spirit could show himself thus intimately acquainted with your earthly life without being you, why might he not be intimately acquainted with Franklin's earthly life without being Franklin?"

"That is a point of view under which I have not considered the question. But, nevertheless, I have subjected the spirits to severe tests, and compelled them to confirm what they say by extraordinary visible manifestations."

"But the difficulty I find is, that there is nothing in those manifestations that necessarily establishes the identity pretended; for they do not necessarily establish the credibility of the power exhibiting them, as you yourself allow, when you acknowledge that the spirits are untruthful, and not unfrequently lie to you. Miracles accredit the miracle-worker, establish his credibility, only when they are such as can be performed only by the finger of God. If they are such as can be performed by a created power, without special divine intervention, or such as might be performed by a lying spirit, they prove nothing as to the credibility of their author. A messenger, or a person claiming to be a messenger from God, performs a miracle which can be performed only by the hand of God, and thus establishes his credibility, because he proves by the miracle that God is with him, vouches for what he says; and God, we know, can neither deceive nor be deceived, and therefore will not endorse a deceiver. But prodigies, though superhuman, which do not transcend the powers of created intelligence, do not accredit the agent who performs them, certainly not when it is conceded the agent can, and in many cases does, lie and deceive. I must think, my dear Judge, that you have been hasty in concluding the

identity pretended. All you can conclude, from the phenomena in the case, is, that there is present a superhuman spirit, personating or pretending to be Bacon, Franklin, Penn, Swedenborg, or some other well-known person who has lived in the flesh, and is able to speak and act in the character assumed."

"My attention, I grant, has not been so specially turned to the question of identity of the spirit with the individual personated, as it has been to establishing the reality of the spiritual presence," said the judge.

"And you have been mainly intent on and carried away, I presume, by the revelations you have received, or doctrines on the greatest of all topics taught you by the spirits."

"That is true. I have been much more impressed and confirmed by them than by the visible or physical manifestations which I have witnessed. The sublime doctrines and pure morality which the spirits teach have chiefly won my conviction."

"But these, however much they may seem to you, are very little to the Christian believer. In their most favorable light, they do not approach in sublimity and purity, human reason alone being judge, the Gospel of our Lord. There is nothing new in your spiritual philosophy, and your morality merely travesties a few principles of Christian morality. You assert the immortality of the soul, never, in ancient or modern times, denied by the heathen world; but the peculiar Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, and of future rewards and punishments, you do not recognize. You hardly stand on a level with Cicero or Seneca. You travesty the Christian doctrine of charity, or substitute for it a watery philanthropy, or a sickly sentimentality. There is in your system some subtilty, some cunning, some chicanery, and ingenuity, but no deep philosophy, no lofty wisdom, no broad, comprehensive principles, no robust, manly virtue. The point on which you place the most importance is that of infinite progression, which is an infinite absurdity; and inasmuch as it denies the doctrine of final causes, denies God himself, and is, in the last analysis, pure atheism.

"That some true and good things are said by the spirits, I do not deny. The devil can disguise himself and appear as an angel of light. He is a great fool, no doubt, but not fool enough to attempt to seduce men by evil as evil. He must present falsehood in the guise of truth, and evil in the guise of good, if he would do evil. It is not likely that he would begin by

shocking the moral sense of the community, and we should expect him to recognize and appeal to the moral sentiments and dominant beliefs of the men of the age; and this is all that you can say of the teachings of the spirits. But, except the confirmation of the fact taught by religion in all ages, that there are spiritual beings, superior to man, who surround us and may invade us, nothing they teach can be relied on, because their veracity is not established, and their unveracious and lying character is conceded."

"There are lying spirits, I concede, but all are not," interposed the judge.

"Be that as it may, in what transcends your own knowledge, or is not verifiable by your own natural powers, you have no means of distinguishing them, or of determining when the communication is true, or when it is false. When a spirit unfolds to you a system of the universe,—a system which comes not within the range of scientific investigation, —you cannot say that he is not deluding you, and giving you fairy gold, which will turn out to be chips or vile stubble."

"You think us deluded, then?"

"In what you see and hear, no; in regard to what lies beyond, yes. I believe you honest; I believe you really receive communications from invisible spirits; I believe you fabricate, simulate nothing. I give you full credit so far as regards the mysterious phenomena you relate; I agree with you in the conclusion that these phenomena are produced by spirits; but I regard as not proved the identity of these spirits with the spirits who were once united as human souls to bodies; and what they teach of God, the universe, and human destiny, I regard as a delusion—a satanic delusion, designed to seduce you from, or to prevent you from returning to, your allegiance to God and his Christ."

"That this is the fact," said I, "I am quite sure. If any proof of it were wanting, it might be found in the fact that these spirit-manifestations are even by Judge Preston himself identified with those which have always been opposed to Christianity, and by it pronounced satanic; and by the further fact, that they teach as truth the principal doctrines which the movement party of the day oppose to the Gospel. Take the doctrines set forth by the Seer Davis, those which you find in the *Shekinah*, and even in Judge Preston's own book, and you find them in substance the prevailing infidelity of the times, dressed out in a spiritual garb. I have very

good reasons for knowing that these spirit-manifestations have been started for the very purpose of overthrowing Christianity by means of an infidel superstition. The prime mover had precisely this object, and no other."

"We have," said the judge, "only your word for that. I regard these phenomena from God."

"So the devil wishes you to regard them, for he seeks, by means of them, to carry on his war against the Christian's God, and to get himself worshipped as God," said I.

"The devil," said Mr. Merton, "can go only the length of his chain, and that chain is much shorter than it was in old heathen times. He can do only what he is permitted, and it is very possible that what he is now doing will turn out to his signal discomfiture. It will give a serious blow to the materialism and Sadducism of the age, lead men to believe in the reality of the spirit-world, and when that is done, they will have made one step towards believing in Christ. The age is so infirm as to deny the existence of the devil; and even becoming able to believe once more in the reality of his satanic majesty, will be a symptom, slight though it may be, of convalescence."

"We," remarked the judge, "are no Sadducees. We believe in both angel and spirit, in good angels and bad angels."

"That is something," said Mr. Merton; "and, if you open your hearts, and keep them open to the light, you may in time believe more, and escape the meshes in which Satan has now entangled you. Your great mistake is in supposing that these good and bad angels are departed souls. I do not say that departed souls may not revisit the earth; they have done so, and they may continue to do so, but the human soul never becomes an angel or a demon. It is all very well to say of a departed dear one, he or she is an angel in heaven, but taken literally, it is never true. In the resurrection, our Lord says the just are like the angels of God, in the respect that they are neither male nor female, and neither marry nor are given in marriage, but he does not say that they are angels; and the Scriptures distinguish between the company of the angels and the spirits of just men made perfect. Men were created a little lower than the angels, and they are of a different order. The demons or devils are not wicked souls separated from their bodies, and wandering on this or the other side of the dark-flowing Acheron, but the angels who kept not their first estate, and were cast out of heaven.

"These fallen angels, under their chief, Lucifer or Satan, carry on their rebellion against God by seeking to seduce men from their allegiance to their rightful sovereign. They can and do invade men, because they are superior to men, and are malicious enough to do it. But the good angels never do it, for they work not by violence, but by moral, persuasive, peaceful, and gentle influences; and human souls cannot do it, for the *strong* keepeth the house till a *stronger* comes and binds him. Nothing remains then, my dear Judge, but to regard these spirit-manifestations, in so far as real, as the invasions of Satan, as produced, not by good angels or departed souls, but by the fallen angels, called demons by the gentiles, and therefore, all these mysterious phenomena, in so far as they are not produced by natural agencies, as sheer deviltry. This is the only conclusion to which I, as a Christian philosopher, can come respecting them."

CHAPTER XXI.—SPIRIT-MANIFESTATIONS.

Mr. Merton's conclusion did not precisely please me, although I had suspected it from the first. Yet it troubled me, and I would gladly have escaped it. The next day, when Mr. Merton called to see me, as he did every day, I told him that I did not like his conclusion, and I wished he would give me his real thoughts on the subject.

"Without recurring to the teachings of Christianity, which I have the happiness of believing, I could not," said he, "explain these mysterious spirit-manifestations, and I should not know what to think of them. I might be tempted to deny them, as does our friend Jack—to believe them produced by some inexplicable jugglery, even against my better judgment; or I might try to acquiesce in the belief of our friend the judge, that they are the souls of the departed. Most likely, I should treat them simply as inexplicable, and attempt to construct no theory for their solution.

"I am unwilling to suppose the supernatural, and will not, where I cannot satisfactorily demonstrate the insufficiency of the natural. The whole history of our race bristles with prodigies, with marvellous facts, clearly divisible into two distinct and even opposite orders. The one seem to have for their object to draw men towards God, and assist them in ascending to him as their last end and supreme good; the other seem to have for their object to draw men away from

God, and to aid men in descending into the depths of night and darkness. Man has a double nature, is composed of body and soul, and on the one side has a natural aspiration to God, and on the other a natural tendency from God, towards the creature, and thence towards night and chaos. A supernatural power assists him to rise; a preternatural power assists him, so to speak, to descend. But whether in the ascending or in the descending scale, it is not easy to say where the natural ends and the supernatural begins, for in both cases the foreign power presupposes the natural, and blends in with it, and simply transforms the action.

"There is, no doubt, much in either order set down by the vulgar to foreign intervention, that is really explicable on natural principles. Good, pious people cry out 'a miracle,' not seldom where no miracle is; and I should be sorry to be obliged to make an act of faith in all the miracles recorded in the legends of the saints. I should be equally sorry to be obliged to believe every tale that is told of satanic invasion. I have a deep and settled horror of scepticism, but also a horror no less of superstition. I would no more be credulous than incredulous. I do not like to undertake the refutation of those who explain the facts of the night-side of nature on natural principles, for it is hard to do it, without giving more or less occasion in many minds to superstition. It is only in cases, like the present, where the disease is an epidemic, more destructive than the cholera or the plague, that I am willing to do what I can to draw attention to their real character.

"In regard to the dark prodigies, if I may so call them, I think not a few included by the vulgar under this head should be dismissed as mere jugglery; others may be explained by animal magnetism, and imply neither fraud nor dealing with devils, but are not innocent, because produced not by a justifiable motive, and are in all cases to be discountenanced because of dangerous tendency; others still may, perhaps, be explicable by natural causes, which science has not yet investigated, and of which we are ignorant.

"But a residuum remains which it is impossible to explain without the assumption of satanic intervention. Such are some of the cases which you have heard me relate. Such are many of the phenomena which you yourself must have witnessed, and perhaps been instrumental in producing. Such, too, is the inspiration of Mahomet, if we may rely on the account given us by his friends, as well as the demon of

Socrates, and such are evidently the well known cases of the Camisards or Tremblers of the Cevennes in 1688, George Fox and the early Quakers, Swedenborg, and the trance or ecstacy of the Methodists, and finally Joe Smith and the Mormon prophets. In all these cases there are evident marks of superhuman intervention, and which no man in his sober senses, and instructed in the Christian religion, can pretend is the intervention of the Holy Ghost, or of good angels. The perturbation, the disorder, the trembling, the falling backwards, the foaming at the mouth, the violence which always in these cases accompany the presence of the spirit, are so many sure indications that it is an evil, not a good spirit. The Lord was not in the strong wind that rent the mountain; he was not in the fire that wrapt it in flames; but in the still small voice that made the prophet step forth from his cave to listen. When the Lord comes in his gracious visitations all is sweetness and peace. No disturbance of the physical system, no whirling and howling, no storm or tempest, no wringing and twisting of the arms and legs, no violent or indecent postures, no abnormal development or exercise of the faculties, mark the incoming of the Holy Ghost. All is calm and serene; the understanding is illuminated, the heart is warmed, the will is strengthened, and the whole soul is elevated by the infusion of a supernatural grace. There is no crisis, no forgetfulness on awakening from a trance. But whenever it is the reverse, wherever there is violence, distortion, quaking, trembling, and disturbance, we know that if any spirit is present it is an evil spirit, which delights in violence and disorder, and displays power without love, force without goodness, knowledge without gentleness.

"Everybody has heard, I suppose, of the prodigies wrought by touching the tomb of the Deacon Paris, the famous Jansenist saint, and the violent controversy they occasioned between the Jansenists and the Jesuits, the former trying to magnify them into miracles to the honor of their sect, and the Jesuits very unnecessarily and very unwisely, in my judgment, laboring to disprove or discredit them as facts. The prodigies are well authenticated, and I see no way of denying them without throwing doubt on all human testimony. Among them I select those which indicate, on the part of the affected, a surprising power of physical resistance, and among these, I select only one, that of Jeanne Moulu, a young woman, from twenty-two to twenty-three

years of age, given by the *Dictionnaire des Sciences Médicales.* This young woman, in her convulsions, was placed with her back against a wall, and a man of great strength took an andiron weighing some twenty-five pounds, and struck her on her stomach several blows in succession with all his strength, sometimes to the number of one hundred blows and over. A brother gave her sixty blows, and afterwards, trying his blows against the wall, it gave way at the twenty-fifth blow. It was in vain, says Carré de Montgeron, a grave magistrate, that I struck with all my force, the convulsionary complained that my blows brought her no relief, and obliged me to place the andiron in the hands of a large and very strong man found among the spectators. He spared nothing, but put forth all his strength, and dealt such terrible blows on the pit of her stomach that they shook the wall against which she was supported. She made him give her the hundred blows which she had demanded at first, counting for nothing the sixty she had received from me. When the andiron sunk so deep into the pit of her stomach as to seem to reach her back, the young woman would exclaim, 'That relieves me. Courage, my brother; strike harder, if you can.' The blows were struck on the naked skin, but without bruising or breaking it in the least. The convulsionary, after this, lay on the floor, and there was placed upon her a heavy plank on which stood a score or more of persons, weighing all together at least four thousand pounds. Then a flintstone, weighing twenty-two pounds, was hurled with full force a hundred times in succession upon her bosom. At each blow, the whole room shook, the floor trembled, and the spectators shuddered at the sound of the frightful blows.

"There were other phenomena of a character no less extraordinary, but I pass them over, all of which were notorious, and witnessed by half, one writer says all, Paris. Hume says that they have all the authenticity that human testimony can give, and that we can deny them only on the ground that such things are absolutely impossible. Humanly impossible I concede, but, as they are not of a character to come from God, I must believe them to be satanic, and that the persons were really possessed and sustained by evil spirits.

"The case of frequent occurrence among the lower class of the lamas, related by M. Huc in his travels in Mongolia, Thibet, and China, is one that cannot be explained save on the

ground of satanic intervention,—that of a lama, a sort of Boudhist monk, who opens his belly, takes out his entrails, and places them before him, and then returns immediately to his former state.

"'When the appointed hour has arrived,' says M. Huc, 'the whole multitude of pilgrims repair to the great court of the lama convent, where an altar is erected. At length the bokte makes his appearance; he advances gravely amid the acclamations of the crowd, seats himself on the altar, and taking a cutlass from his girdle, places it between his knees, while the crowd of lamas, ranged in a circle at his feet, commence the terrible invocations that prelude this frightful ceremony. By degrees, as they proceed in their recital, the bokte seems to tremble in every limb, and gradually fall into strong convulsions. Then the song of the lamas becomes wilder and more animated, and the recitation is changed for cries and howlings. Suddenly the bokte flings away the scarf which he has worn, snatches off his girdle, and with the sacred cutlass rips himself entirely open. As the blood gushes out, the multitude prostrate themselves before the horrid spectacle, and the sufferer is immediately interrogated concerning future events and things concealed from human knowledge. His answers to these questions are regarded as oracles.

"'As soon as the devout curiosity of the pilgrims is satisfied, the lamas resume their recitations and prayers; and the bokte, taking up in his right hand a quantity of his blood, carries it to his mouth, blows three times on it, and casts it, with a loud cry, into the air. He then passes his hand rapidly over his stomach, and it becomes whole as it was before, without the slightest trace being left of the diabolical operation, with the exception of an extreme lassitude.'

"'Occurrences like these are not rare, and I could fill volumes with phenomena equally extraordinary, which I cannot deny, and which cannot be explained without the assumption of a superhuman agent, and I may add, a diabolical agent. Dupotet exhibits, by means of his magic ring, almost daily in Paris, the most extraordinary magic wonders, and he confesses that he does it by means of a mental evocation, and by virtue of a PACT.

"Now these, and facts like these, instructed as I am in the Christian faith, and holding it without any doubt, prove to me that the satanic invasion, demonic possession, and ob-

session, are no fables, but facts not to be denied, though each particular case must stand on its own merits, and be received or rejected according to the evidence. In general I am slow to believe this or that particular case is diabolic, and I require clear and irrefragable proof, strong and perfectly reliable testimony.

"The criteria of demonic invasion or obsession, as laid down by the Christian church, for the guidance of exorcists, are seven:

1. Power of knowing the unexpressed thoughts of others.
2. Understanding of unknown languages.
3. Power of speaking unknown or foreign languages.
4. Knowledge of future events.
5. Knowledge of things passing in distant places.
6. Exhibition of superior physical strength.
7. Suspension of the body in the air during a considerable time.

"Now I find all these in the recent spirit-manifestations, clearly and distinctly testified to by such ocular witnesses as Dr. Dexter, Judge Edmonds, and the Hon. N. P. Talmadge, not to mention any others. The spiritualists or spiritists do not deny, they assert that the manifestations they witness are strictly analogous to the class of facts which have been always regarded as satanic. At first, the spirits communicated by rapping and moving furniture. But now, besides rapping mediums, there are writing mediums, seeing mediums, and speaking mediums. In these last three cases they admit the fact of spiritual invasion, and even call it possession. In the case of the speaking medium particularly, I find it contended that the spirit takes possession of the medium, generally a woman, maltreats her at times, throws her down, gives her convulsions, and forces her to do things which she is unwilling to do, and compels her organs to utter words to which she has the greatest repugnance.

"Hear Judge Edmonds. 'I have frequently known mental questions answered, that is, questions merely framed in the mind of the interrogator, and not revealed by him or known to others. Preparatory to meeting a circle, I have sat down alone in my room, and carefully prepared a series of questions to be propounded, and I have been surprised to find my questions answered, and in the precise order in which I wrote them, without my even taking my memorandum out of my pocket, and when I knew not a person present even knew that I had prepared questions, much less what they were.

My most secret thoughts, those which I never uttered to mortal man or woman, have been freely spoken to, as if I had uttered them. Purposes which I have privately entertained have been publicly revealed, and I have once and again been admonished that my every thought was known to, and could be disclosed by, the intelligence which was thus manifesting itself.

"'I have heard the mediums use Greek, Latin, Spanish, and French, when I knew that they had no knowledge of any language but their own; and it is a fact that can be attested by many, that often there has been speaking and writing in foreign languages and unknown tongues by those who were unacquainted with either.'

"Dr. Dexter is explicit to the same purpose. I need not multiply citations. The books of the spiritualists are full of instances in point. And as it is clear, from the phenomena presented, that the superhuman intelligence and power manifested are not divine, I can, as a rational man, only conclude that they are satanic. I believe the persons engaged in the unhallowed intercourse are, to a great extent, in good faith, and have no suspicion that they are really dealing with devils."

"I believe you are right," said I. "One thing is certain, that even in mesmerizing, there is always an implicit mental evocation, and without it, I venture to say, no one was ever able to exhibit the mesmeric phenomena. The effort of the will which the mesmerizer makes, whether he uses passes or not, is at bottom an evocation, a calling up of the mesmeric spirit; and he who set the spirits a-rapping, you may be sure, had made a virtual, if not an explicit, a tacit, if not an express compact with the devil. But there is one thing further I would have you explain, that is, the connection of spirit-manifestations with so-called animal magnetism."

"That is a great subject, and would lead me too far for my time and for your strength. There are different spirits that besiege us or invade us, but those that usually do so probably, after the language of St. Paul, swarm in the air and inhabit what the ancients called Ether. Many of the fathers, and some later doctors of the church have believed that they are created with and inhabit fine ethereal bodies. However this may be, they no doubt, in their operation, assume such bodies, and consequently find their operations facilitated by a subtile material medium, such as the mes-

meric fluid. Hence I do not regard mesmerism itself as satanic, but as facilitating demonic invasion.

"There is also in man what the ancients called the *umbra*, the shade, which is not the soul, nor the body in its mere outward sense. It is, as it were, the interior lining of the body, capable, to a certain extent, of being detached from it, without however losing its relation to it. Hence the phenomena of bi-location, so frequently noticed in the annals of sorcery or witchcraft, can be conceived as possible. The body lies in a trance, and the soul with its *umbra* is able to carry on, by the assistance of the demon, its deviltry, even at a distance; and the wounds given to the shade will reappear on the body, as has been often observed.

"But you must excuse me from entering further into this intricate and mysterious subject. Many ingenious theories have been devised, but I wish to deal as little with them as possible. There is a laudable curiosity, there is also an unlawful curiosity, and there is a science which is not desirable. I have been obliged, in the way of my calling, to study it; but I never touch it, without regretting its necessity. Spare me. The knowledge that cannot enlighten, that cannot aid virtue, and only leads astray, should never be sought."

CHAPTER XXII.—SUPERSTITION.

I HAD, from the first, suspected Mr. Merton's conclusion, and should never for a moment have doubted it, had I not grown up in the disbelief of evil spirits. Science, or what passes for science, had long denied all supernatural and all superhuman intervention in the affairs of mankind; and I, like the majority of my contemporaries, had grown up a complete Epicurean. There was, perhaps, a God who had created the world, but having created it, and impressed upon it certain fixed and invariable laws, he left it to take care of itself. I denied his providence, or, what is the same thing, resolved it into the uniform and inflexible laws of nature, and like my friends of the French eclectic school, saw the divine intervention only in the necessary and immutable elements of human history. God was for me simply fate, invincible necessity, and therefore no free person, no object of reverence, love, or worship.

Having excluded providence, I necessarily rejected the ministry of angels. I resolved all nature into a collection of forces operative by intrinsic and necessary laws. Man is

one of these forces, neither the strongest nor the weakest. In his own intrinsic strength he is not much, but by placing himself in a right position with regard to the other forces of nature, he may make them work in him and for him, and thus increase nis strength by the whole of theirs, as the millwright makes use of the force of the stream to turn his mill, the inventor of the magnetic telegraph of the lightning to convey his messages, or as the sailor avails himself of the wind to propel his ship.

Belief in the free or voluntary intervention of the Divinity in human affairs, I had been taught by received science to regard as superstition. Religion, Christian or Mahometan, Jewish or pagan, inasmuch as it always presupposes the supernatural, or the intervention of God *extra naturam*, or otherwise than in and through the laws of nature, was superstition. The ministry of angels was superstition. The assertion of satanic interposition was, beyond all doubt, superstition. The facts which had led to the supposition of divine providence, and of the ministry of good and evil angels, were, no doubt, real; but ignorant of the laws of nature, men had misinterpreted them, and assigned them causes which are unreal. All religion has, I said, its origin in ignorance, and necessarily recedes as science advances. Hence I felt that it would be only a proof of my ignorance and superstition to ascribe the mysterious phenomena to any spiritual or supernatural agency.

Even after the explanations of Mr. Merton, and after my reason was silenced, I was unwilling to abandon my prejudices, and accept his conclusion. What, should I, in this nineteenth century, in this age of genuine science, which has done so much to roll back the clouds and dissipate the darkness which enveloped past ages, consent to adopt the vulgar belief of the sixteenth century, when men were but just escaping from the thraldom of Romanism—of the thirteenth century, when they were but just beginning to emerge from barbarism—of the first century, when still buried in the night of heathenism? My pride of science, my pride of intellect, revolted at the thought. What ridicule would not be showered upon me by the wits and freethinkers of the age, should it be known, or even suspected!

I hesitated long, for I saw at once, that if I admitted the existence and influence of Satan, I must go further, and concede the Christian mysteries. I must abandon liberal Christianity, deny the supposed progress of recent times in

religious notions, and return to old-fashioned orthodoxy Perhaps I should find it necessary to go even further back than the orthodoxy of my own country. This was no pleasant thought. To unlearn all I had learned, to regard all my most cherished convictions as so many delusions, to become in reality as a little child, and to commence life anew, as Jesus Christ taught we must do, if we would enter into the kingdom of heaven, was too humiliating to be contemplated with pleasure even on my dying bed, and when the world was fast disappearing from my view. What would have been the result of my internal struggle, if I had been left wholly to myself, I will not pretend to say. But I was not so left. Mr. Merton was with me almost daily, and seemed always to read my thoughts before I expressed them, and to comprehend my difficulties.

"Your great mistake," said he to me one day, when the subject came up, "is in supposing that religion is the offspring of ignorance, and stands opposed to science. Your assumption that man began in ignorance, and has attained to science only by long and patient research and laborious experiment, is at best gratuitous. Some things, of course, have been acquired only in process of time. Man has made progress in the knowledge of all that which he himself has done, or has suffered; but nothing requires you to assume that his progress in knowledge is any thing more than progress in the knowledge of his own doing and suffering. It is not likely that Adam knew the history of the battle of Pharsalia, of Hastings, Bovines, or Waterloo; it is not probable that he was acquainted with the steam-engine, the cotton-gin, the spinning-jenny, the power-loom, or the lightning-telegraph. But he may have received from his Maker, as religion teaches, a knowledge of the nature and causes of things, and of his moral relations and duties, equal to that possessed by the most enlightened of his posterity.

"Historically considered," proceeded Mr. Merton, "the earliest belief of mankind was the existence, unity, and free providence of God—a belief in strict accordance with the deductions of genuine science in every age. Every language under heaven bears indelible traces of that belief, and would be unintelligible, absolutely insignificant, if it were denied. Yet all languages are radically one and the same, and must, in some form, have been given supernaturally to man, for man speaks only as he has learned to speak; and it would have required language to invent language."

"But if all languages are radically the same, how do you explain their manifest differences?" I asked.

"That is a question which I leave to the philologists; but they, I believe, very easily prove that these differences are not radical, and that they are due principally to the differences of pursuits, of circumstances, temperaments, and pronunciation of different tribes having little or no intercourse with one another. However great or small they may be, or whatever their causes, it has been proved that they are only modifications of one and the same original tongue."

"But you know," said I, "that religion is progressive, and that the earliest religion of mankind was a gross fetichism, a worship of animals and inanimate things. From that gross superstition we can trace its gradual purification and progress towards the sublime monotheism of Moses, Socrates, Plato, and Jesus, moulded by the church fathers into Christian theology."

"I know no such thing," replied Mr. Merton, "and St. Paul, who was a good philosopher as well as an inspired apostle, tells us that men left the true God to worship creeping things and four-footed beasts. The monotheism you speak of is historically older than the fetichism of which you would make it a development. What you are pleased to call the monotheism of Moses, was older than that lawgiver. Moses, under divine inspiration and direction, founded the Jewish state, or commonwealth, and instituted the Jewish worship, but he did not introduce a new faith or theology. The faith or doctrine he taught concerning God and moral duty, was that of the old patriarchs, and the same which had been held from Adam. Christian faith and theology have come down to us through the line of the patriarchs and the Jews, not through that of the gentiles, and, if a development at all, is not a development of heathenism, but of the earlier patriarchal religion preserved in the synagogue. Hence St. Augustine says, that faith has not changed; as believed the fathers, so we believe—only they believed in a Christ who was to come, and we believe in a Christ who has come.

"Then, again, the monotheism, if monotheism it was, of Socrates and Plato, was not a development or gradual purification of fetichism or of the gross forms of nature-worship. They themselves tell you as much, and always claim to be restorers, not innovators. In asserting the unity of God,

they profess always to revive the belief or the wisdom of the ancients. No one can have studied the various forms of heathenism without finding in them ample evidence that they are not primitive formations. They all bear witness to a type which is not in themselves—a type from which they have departed, not a type which they are approaching or realizing. They bear the deep traces of corruption, and are evidently travesties of the old patriarchal or primitive religion, without a knowledge of which they are absolutely inexplicable. The memory of the loss of its primitive perfection, all heathenism retains in its heart. All heathenism is imprinted with profound grief for a lost good, and never does it show signs of a true joy. There is sadness in all its rites, gay and joyous as it tries to make them. Its joy is a drunken joy, and its boisterous mirth is the wild laugh of the maniac. But over the whole of heathenism, even in its grossest forms, there hovers always the primitive monotheism. It retains always some reminiscence of the belief in one supreme God, Father of gods and men. Anaxagoras, Socrates, Plato, and others, acquainted with the Jewish belief, and meditating on this reminiscence, undoubtedly rose to sublimer and more rational views of the Divinity than those which were entertained by the vulgar; but this says nothing in favor of that gradual development and purification of heathenism, which you and a well known modern school assert, and assert without one single fact to support you.

"You must rely on history," continued Mr. Merton, "for your theory professes to be historical, and to sustain itself by facts. But history has been tolerably authentic for some thousands of years. How happens it, if your theory be correct, that we find no instance of this gradual development and purification of heathenism? In all the cases where the history can be traced, it is undeniable that the purest or the least deformed state of any heathen superstition is its earliest; and the grossest, the most corrupt and revolting, is always its latest. Nothing in this world ever reforms itself, and the inevitable tendency of all error, as of all vice, is from bad to worse. Compare the popular religion of Rome under the kings, with the popular religion under the pagan emperors, and you will find this proved.

"Indeed, my friend, your whole theory is false. Never yet has religion receded before the advance of true science, and religion, as you well say, has always asserted the super-

natural, the interposition of God in human affairs, *extra naturam.* Always, too, has it asserted the existence of good and bad angels, and their intervention on the one hand by divine command, and on the other by divine permission, in the affairs of mankind. This belief of all ages is itself a phenomenon to be explained, accounted for; and you will find it impossible to explain it, or account for it, without admitting its substantial truth. Men may err in supposing a supernatural or superhuman intervention where none takes place, and undoubtedly they have so erred time and again; but they could not have so erred if they had not already had the idea or belief of such interposition. Whence comes that idea or belief? If that is false, explain whence comes the general error before the particular? A general *a priori* error is impossible. All error is in the misapplication of truth. A general error is nothing but a generalization by way of induction of particular errors, or misapplications of truth to particulars, and is therefore necessarily subsequent to them. If there were in reality no true religion, there could be no false religion, as if there were no genuine, there could be no counterfeit coin. Always is the true prior to the false; and how then could mankind come to assert a false supernatural interposition, if they had no prior belief in a true supernatural interposition, or believe in such an interposition, if no such interposition had ever taken place?"

"But how will you clear this belief in satanic interposition from the charge of superstition?" I asked.

"Superstition, my friend, is a word oftener used," replied Mr. Merton, "than understood. The heathen religions were all superstitions, I grant, because they all ascribed effects to unreal or inadequate causes. To believe in the existence of good and bad angels is not superstition, if good and bad angels really exist, any more than it is to believe in the existence of men and women, horses or oxen. Where there is no error, there is no superstition. Suppose a fairy really to exist, there is no superstition in believing the fact. Suppose the ministry of angels to be a fact, there is nothing superstitious, unreasonable, or unscientific in believing it, or in ascribing to that ministry real effects. Suppose fallen angels or wicked spirits do really exist, do really tempt us, and by divine permission, do really besiege or possess us, there is no superstition in believing it, in taking the proper precautions against them, or the proper measures

to disperse or expel them. If the real origin of the phenomena we have been considering is diabolical, nothing is more reasonable than to believe it; and to ascribe them to natural causes, would be unscientific, and itself a sort of superstition. Undoubtedly, the spirit-rappers, or spiritualists, as they call themselves, are superstitious. What they call spiritualism is rank superstition, because they believe the phenomena are produced by the *shades* or spirits of the dead, and the word *superstition* was originally used, I believe, to imply a belief in, and a dread of, the influence of the departed on the living; but to ascribe them to fallen angels, if such they are, is no superstition at all, for then they are ascribed to an adequate cause, and to their real cause.

"There are two opposite errors," concluded Mr. Merton, "both equally hostile to religion and to good sense,—superstition and irreligion. Each is an abuse, as the schoolmen say, an *excess* in a contrary direction; and unhappily, the tendency of most men is to one or the other. Nothing is more certain than that in every age much superstition has been connected with the doctrine I have contended for."

"That," said I, "is what makes me dread and hesitate to accept it."

"I know," Mr. Merton replied, "all that you would say on that score. I have myself read history, and, no less than you, been shocked by these abuses. But there is no truth that cannot be or that has not been abused. I am as much opposed to these abuses as you are. It will not do to suppose that every event a little out of the range of our ordinary experience, is a miracle, or effected, if good, by angelic, if bad, by satanic agency. Every time a murrain prevails among the cattle, it will not do to ascribe it to sorcery, or when the butter will not come, to lay the blame upon Robin Goodfellow. The tendency to do so is undoubtedly a superstitious tendency. But the contrary, or Sadducean tendency, to believe in neither angel nor spirit, is even more dangerous. I do not believe every tale of witchcraft I hear, and I am slow to believe in actual satanic invasion in any particular case that may be alleged. The church has always asserted the possibility of such invasion, but she does not permit a resort to exorcism on every apparent instance of it. She demands previous consultation, long examination, and the judgment of the most rigid science. While the greatest caution should be exercised as to every case of sup-

posed actual satanic invasion, we should guard equally against running into the contrary error of denying that such invasion ever takes place. An unreasonable scepticism is as far removed from true wisdom and virtue, as an unreasonable belief. Modern science is sceptical; and it is more important just now to guard against scepticism and its irreligion, than it is to guard against superstition.

"Yet we deceive ourselves, if we suppose that the scepticism of science has penetrated far into the popular mind, even in our own country. Science can never root out popular superstitions. While the few laugh at the superstition of the vulgar, that superstition, though modified perhaps as to its forms, continues to thrive, and attains, not unfrequently, even a more vigorous growth. The old popular superstitions, brought hither by our ancestors, still live in the heart of the people, and in forms as gross and as revolting as in the seventeenth century. Superstition is cured, not by a sceptical science, denying altogether the spirit-world, but by religion, which, while it recognizes that world, teaches us to draw accurately the line of demarcation between genuine and counterfeit spirit-manifestations. The people cannot live in absolute irreligion; and where they have not religion, they will have superstition. The tendency of modern science is to destroy all religious faith, and therefore to promote, indirectly, the very evil it proposes to cure,—the common effect of all unbaptized science, as of all unbaptized philanthropy."

"There is some truth in that, I must own," I remarked. "I know not why it is so, but every effort made, although with the purest and best intentions in the world, outside of Christianity, seems always to fail, or to end only in aggravating the very evils it was intended to cure. There is less real liberty in France to-day than there was before the meeting of the states-general in May, 1789. The revolutions which, during the last sixty or seventy years, have so terribly raged on European soil, though made in behalf of liberty or of popular representation, have resulted only in depriving each nation in which they have taken place of its former too feeble checks on power, and in rendering the monarchy more absolute. The same may be said in principle of all our efforts at philanthropic reform on a smaller scale."

"Undoubtedly," replied Mr. Merton; "and the reason is, that the glory of whatever is good is due to God, and he will suffer no plans to succeed that would rob him of his due. He has himself given us his law, and provided us the

means of salvation, temporal and eternal; and whosoever seeks salvation by any other means, or in contempt of that law, must fail, and shamefully fail."

CHAPTER XXIII.—DIFFICULTIES.

"WHAT you say, Mr. Merton," said Jack, "may be very plausible, but you will never convince me that Almighty God, the loving Father of us all, would ever permit his children to be exposed to satanic invasion. It would impeach either his wisdom and love, or his power."

"Why more than his permission of the same vexations and afflictions by any other agency?" asked Mr. Merton, very quietly. "The facts, the phenomena themselves are undeniable, and must be produced by some agency, and by divine permission too. While they remain the same, I cannot see how their production by Satan, any more than their production by some other created or secondary cause, is incompatible with the divine perfection."

"I do not pretend to be able to say how that is," replied Jack, "but I will never believe that God will allow the devil, or any other being subject to his power, to have such influence over the children he loves. It is contrary to common sense. It is nonsense, absurdity, blasphemy."

"I am very much of Jack's opinion," interposed Dr. Corning, who had for a long time ceased to take any part in our conversations. "If there is a God, a God who is Lord Omnipotent, the devil, if devil there be, must be subject to him, and unable to do any thing without his permission. Can any reasonable man believe that God would permit the devil to harass and afflict, besiege and possess his children? Would a human father permit, if he could help it, any enemy to exercise a corresponding power over his own offspring? God is love, and love worketh no ill, and, as far as in its power to prevent, suffers no ill to be worked to any one."

"All that," replied Mr. Merton, "would be very conclusive, if the facts or phenomena did not exist to give it a flat denial. Here are the facts, and whatever origin you assign them, they remain, in themselves considered, the same. You assign insanity as their origin. Be it so. But would a God who is love, who is wisdom, who is omnipotence, suffer his children to be afflicted with so grievous a disease as insanity, one so terrible and so humiliating in its effects? Insanity must be subject to his dominion; and why then does he suffer any to become insane?"

"Many of these facts, as you call them, are the result of mere jugglery and sheer imposture," answered the doctor, "and do not deserve a moment's consideration."

"Be it so," replied Mr. Merton. "But how can God permit such jugglery and imposture?"

"They are the works of man, and the results of evil passions," promptly replied Dr. Corning.

"Very good," said Mr. Merton; "but whence these evil passions? and how can God, consistently with his perfections, permit them to produce such pernicious effects? You see, my dear Doctor, turn which way you will, take what ground you please, your argument can always be retorted. As far as the divine perfection is concerned, it makes no difference, since the facts really exist, whether you ascribe them to satanic invasion or to insanity, to the evil passions of man, or to the elemental forces or inherent laws of nature; for, on any of these suppositions, you ascribe them to a created cause, dependent on God as first cause for its very existence, and therefore a cause that cannot operate without his permission. The whole question resolves itself into the old question, then, of the origin of evil. Evil certainly could not exist without the permission of God; and yet you yourself concede that evil does exist. How can God, consistently with his perfections, permit it? This is the question; and, if he can permit it at all, he can as well permit it when produced by one agent, as when produced by another."

"But that," said Dr. Corning, "is a question for you to answer, as well as for me."

"Not in the case before us," rejoined Mr. Merton, "because your objection concedes the existence of evil, and only denies it as the work of a particular agent. But let that pass. I can answer the question only in the light of Christian theology. According to that theology, there is no real evil but sin; and sin is always voluntary on the part of the sinner. God chose to create men and angels free moral agents, that they might be capable of virtue, and of meriting the rewards of obedience. He could not so create us without making us capable of abusing our freedom, for obedience is not and cannot be meritorious where there is no power of disobedience, as disobedience, is not culpable where there is no power of obedience. Hence the saints in heaven, having no longer the power of disobedience, do not merit by their obedience, and simply enjoy the rewards of their obedience in their state of probation on earth. If any do

not obtain the rewards of obedience, the fault is their own, and they have no one to blame but themselves. Their failure is voluntary; they fail only because they choose to fail.

"In regard to the satanic vexations," continued Mr. Merton, "we must bear in mind that Satan has no power to harm us—not even a hair of our head—against our free will or deliberate assent. It is always in our power to resist him, and even to turn his machinations and vexations against him, and to make them occasions of merit. 'Count it all joy, my brethren,' says the blessed Apostle St. James, 'when ye fall into divers temptations,' that is, trials and afflictions. The evil is not in the temptation even to sin, but in the free, voluntary assent; it is not in the vexations and afflictions, obsessions and possessions, but in our voluntary abuse of them, or failure to turn them to a good account. God suffers no one to be tempted or tried or harassed beyond what he can bear. Always is his grace sufficient for all straits. Always stands firm his promise, 'My grace is sufficient for thee;' and this sustains and consoles us in the midst of our greatest distress, our severest trials, and our most perfect abandonment. We may always, if we will, come forth from the furnace of affliction purified as gold tried in the fire. It depends on our own free will whether the vexations of Satan shall do us good or harm. If we choose, we can always prevent his wiles from doing us evil, and derive profit from his malice. This is a sufficient answer to the objection drawn from the perfection of God. It is no impeachment of divine love to let loose an enemy against us for our good, or to give us an opportunity to acquire merit, any more than it is of divine justice to permit an enemy to harass us as a punishment for our sins. Satanic temptations and invasions are sometimes permitted for the one purpose, and sometimes for the other, and in either case are perfectly compatible with the attributes of God."

"I think I can understand that," I remarked, "and I think also I can see in it a manifestation of divine love. God, in permitting these vexations against the wicked, manifests his justice; but in permitting them against the good, he manifests his love, and turns the malice of Satan against himself. What Satan intends shall work our ruin, by the grace of God is made to work our higher perfection; and thus God overcomes Satan by educing good from evil."

"Undoubtedly," added Mr. Merton, "God often permits Satan to afflict the faithful, to prove them,—sometimes to

humble them, to chastise their spiritual pride, and to become their occasion of rising to a purer and loftier virtue; and in such cases we may say he educes good from evil, and makes the malice of Satan redound to his own glory. In the cases where he permits Satan to harass by way of penalty, he equally makes the satanic malice redound to his glory, for God's glory is no less interested, so to speak, in justice than in love. There is no discrepancy between the divine attributes; and the manifestation of his justice is no less essential to his glory, or the good of his creatures, than the manifestation of his love or mercy. The beginning of love is the love of justice, equity, right."

"But be that as it may," said Jack, "I have heard it contended by theologians that Satan has been bound since the coming of Christ, and has no longer any power, since Christ triumphed over him on the cross, to besiege or to possess men, as it is supposed he had before."

"I am not answerable," replied Mr. Merton, "for what you may have heard theologians maintain. I concede that our Lord, on his part, triumphed over Satan on the cross; I also concede, that since the coming of our Lord, and the spread of Christianity, the power of Satan has been greatly curtailed; but I know no authority for saying that he does not continue to go about 'as a roaring lion, seeking whom he may devour,' or that he has not power still to besiege men, and literally take possession of them. The church, whether Catholic or Protestant, has a form of exorcism, and continues to practise it. The faithful are daily winning victories over him, and if God gives them the grace of perseverance, they will finally overcome him, and obtain a triumph; but their warfare with him ceases not so long as they remain in the flesh. Satan, it is true, has no power to harm us against our deliberate consent, and it is far easier to resist him now, than it was before our Lord died on the cross, because grace is more abundant; but still he may besiege and actually possess the holiest of men, the most devoted followers of the Lord, at least so far as it is given to men to judge. He cannot harm us without our own fault; but he may vex, afflict, even possess us, without any blame on our part, as a man may become sick, or even insane, without any fault of his own.

"Out of the Christian society," continued Mr. Merton, "where there are wanting the means which Christians have to defend themselves against his approaches, and to drive him away, his power is, no doubt, far greater. Among Mahom-

etans, and among the pagan tribes of Asia, Africa, and America, inhabiting a land which has, so to speak, never been baptized, or sprinkled with holy water, his power is still very great; and, if we may credit the well-attested reports of our missionaries, almost as great as ever. He recovers his power, too, in Christian nations in proportion as they recede from the faith and piety of the Gospel, and fall anew into heathenism."

"But there are some difficulties, under the point of view of jurisprudence, in the way of your doctrine of satanic invasion," interposed Jack. "Suppose a man possessed by a devil kills another, or commits some act which the law regards as a crime, is the man guilty, and to be punished?"

"You are a lawyer," replied Mr. Merton, "and nothing is more natural than that you should ask that question. The difficulties you suggest, however, are no greater on the supposition of satanic invasion than on any other theory. They are the same, whether we contend that the person is subjected by Satan or by mesmerism, by a primitive or elemental force of nature, or by what some manigraphs call madness without delirium, or instinctive insanity. The question turns on the fact whether the man is involuntarily and completely subjugated, or whether he retains the exercise of his free will; or, in other words, whether the actions are really his, or those of the power that oppresses or subjugates him. For myself, I think our courts are beginning to adopt a very dangerous doctrine with regard to insanity, and are admitting the plea of insanity where it ought not to be entertained. In an eastern city, not long since, it was gravely contended by counsel, that a man must be held to be insane and irresponsible, because his crimes were so aggravated. Under this lies a dangerous principle, which, in its development, will lead to the conclusion that all great criminals are insane and irresponsible. But in regard to another class of cases, cases in which there obviously is no inebriety, ill health, or delirium, and yet in which the person seems to himself to be irresistibly urged by a foreign power, against his will, to the commission of horrible acts, I think the law, or the practice of the courts, is quite too severe. I take a case cited to my hand by a respectable French writer, that of a father who killed his young son. The father was an honest, temperate, and industrious man, of a mild and affectionate disposition, and it is clear that he loved his son with great tenderness.

"'The night in which I did the deed,' says the unhappy

father, 'I was so agitated, that I trembled in my whole body . . . . . I am unable to conceive how I could commit a crime so atrocious. I was so agitated, so troubled in my brain, and felt something within me so irresistible, that I was *obliged* to commit the deed. I was fasting. I was not sick; and I am wholly unable to explain how it was possible for me to do it. Twice before I had had the horrible inclination to kill my child. The first time was last winter, about six weeks before Easter. I was at work making a sledge, and my boy, as usual, was playing near me. In his playfulness, he climbed upon my back, and clasped me round the neck. My wife, thinking he would hinder me from working, called him away; but I loved him so much, that I patiently endured all his frolicsome tricks. I took him upon my knees to play with him, and in that very moment I thought I heard a voice within me, saying, "You cannot help it. Your child must die, and you must kill him." I was startled, seized with fear, my heart palpitated, and I instantly set him down, rushed out of the room, and went to the mill, where I stayed till nightfall, till my evil thought passed away.

"'The second time was one morning a few days before Easter. My wife was busy with the affairs of the house, and I was lying on the bed, with my child near me. He asked me for some bread, and I gave him a cake, which he eat with great pleasure. At that moment, as I was watching him with tender affection, I thought I heard again a voice within me, saying, in a low tone, "You must kill him." I shuddered at myself, experienced violent palpitations, and felt a heavy oppression within my breast. I instantly jumped from the bed, and ran out of the house. I began saying my prayers, went to the stable, and busied myself with various labors, and did all in my power to drive away the evil thoughts that beset me. I finally succeeded, but not till midday, in regaining the mastery of myself, and in recovering my tranquillity. In neither of these cases was I drunk, or had been for many weeks previous; nor was I at the third access, when I took the life of my child.'*

"Now here was a man who was not sick, who was not in liquor, who was not delirious, who was evidently a mild and loving father, and who yet, in consequence of an impression, killed his child, whom evidently he loved with all a father's fondness. This man the courts condemn as a horrid murderer."

**Pneumatalogie*: *Des Esprits, &c.*, p. 186, *et seq.*

"And why not?" said Jack. "It is evident his free will remained. Twice he resisted the temptation, and regained the mastery of himself; and nothing proves that he might not have done so the third time, if he had done his best."

"It is possible," replied Mr. Merton, "and therefore I do not say the man was absolutely innocent. But we see he did struggle against the evil thought, and twice successfully; and he yielded even at last only from an impression, all but irresistible at the moment, and therefore he cannot be said to have had the full possession of his freedom. In proportion as his power of external resistance was diminished by the impression, or the mysterious influence that acted on him, was diminished his responsibility. He who yields only to a powerful temptation, is less guilty than he who does the same deed under only a slight or feeble temptation. The courts should take cognizance of the strength of the impression under which the man acts, and take into the account the more or less resistance that was possible. If the man succumbs only after a long and severe struggle, that should go to mitigate his guilt.

"Dr. Cazeauvielh relates the case of a woman who attempted to kill her infant sleeping in the cradle. 'I am,' said she to the doctor, 'the most miserable of beings. Never was anybody like me. The other day I approached the cradle, and I looked upon my darling. Fearing I should do him harm, I went away to the house of my neighbor. hen, in spite of myself, I returned, for *something* seemed to push me. I went near my infant, and attempted to choke it with my hands, but my legs failed me, and I became senseless.' This woman, Dr. Cazeauvielh tells us, loved her relations and her child, and her intellectual faculties were not injured. It is true he regards her as insane; but how can there be insanity, with the full possession of the intellectual faculties? She struggled against the *something* that pushed her, and had a horror of the crime; the law ought, therefore, to treat her with indulgence, yet it does not, because there really is here no delirium. In the middle ages, which you regard as so barbarous and cruel, she would not have been held responsible, because her act would have been explained as the result of a foreign power, which for the time being overcame her resistance, and pushed her to do that for which she had a natural horror.

"Yet a difference should no doubt be made between cases like these, where the unhappy person commits a deed

for which he has a natural horror, and against which he struggles, and those in which the criminal, so to speak, has a natural relish for his crime, delights, and persists in it. Take the case of Gilles Garnier, which occupied the attention of all France in the reign of Louis XIII. 'This man-wolf (*loup-garou*),' says Bodin, 'carried away a girl from ten to twelve years of age, killed her with his hands and teeth, and eat the flesh from her thighs and arms. Sometime afterwards he strangled a boy ten years old, and eat his flesh. Still later he killed another boy, from twelve to thirteen, with the intention of eating him, but was prevented.' He was arrested, convicted, and burnt alive. There was here no insanity; the horrid deeds were all avowed with the minutest circumstances, the intention was express, and the crime was repeated and persisted in. I cannot regard this monster as innocent, for I cannot discover that he resisted or struggled against the diabolical impulse.

"Take the case of Leger, a recent case, related by Dr. Cazeauvielh, from the monster's own confessions. He lived in a cave, and had an unnatural craving to feed on human flesh. One day he perceived a little girl, ran to her, passed a handkerchief around her body, threw her upon his back, plunged into the woods and hastened to his cave, where he killed and buried her. Arrested three days after, he immediately told his name, where he lived, and said that having received a blow on his head, he had left his country and his family. In his prison he related how he had lived in caverns in the rocks. 'Wretch,' said the physician to him, 'you have eaten the heart of this little girl. Confess the truth,' He then answered in trembling, 'Yes, I did so, but not all at once.' After that he sought no longer to conceal his crimes, and with great coolness and indifference related a long series of horrible deeds which he had committed. He revealed them, even to the minutest particulars; he produced the proofs, and pointed out to the court the place of the crime, and the manner in which it had been consummated. The judge had no need to question him, for he himself disclosed all of his own accord. On the trial, his features wore a mild and placid aspect. He seemed quite unconcerned and insensible, except his face assumed an air of gayety and satisfaction during the reading of the indictment. After about half an hour's deliberation, the court rejected the plea of in-

sanity, and declared him guilty of homicide, with premeditation and lying in wait. He heard his sentence with the same placid indifference, and was executed a few days after. This seems to me to prove that the middle ages were not more severe than we are to-day."

"But Leger," said Dr. Corning, "was evidently a madman. Georget is right in saying that he was a madman, because none but a madman would say that he had been led to commit murder by a blind and *irresistible* will."

"That might do to say, if we were certain of the truth of the materialistic doctrines taught at Paris some forty or fifty years ago, but which are now generally rejected. Dr. Cazeauvielh, however, concedes that persons of this description, without being deprived by their madness of free will, are yet carried away, driven onward by an idea, by something indefinable, which is precisely what theologians mean by obsession. The court decided correctly, I think, in rejecting the plea of insanity in the case of the monster Leger, and in condemning him to death, though evidently under satanic influence when he committed his horrible and disgusting crimes—crimes which recall the ghouls of the Arabian Nights—because there was no struggle of the human person against the invading spirit.

"Satan can by divine permission enter our bodies, compel, as it were, the human person to stand aside, and use our organs himself, and do whatever he pleases with them; but he cannot annihilate the human person, or take from the soul free will. Always is it in the power of the possessed to resist, morally and effectually, the evil intentions of the devil. The possessed retains his own consciousness, his own intellectual and moral faculties unimpaired, and never confounds himself with the spirit that possesses him. Always, then, does he retain the power of internal protest and struggle. Wherever this power is exercised, and there is clearly a struggle, there is no responsibility attaching to him, whatever the crimes the body, through the possession of the devil, is made to commit. But it may often happen that this power to protest is not exercised, and the possessed yields his moral assent to the crimes committed by the demon that possesses him. He then becomes a partaker of their guilt. Wherever it is clear that he has not internally resisted, that he has not struggled against the demon, and protested against his iniquity, the law should punish him for the crimes as

severely as if there had been no possession at all. The error of modern jurisprudence is that, not recognizing the fact of possession, it punishes alike both classes, or it lets off both under the plea of insanity. In the latter case justice becomes too lax, and the greater the criminal, the more enormous his crime, the less likely is he to be punished; in the former case justice is too severe, and persons really innocent, and meritorious even, are condemned as the basest of criminals. The law in the middle ages, or before the wonderful progress of intelligence and humanity in modern times, distinguished between the two classes, and knew how to acquit the innocent and to punish the guilty. Now the tendency is either to acquit or to condemn both indiscriminately."

Dr. Corning and Mr. Merton, after this, revived their former discussion of the question of insanity; but as nothing was really added on either side to what had been previously said, I do not think it necessary to record their conversation. For myself, it seemed to me that the question between the theory which explains the phenomena by insanity, and that which explains them by satanic invasion, is of immense practical importance. When the old doctrine was rejected, the law became excessively severe, and humanity was shocked. Philosophers and philanthropists sought to mitigate it by asserting the doctrine of necessity, of materialism, of the inherent goodness of the soul, and by ascribing all misdeeds to external influences, to the action of nature, society, government, &c. In other words, they sought to mitigate the law by denying all moral turpitude.

But latterly the older doctrine of spiritualism, as opposed to materialism, and of freedom as opposed to necessity, has revived, and the old severity of the law must return, unless some new way can be discovered of escaping it. This new way is the plea of insanity. The tendency now is to make insanity a plea for every crime of some little magnitude. Our lunatic hospitals are crowded; new ones are constructed, and no inconsiderable portion of our population are likely to become their inmates. Physicians, carried away by their false science and mistaken humanity, discard all the old criteria of lunacy, and the courts, following them, will soon find that all persons brought before them for trial are insane and irresponsible. The guilty will go unwhipt of justice, because no guilt will be recognized. If the phenomena in question are to be explained by insanity, I do not see what crime it will not cover.

The subject deserves serious consideration. For my part, I cannot recognize insanity where the person evidently retains his intellectual powers underanged or unimpaired, where he retains the faculty of reasoning and judging correctly, however he may be driven by foreign influences to this or that crime. When he tells me that he was obliged by *something* to do this or that, and that when he did it, it seemed to him that it was not he, but some power impelling him, I raise no question of insanity, but simply, as Merton suggests we should, the question of internal resistance, and measure him by the greater or less energy and persistence of that internal resistance.

CHAPTER XXIV.—LEFT IN THE LURCH.

THOUGH I remained an invalid, there were times when I revived, and almost flattered myself that I might yet, in spite of the prognostications of my physician, recover. I was still comparatively young, and I did not precisely like the thought of dying. The simple pain of dying did not affright me; nor had I much reluctance to leave the world, where there was little that had any charm for me. But I could not help sending now and then uneasy glances beyond the tomb. There might be a spirit-world beyond, and death might not after all extinguish the life of the soul. I might, perhaps, live in that unknown world, retain my personal identity, and distinct consciousness and memory. I might, too, at least I could not say it was impossible, be punished there for my sins in this world, and be condemned to have for my companions those very devils whose acquaintance I had so assiduously cultivated here. That might not be pleasant. Indeed, I began to have many painful reflections, and to ask myself if I had not been all my life making a fool of myself. I had been promised great things, but what had I obtained?

"Your experience, my dear friend," said Mr. Merton, "I doubt not, proves the truth of the old saying, the devil always, sooner or later, leaves his followers in the lurch. You remember, probably, I called the morning after my introduction to you, to give you and Priscilla a warning as to what awaited you. You were then too elated, too full of hope, to listen to any thing I could say; at least, so it seemed to me at the time."

"Yet you were mistaken. The few words you said in-

terested me much, and I wished at the time to hear more."

"Alas! it is one of the miseries of the world, that the wicked are much more active for mischief, than the virtuous are for good. Would to God that the followers of Christ had a tithe of the industry and energy of the followers of Satan. If I had been more earnest, more ready to sacrifice my own ease and my own pride, perhaps——. But that is idle. You will, I presume, readily concede now that you were then laboring under a delusion, and indulged hopes which have not been realized?"

"Undoubtedly."

"So it is. Satan never keeps his promises."

"I wish you to explain," said Jack, who that moment entered the room,—"I wish you to explain how it is, if Satan is as powerful, and does as many marvellous things as you pretend, that they who give themselves up soul and body to him, always fail at last. Your mighty sorcerers and magicians always find their master failing them when it comes to the pinch. Ninety-nine times the devil enables the sorcerer to open the prison doors, to become invisible to the sight or impervious to the sword of his enemies, to overwhelm them, or to escape them by flying away through the keyhole; but the hundredth time fails him, and leaves him to be captured, to confess his crimes, and to be burnt alive. According to all accounts, your witches are the most miserable old hags one ever meets—wretched old crones, living in the most abject poverty, and hardly able to procure the food necessary to keep soul and body together. The devil never comes when wanted, never makes his appearance before competent and credible witnesses. He performs his wonders in the dark; and when one would really prove the fact of his presence, he is away, and nobody can get a glimpse of him."

"And what else," replied Mr. Merton, "should be expected of the devil? And yet I would not treat your objection lightly, for it is one which has at times raised doubts in my own mind, and it makes me rather sceptical as to most of the tales of witchcraft, ghosts, and hobgoblins I hear or read of. But you should bear in mind that the devils are capricious as well as malicious, or rather, their malice itself is full of caprice. The devil, in all his invasions, seeks only to get himself worshipped, and to ruin souls. When he has made a soul his slave, made sure of its destruction in hell, his end is answered. He is a liar from

the beginning, and the father of lies. He is the inveterate enemy of truth, and if he sometimes tells it, it is because compelled by a higher power; or if now and then, of his own accord, it is only because it serves his purpose of deception better than falsehood. If he sometimes keeps his promises, and seems to do the best he can for his slaves, it is for the same reason. Then, again, he is not omnipotent, he is not the supreme Lord; and however powerful he may be, there is One mightier than he, who can thwart him when he pleases. He can, as I often say, go only the length of his chain. It may comport with the purposes of God to suffer him to do many marvellous deeds, but never to suffer him to do them so uniformly or in such a manner that his victims shall not be able to detect the impostor, and know, if they will, that it is a foul and lying spirit they follow. Satan's delight is in deceiving, and he delights as much in deceiving those already his slaves, as those he would make such; and God so orders it, that his deceptions shall be discoverable by all not wilfully blind.

"The devil is called the prince of this world, but he is not its absolute lord. He can even here do only what he is, for the purposes of love or justice, permitted to do. It may turn out, then, that he is forbidden to come to the assistance of his servants in the nick of time, even when he himself is disposed to do so. He may raise the storm, but there is One asleep in the bark, who can at any instant awake, and say to the winds and the waves, Peace, be still. It is not fitting that Satan should be able to keep his promises in the great majority of cases to the last, for that would leave too little chance of detecting his delusions, and would confirm his worship. His failures prove his malice, and also that his power is not his own, therefore that he is not God. They serve, too, as punishments to his dupes, for it is fitting that they who, through evil inclination and undue love of the world or of pleasure, trust to him, should ultimately fail in the very goods promised.

"The principles of God's providence are always and everywhere the same, and there is a close analogy between the natural and the supernatural. God has given to the universe its law. He has placed before man a real, substantial, and desirable good; but he has made this good attainable only in one way, by obedience to his law, which is not an arbitrary law, but a law founded in his own eternal

reason, in his own infinite, eternal, and immutable justice. He who attempts to attain to his good, his beatitude, by any other means, invariably and inevitably fails. It is as our Lord said,—'I am the door;' and 'he that entereth not by the door, but climbeth up another way, the same is a thief and a robber.' Whoever seeks entrance into the fold of happiness by another than the God-appointed way, whatever that way may be, is predoomed to disappointment. All experience proves it. The departure by the ancient gentiles from the patriarchal or primitive religion, led to the confusion of their understandings, and to the adoption and practice of the grossest and most abominable superstitions —the extreme of moral or spiritual misery. The man who seeks happiness, even in this life, from acquiring or possessing riches and honor, always fails, even when he apparently succeeds. The most miserable of men are they who make pleasure their sole pursuit. The reason is, that beatitude is not promised to those pursuits, lies not on their plane, and is not attainable by following them. He who attempts to attain it in any of those ways is no wiser than those philosophers of Laputa who sought to extract sunbeams from cucumbers. It is only in accordance with the same principle, that they who seek worldly felicity, by consorting with devils, should in like manner be disappointed."

"All that is very wise, and would do very well for a sermon," said Jack. "It may, for aught I know, be very true. I have no knowledge on the subject, and no acquaintance with the devil or his angels. But I wish you would tell me how it happens that the witnesses to these marvellous phenomena are seldom if ever men of real science, well known, and of name in the scientific world?"

"I thought you were one of those who would not admit authority even in matters of faith, and yet you demand authority in matters of science," replied Mr. Merton, in a tone slightly sarcastic. "You would have the French Academy, for instance, in science what Rome claims to be in religion, and admit a historical fact or a scientific conclusion only on academic authority."

"But you know," replied Jack, "that scientific commissions appointed to investigate and report on particular cases in France, never succeed in getting a sight of those marvellous facts which are so readily exhibited to others. Is not this a suspicious circumstance?"

"Not in my mind," replied Mr. Merton. "Your learned

academicians generally commence their investigations with the persuasion that all facts of the kind alleged are impossible, and they seldom pay attention to the actual phenomena passing before them. They are busy only with their scepticism, and do not see what really takes place. Their study is simply how to explain away the phenomena they do see, without admitting their supernatural or superhuman character. Lawyers are said to be the worst witnesses in the world. Academicians are the very worst people in the world to observe facts. I would trust, in what depends on the senses, a plain, honest, unscientific peasant, much quicker than I would an Arago or a Babinet, for he has no theory to disturb him, no conclusion to establish or refute. The science of all your learned academies is infidel in regard to religion. Babinet, of the Institute, has just written an Essay in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, in which he pronounces the phenomena alleged by our recent spiritists impossible, because they contradict the laws of gravitation. Poor man! he reasons as if the phenomena repugnant to the laws of gravitation are supposed to be produced by it, or at least without a power that overcomes it. Why, the very marvellousness of the phenomenon is that it is contrary to the law of gravitation; and because it is contrary to the law of gravitation, we infer that it is preternatural. The learned member of the Institute argues that the fact is impossible, because it would be preternatural, and the preternatural is impossible, because the preternatural would be preternatural! When I see a man raised, without any visible means, to the ceiling, and held there by his feet with his head downwards for half an hour or more without a visible support, I do not pretend that it is in accordance with the law of gravitation, but the essence of the fact is precisely in that it is not. Now, to deny the fact for that reason, is to say that the law of gravitation cannot be overcome or suspended, and precisely to beg the question. When I throw a stone into the air, my force, in some sense, overcomes that of gravitation. How does M. Babinet know that there are not invisible powers who can take a man and hold him up with his feet to the ceiling, or a table, as easily as I can a little child? The fact of the rising of a table or a man to the ceiling is one that is easily verified by the senses, and if attested by witnesses of ordinary capacity and credibility, must be admitted. That it is contrary to the law of gravitation, proves not that it is impossible, but that it is possible

only preternaturally. It would be a real relief to find a distinguished academician who had learned practically the elements of logic.

"The devils, again," continued Mr. Merton, "may not choose to exhibit their superhuman powers before your scientific commissions. It might be against their interest. He is sure of the commissioners as long as he can keep them in their scepticism; but were he to suffer them to escape it, he might lose them. Compelled to acknowledge the existence of Satan, they might go further and acknowledge that of Christ, and become Christians, and labor to harmonize science with faith. Even God himself may choose to let them remain in their scepticism as a just punishment of their intellectual pride, their indocility, and their preferring their own darkness to his light. They take pleasure in sin, and he gives them up to their own delusions, and permits them to believe a lie, that they may be damned, as they deserve, for their sins. The malice, the cunning, the astuteness, the caprice of the devils, the prepossessions of the scientific, and the purposes of God are amply sufficient to account for the fact that these commissions never succeed in witnessing the preternatural or superhuman phenomena said to be witnessed by others."

"But how am I," asked Jack, "to believe that a poor old crone, who is half dying of starvation, is in league with the devil? Why does she not make use of her power to procure decent clothing and maintenance?"

"The devil is by no means a trustworthy or a kind and generous friend. He is a philanthropist, and never relieves the suffering under his nose, or cares for that of individuals."

"I have read," Jack went on, "a great many witch-stories, and descriptions of witch-feasts, and I cannot discover what there is in them to attach these hell-cats to their alleged orgies. I came across, yesterday, an account of the witches' sabbath. I can conceive nothing more absurd, ridiculous, or rather disgusting. The acquaintances of the devil generally represent him as respectable at least for his intellect, and many insist that he is a gentleman. But if all accounts are true, he is very low and vulgar in his tastes, has very little sense of dignity, and is in fact a very shabby fellow. In these orgies he appears, it is said, sometimes in the form of a big negro, more generally under the form of a black ram with immense horns, and in that form is very inde-

cently kissed and worshipped by Mesdames the witches. We know from Tam O'Shanter that on these occasions there is much fiddling and dancing, but I cannot conceive how there can be much pleasure. The whole scene is fitted only to turn one's stomach."

"There is no doubt of that," replied Mr. Merton. "The devil and his worshippers certainly cut a very sorry figure in these nocturnal orgies, as they are represented; but I am not certain that that should be regarded as good ground of scepticism. I never understood that the devil was a *clean* spirit, and I should naturally expect some degree of filthiness in his worshippers. You must know something of the sins or moral diseases of mankind. Has it not sometimes occurred to you that some apparently very respectable people, —people who go well dressed and wear clean linen,—under the influence of their passions, acting out their natures, cut, to an impartial spectator, about as sorry a figure as Master Leonard and his witches? In the eyes of infinite Holiness, I am inclined to think there is much that passes in refined and cultivated society that does not appear at all more clean and respectable than do these nocturnal orgies in yours. I do not vouch for the correctness of the popular descriptions of these orgies, but they are in accordance with the well-known principles of depraved nature. The indulgence of any of our morbid passions degrades us; and in following our lusts, there is no beastliness which is not for the moment charming to us. How much more, then, when to our natural passions, rendered morbid by indulgence, is added the superhuman influence of unclean spirits! The sensualist lives constantly in a state as disgusting as ever the nocturnal orgies of witches were represented to be. It is the law of all vice to descend, and consequently, the more intimate we are with the devil, only the more rapid and deep is our descent. The moral of the witches' orgies is true, whether the particular descriptions be or not. He who takes the devil for God, must expect to have hell for his heaven."

"The academicians are right," I remarked, "in telling us that the whole of the alleged *diablerie* is all a delusion or an imposition."

"Not precisely in their sense, however," interrupted Mr. Merton. "The whole is unquestionably a delusion, a sheer imposture, but of the devil, not always of man. The devil promises according to the respective inclinations of his servants—to some riches and honors, to some sensual pleasures,

to others power, dominion over men, and the secrets of nature. I doubt not that he knows more than men, but he can never be relied on, for he so mingles his lies with the truth, that we cannot separate the one from the other."

"That is true," I remarked; "and those secrets he promises we never gain. We grow proud, we assume airs, we feel that we are making marvellous discoveries; we talk large, use big, swelling words, and seem to penetrate the secret of the universe; but we have only clutched at the air, and when we open our hand, it is empty. We had made no advance, we had found no vein of knowledge; and when the spell was broken, we found ourselves weaker and more ignorant than ever. The fairy gold was chips and stubble. The palace of wisdom we saw before us, and in which we proposed to live with the Sultan's fair daughter, disappears, carries her away in it, and leaves us only empty space. I well remember some of my early aspirations. I thought I was illumined by a more than natural light. The clouds rolled back before my searching glance; the darkness disappeared; there was no dread Unknown to confront me; I rose to the empyrean; I was all intelligence; I looked, as a lady of my acquaintance expressed it, 'into the very abyss of Being.' Yet it was all illusion—a devilish illusion—and my understanding was all the time darkened, and my eyes closed to the plainest and most obvious truths before me."

"It was a deception practised upon you—a deception practised alike upon all who would attain to a forbidden knowledge, or to knowledge by ways not permitted by the supreme Intelligence—upon the Neo-platonists, the gnostics, the transcendentalists, and false mystics of every age," added Mr. Merton. "The light we hail in those forbidden ways or aspirations, is the light which we see when our eyes are shut. It is a preternatural hallucination, and he who follows it is sure not only to go astray, but to fall into the greatest absurdities, and to utter the most ridiculous nonsense."

"The same principle," I added, "is true with regard to the promised power over men. These satanic revolutions, and the terrible doings of our revolutionary Berserkirs, all prove failures in the end. Cromwell supplants Hampden, and Napoleon Lafayette. The devil always leaves us in the lurch."

"This fact should be borne in mind," added Mr. Merton,

"and if so, might save the world from much superstition. The superstition is not in believing in the reality of demonic invasions, or in believing that the devil sometimes exhibits a superhuman power, tells us, in dreams, visions, necromancy, or other forms of divination, facts of which we were ignorant; but in practising these forms, in confiding in the communications, and in seeking to avail ourselves of the power displayed. No reliance can ever be placed upon them, for supposing the demonic presence real, we have still only a lying spirit on which to depend. The dream of yesternight has come true, that of to-night will prove false. The *medium* you consulted the other day foretold correctly what was to happen; to-day her familiar spirit is a lying spirit, and her tale is false in all its parts. The predictions of the fortune-teller last year have been fulfilled; his predictions of to-day are a tissue of lies. If Ahab goes up to battle, he shall not die; yet is shot by a bow drawn at a venture. To trust in these things is gross superstition, and tends only to degrade, to render immoral, weak, timid, and miserable. The way of wisdom is to let them alone, turn your back on them, and never suffer your mind or imagination to run on them.

"It is worthy of remark, that the men who declaim the most against superstition are unbelievers in Christianity, and who, under pretext of making war on superstition, attack religion itself. And yet the church has always forbidden all superstitious practices, and she commands her children to have no dealings with the devil, to forbear all resort to fortune-tellers or divination, and to pay no attention to dreams, omens, &c. Of course all such things are wrong, are sin, are treason against God; but they are also, and because treason against God and a dealing with the enemy, unwise and degrading. There is no saying to what depths he may fall who gives way to them, or the misery and wretchedness he may bring upon himself, and even upon those dear to him. I could, were I disposed, draw proofs enough from my own experience, while I was a prey to the superstitions still so rife in our country; but I will not trouble you with them. But of this be sure, that you will never root out that superstition by denying the existence and influence of demons. The remedy is in religious faith in cultivating a firm trust in God, in obedience to his commands,—and in the firm persuasion that all dealing with devils is unlawful, and that all regard paid to signs, dreams,

and omens is superstitious and sinful, and, what will weigh perhaps still more with our age, wholly unprofitable. No good can come from seeking knowledge by forbidden paths, and much evil is sure to come."

"I am glad," said Jack, "that Mr. Merton has the grace to admit so much. It would have been a blessed thing for me, if I had been taught to regard mesmerism as unlawful; better still, if it had never been recommended to me as a legitimate science. I do not believe in satanic invasions; but I do believe little good comes from departing from the old ways, and attempting to be wiser than our fathers were."

CHAPTER XXV.—CONCLUSIONS.

Our conversations were continued, but they threw no additional light on the main subject of our investigations, and I may well dispense myself from the labor of recording them. I found my early suspicion confirmed, and finally adopted Mr. Merton's conclusion, that the class of phenomena which had for several years occupied my attention, and to which, according to the spiritists themselves, the recent spirit-manifestations belong, are real, are facts which actually take place, and are, under certain relations and to a certain extent, superhuman in their origin and character. As these phenomena cannot be ascribed to God or to good angels, they must be ascribed to Satan, to evil spirits, the enemies of God and man.

I am well aware that this conclusion will be received by my brother savants with great derision, and that they will look upon me as having lost my wits. Even many who are not savants, who are sincere and firm believers in Christianity, and who, in a general way, admit the fact of satanic invasion, will laugh at the supposition that the phenomena of spirit-rapping, table-turning, &c., are any thing more than very bungling pieces of humbuggery and sleight-of-hand. Be it so. Their good or bad opinion, their esteem or contempt, is of very little importance to me, who have not many days to live, and who have so soon to face another and a far different Judge. He who fears God, cannot fear man. My conclusion has not been hastily adopted, and it is, as far as I can see, the only conclusion to which a Christian philosopher can come.

Mr. Cotton had preserved, what so many have lost, the

Christian tradition as to evil spirits, and was right in the main. His error was in ascribing *all* the phenomena exhibited by the practice of mesmerism to the devil and his angels. Mesmerism, though abnormal, is to a certain extent susceptible of a satisfactory explanation on natural principles. Man, as Mr. Merton, after the elder Görres, maintained, has a twofold development, the one normal, in which he rises to spiritual freedom by union with God, the other abnormal, in which he descends to spiritual slavery by descending to union with created nature. In the former he tends continually to escape from the fatalism of nature, and to ascend to the pure and serene atmosphere of spiritual freedom, in which the spirit becomes supreme over the body. In the latter he follows the laws of fatal or unfree nature, loses his spiritual dominion, becomes, or tends to become, subject in his soul to his body, while the body falls under the operation of the general forces of necessary nature, and responds fatally, or without freedom, to the pulses of the external universe.

In the ascending development, by the aid of grace and good angels, the man, the Christian mystic, like St. Catherine, St. Theresa, or St. Bernardine of Sienna, and so many others of the saints of the church, rises to spiritual freedom, and even to a certain extent, liberates the body from the fatalism of nature. The body itself seems to enter into the freedom of the spirit, and, through the free soul informing it, to be able to resist the action of necessary or unfree nature, as the vital principle enables the living body to resist and overcome the action of chemical affinity. The body is as it were spiritualized, not absolutely indeed, but partially, as if in anticipation of the resurrection, or rather, as pointing to a resurrection and its glorious transformation hereafter. It is baptized, participates, if I may so say, in the sanctifying grace infused into the soul, becomes pure, and even when the soul leaves it, emits a fragrant odor.*

In the descending development, that is, in the abnormal

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*I do not forget here, nor do I intend to assert any thing against the doctrine of the holy Council of Trent, that concupiscence remains after baptism, for the combat, or the *fomes* of sin remains, and as long as one lives there is the possibility of sin. The body, in this life, is never wholly liberated and restored to its integral state; but that it is liberated in some measure, and that it in the saints (in some saints at least), in a degree participates, even this side the grave, in the freedom of the soul, I think is undeniable.

development, in which we turn our backs on our Maker, who is at once our original and end, our creator and our supreme good, and tend in the direction from him, our soul lets go its mastery, and our body falls under the dominion of unfree nature, enters into the series of its laws, and is exposed to all its necessary and invincible forces. We become not merely sensual, but, in some sense, physical men, and act under and with the great physical agents of the universe. We become feeble and strong as the lightning whose bolt rends the oak, and is turned aside by a silken thread. Now to this abnormal development, mesmerism, in my judgment, belongs; and therefore, though abnormal, it is not necessarily preternatural. It belongs not to healthy but unhealthy nature, and its phenomena are never exhibited except in a subject naturally or artificially diseased. I have never known a person of vigorous constitution and robust health mesmerized. The experiments of Baron Reichenbach were all made on persons in ill health, for the most part on patients under medical treatment. The seeress of Provost was sickly, and suffering from an incurable malady; and it may be asserted as a general rule, that no one is a *subject* of mesmerism whose constitution, especially the nervous constitution, is in its normal state.

I have no doubt that many of the phenomena regarded by the vulgar as the effect of satanic invasion, are to be explained by reference to this abnormal development, without the supposition of any direct agency of evil spirits. The precise limits of the power of this abnormal development we do not know, and therefore we are always to be exceedingly slow to assume the direct invasion of the devil to explain this or that extraordinary phenomenon, as Mr. Merton has already shown. The error of Mr. Cotton was in not distinguishing between abnormal phenomena artificially produced, and the phenomena of real demonic presence. He asked too much of us, and we gave him nothing. He failed to command from us the respect he deserved, and I am sorry for it. He was a worthy man in his way, and far less superstitious, and far more philosophical than those who thought it a mark of their superiority to ridicule him. But he is gone, and has in his own denomination left few behind who are worthy to step into his shoes.

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to infer, from the fact that the proper mesmeric phenomena are explicable on natural principles, that the practice of mesmerism is lawful

or not dangerous. It is an artificial disease, and injurious to the physical constitution. It moreover facilitates the satanic invasion. Satan has no creative power, and can operate only on a nature created to his hands, and in accordance with conditions of which he has not the sovereign control. Ordinarily, he can invade our bodies only as they are in an abnormal state, and by availing himself of some natural force, it may be some fluid, or some invisible and imponderable agent like electricity, or what Baron Reichenbach calls od, and Mesmer animal magnetism, and the older magnetists called spirit of the world. The practice of mesmerism brings into play this force, and thus gives occasion to the devil, or exposes us to his malice and invasions.

But, though it is unwise, as well as unscientific, to ascribe to Satan what is explicable on natural principles, the contrary error is the one which in our times is the most necessary to be guarded against. Nothing is more unphilosophical than to treat the dark facts of human history as unreal, or to attempt to explain them all without resort to demonic influence. Many of the facts recorded, no doubt, never took place. Many were the result of fraud, imposture, jugglery, and many are explicable by reference to the abnormal development of human nature; but after making all reasonable deductions for these, there remains a residuum, as Mr. Merton has said, which it is as absurd to attempt to explain without the action of evil spirits, as to explain the light of day without the sun, or the existence and preservation of the universe without God. Not otherwise can you ever succeed in explaining the introduction, establishment, persistence, and power of the various cruel, filthy, and revolting superstitions of the ancient heathen world, or of pagan nations in modern times. No genuine philosopher will attempt to explain them on natural principles alone.

They reveal a more than human power, and we have no alternative but to ascribe them either to God or to the devil. We cannot ascribe them to God, for they were too foul and filthy, too deleterious in their effects, too debasing and enslaving in their influence, to be ascribed to a good source. They were, then, from Satan, operating upon man's morbid nature, and permitted by infinite Justice as a deserved punishment upon the gentiles for their hatred of truth, and their apostasy from the primitive religion. Men left to themselves, to human nature alone, however low they might be prone to descend, never could descend so

low as to worship wood and stone, four-footed beasts, and creeping things. To do this needs satanic delusion.

The same must be said of Mahometanism. The old theory, which made Mahomet an out-and-out impostor, who said, deliberately, "with malice aforethought," "Go to now, let us make a new religion and impose it upon the world," no man, accustomed to philosophize, can for a moment entertain. No man ever yet went to work deliberately to devise and impose a false religion, or if any one ever did, he never succeeded. He who founds a new religion is never an impostor in his own eyes. He works "in a sad sincerity," and imposes on himself before imposing on others. Mahomet evidently believed in himself, in the sanctity of his own mission, and worked from an earnest conviction, not from simple craft or calculation. I am pleased to find the author of that admirable poem, *Mohammed, a Tragedy in Five Acts*, a work of rare sagacity and true poetic genius, rejecting the old theory of downright imposture. The estimable author maintains that he was sincere in part, and in part insincere. He was sincere in his assertion of the unity of God, and in his hostility to idolatry, but insincere in the assertion of his prophetic mission. I am not, however, satisfied with this. I do not deny that men may be half sincere, and half knavish, or that they be sincere and earnest as to the end, and wholly unscrupulous as to the means. But in nothing was Mahomet more sincere than in his belief in his own mission, and in the supernatural origin of the Koran. Never, without that conviction, could he have inspired his followers with it, or have himself persevered for so many years, amid the ill-success and discouragements that he experienced. His gratitude, evidently unfeigned, to Cadijah, his first consort, and to Medina, which received him on his flight from Mecca, cherished to the last moment of his life, proves that he believed in his own mission.

The same thing is proved by his open vice and profligacy after his success. A man conscious that he is playing a part, that he has a character to sustain, that he is acting the prophet, would have been more circumspect, more wary in the indulgence of his lusts, and affected a life of more rigid asceticism. He would have been on his guard against scandalizing his followers, and would never have dared insert in his Koran those scandalous provisions which specially exempt him from obedience to the laws which he

professed, by divine authority, to impose upon his followers. Imposture can never afford to abandon itself openly to the empire of the passions. Heretics are usually more careful than the orthodox in regard to appearances. They usually affect great purity of life, a decorous exterior, and a grave and sactimonious face and tone. Hypocrisy is austere, maintains in its look and tone an awful gravity, and never relaxes in public. It is only innocence that dares be light and frolicsome, and yield to its varying impulses. Nobody is so shocked with the imaginary impurities of convents and nunneries as your debauched old sinners, steeped in corruption, and the miserable slaves of their own morbid passions and prurient imagination.

What deceives the excellent and gifted author of the tragedy, is the fact that so far as Mahomet asserted the unity of God against the polytheism of the unconverted Arabs, and opposed idolatry, he was on the side of truth and religion, and consequently was so far opposed to Satan. He thinks that thus far he could not have been under the influence of an evil spirit. Has he forgotten the demon of Socrates? Has he forgotten that the devil can disguise himself as an angel of light? Paganism, in its old form, was doomed. Christianity had silenced the oracles and driven the devils back to hell. How was the devil to re-establish his worship on earth, and carry on his war against the Son of God? Evidently only by changing his tactics, and turning the truth into a lie. There is nothing to hinder us from believing that Satan himself taught Mahomet the unity of God, and inspired him with horror of the prevailing forms of idolatry. The strong keeps the house, as our Lord says, till a stronger binds him and enters into possession. The devil would expel polytheism and the grosser forms of idolatry, no longer in harmony with the spirit of the times, that he might make the last state worse than the first; and whoever has studied history knows that Mahometanism has proved a far more formidable enemy to Christianity than was the paganism braved by the apostles. The truths of the Koran are introduced only to sanction its errors, and its moral precepts, many of which are good, only to give countenance to its immorality, to its satanic abominations.

Mahomet in his life was subject to what we call in these days the mesmeric trance, as was Socrates. He would often be suddenly arrested, fall prostrate upon the earth, and in this attitude and in these trances he professed to receive his

revelations. Here are evidently the mesmeric phenomena which in some form always accompany the presence and invasion of demons. Mr. Miles has introduced these, and described them with great spirit, truth, and propriety, in the opening scene of his tragedy. The time is the night of Al Kadir, the place is the Cave of Hara, three miles from Mecca, where Mahomet was accustomed to resort and spend much time alone. Mahomet is seen prostrate upon the slope of a rock, resembling a rude pedestal, his face concealed by his turban. He is visited by Cadijah, his affectionate and beloved wife. To her he seems asleep. She calls him, she approaches him, she embraces him, and tries to awaken him. All in vain. Finding her efforts fruitless, she exclaims,

> "Alas, this is not sleep! Some evil spirit
> O'ershadows thee."

When finally the vision departs, and Mahomet awakes, he breaks out,

> "Gone! gone! celestial messenger,
> Angel of light!
> . . . . . .
> . . . . . Yes—'twas there—'twas there
> The angel stood, in more than mortal splendor,
> Before my dazzled vision!—I have heard thee,
> Ambassador from Allah to my soul,
> Have heard and will obey."

To the question of Cadijah, "What mystery is this?" he answers,

> "Ah! the tremendous recollection bursts
> So vividly upon me, that my tongue
> Grows cold and speechless. I was here alone,
> Expecting thee, when, suddenly, I heard
> My name pronounced, with voice more musical
> Than Peri warbling in my ear.
> Ravish'd, I turned, and saw upon that rock,
> Resplendent hovering there, an angel form;
> I knew 'twas Gabriel, Allah's messenger.
> Celestial glories compassed him around;
> Arched o'er his splendid head, his glistening wings
> Shed light, and musk, and melody. No more
> I saw—no more my mortal eye could bear.
> *Prone on my face I fell*, and, from the dust,

Besought him quench his superhuman radiance.
'Look up,' he said; I stole a trembling glance;
And then, a beauteous youth, he stood and smiled.
Then, as his ruby lips unclosed, I heard—
'Go teach what mortals know not yet,—THERE IS
NO GOD BUT ONE—MOHAMMED IS HIS PROPHET!'
E'en as he spoke, his mantling glories burst
With such transporting brightness, that, o'erawed,
I sunk in dizzy trance, which still might thrall
My inmost soul, had not those impious names,
Breathing of hell, dispelled it."*

Here are presented, very clearly, the phenomena which precede or accompany the demonic approach and invasion. When the false god took possession of Balaam, he threw him to the earth; and it was in a sort of somnambulic state that he prophesied, or rather that the demon in him was compelled, against his will, to bless instead of cursing Israel, and to prophesy his glory. "There is no God but one," in the sense intended by Mahomet, and understood by his followers, is by no means a truth, for in that sense, it denies not merely polytheism, but was intended more especially to deny the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. The Koran repeatedly so explains it, and therefore the unity of God, as taught by the false prophet, is not a truth but a lie, and the Mahometans worship not the true God, but a false god, as do all who deny that God is at once three distinct persons in one divine essence or being.

Nothing is less philosophical than the tendency in modern times, especially since the time of Voltaire, to explain great effects by petty causes, as the peace of Utrecht by Mrs. Masham's spilling a little water on the duchess of Marlborough's dress. The stream cannot rise higher than the fountain, or the effect exceed the cause. A little fire can kindle a great matter, but that little fire is the occasion, not the cause of the wide-spread conflagration. Nothing more surely indicates a narrow, superficial, and unphilosophical spirit than the attempt, as is the case with most writers, to explain the origin, progress, and power of Mahometanism by the fanaticism, the cunning, the craft, or the superior genius and ability of Mahomet, even though we suppose him aided by a Jew and a Nestorian monk. There were fraud, craft, trickery, and all the means of imposition em-

**Mohammed*, a Tragedy in Five Acts. By GEORGE H. MILES. Boston: 1850, pp. 1–6.

ployed; yet never can they suffice alone to account for the terrible phenomena of Islamism, which for twelve hundred years has waged battle with the cross, and possessed itself of the fairest regions of the globe. Whoever studies it calmly and profoundly must come to the conclusion that there has been at work in it a more than human power, and that, if not, as the Moslems believe, from God, it must be from the devil.

Do not ascribe so much to mere human power, wisdom, craft, fraud, dexterity, or skill. These are far feebler than it is customary in our days to regard them. In general men are duped themselves before they undertake to dupe others. Never yet was there a noted heresiarch who did not believe in his own heresy, and hence there is no instance on record of a real heresiarch, the originator and founder of a new heresy, being reclaimed to the orthodox faith, unless we except the doubtful case of Berengarius. I have never been able to sympathize with those Catholic writers who would persuade us that the Protestant reformation originated in petty jealousies and rivalries between the Dominican and Augustinian monks. That view is too narrow and superficial; nor can we ascribe it to the pride, the vanity, and the ambition, or the intelligence, the virtue, the wisdom, and the sanctity of the monk Luther. Luther was a man terribly in earnest, a genuine man, and no sham, as Carlyle would say; and so were all the prominent chiefs in that terrible movement of the sixteenth century. The cool, subtle, dark, persevering Calvin, the fiery, energetic, and ferocious John Knox and their compeers were no petty tricksters, no *dilettanti*, no shrewd calculating hypocrites. They were terribly in earnest; they believed in themselves; they believed in the spirit that moved them, that spoke in their words, and struck in their blows against the old Papal edifice. It is nonsense to repeat, age after age, that the denial by the Holy See of the divorce solicited by Henry VIII., caused the separation of England from Catholic unity. That wily and lustful monarch, who must live in history as the "wife-slayer," found in that denial only an occasion of withdrawing his kingdom from its spiritual subjection to Rome, and of uniting in the crown the pontifical with the royal authority. Whoever looks beneath the surface of things, whoever studies, in a true philosophical spirit, that fearful Protestant movement, must recognize in it a superhuman power, and say that either the finger of God, or the

hand of the devil is here, and that its chiefs must have been inspired by the Holy Ghost, or driven onward by infuriated demons.

So, it seems to me, we must reason with regard to Cromwell and the stern old Puritans, fierce and terrible as the old Berserkirs from the North. There was something superhuman in the English rebellion and revolution of the seventeenth century; and if Cromwell and his party were not specially moved by the Holy Spirit, as they believed, they must have been animated and driven on by the old Norse demon. So also of the old French Revolution, and of all those terrible convulsions which have ruined nations and shaken the world. Men are indeed in them, with their wisdom and their folly, their beliefs and their doubts, their virtues and their vices, but there is more in them than these. There is in them the fierce conflict of invisible powers, ever renewing and carrying on that fierce and unrelenting war which Lucifer and his rebel host dared wage against the Most High, and which must continue till time be no more. All history, if we did but understand it, is little else but the history of the conflict between these invisible powers; and till we learn this fact, in vain shall we pride ourselves on our philosophies of history.

Carlyle has well exposed the shallow philosophy and absurd theories of our popular historians. Would he had himself gone deeper, and recognized the demonic and also the providential element in history, and not attempted to explain its philosophy on human nature alone. Your Odins, Thors, Socrateses, Mahomets, Cromwells, Bonapartes, are not simply exponents of true, living, and energetic manhood, and owe not their success, or their place in history to their clear perception and their instinctive adherence to the laws of true and genuine nature, as Carlyle would have us believe. The nature he bids us worship is the devil, the dark, subterranean demon, that seizes us, blinds our eyes, and carries us onward, whither we know not, and by a power which we are not. It is the demon of the storm, the whirlwind, and the tempest, the volcano and the earthquake, and the Carlylean heroes are energumens, Berserkirs, who spread devastation around them, who quaff the blood of their enemies, from human skulls, in the orgies of Walhalla, and leave as their monuments the ruins of nations. Carlyle has himself been touched with a German devil, and received a slight manipulation from the old Norse demon. But he

has done well to say, "No sham can live;" he might have added, No sham is or can be productive. It is not by petty passions and petty tricks that nations are shaken to their centre, and fearful revolutions, which change the face of the world, are effected. Only what is real is, and only what is, can do. Under all the heavings and tossings of nature, there is a reality of some sort; and only by means of that reality can you explain the historical phenomena that arrest your attention.

I have just been reading, in order to relieve my weariness, Sir Walter Scott's *Woodstock*, not surely one of his best, but one of his most serious novels, in which he has endeavored to be something of the philosopher, as well as the unrivalled romancer. Poor man! wizard of the north, as he has been called, his magician's wand fails him here. How was he, with the shallow philosophy of the eighteenth century, to explain such a phenomenon as Cromwell and his major-generals, those furious Berserkirs, true descendants of the old Vikings of the North? To say that Oliver and the Independents were mere long-faced, psalm-singing hypocrites, moved only by the ordinary motives and passions of human beings, is a libel on history. Long-faced, sanctimonious, and long-winded, famous for their dark cloaks and steeple-crowned hats, their psalm-singing, their Biblical phraseology, their speaking through the nose, and turning up the white of the eye, they certainly were; but whoso supposes they were so by virtue of subtle, calculating hypocrisy, knows them not. Whatever else Cromwell and the Puritans were, they were no hypocrites; their manners, their dress, and address, however objectionable we may choose to regard them, were not affected to cloak conscious vice or iniquity, or to deceive either their friends or their enemies. Never were men more serious, more deeply in earnest; and it was in obedience to what they held to be the voice of God that they preached, fasted, sung psalms, prayed, and—kept their powder dry. It was not by their snivel, their nasal twang, their Biblical phraseology, nor by an affectation of piety and dependence on the Lord, nor by any form of hypocrisy or cant, that they made mincemeat of the drinking, swearing, rakehell, but brave and loyal cavaliers at Marston Moor, Edgehill, and Worcester. A chorus of spirits, black or white, joined in their psalm-singing, and invisible powers sped their balls to the hearts of their enemies, and gave force to the well-aimed strokes of their swords.

Certainly the hand of Providence in the affairs of nations is not to be denied, and certain it is that God visits nations in mercy and in judgment. A sound theology, an enlightened piety sees the providence of God in the growth of the infant colony, in the prosperity of states, and the revolutions and fall of empires. But he works by ministries; and the most terrible exhibitions of his wrath, the most fearful of his judgments are those in which he lets loose the demons, and permits a people to fall under their power. These demons work their own will, but are at the same time the executors of his vengeance—of his justice. The good, even in the greatest national calamities, are never injured, for nothing but sin ever injures; but the wicked are punished. They had chosen the devil for their master, and it is fitting that he whom they had falsely worshipped as God, who is no God, should be made the instrument of their punishment. The national sins of England were great; her kings had betrayed their trust—had led the people into error, and forgotten what they owed to the King of kings and Lord of lords. The Lord had a controversy with them, and he permitted the old Puritans to triumph over them; and whether they did so by simple human strength, or by the willing assistance of evil spirits, inflaming them with a preternatural courage, and driving them on by a preternatural fury, the principle is one and the same. So also of France, in her terrible revolution of 1789, and of Europe in 1848.

I read with sorrow the puny attempts of the author of *Woodstock* to explain away, as mere jugglery or trickery, the strange phenomena which disturbed the sequestrators of the Royal Lodge. He would, on the strength of an anonymous pamphlet, explain them as a trick played off upon the parliamentary commissioners by Dr. Rochecliff, Albert, Tompkins, Joceline, and Phebe. It may have been so; but the machinery he supposes is clearly inadequate to explain all the mysterious phenomena he acknowledges. The trick could hardly have failed, if trick there was, to be detected either by Colonel Everard or the Commissioners. But even, if his explanation of that particular case is to be accepted, or if a thousand instances are to be referred to trickery, it says nothing as to the general fact of demonic vexations and invasions. As Christians, we know that we are constantly beset by evil spirits, and the mysterious occurrences at the Royal Lodge of Woodstock, even if real, are only a step beyond ordinary satanic temptations, as possession is only a further extension of obsession.

If much harm is done by superstition, perhaps even more is done by the denial of all demonic influence and invasion, and the attempt to explain all the so-called satanic phenomena on natural principles. It generates a sceptical turn of mind, and the rationalism resorted to will in the end be turned against the supernatural facts of religion, and the same process which is adopted to explain away the satanic prodigies, will be made use of to explain away the miracles of the Old and New Testaments. In fact it has been so done, and we have seen grave commentators laboring, as they believed, to explain these very miracles on natural principles; thus reducing Christianity from its high character of a supernatural religion to a system of mere naturalism, at best a simple human philosophy, perhaps inferior to many other systems. Jefferson, writing to Priestley, speaks, as he supposes, very well of our Lord, but disputes his merits as a philosoper, and says, in substance, "Jesus was a spiritualist, I am a materialist." How many men in our days regard themselves as very commendable Christians because they recognize the beauty and worth of certain moral precepts of the Gospel, precepts which are only the universal dictates of reason, and recognized by the common sense of all nations—heathen as well as Christian! Thomas Paine was more honest, for though he could say Jesus taught very pure morals, which have never been excelled, he refused to call himself a Christian. I have met many a professed minister of the Gospel who would find Tom Paine's creed, meagre as it was, too big for him: "I believe in one God and no more, and I hope for happiness beyond this life. I believe that religious duties consist in justice and mercy, and endeavoring to make our fellow-creatures happy." The Gospel, as it is preached by some "godly" ministers in New England, is too meagre to have satisfied a Rousseau, or even a Voltaire.

In the case of the spiritists of our own times, much harm is done by telling them the spirit-manifestations are all humbuggery, imagination, fraud, or trickery. These people know that it is not so. They know that they are not knaves, that they practise no trickery, and have no wish to deceive or be deceived. They are not conscious of any dishonest intentions, and they have no reason to think that they are less intelligent or less sharp-sighted than they who abuse them as impostors, or ridicule them as dupes. The worst way in the world to convert a man from his errors is to begin by

abusing him, and denying what he knows to be true. Except in the teachings of God, or what is the same thing, the teachings of men appointed, instructed, and supernaturally assisted by him to teach, we never find unmixed truth, for to err is human; and on the other hand, we never find pure, unmixed falsehood. Unmixed falsehood is universal negation, and no negation is possible but by an affirmation. Error is the misapplication of the true. These spiritists are deceived, are deluded, I grant, for they are the sport of a lying and deceiving spirit; but they are not deceived or deluded as to the phenomena to which they testify, nor, as a general thing, do they wish to deceive others. Among them there may be knaves and fools, there may be quacks and impostors, but I have no reason to suppose that the mass of them are not as intelligent and as honest as the common run of men, as the world goes. Their error is in their explication of the phenomena, not in asserting the reality of the phenomena; and to begin by telling them that no such phenomena have ever occurred, that the spirit-manifestations are all humbug, is, to say the least, a very unwise proceeding. If you are a minister of religion, by doing so you are only playing into the hands of the devil, for you outrage the natural sense of justice and truth which these people still retain, and dispose them in turn to look upon religion itself, as held by the Christian Church, as a humbug.

I have known many apparently sincere and pious persons driven to apostasy by the scepticism with regard to the phenomena they have themselves seen. The very worst way in the world to deliver ourselves or others from the power of Satan, is to deny his existence. Resist the devil, and he will flee from you; laugh at him, if you will, and he will hie himself back to hell, for he cannot endure contempt; but deny his existence, persuade yourselves that there exists no devil, and he in turn will laugh at you, and take quiet possession of you. Oppose the spiritists we certainly should, but not where they are strong and we are weak. The true way is to concede the facts, concede all that they really and honestly observe, concede even their mysterious and superhuman character, and then explain to them their principle and origin, and show them that they proceed not from good angels, even when apparently they are pure and unobjectionable, but from the enemies of Christ, from Satan and his angels carrying on, with devilish malice, their never-ending war against Heaven.

Such at least are the conclusions which I have been forced in my own mind to adopt, and such, it seems to me, all must adopt who study the question in the light of Christian theology. I am at least honest in these conclusions, and, though I may err now, as I have so often erred before, yet I am not more likely to err than others. Err indeed I may, but, if I must err at all, I would rather err on the side of superstition, than on the side of scepticism and irreligion.

CHAPTER XXVI.—CONVERSION.

My story, like my life, draws to its close. The change which my religious views have undergone has been more than once hinted. On religion, as on most other subjects, I no longer think or feel as I did in the day when I fancied I possessed more than human science, and wielded a more than human power.

I grew up without any decided religious doctrines, though inclining to what was called liberal Christianity, that is, a Christianity kept up with the times, and conformed to the ever-changing spirit of the age. I was not an avowed unbeliever; I was not an open scoffer; I even thought it well to pay a decent external respect to religion, to attend church when convenient, and to patronize the Gospel, providing it was not preached with too much earnestness and devotedness, and not promulgated as a law which must govern all my thoughts, words, and deeds, but was proposed simply as a speculation, as a theory, or as an opinion, which I was at liberty to accept, modify, or reject, as seemed to me good.

Before my mesmeric experiments and acquaintance with Priscilla, I was a sort of rationalist, accepting Christianity in name, and explaining its miracles and mysteries on purely natural principles. Afterwards, after my philanthropic schemes had miscarried, my worship of humanity as God had proved a failure, and my belief in progress had expired in the crucible of experience, I fell into a sort of despair, and would fain have persuaded myself that I believed in nothing. If I did not absolutely deny God, my belief in him became so obscured by the mists of my speculations and the corruptions of my heart, that I was in reality no better than an atheist. The devil was a bugbear invented by the priests, and men were mere motes in the sunbeam. I have already described the state into which I fell—a state from which I would risk my life to save my bitterest enemy

Prior to the absolute crushing of all my hopes, which followed my having finished all the work I had marked out for myself to do, and found it nought, I regarded myself as a free-thinker, because I had either allowed myself to think, or had made myself acquainted with the thoughts of others, against religion. My freedom and independence of mind were in denying, not in believing. I was not free to think in favor of religion, nor sufficiently independent to believe Christianity, and labor in earnest to serve God and save my own soul. To have done so would have been sheer superstition, would have been sinking myself to the level of the vulgar, and to have exposed myself to the gibes and sneers of my scientific associates.

Nevertheless, my unbelief, my scepticism, and my radicalism, were a sort of violence done to my own better feelings and graver judgment. They never came natural to me, and I am sure I was never cut out for a philanthropist or a world-reformer. There was always something in the views and practices of my associates that disgusted me, and often was I obliged to hold my nose when they were discussed, as it is said Satan does when he encounters a confirmed sensualist. I had no natural relish for "the newness," and when at worst retained a secret reverence for the past, and dwelt with pleasure on the time-hallowed, over which for ages had flowed the stream of human affection, human joy, and human sorrow. I stood in awe before the shadow of the hoary Eld, and wished always to find myself bound by indissoluble ties to what had gone before me, as well as to what might come after me. Half in spite, and half under the charm of Priscilla, I embraced philanthropy, but not inwardly, for her sophistry never for a moment deceived me. Never was there a moment when I did not see through the philanthropists, radicals, and revolutionists with whom I associated, or when with a breath I could not have swept away their cobweb theories; never for a moment was I deceived as to the actual character of the devilish movements I myself set on foot.

It may be thought strange, such being the fact that I could or would have played the part I did. It might be enough to say Satan had power over me; but I associated with the prophets of "the newness," and led on the movement, partly because I did not know what else to do, and partly because I could not endure absolute idleness. I saw indeed the destructive character of my movements, but I

cherished a hope that by making things worse, I should prepare the way for making them better. You must demolish, I said, the old edifice, and clear away its rubbish, before you can erect a new, a more beautiful, or a more convenient structure on its site. I accepted, after a manner, the opinions and theories of the neologists, not because they satisfied me, but because I knew not what else to accept; and, though not true, they might conduct me to truth. The road to the temple of Purity runs through the Bower of Bliss, the path to heaven crosses the devil's territory, and error is the prodrome of truth. Such were the maxims I adopted, not indeed because I believed them, but because they were convenient, and because I saw not otherwise how to justify myself, or solve the problem of experience. I adhered to my philanthropy, infidelity, and radicalism, not because I loved or believed them, but because I saw nothing true in the principles and reasonings I was accustomed to hear opposed to them. The religious and conservative people I knew, and I supposed them the most enlightened and the least irrational of their class, seemed to believe and retain either too much or too little. On one side they seemed to accept and act on the principles which I and my party professed, and on the other to insist on conclusions which could be logically obtained only from a contradictory set of principles, and which they with one voice condemned as false, mischievous, and leading only to superstition, idolatry, and spiritual thraldom. Their denials struck me as too sweeping for their affirmations, and their affirmations as quite too broad for their denials. I found myself in the unpleasant predicament, either of divinizing humanity, or of embracing a religion which they held to be worse than the rankest infidelity.

For a time, while I was in good health, while I possessed and wielded a more than human power, and had not yet exhausted the world in which I did believe, or despaired of recasting it after my own image, I got along without much difficulty; but when I no longer saw any object in life, when there was from my own point of view no longer any work for me to do, and I was thrown back on my own failing godship, and left to devour my own heart, I became wretched, more wretched than I can express. The blow which prostrated me, and the disease which it developed, and brought me to handgrips with Death, changed the current of my thoughts, but unhappily only to render them for the time

still more painful. "You know, O Socrates," says Cephalus in Plato's *Republic*, "that when a man thinks that he is drawing near to death, certain things, as to which he had previously been very tranquil, awaken in his bosom anxiety and alarm. What has been told him of hell and the punishment of the wicked, the stories at which he had formerly laughed or mocked, now fill his soul with trouble. He fears that they may prove true. Enfeebled by age, or brought nearer to the frightful abodes, he seems to perceive them with greater clearness and force, and is therefore disturbed by doubts and apprehensions. He reviews his past life, and seeks what evil he may have done. If he finds, on examination, that his life has been iniquitous, he awakes often in the night, agitated and shuddering, as a child, with sudden terrors, trembles and lives in fearful expectation;" or, as I may add with St. Paul, "a certain fearful looking for of judgment and fiery indignation." As I found myself on my dying bed, things began to wear to me a very different aspect from what they did when I was in the heyday of youth, in the full flow of my animal spirits, or filled with the vain and delusive hope of subjecting all nature to my will. The lessons which I had heard in my childhood, and which I had ridiculed or forgotten, came back with startling power; and in my lonely reflections I was forced to ask what, if that which they tell us of death and judgment, of heaven and hell, the rewards of the good and the punishment of the wicked, should turn out to be true?

My trouble, my anxiety, and my alarm increased in proportion as Mr. Merton forced upon me, by his conversations, the full conviction that I had really been dealing with devils, that Satan is really a personal existence, and that I had made a covenant with him, and had acted under his influence. My rationalism had led me to question his personal existence, and to attempt to explain the demonic phenomena without the supposition of his interposition. Denying Satan, I had denied Christ; and being now forced to recognize Satan, I was forced to confess Christ, and all the Christian mysteries. By the same process by which I had explained away the demonic phenomena, I had explained away the miracles and the supernatural character of Christianity. By that same process of reasoning by which Mr. Merton compelled me to admit the false miracles, the lying signs and wonders of Satan, I was forced to admit the true miracles, therefore the divine commission, and therefore the divinity of Christ, because Christ claimed to be the Son of God.

Here is, I apprehend, the principal source of that difficulty which so many people find in admitting the reality of the demonic phenomena. They cannot admit Satan and his works, without admitting Christ and redemption, purchased with his own blood on the cross,—in a word, without admitting all the Christian mysteries and dogmas,—Christianity itself, and that not as an opinion, not as a speculation, but as the law of God for conscience. Most men have, at least, a dim perception of this fact; and as they do not like to admit Christianity in a Christian sense, they will not suffer themselves to believe that there is any thing satanic in the dark phenomena of human history. For, whatever may be the professions we hear, whatever the apparent zeal displayed in the cause of a bastard Christianity, our age is an unbelieving age, and hates, I may say, with a perfect hatred, Christ and his church. The age is blind to the perception of Christian truth, but sharp-sighted to whatever is requisite to prevent that truth from making its way to the heart. It sees very clearly what it must concede, if it accepts Mr. Merton's doctrine; and therefore, with all its energy and astuteness, it insists on explaining the demonic phenomena on natural principles, or on denying them outright.

But detached from the world by experience of its hollowness, and by my mortal illness, I became less disposed to resist the grace of God, and in some measure prepared to listen with candor to Mr. Merton's reasoning. I very soon became convinced that I had really fallen into the error of calling good evil, and evil good. I had really substituted Satan for God, and in doing so had committed the precise error the Christian clergy had always laid to my charge. I saw that they had been right in advocating what I called, with Priscilla, the system of repression, and I wrong in advocating the contrary system. I saw that, as a reasonable man, I must abandon the whole order of ideas which I had cherished in my satanic pride and lust, and embrace that order of ideas which I had hitherto rejected as false and mischievous. There was no room for compromise. I must say decidedly either "Good Lord" or "Good Devil," and as I could no longer say the latter, I must say the former.

Many people, knowing my order of thinking when I was well and in the world, may blame a change so complete and so universal; but only because they are people of confused, incomplete, and disjointed thought, whose views are always dim, obscure, and incoherent, and who can never understand

the operations of a mind that reduces all its views to their fundamental principle, to a clear, well-defined, and self-coherent whole, so that any change at all must be change of principle, and involve an entire change of system. Philosophical and logical minds may err, but in their premises, not in their conclusions from them. No question with them is ever a question of detail, and none ever turns on a collateral issue. If they start from infidel premises, they will come to the conclusion that Satan is God, and adjust their theory of the universe accordingly. If they assume, as their point of departure, that liberty is in the absence of all restraint, and that liberty in this sense is good, they must come to the conclusion so earnestly insisted upon by my instructress Priscilla, and of course reject that whole order of ideas which asserts the need of law, the utility of government, or the necessity of restraint. That, in doing so, they go against common sense, they are as well aware as are their opponents; but that fact cannot move them, for the legitimate conclusion from it, if their premises are right, is that so-called common sense is wrong, and needs to be corrected. If the common opinions, doctrines, or judgments of mankind are against them, they are indemnified by finding a common feeling, a secret but real feeling, of all men in their favor; for the very fact that restraint is necessary, proves that perverse nature demands, when left to itself, universal liberty or unbounded license. They have but to adopt the doctrine of the innate purity and sanctity of nature, to call this natural feeling a pure and holy instinct, and bid us follow nature, in order to make out their complete logical justification. They are simply consequent, to use a logical term; and their opponents, who accept their premises but deny their conclusions, are inconsequent.

The common run of men, who oppose this class of thinkers and speculators, not by a complete and coherent system constructed on the principle of law and authority, and who are constantly saying Good Lord and Good Devil, Good Devil and Good Lord, trying forever to conciliate both at the same time, and endeavoring with all their might to serve both God and Mammon, which He who "spake as never man spake" declares to be impossible, whenever they are hard pushed, cry out against them as logic-choppers, hair-splitters, narrow-minded system-mongers, and represent them as wanting in broad and comprehensive views, in liberal and generous feelings, as mere theorists, destitute of plain,

practical common sense. What is really a merit in them, is denounced as folly or crime, and the whole pack,

"Tray, Blanche, Sweetheart, little dogs and all,"

are let loose against them. This is wrong. Either our feeling, our sensitive and affective nature, is to be made subordinate and subservient to our reason, or our reason is to be subordinated and made subservient to feeling. To attempt to maintain them as two equal, coördinate, and mutually independent powers, after the manner of the Gallicans in relation to church and state, is only to prepare the way for internal anarchy and disorder. The fool makes reason subservient to his feelings, emotions, affections, or passions, and as to his proper manhood, lives as a slave; the wise man subjects these to his reason, that is, to understanding and will, and lives, moves, and acts as a freeman.

Now I had one of those minds which reduce their views to system, or to their fundamental principle. My starting-point, my fundamental principle was false, and therefore my whole system or theory of the universe was false. This once discovered, I necessarily embraced the opposing principle, and as necessarily embraced it in all its legitimate consequences. I never was so constituted as to be able to strike a balance between truth and falsehood, or to accept a principle and deny its consequences. In matters of practice, I can understand, where no principle is sacrificed, what are called compromises, and I have never needed to be told that true prudence usually forbids us to push matters to extremes. When we act, we must consider the practicable, and the expedient, as far as principle leaves us any discretionary power; but in asserting principles, in the question between truth and falsehood, right and wrong, I have always felt it necessary to be on one side or the other. It ought not therefore to be considered strange that, forced by Mr. Merton and my own serious reflections to deny that Satan is God, I should swing round to the other extreme, and assert that God is God; or that, starting from this bold proposition as a first principle, I should adjust, or endeavor to adjust my whole order of thought to it. I am aware that my having done so will, with the mass of my countrymen, bring reproach upon my memory, and induce some who may cherish a regard for me to attempt to apologize for my want of inconsistency and incoherency; but, happily, the praises or the censures of men cannot affect me any longer, and I shall soon be where they cannot reach me.

Brought back to an intellectual conviction of the truth of Christianity, my trouble increased; for if Christianity be true, it is not simply the revelation of a truth to be believed, but also of a truth to be practised—of a law to be obeyed. I had not obeyed that law; I had deliberately, systematically violated all its precepts for years, and had taught others to do the same. I had fallen under its condemnation, and had incurred its severest penalties. The prospect that now opened before me was not pleasing. There was a vision of blackness and despair. The judgment I derided, the heaven I had scorned, the hell I had braved or treated as a fiction, were all realities. I must soon appear before my Judge, loaded with crimes and sins innumerable, and of the blackest dye. It was impossible to imagine one more wicked or guilty than myself. I could plead nothing in excuse or extenuation of my guilt. I had proved myself the enemy of my race, a foul-mouthed and black-hearted rebel against God, my sovereign, who had done nothing to me but load me with benefits. It was no pleasant thought. I had consorted with devils. I had chosen them for my associates, and what more fitting than that I should be left to my own choice, to reap the fruits of my own doings, and be doomed to dwell eternally with them in hell? It was what I deserved, what immaculate Justice might well inflict. The thought was not to be endured.

I had made a covenant with death. I had entered into an agreement with hell, and had by a solemn pact given myself to the devil, and who had ever heard that such a one had ever received grace to repent? Had I not blasphemed the Holy Ghost, committed the unpardonable sin? My accomplice had been rescued, it was true, but she had been less guilty than I. She had been deceived, seduced by the wiles of the serpent, and struggled to break the meshes he had cast around her as soon as she fully understood their real character. Guilty she certainly had been, but there was some limit to her guilt. I can hardly say that I was deceived. From the first I suspected the truth, and when I remained blind, I remained so wilfully. I had acted deliberately;—not from the strength of feeling, or the heat of passion, but coolly, from calculation, with full assent. There was a great difference between us. What hope, then, remained for me?

The world will laugh at me for all this, and wag their heads at the mighty magician starting back with fear of death and dread of hell. The world has no faith. If it can make

sure of this life, it thinks we may jump, as Macbeth proposed, that which is to come. But the world is nothing to me now, and I am not moved by its mockeries. I am not ashamed to own my fears. I fear not dying. I fear what may come after death. I fear the last judgment. I fear hell. I fear being condemned to dwell forever with the damned. The salvation of my soul to me now is the great, the all-absorbing question—the question of questions.

Mr. Merton continued to visit me, and to unfold to me the scheme of Christian redemption, and assured me that, if I willed it, there was salvation even for me, for Christ had died for all, had made ample satisfaction on the cross for the sins of the whole world, and that great as my sins were, they were surpassed by the divine mercy. He instructed me in what I had to believe, and in what I had to do. The baptismal waters were poured over me, and I was confirmed by the holy chrism, and I hope that my pact with Satan is broken, and my soul delivered. But I know not whether it be so or not; I know not whether I deserve love or hatred. I still fear and tremble, but will not despair. I am trying, as far as in my power, to undo the wrong I have done, and have dictated with that view these my confessions, which will see the light as soon as may be after I am no more.

All are kind to me. My friends, those who have known me in my pride and wickedness, strange to say, do not desert me; and those I love best are constantly near me, and do all they can to relieve my pain, and to strengthen my good resolutions. Priscilla is not unfrequently my nurse, and James is most kind and affectionate to me. If human aid or sympathy could avail me, I should have nothing to fear. But here I lie waiting my departure. How it will fare with me hereafter, God only knows. His will be done.

My story is told. My confessions, as far as I can make them to the public, are made. Let no man see in me an example to be followed, or regard me otherwise than as a miserable wretch who, in manhood and health, abused all God's gifts, and has nothing to relieve his character from utter detestation but a late death-bed repentance. My life can serve as a beacon; let it so serve. Yet I beg all whom I have wronged to forgive me, for I would, as far as possible, die in peace with all the world. I have nothing to forgive, for I have received no wrongs. I have done wrong to the world, but I have suffered no wrong from it. I cannot ask that my memory should be cherished, for it deserves only to

be execrated. Yet is it pleasant to feel that there are some who, bad as I have been, still love me, and will drop a tear of sincere grief over my lifeless remains. There are, too, some who, from the abundance of their charity, will, as they pass by my final resting-place, breathe the prayer, so consoling to the living at least,—"May his soul rest in peace." After all, good is greater than evil, and love stronger than hell.

PRETENSIONS OF PHRENOLOGY.*

[From the Boston Quarterly Review for April, 1839.]

PHRENOLOGY, properly speaking, is a physiology of the brain; and, as such, an interesting and useful branch of science. Considered solely in this light, we are disposed to think favorably of it,—indeed, to believe it. But phrenologists pretend that it is something more than this. They claim for it the high merit of being a philosophy of the human mind, and the only sound philosophy of the human mind ever set forth. Mr. Combe recommends it on the ground of its throwing a flood of light on the philosophy of mind; and we heard him declare positively, that, if it be not true, mental philosophy cannot be understood. *The American Phrenological Journal* grounds the utility of phrenology, in part, on the assumed fact, that it forms the basis of a more correct system of mental philosophy than has hitherto been embraced. We are, therefore, called upon to examine its pretensions, not merely as an account of the functions of the brain, but as a system of metaphysics; and an examination of it, in this respect, will probably be acceptable to the majority of our readers.

Phrenology, as defined by its advocates, treats of the manifestations of mind, and of the physiological conditions under which they take place; but it is all embraced in the four following facts or principles: 1. The brain is the organ of the mind; 2. The brain is a congeries of organs, and each individual organ serves to manifest a special faculty of the mind; 3. The strength of a faculty, *cæteris paribus*, is proportioned to the size of the organ; 4. The size of the organ, and therefore, with the above qualification, the strength of the faculty may be ascertained by examining the external head. As these four facts or principles embrace the whole of phrenology, nothing can be claimed as phrenology which does not come within their scope. We accept these four facts or principles, and all that necessarily grows out of them. We, therefore, concede to phrenologists their whole science. We controvert, at present, none of their

*A *System of Phrenology*. By GEORGE COMBE. Boston: 1835.

facts. But though we make this concession, which is all that they can in conscience ask of us, we are by no means prepared to admit the inferences by which they erect it into a complete system of mental philosophy.

Phrenologists offer us an enumeration and classification of the primitive tendencies—faculties, they call them,—of human nature. This enumeration they consider as nearly complete, and this classification as just. In this ground, and in this alone, must they found their pretensions as metaphysicians. But we ask them,—1st. If their account of the primitive faculties of human nature be the true account? 2d. Admitting it is, does it take in the whole of mental science? and 3d. Admitting it does take in the whole of mental science, is it obtained by means of phrenological principles, instead of the method adopted by metaphysicians in general? These three questions are pertinent, and we regret that we do not find phrenologists giving them that distinct consideration their importance demands.

We proceed to consider the last question first. Admitting the phrenologist's account of the primitive faculties of human nature is the true one, we ask how has he obtained it. Grant his psychology; how has he constructed it? Has he done it by means of his phrenological facts, or by simply noting the facts he is conscious of in himself?

The simple fact, that a phrenologist is able to give, and does give, us a true account of the faculties of the human soul, is not necessarily a proof that this account is involved in, or that it grows out of the four phrenological principles we have enumerated. It is not, then, a proof that this account has any necessary connexion with phrenology. A shoe-maker may chance to construct a true system of astronomy, but it does not follow from this that astronomy is a branch of shoe-making, or that it can be successfully prosecuted by none but shoe-makers. Before the phrenologist can claim his psychology as a part of phrenology, he must show that it can be arrived at only by means of his four phrenological principles; and that, if these be denied, its truth cannot be maintained.

The phrenologist has counted some thirty or forty primitive faculties of human nature, *located*, named, and described them. We will, for our purposes, take but one of these, that of Benevolence. Two things are to be considered: 1. The faculty of benevolence; 2. The cerebral organ by which it is manifested. We presume the phrenologist does

not intend to confound the faculty with the organ. We do not confound the sense of sight with the eye. The faculty of benevolence is psychical—the organ physical. Now, does a knowledge of the organ afford any clue to the nature and character of the faculty of benevolence? Certainly not. Knowledge of the fact, then, that each special faculty of human nature has its appropriate cerebral organ, together with manipulation of that organ, cannot lead to a knowledge of the faculty. What aid, then, do we derive from phrenology in constructing our psychology?

How, we ask, does the phrenologist come to the knowledge of the fact, that benevolence is one of the primitive faculties of human nature? Will he say, here is a cerebral organ for benevolence, therefore there must be a faculty for benevolence? With his leave, this is not sound logic. When he declares this or that portion of brain the organ of benevolence, he assumes the existence of the faculty of benevolence. How can he say this portion of brain is consecrated to benevolence, if he be ignorant of the fact that there is such a faculty as benevolence? Man has an organ for veneration, therefore veneration is the primitive faculty of human nature. But how know that this is an organ of veneration before we know that man venerates, and venerates by means of this portion of the cerebrum?

We confess we cannot see how the phrenologist obtains his psychology by means of his phrenological principles. He does not pretend that the organs are distinctly marked on the brain. There are no cerebral marks by which he can tell where benevolence ends and veneration begins. The number of the organs cannot be ascertained so as in return to aid in determining the number of faculties. This is evident from the fact that phrenologists do not agree in their enumeration of one or the other; some reckoning more faculties and organs, and others fewer. The portion of brain, which Spurzheim and Combe devote to ideality, others devote to ideality and sublimity,—thus dividing what was regarded as one organ into two, and making two primitive faculties out of what was at first pronounced to be but one. It is evident, from this, that the examination of the skull can no more determine the number of our primitive faculties, than it can their nature and character. We ask again, then, what light does phrenology throw on psychology?

The phrenologist must determine the number and char-

acter of our primitive faculties independently of his craniology, or not determine them at all. How, then, does he determine their number and character? We presume by analyzing his own consciousness. Mr. Combe declared in his lectures that a man destitute of conscientiousness would be incapable of conceiving moral distinctions. He differed from Dr. Spurzheim as to a particular faculty, and claimed superior authority for his own opinion, because the organ of the faculty in question was large on his head, and almost totally deficient on Dr. Spurzheim's. Phrenologists, then, resort to consciousness. They turn their eyes in upon themselves, and analyze the facts of the mental world. But this is the way all psychologists do, and ever have done. Phrenologists then, as pyschologists, have nothing peculiar in their method. Their psychology, then, is not obtained by their phrenological principles, but by the usual process. If any one doubts this, let him ask if a phrenologist would feel himself warranted in denying the existence of a faculty he should be conscious of possessing, and which he should see manifested in the lives of others, merely because he could find no organ for it? We do not believe he would. We conclude this part of the subject, then, by saying that, admitting that the phrenologist has accurately enumerated and rightly classed the faculties of human nature, he has not done it by virtue of his phrenology, but by virtue of his superior psychological analysis.

But we go further. We deny both the completeness and the justness of the phrenological psychology. Dr. Spurzheim and George Combe enumerate and describe thirty-five faculties, and speak of two more which are considered doubtful, or not fully settled. But what they call faculties, are evidently nothing but instinctive laws or tendencies of human nature, and not at all deserving the name of *faculty*. We accept the number and character of these tendencies, as given by phrenologists, but they by no means exhaust the consciousness.

These tendencies are all instinctive; they are blind cravings, and the causality at work in them is not our personality. We are separate from them, and either obey them or control them. The faculties proper, those powers by which we control our instincts, are not accounted for by phrenologists. Memory is unquestionably a faculty of the human soul, but the phrenologist has no organ for it. He virtually denies memory. True he says each faculty re-

members,—that eventuality remembers events, individuality remembers individual facts, causality remembers causes, comparison relations, and so on through the whole list. But does he not see that this is all aside the mark? It is not this or that faculty that remembers, but *we* remember. What he alleges merely explains why it is that we remember some things rather than others; but it says nothing of why we remember at all. Memory is two-fold. Sometimes the past comes up of its own accord, sometimes it comes up only as we recall it. Now, how, if we have no faculty of memory, are we able to recall the past?

Sensibility is another faculty of which phrenologists give a very unsatisfactory account. The feelings they speak of are merely modes or variations of sensibility, not the capacity of feeling itself. Endowed as I am with the capacity of feeling, I can easily understand that with the brain large in the region of benevolence, I shall have that modification of sensibility strong; or if small in the region devoted to self-esteem, I shall not be proud. But this does not explain the capacity of feeling, nor give it a cerebral organ. There is no organ for sensibility; there are simply organs for its modes.

The same difficulty occurs in relation to the faculty of *knowing*, intelligence, or reason. We know well what phrenologists say on this subject; we know that they have devoted to the intellect the anterior lobe of the brain, or at least the larger portion of it; and that they speak of perceptive faculties and reflective faculties; but wherefore we understand not. If true to their own system, they must pronounce the intellectual faculties, as they call them, instincts, desires, cravings, as well as the propensities and sentiments. Comparison, in their account of the matter, is nothing but a craving to know relations, causality to know causes, individuality to know individual facts. The cerebral organ of causality, with all deference to George Combe, we must suggest, does not take cognizance of causes; it is merely the organ by which the man manifests his desire to know causes. Similar remarks may be made of all the intellectual faculties, as they are called. They do not constitute the knowing faculty, but are merely its modes, and simply account for the fact that all kinds of knowledge are not acquired by all men with equal facility. To know, is the same, whether it be of causes, relations, facts, tunes, times, colors, or events. It is a general power, which, if we

choose, will be directed to an investigation of causes, of ideas, of beauty, of religion, as causality, comparison, ideality, or veneration is the larger organ on the head. But the fact that it is directed to one class of facts rather than another, in consequence of cerebral development, can by no means destroy its unity, or make it not a faculty of the human soul. The phrenologists, in rejecting it, appear to us to make out but a very defective psychology.

The *will*, or personality, is also denied by phrenologists. We mean not to say that they have banished the word, but the thing. Benevolence does this, causality does that, is their way of speaking. The man, the person, does nothing. There is no unity. Phrenologists even labor to disprove all unity of consciousness; and Dr. Spurzheim introduces a man crazy on one side of his head, but sane on the other, to prove the fact of double consciousness. One can hardly refrain from adding that a man resorting to such testimony for such a purpose must needs be crazy, not on one side of his head only, but on both sides.

One while, the phrenologists confound will with desire; another while, with a decision of the understanding, and generally, with the circumstances which influence it. Each faculty is said to will its appropriate objects. Here by will they mean desire. When the intellect perceives that a certain group of organs ought to be obeyed, there is a will to obey them. Here will is taken for a decision of the understanding. If a group of organs giving a determinate character be predominant, there is a will to follow them. Here will is confounded with both desire and the circumstances which influence us. Are men, who can commit mistakes like these, philosophers?

The will, we have shown elsewhere, is the ME, the personality, the power of acting, not the mere capacity of receiving an action. The causality at work in the will is always the person, the ME, myself. It is the power of self-determination. Take away the will, and you destroy personality. The will is always free. Indeed it is identical with freedom. A necessary will, or a will that is not free, is a solecism. But desire is not free. It does not spring up because I will it. It takes place independently of my personality. The causality at work in it, then, is not mine. If, then, there be no will but desire, there is no will at all; then there is no personality, then we re-enter into nature and necessity, and fatalism is truth. The same remarks may be made on the

decision of the understanding. I cannot control the decisions of my understanding. I see as I can, not as I will. The decisions of the understanding are controlled by a power which I am not. They are necessary, not free. If we confound the will with them, we destroy it, efface personality, and reduce man to a thing, at best, to an animal. We reside eminently in our power of acting, and this power of acting is what we mean by the will as a faculty of human nature.

Now, we are conscious of possessing this power. We do not seek to prove it, for we know it as immediately and as positively as we know that we exist. Our judgments may decide one way, but we can resolve to go another. Desire may prompt us to one deed, but we can will to do another. Every man knows this, for every man repeats the experiment every day of his life. It is true, I may be overpowered by my appetite, my desires, my passions, and led into sin; nevertheless I retain ever the power of willing to resist. This power may not always manifest itself in outward acts, but it exists and manifests itself, internally, in the sphere of consciousness. A strong man may hold me to the ground, so that I cannot rise; but though I cannot rise, I can will to rise. Here, then, is a faculty or power which I unquestionably possess, or rather which is myself, of which phrenologists take no account. We can find no recognition of it in their psychology. By what authority, then, do they say that they have constructed a complete psychology? Here is the man himself, of which they take no account, and for which they find no place.

"The knowing and reflecting faculties," says Mr. Combe, p. 467, "are subject to the will, or rather constitute will themselves." In his lectures he told us repeatedly that will is seated in the anterior lobe of the brain, and is identical with intellect. Consequently the power of preceiving is identical with the power of willing, and to know is simply to resolve! This may be true philosophy, and deserving the vote of thanks and piece of plate from Bostonians, which Mr. Combe received for it; but we confess that it is a philosophy which we are not yet prepared to embrace. We pretend not, however, to refute it; for he who can see no difference between knowing a thing, and resolving to do or not to do a thing, though he win not conviction, must needs be unanswerable.

What, again, do phrenologists mean by calling causality

and comparison *reflective* faculties? Have they analyzed reflection? In reflection there is both intelligence and will. We will to reflect. In every act of reflection we turn the mind in upon itself. But phrenologists deny will, they deny activity, freedom; how, then, can they admit reflection? And moreover, what are causality and comparison but simple tendencies to inquire into causes and relations? They do not, of themselves, take cognizance of causes and relations, otherwise every man who has them large would be sure to have an extensive knowledge of causes and relations, without having ever inquired, which is not the fact. But suppose causality knows causes, and comparison knows relations, we should like to know if they reflect in knowing these, any more than individuality does in knowing facts, or time in knowing dates? Admit they do, how does the phrenologist know the fact? How does he learn that causality is a *reflective* faculty, and individuality a simple *knowing* faculty?

Again, phrenologists boast much of phrenology as harmonizing with Christianity. Now, one of the plainest injunctions of Christianity is that of self-denial. We should like to see the phrenologist explain, on his principles, the doctrine of self-denial. He recognises no self, no ME, but some thirty or forty faculties having no common spiritual centre. What to him, then, will be self-denial? To deny one's self, we presume he will say, is to give predominance to the moral and religious sentiments over the lower or animal propensities. But two questions in reference to this answer: 1. What is that which gives the predominance to the moral and religious sentiments? and 2. Is this predominance really a self-denial? Are not the moral and religious sentiments as much parts of *self*, in the view of phrenologists, as the propensities themselves? Why is it, then, any more self-denial to bring the propensities into subjection to the sentiments, than it would be to bring the sentiments into subjection to the propensities?

But what is it that brings the one into subjection to the other? What is this which exerts this power? Is it the ME, the personality, activity, liberty, which is not the tendencies, but their subject, their common centre? Is it, in a word, the will? Why have phrenologists then neglected to describe it, to give us an account of it? and why do they give us such an account of the will as necessarily excludes it? Will they say, as George Combe does, that it is the intel-

lect? Well, what directs the intellect to that end? A power which we are, or which is objective to us? If objective to us, as they imply in all they say, then it is not we that subject our propensities to our moral and religious sentiment, but something else. Then we do not deny ourselves, and cannot. Then the Christian duty of self-denial is impracticable.

Once more.—Christianity teaches the doctrine of accountability; how will the phrenologist make this doctrine harmonize with his philosophy? Mr. Combe took up this subject in his lectures; but his mode of treating it struck us at the time as peculiarly vague and inconclusive. Christianity represents man as placed under a law which he is morally obliged to obey, and which he has the power to obey or not to obey. We believe every man's conscience bears witness to the truth of this Christian doctrine; all languages imply it, and all systems of morality and jurisprudence are based upon it. But if a man be the slave of his instincts, if he be not free to control them, to will the right, though they would lead him to pursue the wrong, it is obvious that he is not accountable for his actions, and therefore is not a subject of moral discipline. Phrenologists say the character of the man will be good, if the moral and religious sentiments and intellect predominate, and bad if the animal propensities predominate. The question which naturally arises is, has a man with large organs for the animal propensities, and small organs for the moral and religious sentiments and intellect, the power to be a strictly moral and upright man? Or has a man with an organization the reverse of this, the power to be a bad man? If not, then the man is controlled by an exterior force; his acts are not, strictly speaking, his acts, but the acts of the force at work in his instinctive tendencies. If then you make him accountable, you make him accountable for deeds not his own. I am responsible only for my own deeds. What is done in me, but not by me, is no more my doing than what is done in a man of whom I never heard, and with whom I have no relation. How then can I be responsible? Indeed does not phrenological psychology destroy all responsibility?

This is a grave question, and as such Mr. Combe gave it a grave, but we are sorry to say, not an explicit answer. The cautiousness so characteristic of his nation, seemed all the while to be predominant. He did not say, man has the power in question, nor that he has it not. He evaded the

real question at issue, and introduced another, which was but remotely related to it. He asked, What do we mean by responsibility? Responsibility to whom? To God? Do we mean by the question to ask whether God will have a right to punish us or not? Phrenology has nothing to do with such questions. Phrenology does not profess to answer theological questions,—although one of its chief recommendations in the minds of many is, the aid it brings to scriptural exegesis. We leave the question of responsibleness to God, and ask again, to whom are we responsible? To society? But the question he should have asked, was not, to whom we are responsible, nor to what we are responsible, but, if our characters are determined by our cerebral development, can we be accountable at all? Yet this question, for reasons best known to himself, he did not choose to ask or answer. He considered merely our responsibleness to society, that is, the right of society to punish us. He placed before us the casts of three heads, one decidedly bad, one middling, and one decidedly good. The first question is to determine who are responsible. Now, persons with heads like this,—showing us the cast of the villain,—are not responsible. You see, here are large propensities, feeble sentiments, and deficient intellect. Such a man should be treated as a *moral patient*, and asylums should be built, in which all persons with heads organized in this way, should be confined. Then again,—showing us the middle head,—is this man responsible? You see the propensities are large, the moral and religious sentiments rather small, though the intellect is considerable. Persons with heads organized in this manner will do very well, if kept out of the way of temptation; but if tempted, they will assuredly fall. But here is a different head. Persons with heads like this are proof against temptation, and maintain their integrity amidst all circumstances. Persons of this class are responsible. You see here moderate propensities, large moral and religious sentiments to perceive the right, and large intellect to will it. If such a person does not do right, he has no excuse.

But we wished Mr. Combe to tell us whether this man, with the good head, had the power to neglect his duty,—whether he did right by the force of instinct, or by voluntary striving. We wished to know whether there be in man a power or faculty, by which he controls his instinctive tendencies, and directs them to the fulfilment of the moral law, or by which he can, if he choose, direct them to the breach

of the moral law. If man has not this power, he is not a moral being, and the accountability spoken of in the Christian revelation is unfounded. Phrenology, then, instead of being in harmony with Christianity, would be directly opposed to it. If there be such a power, phrenologists have not given us a true philosophy of man, because they have failed to recognize and describe it.

If the phrenological psychology be admitted, virtue is indeed, as Brutus said, "an empty name." In none of the phrenological lectures we have heard, in none of the phrenological books we have read, have we found any thing on which virtue can be based. We can conceive how a man, on phrenological principles, may be good or bad, in the sense in which we say a good or bad knife, but we cannot conceive it possible for one to be virtuous or sinful. Virtue is my own act; it springs from my will, and can spring from no other. No power can compel me to be virtuous; for the deeds I do through compulsion, I do not, but the power that compels me, and therefore they are not mine, and however good they may be, they are not virtuous.

Now, in the primitive instincts of my nature, I do not act. In relation to these primitive tendencies, which the phrenologists call faculties, I am passive, and hence they are termed *passions*. The active force in them is not my ME, my personality, but a force foreign to it. Admitting, then, that all these tendencies are good, and that all which is done through their impulsive force is in harmony with the law of God, it does not follow that I am virtuous. The sun and stars obey God's law, but are they virtuous? Not at all. Because they are not persons, are not active but passive, and revolve in obedience to God's law only because a power foreign to them makes them so revolve. The analogy holds good in man. When I find myself in harmony with the law of God, by the force of my instinctive tendencies, I am there by no act of mine, and consequently have no claim to virtue. This distinction between virtue and goodness, our phrenologists seem not to have made. Goodness is conformity to the will of the Creator; virtue is the voluntary striving after that conformity. I may be forced to conform and therefore forced into goodness; but I cannot be forced to will to conform, therefore cannot be forced into virtue. Now, what I do in obedience to my instinctive tendencies, I am forced to do as much as if the impelling power were outside of my body; consequently, though forced to con-

form by my instincts, I am only good, not virtuous, unless I have also willed to conform. Phrenologists seem always satisfied when the conformity is obtained, although in obtaining it, they annihilate the man. They do not regard it as essential that we should will that conformity, therefore do not regard virtue itself as essential; and as they do not give us this power of willing, they represent virtue as impossible.

But waiving all this, we must tell our phrenological friends, that psychology does not embrace the whole of philosophy. Their views of mental science are low and narrow, and make them physicians rather than metaphysicians. They seem to imagine that mental philosophy is merely a sort of natural history of the mind,—that when they have enumerated and described the primitive tendencies, or laws, of human nature, their work is done. But we must assure them, that the mental philosopher has other and more important matters than these to settle, and which, in our judgment, phrenology does not in the least aid him to settle. There is the somewhat important question of the criterion of truth, or ground of certainty. We should like to know what light phrenology throws on this question. Does it give us any clue to its answer? Phrenologists assert many things as true; how do they know that what they assert is true? How do they know that the authority on which they rely, and to which they appeal, is legitimate and safe? How do they determine that all human knowledge is not dream, or that our faculties are to be trusted? They may tell us that phrenology does not ask these questions, and that it should not be called upon to answer them. Be it so. But these are philosophical questions, and if they do not bring them within the scope of phrenology, what right have they to call phrenology a system of mental philosophy? Does it afford the basis of an answer to these questions? Not at all. Then it does not embrace the whole of philosophy.

Men generally believe in something existing outside of them; but some philosophers contend that we cannot pass, by any legitimate process, from the world within us to a world outside of us. We do not expect our phrenological readers, generally, will comprehend the problem here implied, for they do not seem to possess the capacity of distinguishing between the ME and the NOT-ME; but still, we trust some of them will understand what we mean, when

we say that a few men have questioned the existence of an external world; have, like Berkeley, regarded it as a picture stamped by God on the retina of the mind, or, like Fichte, as the ME projected, taken as the object of itself. Now, what light has the phrenologist to throw on this question? Are these philosophers right; or shall we continue to believe, with the great mass of mankind, that there is a real world existing outside of us, and independent of us? How, out of the four phrenological principles we have enumerated, shall we extract an answer to this question? If phrenology cannot answer it, how can its friends call it a system, or the basis of a system, of mental philosophy?

Mr. Combe touches, in his book (pp. 453, 454), upon this question, but unfortunately he does not give it that direct and explicit answer which its importance seems to demand. He says Berkeley denied the external world, because he could see no necessary connexion between the conception or idea of it, which is a mental affection, and its existence. But instead of informing us whether Berkeley was right or not, or showing us how phrenology enables us to solve the problem, he merely undertakes to tell us how he can explain, on phrenological principles, the fact that Berkeley denied an external world, and also the fact that Reid asserted it. "Individuality, aided by the other perceptive powers, in virtue of its constitution, perceives the external world, and produces an intuitive belief in its existence. But Berkeley employed the faculty of causality to discover *why* this perception is followed by belief; and as causality could give no account of the matter, and could see no necssary connexion between the mental affection, called perception, and the existence of external nature, he denied the latter." This, translated into the language of mortals, means, we suppose, that Berkeley denied the existence of external nature, because he could discover no reason for asserting it. This is a very satisfactory reason, no doubt, why Berkeley denied the existence of an external world, but Mr. Combe must pardon us, if we cannot accept it as a satisfactory answer to the question, whether Berkeley was justified in his denial or not.

There are two other points in this answer deserving attention. "Individuality, aided by the other perceptive powers, in virtue of its constitution, perceives the external world, and produces an intuitive belief in its existence." Translated, as we have said, into the language of mortals,

this means, we suppose, that we perceive an external world, or by the constitution of our nature, are led irresistibly to believe in its existence. This is the doctrine of Reid, advanced in reply to Hume and Berkeley. It is not, then, necessarily, a phrenological doctrine. But this is of no consequence. Does phrenology throw any additional light on it, or give to it any additional certainty? Is our belief in an external world made more rational or philosophical, by saying that "individuality, by virtue of its constitution, perceives the external world, and produces an intuitive belief in its existence," than it was when we said with Reid, we are irresistibly led, by the constitution of our nature, to believe in an external world?

Again,—how does Mr. Combe know that individuality does actually perceive an external world? The perception, we suppose he will admit with Berkeley, is a mental affection; how, then, by the aid of phrenology, pass from the mental affection, the idea, to the object? We wish he would tell us what principle or fact phrenology has disclosed, which enables him to do this. We cannot see that he has advanced at all on Berkeley, or obtained any means of legitimating our faith in an external world. Phrenology appears to us to leave this question where it found it.

This answer of his also implies that we cannot legitimate belief in the objective. He says that causality can assign no reason why we should believe in the existence of external nature,—that is, we have no other ground for asserting that existence, than that we believe it because it is our nature to believe it. Hume and Berkeley both said as much. Phrenology, then, so far from legitimating the universal belief of mankind in an external world, either leaves that matter untouched, or, according to its greatest living expounder, tells us that we cannot legitimate it. We should like to know wherein phrenology decides that we can *not* pass legitimately from the subjective to the objective?

The friends of phrenology boast its value in settling the great problems of natural theology. Some of them go so far as to say that it puts the question of the existence of God at rest. If it be a complete system of mental philosophy, it ought to do this. Let us see, then, if it does. Mr. Combe attempts, in his book, to show that it does; but he merely shows us why some men believe in God, and why others do not. Men on whose heads the organ of causality is large, believe in God,—those on whose heads it is small, do not.

Now this, in point of fact, is not true. Abner Kneeland has large causality, and the Abbé Paris was almost entirely deficient in it. Hume had large causality, and Reid, according to Mr. Combe, had small causality. But let this pass. Suppose Mr. Combe is right, his remark no more proves the legitimacy of theism than it does of atheism; and the argument which he introduces after this remark, and which he represents as always silencing atheists, is nothing but the old argument from Design, which is inconclusive, unless we have first established the existence of a Designer. But be it ever so conclusive, it derives no additional force from phrenology.

But phrenologists profess, also, to find a proof of the existence of God in the sentiment of veneration. "Destructiveness is implanted in the mind, and animals exist around us to be killed for our nourishment; adhesiveness and philoprogenitiveness are given, and friends and children are provided, on whom they may be exercised; benevolence is conferred on us, and the poor and unhappy, on whom it may shed its soft influence, are everywhere present with us; in like manner, the instinctive tendency to worship is implanted in the mind, and, conformably to these analogies of nature, we may reasonably infer that a God exists whom we may adore." (p. 261.) That is, man is disposed to venerate, *therefore* there is a God for him to venerate. Supposing you had first proved a God, who has implanted in us the tendency to venerate, you might then take the existence of the tendency as a proof that it is God's will that we should venerate him; but that the tendency, of itself, supposes God, is more than we can conceive. The logic, by which we conclude from the existence of the tendency to the object, is, we presume, peculiarly phrenological.

But the evidence of a God, to be derived from this source, is taken away by the very persons who adduce it. "Man," says Dr. Gall, "adores every thing, fire, water, earth, thunder, lightning, meteors, grasshoppers, crickets." The existence of the fact, that man worships, is, then, according to phrenologists themselves, no better evidence of the existence of God, than it is that God, if he exists, is a cricket or a grasshopper. After this, we hope they will cease to boast of the new light their science throws on the fundamental truths of natural theology.

But passing over this;—phrenologists have only told us what we all knew before, that men have a disposition to

venerate, to adore. All have admitted this. The only question in dispute is, Is there a God to be adored? This question phrenologists leave where it was before. They have merely, by pointing out an organ of veneration, led people to reflect, perhaps, more on the fact that man is naturally religious, than they otherwise would have done; but whether religion is grounded in truth, or whether it be an illusion, is a question they have not answered, nor increased our means of answering.

One great object of philosophy is to demonstrate the fact, that man is a moral being,—that there is above him a law he ought to obey, and that he is in the way of his duty when he obeys it, and sinful when he disobeys. That man is under such a law, is the universal sentiment of the race, as the universal presence of conscience testifies. But some men have questioned this law, in fact denied its reality. This has led others to seek to establish it. Now, if phrenology be a complete system of philosophy, it must settle this question. Does it do it? So say the phrenologists. How does it do it? Why, there is on man's head an organ of conscientiousness, and those who have it large are disposed to be honest, upright, moral; and those who have it very small, are incapable of perceiving moral distinctions. We shall not laugh at this answer, for we suppose it is given in good faith; but, taking it in its most favorable light, we must ask what it amounts to? Simply to the fact, that men are so organized, or so constituted, that they do believe in moral distinctions. Is this belief well founded? Is there that moral world actually existing, which it implies? Here is a question our phrenological friends do not answer. Can they answer it?

The immortality of the soul is another philosophical question, and one which philosophy ought to settle. Does phrenology throw any light on this question? Not at all. It professes to leave this, and all similar questions, by the way. Very well. We do not ask it to answer them, only we say, if it does not, it takes in but a small part of what we understand by the philosophy of the human mind; and therefore its friends should not claim for it the high merit of being the foundation of all correct mental science. We do not complain of phrenology, because it does not do more, but of its friends for representing it as being more than it is.

Mr. Combe speaks of phrenology as exalting the dignity

of human nature. It teaches, he said, in his lectures, that all our faculties are in themselves good, and given by our Creator for useful purposes, and that they become the occasion of evil only when abused. Phrenologists teach this, we admit, and perhaps to recommend their science; but how they deduce this from their phrenological principles, is to us a mystery. It is a conclusion to which they doubtless arrive by reasoning from certain notions of justice which they entertain; but do they derive those notions from phrenological facts, or from sources in no sense dependent on the truth or falsity of phrenology?

Phrenologists speak of the moral and religious sentiments as the *higher* nature of man. Is this because their organs are located on the upper part of the head? They say the moral and religious sentiments *ought* to govern the propensities. We admit it; but will they tell us how they verify this fact by phrenology? Is there any thing to be discovered by manipulation to establish it? Or do they establish it by consulting the revelations of consciousness, just as all philosophers do? But Mr. Combe ridicules the idea of knowing any thing of the mind, by the study of consciousness. "The human mind," he says, "in this world, cannot, by itself, be an object of philosophical investigation." The mind, then, cannot investigate itself,—thought cannot be an object of thought, and we can never turn our minds in upon themselves, and study the facts of consciousness! This, we confess, is a novel view of the matter, and one which, we presume, no mental philosopher ever suspected before Gall, Spurzheim, and George Combe.

But enough. We wish our readers distinctly to understand that we make no war upon phrenology, when restricted to its legitimate sphere. As a physiological account of the brain, a treatise on its functions, and as enabling us to explain the causes of the differences we meet with in individual character, we believe it, and value it. Within these limits, within which Gall usually confined it, it is, as we have said, a useful and interesting branch of science. The mischief of it lies in attempting, as Spurzheim and Combe do, to make it a system of mental philosophy, which it is not, and never can be. The fundamental principles of phrenology are easily reconcilable with a sound spiritual philosophy, and on some future occasion we may attempt to show this. The objections we have brought forward, do not bear against those principles, but against the doctrines

phrenologists profess to derive from them. We war, then, not against the science, but against what its friends have superinduced upon it, or alleged it to be.

They, who oppose phrenology by controverting its physiological facts, do no seem to us to act very wisely. Mr. Combe's Lectures, we confess, tended to weaken our faith in the reality of those facts, and to induce us to class phrenology with the other humbugs of the day; but our own observations have been somewhat extended, and we are satisfied that the phrenologists have really made some physiological discoveries not altogether worthless; and their assertion of a connexion between the instinctive tendencies of our nature, and cerebral organization, has led to a kind of observation on the different traits of individual character, which has enlarged our stock of materials for a Natural History of Man. They have, also, made many valuable observations on education, and the means of preserving a sound mind in a sound body; and induced many to turn their attention to the study of mental science, who, but for them, might never have done it. This is considerable; enough to give them an honorable rank among the benefactors of their race,—and a rank they should be permitted peaceably to enjoy, unless they claim one altogether higher, and to which no man of any tolerable acquaintance with mental science can believe them entitled.

Admitting all the facts phrenologists allege, all that legitimately belongs to their science, we contend that it throws no light on the great problems of mental philosophy. In relation to all those problems, we stand unaffected by the discoveries of Gall and Spurzheim; and had phrenologists clearly preceived the nature of these problems, they would never have dared to put forth the claims they have, and which we have contested. Phrenology is a physical, not a metaphysical science, and all it can, with any propriety, pretend to do, is to point out and describe the physiological conditions to which, in this mode of being, the mental affections are subjected. This it has, to some extent, done; but this does not amount to so much as they imagine. In doing it, they do not approach the boundaries of metaphysical science, and therefore we have felt it necessary to show them that they claim for it more than it is or can be.

We are grateful to all laborers in the field of science, and to every man who discovers a new law or a new fact. But we confess we are a little impatient with arrogant pretensions. Let the discoverer of the new law or the new

fact, describe it to us, and claim the merit that is his due; but let him not fancy his merit must needs be so great as to sink out of sight the merit of everybody else. We could bear with our phrenological friends altogether better, were they not perpetually addressing us, as if all wisdom was born with Gall and Spurzheim. To believe them, before these two German empirics Plato and Aristotle, Bacon and Descartes, Leibnitz and Locke, Reid and Kant, sink into insignificance. Now, this is more than we can bear. "Great men lived before Agamemnon,"—and we believe there were philosophers, before Gall and Spurzheim set out with a cabinet of skulls on their wanderings from Vienna. It is because phrenologists lose sight of this fact, and would fain make it believed that nothing can be known of the human mind, but by means of their four principles, that we have deemed it necessary to rebuke them. We hope they will bear our reproof with the meekness of philosophers.

We honor the man who has the courage to proclaim a new doctrine, one which he honestly believes, and which he knows is in opposition to the habitual faith of his age and country; but we always distrust both the capacity and the attainments of him, who can see nothing to venerate in his forefathers, and who bows not before the wisdom of antiquity. Progress there may be, and there is; but no man can advance far on his predecessors,—never so far that they shall sensibly diminish in the distance. These arrogant reformers with the tithe of an idea, who speak to us as if they had outgrown all the past, and grasped and made present the whole future, are generally persons who, having advanced on their own infancy, imagine therefore, that they have advanced on the whole world. But the more we do really advance, the more shall we be struck with the greatness of those who went before us, and the more sincere and deep will be our reverence for antiquity. The darkness we ascribe to remote ages is often the darkness of our own minds, and the ignorance we complain of in others may be only the reflex of our own. Progress we should labor for, progress we should delight in, but we should beware of underrating those who have placed us in the world. "There were giants in those days."

Phrenologists must attribute the ridicule and opposition they have encountered to themselves. Their method of propagating their science, their character of itinerant lectur-

ers, and their habit of manipulating heads, likening their science so much, in its usages and effects, to the science of palmistry, together with their uncouth terminology, and the absurd statements which they are continually making, betraying at once their ignorance and simplicity, can hardly be expected not to excite a smile of pleasantry, or of contempt, in every man of ordinary discernment and information. But if they will betake themselves to their cabinets, and study their science in the modest, unpretending manner, physiologists in general do, instead of perambulating the country, manipulating skulls at so much a-piece, or treating their science in a way that encourages the ignorant and designing to do it, they will find the public ceasing to oppose them, and gratefully accepting the fruits of their labors. Let them lay aside their pretensions as system-makers, reformers, revolutionists, and throw into the common mass the facts or principles they discover, and suffer them to go for what they are worth, and, in common with all studious men, they will contribute something to the well-being of the race, and deserve well of humanity.

SCIENCE AND THE SCIENCES.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for July, 1863.]

THERE are many Catholics, and very good Catholics too, we learn from the *New York Tablet*, who care very little for the objections to our faith drawn from the discoveries, or alleged discoveries, and inductions of modern science, especially the science of geology, and regard it as a waste of time even to listen to them. There can be, they say, no conflict, if both are true, between faith and science. We know our faith is from God, and that it is true, and therefore that whatever science conflicts with it is false science, and should be dismissed without ceremony, as an impudent pretender. There is, no doubt, truth in this argument, and we might justly content ourselves with it if we had to deal only with sciolists and cavillers, or if all Catholics were good and stanch Catholics like those described by *The Tablet*; if there were no weak Catholics; if there were no non-Catho-

lics; if Catholics had no interest in science and owed no duties to civilization; if only the whole needed a physician; or if charity were a vice or weakness, and not a Christian virtue. The argument is conclusive for all those who care nothing for science or civilization, for human intelligence and social well-being, and whose faith having been entertained without reason, no reason can disturb; but these Catholics, however numerous and respectable they may be, are not all the world, nor all who are Catholics, and their wants are not the only wants to be consulted. The argument, in point of fact, is more appropriate in the mouth of a boasting pharisee, or an arrogant scribe, than in the mouth of a docile, modest, humble, and truth-loving Christian. It is far better fitted to raise doubts in the minds of thoughtful men, than it is to remove them, and far more likely to repel the cultivators of science from the church, than it is to keep or draw them within her fold.

The argument is, also, one that can be retorted, and used with as much practical effect against faith as against science. There can, if both are true, be no conflict between science and faith. We know our science is true, and therefore that your faith, so far as it conflicts with it, is a false faith, an impudent pretender. It will be difficult to persuade the man of science that the argument is not as valid for him as it is for you, or even to satisfy all who are inside of the church that it is not a fair retort. Few Catholics, we apprehend, can see their faith clearly contradicted by the alleged discoveries and inductions of science without being more or less disturbed; and many, we know, have been led to abandon their faith by objections drawn from the sciences, which they had no scientific means of refuting. In both Catholic and non-Catholic countries, we find the sons of believing fathers and devout mothers, brought up in the Catholic faith, trained in Catholic schools even by priests and religious, who yet, as they go out into the world, abandon their childhood's faith, the faith of their fathers, and fall into the ranks of its most bitter and determined enemies. It is idle to attempt to deny or to conceal the fact, for all the world knows it; and useless to attempt to explain it away by attributing it to perverse inclination, to licentiousness, or to any species of moral depravity, for they are not seldom the most innocent, the most ingenuous, the most gifted, and the most noble-minded of our youth. Science, or what passes for science, is, and for a long time has been *extra eccle-*

siam, and in its spirit and tendency *contra ecclesiam*. The public opinion of the scientific world is against us, and carries away not a few of our own children, and prevents those not in the church from ever listening to our argument in her favor.

It is certainly true that science does not and never can conflict with the revelation of God, and whenever an apparent conflict arises we must always conclude that either what is alleged as science is not science, but the opinion and conjectures of scientific men; or that what passes for faith is, after all, only the opinion or conjectures of theologians. Personally we feel no uneasiness on the subject, because we have brought our faith and science into harmony, and know that what science, so far as science it is, contradicts, is not faith, but opinion; not the teaching of the church, but the opinions of the schools, or the constructions put upon the word of God by fallible men. Yet it is well to bear in mind that the certainty of faith neither objectively nor subjectively surpasses the certainty of science. Men have been able to deny the true faith, which they have once believed; no man ever denies or abandons what he sees and knows to be scientifically true. The believer who finds his science contradicting his faith, yields his faith rather than his science; for, in such a case, to continue to believe would be to cease to reason, would be to deny the very intellect, without which not even faith would be possible.

Then, again, we must bear in mind that, through faith and science can never be in contradiction, yet much that passes for faith may be in contradiction with science, and much that passes for science may be in contradiction with faith. This contradiction, indeed, affects neither what is really faith nor what is really science, but in minds not sufficiently instructed to draw sharply, on the one hand, the line between what is faith and what is only theological opinion, and, on the other, between what is science and what is only the opinion or conjecture of scientific men, it has the inevitable effect of creating, on the one side, a prejudice against science and, on the other, a prejudice against faith. Hence the *good* Catholics, of whom *The Tablet* speaks, are really opposed to all scientific investigations, to all exercise of reason, and seek their only natural support for faith in ignorance and pious affection. It is therefore the church comes to be looked upon as the enemy of intelligence, as in some sense an institution for the perpetuation of ignorance and

diffusion of general stupidity. She thus loses her hold on the intelligence of the age, on a large portion of the free, independent, ingenuous, and cultivated young men, even in her own communion, and fails almost entirely to command the respect or the attention of a similar class brought up in heterodoxy or unbelief. Therefore it is that the modern world has lapsed into unbelief, and remains outside of the church and bitterly prejudiced against her.

We owe it to the generous and noble youth growing up in the church, and who, as things go, are sure one of these days of being found among her enemies, to these immortal souls whom our Lord hath redeemed with his precious blood, to show them what we are constantly telling them is true, namely, that science never is and never can be in conflict with faith; that there really is no conflict between what we are required by our church to receive as the word of God, or hold as divine faith, and real science, whether physical or metaphysical, whether ethical or historical. We must not simply *say* there is none, but we must *show* it, and enable them to see and know that there is none; not merely assert it *ex cathedra*, and consign to the flames of hell all who do not believe us, but prove that what we assert is true, either by showing scientifically that what is alleged as science is not science, or by showing theologically that what science contradicts is not any part of faith, or any thing we are required to receive as divine revelation, but is simply the opinion, the honest opinion it may be, of fallible men. We must make ourselves masters of science, not simply as it was before the flood, or as it was in the ages of barbarism, but as it is now, as held by the recognized masters of to-day, and thus gain the ability to meet the scientific on their own ground. We must not, in order to save their faith, discourage our youth from cultivating either science or the sciences, or content ourselves with merely declaiming against modern science as anti-Catholic, as infidel, and with refuting it with a condemnation pronounced by authority against it, or declaring it *contra fidem*. We must go further, and meet it scientifically, with superior science, and refute it, where it errs, on scientific principles, by scientific reasons.

It is not enough to show that what passes for science is in contradiction with systems constructed by eminent theologians, which have widely obtained in the church, and which are still held by multitudes in her communion without cen-

sure or reproof; for theologians, even the most eminent, are men and fallible as all men are, and it is well known that there are opinions in the church which are not the opinions of the church,—*sententiæ in ecclesia*, not *sententiæ ecclesiæ*. We must either show theologically that what is contradicted is not of faith, and has never been taught as of faith by the church in her official teaching, or scientifically that what contradicts is not science, or no just induction from the real facts in the case. We owe this to those whom the writer in *The Tablet* would probably call weak Catholics, bad Catholics, or no Catholics at all, though nominally in the church. There are many such, and we who are strong must endeavor to strengthen them. It will not do for us, if we would secure the approbation of our Lord, to congratulate ourselves that we are free from their infirmities, and to give them the cold shoulder because they are not such as we are, or with sublime self-complacency tell them that they must believe or be damned. We must love them, and help them, especially since the greater part of their difficulties are created by us.

We owe this also to the heterodox and the unbelieving outside of the church. They are men as well as we, and God assumed their nature as well as ours. He died for them as well as for us, and he is as much glorified in their salvation as in our own. Be it they are sick, but they who are sick, not they who are whole, need the physician. Our Lord seeks their recovery, for he came not to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance; and there is more joy in heaven over one sinner that repenteth than over ninety and nine just persons who need not repentance. Charity is a Christian, a divine virtue, for *Deus charitas est*, God is charity or love. Charity is also a comprehensive virtue, embracing God and man in its affection. If it begins at home, it does not end there, nor is it, as too many seem to imagine, confined to the household of faith. Our Lord died for sinners; while we were yet sinners and his enemies, he loved us, and gave his life for us. Superb contempt for or even cold indifference to those who are out of the way may comport with the Pharisee, who says, "Stand aside, I am holier than thou;" but not with the Christian, who knows that it is by no merit of his own that he has been called while others have been left behind. The Scribes and Pharisees are hardly less rife in the church than they were in the synagogue; and now, as in the time of our Lord, they hold places of honor and

influence. They are regarded as the flower of Catholics, and to pass for good Catholics amongst men, we must be like them. Yet our faith was not given us solely for our own benefit, nor to be wrapped in a clean napkin, and buried in the earth. We, who fancy heaven was made for us alone, and thank God that we are not like these poor perplexed, doubting, heterodox, infidel sinners outside of the church, and look down on them with sovereign contempt from the heights of our spiritual pride, should bear in mind that we are answerable for all who are kept out of the way of salvation by the public opinion that has grown up in modern times hostile to the church of God. That public opinion grew up and remains uncorrected through our fault. All the world, a few centuries back, was Catholic, public opinion was Catholic, power and all the means of social influence were in the hands of Catholics; Catholics had the control of education, the universities, the schools, the colleges; they had the mastery of the scientific mind, and were the leaders in all that pertains to civilization. How, save through our fault, could a public opinion grow up hostile to us, or the conviction obtain that the church is hostile to science, and unfavorable to civilization?

There can be no question that Catholics have lost the vantage-ground they once held, and lost it through their own fault. To a fearful extent, they have failed to comprehend their mission, and proved unfaithful to their trust. They have incurred the reproach of our Lord, that of failing to "discern the signs of the times." They have in their practice too often confounded the human with the divine, and done evil by endeavoring to give to political institutions and scientific theories and opinions of an ignorant and semi-barbarous age the stability and immutability which belong only to the church of God, or to Catholic faith. Faith is stable, invariable, permanent; opinion is fickle, variable, transitory. But we have held on to opinions in the church and associated with faith, though confessedly human, and staked as far as possible, the Catholic cause on their maintenance. When advancing science assails them we cry out infidelity, and instead of calmly re-examining them, and modifying them as demanded by the new light thrown on them by the investigations and discoveries of the scientific, we declaim against the arrogant pretensions of the cultivators of science, and get off any number of wise saws against the uncertainty of science, the weakness of human reason, and the folly and sin

of setting up its conclusions above the word of God, forgetting that what we are defending is itself only human opinion in the church, not the divine faith the church teaches. Hence is created a public opinion hostile to the church, and which, as against her, is unjust, and wholly unwarranted. This hostile public opinion, a mere prejudice as against the church, and yet not wholly unfounded as against Catholics, tends to keep the heterodox and unbelieving out of the way of salvation, and to deprive them of the divine light of the gospel. It is our duty to correct that public opinion, and to remove that prejudice for which we are ourselves answerable, not by words only, but by deeds; not by showing what the church did for civilization in the barbarous ages that followed the downfall of Græco-Roman civilization, but by proving practically that we are to-day the real friends of science; that if we reject any of the alleged facts or conclusions of modern science, we do it by a superior scientific knowledge, and for scientific reasons, which the scientific world must hear and respect. We must beat the heterodox and unbelieving on their own ground, with their own weapons. We must be more scientific than they, and more perfect masters of the sciences.

We owe this, finally, to science itself. We must not suppose because we have the revelation of the eternal things of God, are Catholic believers, and seeking eternal rest in heaven, that we are withdrawn from the affairs of this world, and that we have no concern with society and its interests, or with science and civilization. God has not made it necessary that the great majority of mankind should be heretics or infidels in order to take care of the earth, and leave us believers free to devote ourselves solely to ascetic exercises and the salvation of our souls. This world has its place in the Christian economy, and is God's world, not Satan's. The earth, according to the Copernican system, is one of the celestial bodies. Natural society is not our end, but it is as necessary to it as the cosmos is to palingenesia. Civilization is initial religion. Science is an essential element of civilization, which is the supremacy of faith and knowledge, of intelligence and love, over ignorance, rudeness, barbarism, and superstition. If we as Catholics have no duties to civilization, pray, tell us who have? If we are not bound to labor for its progress, who is? If we neglect modern civilization, what right have we to stand and declaim against it as heretical or infidel? If we denounce science, or refuse to cul-

tivate it, what right have we to complain that it becomes our enemy instead of our friend and ally? If the spirit of the writer in *The Tablet* were to become universal in the church, and all the world were to become Catholics, society would come to a stand-still, nay, would cease to exist; science would cease to be cultivated; the arts would perish; there would be an end to human development; and the human race would sink into the lowest form of barbarism and savagism, giving a most terrible significance to the *oportet hæreses esse.*

It is of the last importance that Catholics should learn, or should practically remember, that Catholicity embraces both religion and civilization; for Catholics are the only people who can give to civilization its normal development and really aid its progress. They and they alone have in their faith the true divine ideal in its integrity and universality, the real system of the universe, the dialectic key to the reconciliation of all opposites, even Creator and creature. Since Catholics have ceased to take the lead in science and civilization there has been everywhere except in the purely material order, or in the simple accumulation of material facts, a decided deterioration. There has been a great enfeeblement of character, a terrible loss of elevated principle and high moral aims. Modern civilization, in the higher, nobler, and more comprehensive sense of the word, has not advanced, and has in many respects fallen below what it was in the ancient gentile world. It is every day becoming more pagan and less Christian. It wants Christian baptism, Christian instruction, the infusion of Catholic life. Of all people in the world, then, we Catholics are the most blameworthy, if we neglect science, or the sciences on which civilization more immediately depends. We have no excuse; the world can be saved only by the faith which we, and we alone, have in its unity and integrity, and God will demand a strict reckoning of us for the use we make of it. A terrible judgment awaits us.

Nevertheless, though we urge upon Catholics the duty of laboring for the continuous progress of civilization, and of making themselves able to meet and master the scientific on their own special ground, yet we are far from accepting as science all that passes for science, or from conceding that there has been in our times any thing like that wonderful progress in science or the sciences, which is very generally asserted. Modern cultivators of science have pushed their

investigations far into the material order, and amassed a considerable body of tolerably well ascertained facts in the history of the globe and its inhabitants, but these facts, though of great value to science, indispensable to it, if you will, are not themselves science. Science does not consist in the simple observation of facts and inductions therefrom; but in their explanation and coördination under the dialectic law of the universe, which has not been done, and cannot be done on the so-called Baconian method, the method modern science boasts of adopting and rigidly following. That method is that of observation and induction,—a good method for investigating nature, when one has science to start with, but a very bad method when one is without science, and is groping his way in the dark to science. Lord Bacon was, no doubt, right when he maintained that the sciences cannot be constructed *a priori*, but we have not found that anybody ever maintained the contrary. His secret of restoring and augmenting the sciences was an open secret before as well as since he wrote. In all the sciences there is a contingent element, and that element can nowhere be learned or ascertained except by the method of experience, or of observation, experiment, and induction. We can successfully cultivate the sciences by no other method. But the sciences so-called are not in themselves science, and from them alone we never do and never can attain to science. Hence we find that the most rigid disciples of Lord Bacon usually proceed by way of a preliminary hypothesis which directs their investigations, and which controls their experiments. Their experiments are all for the purpose of confirming or exploding some hypothesis or preconceived theory. They cannot, if they would, do otherwise, for the sciences demand science as the condition of their construction, and in the absence of science, apodictic science, we mean, the human mind must resort to hypothesis.

The error of our men of science is not in adopting the Baconian method, but in adopting it as an exclusive method, and in attempting by it alone to attain to science. That method begins by the study of phenomena, and gives us at best only an arbitrary classification of appearances. But the simple study and classification of phenomena is not science, for the excellent reason that nothing exists as pure phenomenon or appearance. Appearance without something that appears is nothing, a sheer nullity. There is no phenomenon without its noumenon, no appearance without that which ap-

pears, no particular without the universal, no mimesis without methexis, no individual without the genus or species, no universe without God; and Kant, after Leibnitz, the greatest of German philosophers, has proved once for all that the second series of terms can never, either by way of deduction or of induction, be rationally concluded from the first; that neither by way of deduction nor of induction is God obtainable from the universe, the methexic from the mimetic, the universal from the particular, the noumenon from the phenomenon. This is the real significance of that little understood and much misunderstood work, the *Critik der reinen Vernunft*. The two terms must be given as they exist, not analytically, but synthetically. God, indeed, is complete in himself, and in no sense dependent in order to be on the universe, but even he can be known to us only in synthesis with the universe, united to him by his creative act. He cannot be concluded from the universe, for the universe is from him, not he from it. To attempt to obtain by logical deduction or induction the noumenon from the phenomenon, the universal from the particular, God from the universe, is to attempt to get something from nothing, and to plunge at last into pure nihilism. To reverse the method, and to attempt to conclude logically the phenomenon from the noumenon, the contingent from the necessary, the universe from God, is to confound creature and creator, the contingent and the necessary, the empirical and the ideal, to deny creation, and to fall into pantheism. And hence all modern science so called tends inevitably either to pantheism or to nihilism.

Here is the grand difficulty. We can construct the sciences on a scientific basis neither *a priori*, nor *a posteriori* alone, because in all the sciences there are both contingent and ideal or necessary elements. The true scientific method combines in a real synthesis the two methods. Either is objectionable when taken exclusively, and each is good when adopted in connection with the other. The sciences cannot be constructed without science,—the science of the ideal, or philosophy, nor without careful observation of contingent facts. The fault of modern science is in separating,—not simply distinguishing, but separating,—in its method the contingent from the necessary, the empirical from the ideal, or the mimetic from the methexic, and hence its inductions and generalizations are nothing but unscientific and arbitrary classifications of phenomena or particulars. Our com-

plaint of the modern cultivators of science, whether in or out of the church, is that they have no philosophy, as our pretended philosophers have no theology. It is our complaint of the modern world itself. Our age has no philosophy, and having no philosophy it has no genuine science. We have separated the sciences from philosophy, that is, from science, and philosophy from theology, reason from revelation, and have therefore been compelled to attempt the construction of science and the sciences empirically, by the study and classification of particulars. We have thus eliminated from the science we study every ideal or non-contingent element, and attempted to explain the universe with the contingent alone, without God or his creative act, as may be seen in the *Cosmos* of Alexander von Humboldt, and in the positivism of Auguste Comte.

All truth is in relation. All things exist in the real synthesis instituted by the creative act of God, and nothing can be truly seen, observed, and known except in the real relations, or the relations in which it actually exists. Even what we call facts, cannot be understood, or represented, cannot be seen, as they are, detached from these relations, taken in detail, and studied in their isolation, because as isolated, detached, they are no facts at all. Hence the science of geology, zoölogy, physiology, philology, ethnology, ethics, or history can never be completed and mastered as a separate and detached science. Each of these sciences, to be successfully studied, must be studied in its real relations, and not one of them can deserve the name of science, if constructed by the effort to rise from the particular to the universal. We must begin with the real beginning, the creative act of God, and descend from the whole to the parts. No matter what science we are studying, the human mind must operate as it is, use its synthetic light,—as blended in one light, the light derived from immediate idea, intuition, or *a priori* reason, supernatural revelation, and experience, or observation and induction. Not that in matters of science the mind must blindly submit to either revelation or philosophy as an extrinsic or foreign authority, restraining its freedom, or prohibiting it from using its own eyes, and following its own inherent constitution and laws; but that to operate freely and scientifically, according to the intrinsic laws of intelligence, it must avail itself of all the light with which it is furnished, —all the means of grasping the universe as a whole and in its parts at its command.

What we insist upon is that the human mind never has its normal action when compelled by false or exclusive theories to operate with only a small portion of the light furnished it. We found not science on revelation, but we maintain that it is impossible to attain to the true system of the universe without the light of revelation. We demand the free normal action of reason, but reason never does and never can have its free normal action, when left to itself alone, with no aid from the revealed word of God. In all that is contingent, reason has need of experience, observation, experiment, investigation; but with these alone, we can never rise above the empirical, or attain to scientific results. Reason cannot operate without principles, and these must be given it *a priori*; for if it cannot operate without principles, it cannot without principles engage in the search after principles. In the superintelligible order, on which the intelligible order depends, and without which it would not and could not be, supernatural revelation must supply the want of direct intuition and sensible apprehension. Ideal science,—philosophy,—and revelation are both necessary to the successful cultivation of the sciences; and the reason why the sciences make so little real progress, why they are so uncertain, and why they are received with so much distrust by metaphysicians and theologians, is that the men who cultivate them insist on cultivating them as separate and independent sciences, and will accept no aid from philosophy or from faith. Descartes ruined philosophy when he separated it from theology, and made it a creation of reason isolated from faith; Bacon ruined the sciences as sciences, when he separated them from philosophy or ideal science and made them purely empirical. Facts or one side of facts may have been examined, and the scientific men of to-day have no doubt, in their possession a larger mass of materials for the construction of the sciences, than had their predecessors, but they have less science than had the great mediæval doctors and professors. St. Thomas had more science than Sir Charles Lyell, or Professor Owen. The recent work of Sir Charles on the *Antiquity of Man*, as well as that of Darwin on the *Origin of Species*, shows not the progress, but the deterioration of science. The same thing is shown by Agassiz in his elaborate essay on *Classification*, and by the trouble naturalists have to settle the proper classification of man. The naturalists are unwearied in their investigations, and shrink from no sacrifice to advance their

respective sciences, but we meet not one of their works that does not prove that they have lost the true key to the scientific sense of the universe. They are men whose ability, whose patience, whose labors we respect; they do all that men can do with their method; they do much for which we are grateful to them, and we are by no means among those who detract from their merits, or denounce them as the enemies of religion; but we must tell them that they will never, in the way they proceed, attain to the science to which their lives are so generously devoted. Civilization separated from religion, science separated from revelation, reason separated from faith, can never flourish, and under this separation, though men may fancy they are still believers on one side of the soul, society goes to ruin, and a gross materialism, pure selfishness becomes predominant, as we have seen and still see, especially in Great Britain and the United States, who, though they have been for some time at the head of modern civilization, which has collapsed in our civil war, are hardly up to the level of the ancient Græco-Roman world.

Yet we are not asserting revelation as a foreign authority, or insisting that the naturalists, or physicists, are in their own departments to bow to the *dicta* of the metaphysicians. We would impose no fetters on reason, no trammels on science; for the assertion of revelation as a trammel on reason, or philosophy as a restraint on science, would be to assert that very separation we complain of, that very divorce of religion and civilization which Bacon and Descartes so successfully inaugurated, and from which all modern society now suffers. What we assert is the synthesis of religion and civilization, of revelation and science, of faith and reason. The human mind operates in all, and operates freely, according to its own intrinsic laws. Faith does not restrain reason in matters of science; does not say to it, Thus far, but no further; but bids it use all the light it has, and aids it to go further than by its own light it could go. We are not contending that reason should cease to be reason, or that reason should close her eyes, fold her hands, and fetter her feet, but that she keep both of her eyes open, and use both of her hands, and both of her feet. We do not wish her to extinguish her own light and envelop herself in darkness, in order to see by the light of revelation. If to attain to true science reason needs immediate intuition of principles and the supernatural revelation of the superintelligible, it is rea-

son that receives and uses them. In the field of science as distinguished from that of faith, revelation is adjutative rather than imperative. Its light and that of reason coalesce and shine as one light. The naturalist studies man, for instance, as an animal, and can give no scientific account of him, and is at a loss how or where to class him, whether in a distinct order of animals by himself, or in the family of baboons. This must be so, because man is not a pure animal, and cannot be classed as such. We know from revelation that he is composed of body and soul, or body and spirit, and that the animal in him is the animal transformed. The animal when separated from the soul or spirit is not a living, but a dead animal. Take this fact from revelation, not as a dogma, unless you please, but as a theorem, and you will find all the facts you can observe in the case harmonize with it, and tend to confirm it. So universally, in every department of science. The key to the scientific classification and explanation of the phenomena of nature is in the superintelligible, and is furnished only by supernatural revelation.

It is because revelation places the mind in the true position, or gives it the true point of departure, for the study of nature, and enables the naturalists or physicists to pursue their investigations scientifically, according to a rule, not at random, that we so strenuously urge upon Catholics the duty of taking the sciences into their own hands. They and they only can cultivate them scientifically, for they and they only have the revelation of God in its unity and integrity, and occupy a position from which the universe can be seen as it is. At present, the men of science pursue one and the same method, whether in or out of the church, and there is in the minds of Catholics themselves a fatal schism between their faith and their science. Catholics are in the sciences followers of the Baconian method, and forego all the advantages their faith and their superior theological science give them. They follow the lead of non-Catholics, and seldom surpass them, seldom equal them. Hence both in and out of the church the sciences are un-Catholic, and, in fact, anti-Catholic. For this reason the more believing and devout among Catholics either neglect them or declaim against them. But let Catholics themselves study the sciences in the light of their own faith and their higher theology, and conquer by their superior science, the mastery of the scientific world, and they would speedily place the sciences on a scientific

track, and make them friends and allies of religion, never again to be enlisted on the side of its enemies. Our faith is of no use to the sciences even if cultivated by Catholics, if these Catholics pursue in their cultivation a non-Catholic or exclusive method. What we must do is to combine our faith and science, unite, without confounding them in our method, the light of revelation and the light of reason. Were we to do this as did the great Greek and Latin fathers, and as did the more eminent mediæval doctors and professors, we could soon, with the vast body of facts or materials accumulated by modern students and at our disposal, heal the deplorable schism between faith and reason, revelation and science; reunite what should never have been separated, and render civilization really Catholic. We could place the public opinion of the civilized world once more on the side of the church, and our youth would grow up believers, and demand reasons for *not* believing instead as now of demanding reasons *for* believing. This is an end worthy of the noblest and most earnest efforts of Catholics. Let them not, we pray them, lose sight of it.

FAITH AND THE SCIENCES.

[From the Catholic World for December, 1867.]

In the last half of the seventeenth century and the first half of the eighteenth, the so-called free-thinkers defended their rejection of the Christian mysteries on the alleged ground that the mathematicians had exploded them. Thus Dr. Garth, in his last illness, resisted the efforts of Addison to persuade him to die as a Christian, by saying, "Surely, Mr. Addison, I have good reason not to believe those trifles, since my friend Dr. Halley, who has dealt much in demonstration, has assured me that the doctrines of Christianity are incomprehensible, and the religion itself an imposture."

In this assurance of Dr. Halley, we see a trace of Cartesianism which places certainty in clearness of ideas, and assumes that what is incomprehensible, or what cannot be clearly apprehended by the mind, is false; as if the human mind were the measure of the true, and as if there were

not truths too large for it to comprehend! But since Berkeley, the Protestant Bishop of Cloyne, exposed in his *Analyst*, and Letters in its defence, the confused and false reasoning of mathematicians, especially in fluxions or the differential calculus, in which, though their conclusions are true, they are not obtained from their premises, the free-thinkers have abandoned the authority of mathematicians, and now seek to justify their infidelity by that of the so-called physicists. They appeal now to the natural sciences, chiefly to geology, zoölogy, and philology, and tell us that the progress made in these sciences has destroyed the authority of the Holy Scriptures and exploded the Christian dogmas. Geology, we are told, has disproved the chronology of the Bible, zoölogy has disproved the dogma of creation, and ethnology and philology have disproved the unity of the species; consequently the dogma of original sin, and all the dogmas that presuppose it. Hence our scientific chiefs, whom the age delights to honor, look down on us, poor, benighted Christian believers, with deep pity or supreme contempt, and despatch our faith by pronouncing the word "credulity" or "superstition" with an air that anticipates or admits no contradiction. It is true, here and there a man, not without scientific distinction, utters a feeble protest, and timidly attempts to show that there is no discrepancy between the Christian faith and the facts really discovered and classified by the sciences; but there is no denying that the predominant tendency of the modern scientific world is decidedly unchristian, even when not decidedly anti-christian.

The most learned men and profoundest thinkers of our age, as of every age, are no doubt, believers, sincere and earnest Christians; but they are not the men who represent the age, and give tone to its literature and science. They are not the *popular* men of their times, and their voice is drowned in the din of the multitude. There is nothing novel or *sensational* in what they have to tell us, and there is no evidence of originality or independence of thought or character in following them. In following them we have no opportunity of separating ourselves from the past, breaking with tradition, and boldly defying both heaven and earth. There is no chance for war against authority, of creating a revolution, or enjoying the excitement of a battle; so the multitude of little men go not with them. And they who would deem it gross intellectual weakness to

rely on the authority of St. Paul, or even of our Lord himself, have followed blindly and with full confidence an Agassiz, a Huxley, a Lyell, or any other second or third-rate physicist, who is understood to defend theories that undermine the authority of the church and the Bible.

We are not, we frankly confess, learned in the sciences. They have changed so rapidly and so essentially since our younger days, when we did take some pains to master them, that we do not know what they are to-day any more than we do what they will be to-morrow. We have not, in our slowness, been able to keep pace with them, and we only know enough of them now to know that they are continually changing under the very eye of the spectator. But, if we do not know all the achievements of the sciences, we claim to know something of the science of sciences, the science which gives the law to them, and to which they must conform or cease to pretend to have any scientific character. If we know not what they have done, we know something which they have not done.

We said, in our article on the *Cartesian Doubt*,* that the ideal formula does not give us the sciences; but we add now, what it did not comport with our purpose to add then, that, though it does not give them, it gives them their law and controls them. We do not deduce our physics from our metaphysics; but our metaphysics or philosophy gives the law to the inductive or empirical sciences, and prescribes the bounds beyond which they cannot pass without ceasing to be sciences. Knowing the ideal formula, we do not know all the sciences, but we do know what is not and cannot be science.

The ideal formula, being creates existences, which is only the first article of the creed, is indisputable, certain, and the principle alike of all the real and all the knowable, of all existence and of all science. This formula expresses the primitive intuition, and it is given us by God himself in creating us intelligent creatures, because without it our minds cannot exist, and, if it had not been given us in the very constitution of the mind, we never could have obtained it. It is the essential basis of the mind, the necessary condition of all thought, and we cannot even in thought deny it, or think at all without affirming it. This we have heretofore amply shown; and we may add here that no one ever

* Vol. II., p. 374.

thinks without thinking something the contrary of which cannot be thought, as St. Anselm asserts.

As Berkeley says to the mathematicians, "Logic is logic, and the same to whatever subject it is applied." When, therefore, the cultivators of the inductive sciences allege a theory or hypothesis which contradicts in any respect the ideal formula, however firmly persuaded they may be that it is warranted by the facts observed and analyzed, we tell them at once, without any examination of their proofs or reasonings, that their hypothesis is unfounded, and their theory false, because it contradicts the first principle alike of the real and the knowable, and therefore cannot possibly be true. We deny no facts well ascertained to be facts, but no induction from any facts can be of as high authority as the ideal formula, for without it no induction is possible. Hence we have no need to examine details any more than we have to enter into proofs of the innocence or guilt of a man who confesses that he has openly, knowingly, and intentionally violated the law. The case is one in which judgment *a priori* may be safely pronounced. No induction that denies all science and the conditions of science can be scientific.

The ideal formula does not put any one in possession of the sciences, but it enables us to control them. We can entertain no doctrine, even for examination, that denies any one of the three terms of the formula. If existences are denied, there are no facts or materials of science; if the creative act is denied, there are no facts or existences; and finally, if God is denied, the creative act itself is denied. God and creature are all that is or exists, and creatures can exist only by the creative act of God. Do you come and tell me that you are no creature? What are you, then? Between God and creature there is no middle term. If, then, you are not creature, you must be God or nothing. Well, are you God? God, if God at all, is independent, necessary, self-existent, immutable, and eternal being. Are you that, you who depend on other than yourself for every breath you draw, for every motion you make, for every morsel of food you eat, whom the cold chills, the fire burns, the water drenches? No? do you say you are not God? What are you, then, we ask once more? If you are neither God nor creature, then you are nothing. But nothing you are not, for you live, think, speak, and act, and even reason, though not always wisely or well. If something and not

God, then you are creature, and are a living assertion of the ideal formula. Do you deny it, and say there is no God? Then still again, what are you who make the denial? If there is no God, there is no real, necessary, and eternal being—no being at all; if no being, then no existence, for all existence is from being, and if no existence, then what are *you* who deny God? Nothing? Then your denial is nothing, and worth nothing.

It is impossible to deny any one of the three terms of the formula, for every man, though he may believe himself an atheist or a pantheist, is a living assertion of each one of them, and in its real relation to the other two. We have the right, then, to assert the formula as the first principle in science, and oppose it as conclusive against any and every theory that denies creation, and asserts either atheism or pantheism. Do not think to divert attention from the intrinsic fallacy of such a theory by babbling about natural laws. Nature, no doubt, has her laws, according to which, or, if you please, by virtue of which, all natural phenomena or natural effects are produced, and it is the knowledge of these laws that constitutes natural science or the sciences. But these laws, whence come they? Are they superior to nature, or inferior? If inferior, how can they govern her operations? If superior, then they must have their origin in the supernatural, and a reality above nature must be admitted. Nature, then, is not the highest, is not ultimate, is not herself being, or has not her being in herself; is, therefore, contingent existence, and consequently creature, existing only by virtue of the creative act of real and necessary being, which brings us directly back to the ideal formula. God denied, nature and the laws of nature are denied.

The present tendency among naturalists is to deny creation and to assert development—to say with Topsy, in *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, only generalizing her doctrine, "Things didn't come; they *growed*." Things are not created; they are developed by virtue of natural laws. Developed from what? From nothing? *Ex nihilo nihil fit.* From nothing nothing can be developed. A universe self-developed from nothing is somewhat more difficult to comprehend than the creation of the universe from nothing through the word of his power by One able to create and sustain it. You can develop a germ, but you cannot develop where there is nothing to be developed. Then the universe is not developed from nothing: then from something. What is

that something? Whatever you assume it to be, it cannot be something created, for you deny all creation. Then it is eternal, self-existent being, being in itself, therefore being in its plenitude, independent, immutable, complete, perfect in itself, and therefore incapable of development. Development is possible only in that which is imperfect, incomplete, for it is simply the reduction of what in the thing developed is potential to act.

There is great lack of sound philosophy with our modern theorists. They seem not to be aware that the real must precede the possible, and that the possible is only the ability of the real. They assume the contrary, and place possible being before real being. Even Leibnitz says that St. Anselm's argument to prove the existence of God, drawn from the idea of the most perfect being, the contrary of which cannot be thought, is conclusive only on condition that most perfect being is first proved to be possible. Hegel makes the starting-point of all reality and all science to be naked being in the sense in which it and not-being are identical; that is, not real, but possible being, the *abyssus* of the Gnostics, and the *void* of the Buddhists, which Pierre Leroux labors hard, in his *L'Humanité* and in the article *Le Ciel* in his *Encyclopédie Nouvelle*, to prove is not nothing, though conceding it to be not something, as if there could be any medium between something and nothing. In itself, or as abstracted from the real, the possible is sheer nullity; nothing at all. The possibility of the universe is the ability of God to create it. If God were not himself real, no universe would be possible. The possibility of a creature may be understood either in relation to its creability on the part of God, or in relation to its own perfectibility. In relation to God every creature is complete the moment the divine mind has decreed its creation, and, therefore, incapable of development; but, in relation to itself, it has unrealized possibilities which can be only progressively fulfilled. Creatures, in this latter sense, can be developed because there are in them unrealized possibilities or capacities for becoming, by aid of the real, more than they actually are, that is, because they are created, in relation to themselves, not perfect, but perfectible. Hence, creatures, not the Creator, are progressive, or capable, each after its kind, of being progressively developed and completed according to the original design of the Creator.

Aristotle, whom it is the fashion just now to sneer at,

avoided the error of our modern sophists; he did not place the possible before the real, for he knew that without the real there is no possible. The *principium*, or beginning, must be real being, and, therefore, he asserted God, not as possible, but real, most real, and called him *actus purissimus*, most pure act, which excludes all unactualized potentialities or unrealized possibilities, and implies that he is most pure, that is, most perfect being, being in its plenitude. God being eternally being in himself, being in its plenitude, as he must be if self-existent, and self-existent he must be if not created, he is incapable of development, because in him there are no possibilities not reduced to act. The developmentists must, then, either admit the fact of creation, or deny the development they assert and attempt to maintain; for, if there is no creation, nothing distinguishable from the uncreated, nothing exists to be developed, and the uncreated, being either nothing, and therefore incapable of development, or self-existent, eternal, and immutable being, being in its plenitude, and therefore from the very fulness and perfection of its being also incapable of development. If the developmentists had a little philosophy or a little logic, they would see that, so far from being able to substitute development for creation, they must assert creation in order to be able to assert even the possibility of development. Is it on the authority of such sciolists, sophists, and sad blunderers as these developmentists that we are expected to reject the Holy Scriptures, and to abandon our faith in Christianity? We have a profound reverence for the sciences, and for all really scientific men; but really it is too much to expect us to listen, with the slightest respect, to such absurdities as most of our *savants* are in the habit of venting, when they leave their own proper sphere and attempt to enter the domain of philosophy or theology. In the investigation of the laws of nature and the observation and accumulation of facts they are respectable, and often render valuable service to mankind; but, when they undertake to determine by their inductions from facts of a secondary order what is true or false in philosophy or theology, they mistake their vocation and their aptitudes, and, if they do not render themselves ridiculous, it is because their speculations are too gravely injurious to permit us to feel toward them any thing but grief or indignation.

None of the sciences are apodictic; they are all as special sciences empirical, and are simply formed by inductions

from facts observed and classified. To their absolute certainty two things are necessary: First, that the observation of the facts of the natural world should be complete, leaving no class or order of facts unobserved and unanalyzed; and, second, that the inductions from them should be infallible, excluding all error, and all possibility of error. But we say only what every one knows, when we say that neither of these conditions is possible to any mortal man. Even Newton, it is said, compared himself to a child picking up shells on the beach; and after all the explorations that have been made it is but a small part of nature that is known. The inductive method, ignorantly supposed to be an invention of Lord Bacon, but which is as old as the human mind itself, and was always adopted by philosophers in their investigations of nature, is the proper method in the sciences, and all we need to advance them is to follow it honestly and strictly. But, every day, facts not before analyzed or observed come under the observation of the investigator, and force new inductions, which necessarily modify more or less those previously made. Hence it is that the natural sciences are continually undergoing more or less important changes. Certain principles, indeed, remain the same; but set aside, if we must set aside, mathematics and mechanics, there is not a single one of the sciences that is now what it was in the youth of men not yet old. Some of them are almost the creations of yesterday. Take chemistry, electricity, magnetism, geology, zoölogy, biology, physiology, philology, ethnology, to mention no more; they are no longer what they were in our own youth, and the treatises in which we studied them are now obsolete.

It is not likely that these sciences have even as yet reached perfection, that no new facts will be discovered, and no further changes and modifications be called for. We by no means complain of this, and are far from asking that investigation in any field should be arrested, and these sciences remain unchanged, as they now are. No: let the investigations go on, let all be discovered that is discoverable, and the sciences be rendered as complete as possible. But, then, is it not a little presumptuous, illogical even, to set up any one of these incomplete, inchoate sciences against the primitive intuitions of reason or the profound mysteries of the Christian faith? Your inductions to-day militate against the ideal formula and the Christian creed; but how know you that your inductions of to-morrow will not be essentially

modified by a fuller or closer observation of facts? Your conclusions must be certain before we can on their authority reject any received dogma of faith or any alleged dictamen of reason.

We know *a priori* that investigation can disclose no fact or facts that can be incompatible with the ideal formula. No possible induction can overthrow any one of its three terms. It is madness to pretend that from the study of nature one can disprove the reality of necessary and eternal being, the fact of creation, or of contingent existences. The most that any one, not mad, does or can pretend is, that they cannot be proved by way of deduction or induction from facts of the natural world. The atheist Lalande went no further than to say, "I have never seen God at the end of my telescope." Be it so, what then? Because you have never seen God at the end of your telescope, can you logically conclude that there is no God? For ourselves, we do not pretend that God is, or can be asserted, by way of deduction or induction from the facts of nature, though we hold that what he is, even his eternal power and divinity, may be clearly seen from them; but the fact that God cannot be proved in one way to be does not warrant the conclusion that he cannot in some other way be proved, far less that there is no God.

We do not deduce the dogmas of faith from the ideal formula, for that is in the domain of science; but they all accord with it, and presuppose it as the necessary preamble to faith. We have not the same kind of certainty for faith that we have for the scientific formula; but we have a certainty equally high and equally infallible. Consequently, the inductions or theories of naturalists are as impotent against it as against the formula itself. The authority of faith is superior, we say not to science, but to any logical inductions drawn from the facts of the natural world, or theories framed by natural philosophers, and those then, however plausible, can never override it. No doubt the evidences of our faith are drawn in part from history, and therefore from inductive science; but even as to that part the certainty is of the same kind with that of any of the sciences, rests on the analysis of facts and induction from them, and is at the very lowest equal to theirs at the highest.

But let us descend to matters of fact. We will take geology, which seems just now to be regarded as the most formidable weapon against the Christian religion. Well,

what has geology done? It has by its researches proved an antiquity of the earth and of man on the earth which is far greater than is admissible by the chronology of the Holy Scriptures. It has thus disproved the chronology of the Bible; therefore it has disproved the divine inspiration of the Bible, and therefore, again, the truth of the Christian dogmas, which have no other authority than that inspiration. But have you, geologists, really proved what you pretend? You have discovered certain facts, fossils, &c., which, if some half a dozen possible suppositions are true, not one of which you have proved or in the nature of the case can prove, render it highly probable that the earth is somewhat more than six thousand years old, and that it is more than five thousand eight hundred and sixty-seven years since the creation of man. As to the antiquity of man, at least, you have not proved what you pretend. Your proofs, to be worth any thing, must destroy all possible suppositions except the one you adopt, which they do not do, for we can suppose many other explanations of the undisputed facts besides the one you insist on our accepting. Moreover, the facts on which you rely, if fairly given by Sir Charles Lyell in his *Antiquity of Man*, by no means warrant his inductions. Suppose there is no mistake as to facts, which is more than we are willing to concede, especially as to the stone axes and knives, which, according to the drawings given of them, are exactly similar to hundreds which we have seen when a boy strewing the surface of the ground, the logic by which the conclusion is obtained is puerile, and discreditable to any man who has had the slightest intellectual training.

But suppose you have proved the antiquity of the earth and of man on it to be as you pretend, what then? In the first place, you have not proved that the earth and man on it were not created, that God did not in the beginning create the heavens and the earth, and all things therein. You leave, then, intact both the formula and the dogma which presupposes and reasserts it as a truth of revelation as well as of science. But we have disproved the chronology of the Bible. Is it the chronology of the Bible or chronology as arranged by learned men that you have disproved? Say the chronology as it actually is in the Bible, though all learned men know that that chronology is exceedingly difficult if not impossible to make out, and we for ourselves have never been able to settle it at all to our entire satisfaction,

is it certain that the Scriptures themselves even pretend that the date assigned to the creation of the world is given by divine revelation and is to be received as an article of faith? There is an important difference between the chronology given in the Hebrew Bible and that given in the Septuagint used by the apostles and Greek fathers, and still used by the united as well as by the non-united Greeks, and we are not aware that there has ever been an authoritative decision as to which or that either of the two chronologies must be followed. The commonly received chronology certainly ought not to be departed from without strong and urgent reasons; but, if such reasons are adduced, we do not understand that it cannot be departed from without impairing the authority of either the Scriptures or the church. We know no Christian doctrine or dogma that could be affected by carrying the date of the creation of the world a few or even many centuries further back, if we recognize the fact of creation itself. Our faith does not depend on a question of arithmetic, as seems to have been assumed by the Anglican Bishop Colenso. Numbers are easily changed in transcription, and no commentator has yet been able to reconcile all the numbers as we now have them in our Hebrew Bibles, or even in the Greek translation of the Seventy.

Supposing, then, that geologists and historians of civilization have found facts, not to be denied, which seem to require for the existence of the globe, and man on its face, a longer period than is allowed by the commonly received chronology, we do not see that this warrants any induction against any point of Christian faith or doctrine. We could, we confess, more easily explain some of the facts which we meet in the study of history, the political and social changes which have evidently taken place, if more time were allowed us between Noah and Moses than is admitted by Usher's chronology; it would enable us to account for many things which now embarrass our historical science; yet whether we are allowed more time or not, or whether we can account for the historical facts or not, our faith remains the same; for we have long since learned that, in the subjects with which science proposes to deal, as well as in revelation itself, there are many things which will be inexplicable even to the greatest, wisest, and holiest of men, and that the greatest folly which any man can entertain is that of expecting to explain every thing, unless concluding a thing must needs be false because we know not its explanation is a still greater folly. True

science as well as true virtue is modest, humble indeed, and always more depressed by what it sees that it cannot do than elated by what it may have done.

Science, it is further said, has exploded the Christian doctrine of the unity and the Adamic origin of the species, and therefore the doctrines of Original Sin, the Incarnation, the Redemption, indeed the whole of Christianity so far as it is a supernatural system, and not a system of bald and meagre rationalism. Some people perhaps believe it. But science is knowledge, either intuitive or discursive; and who dares say that he *knows* the dogma of the unity of the human species is false, or that all the kindreds and nations of men have *not* sprung from one and the same original pair? The most that can be said is that the sciences have not as yet proved it, and it must be taken, if at all, from revelation.

Take the unity of the species. The naturalists have undoubtedly proved the existence of races or varieties of men, like the Caucasian, the Mongolian, the Malayan, the American, and the African, more or less distinctly marked, and separated from one another by greater or less distances; but have they proved that these several races or varieties are distinct species, or that they could not all have sprung from the same original pair? Physiologists, we are told, detect some structural differences between the negro and the white man. The black differs from the white in the greater length of the spine, in the shape of the head, leg, and foot and heel, in the facial angles, the size and convolutions of the brain. Be it so; but do these differences prove diversity of species, or, at most, only a distinct variety in the same species? May they not all be owing to accidental causes? The type of the physical structure of the African is undeniably the same with that of the Caucasian, and all that can be said is, that in the negro it is less perfectly realized, constituting a difference in degree, indeed, but not in kind.

But before settling the question whether the several races of men belong to one and the same species or not, and have or have not had the same origin, it is necessary to determine the characteristic or *differentia* of man. Naturalists treat man as simply an animal standing at the head of the class or order mammalia, and are therefore obliged to seek his *differentia* or characteristic in his physical structure; but if it be true, as some naturalists tell us, that the same type runs through the physical structure of all animals, unless insects, reptiles, and crustacea form an exception, it is difficult to

find in man's physical structure his *differentia*. The schoolmen generally define man, a rational animal, *animal rationale*, and make the genus animal, and the *differentia* reason. The characteristic of the species, that which constitutes it, is reason or the rational mind, and certainly science can prove nothing to the contrary. Some animals may have a degree of intelligence, but none of them have reason, free will, moral perceptions, or are capable of acting from considerations of right and wrong. We assume, then, that the *differentia* of the species *homo*, or man, is reason, or the rational soul. If our naturalists had understood this, they might have spared the pains they have taken to assimilate man to the brute, and to prove that he is a monkey developed.

This point settled, the question of unity of the species is settled. There may be differences among individuals and races as to the degree of reason, but all have reason in some degree. Reason may be weaker in the African than in the European, whether owing to the lack of cultivation or to other accidental causes, but it is essentially the same in the one as in the other, and there is no difference except in degree; and even as to degree, it is not rare to find negroes that are, in point of reason, far superior to many white men. Negroes, supposed to stand lowest in the scale, have the same moral perception and the same capacity of distinguishing between right and wrong and of acting from free will, that white men have; and if there is any difference, it is simply a difference of degree, not a difference of kind or species.

But conceding the unity of the species, science has, at least, proved that the several races or varieties in the same species could not have all sprung from one and the same original pair. Where has science done this? It can do it only by way of induction from facts scientifically observed and analyzed. What facts has it observed and analyzed that warrant this conclusion against the Adamic origin of all men? There are, as we have just said, no anatomical, physiological, intellectual, or moral facts that warrant such conclusion, and no other facts are possible. Wherever men are found, they all have the essential characteristic of men as distinguished from the mere animal; they all have substantially the same physical structure; all have thought, speech, and reason, and, though some may be inferior to others, nothing proves that all may not have sprung from

the same Adam and Eve. Do you say ethnology cannot trace all the kindreds and nations of men back to a common origin? That is nothing to the purpose; can it say they cannot have had a common origin? But men are found everywhere, and could they have reached from the plains of Shinar continents separated from Asia by a wide expanse of water, and been distributed over America, New Holland, and the remotest islands of the ocean, when they had no ships or were ignorant of navigation? Do you know that they had, in what are to us ante-historical times, no ships and no knowledge of navigation, as we know they have had them both ever since the first dawn of history? No? Then you allege not your *science* against the Christian dogma, but your *ignorance*, which we submit is not sufficient to override faith. You must prove that men could not have been distributed from a common centre as we now find them before you can assert that they could not have had a common origin. Besides, are you able to say what changes of land and water have taken place since men first appeared on the face of the earth? Many changes, geologists assure us, have taken place, and more than they know may have occurred, and have left men where they are now found, and where they may have gone without crossing large bodies of water. So long as any other hypothesis is possible, you cannot assert your own as certain.

But the difference of complexion, language, and usage which we note between the several races of men proves that they could not have sprung from one and the same pair. Do you know they could not? Know it? No; not absolutely, perhaps; but how can you prove they could and have? That is not the question. Christianity is in possession, and must be held to be rightfully in possession till real science shows the contrary. I may not be able to explain the origin of the differences noted in accordance with the assertion of the common origin of all men in a single primitive pair; but my ignorance can avail you no more than your own. My nescience is not your science. Your business is by science to disprove faith; if your science does not do that, it does nothing, and you are silenced. We do not pretend to be able to account for the differences of the several races, any more than we pretend to be able to account for the well-known fact that children born of the same parents have different facial angles, different sized brains, different shaped mouths and noses, different temperaments,

different intellectual powers, and different moral tendencies. We may have conjectures on the subject, but conjectures are not science. If necessary to the argument, we might, perhaps, suggest a not improbable hypothesis for explaining the difference of complexion between the white and the colored races. The colored races, the yellow, the olive, the red, the copper-colored, and the black, are inferior to the Caucasian, have departed further from the norma of the species, and approached nearer to the animal, and therefore, like animals, have become more or less subject to the action of the elements. External nature, acting for ages on a race, enfeebled by over-civilization and refinement, and therefore having in a great measure lost the moral and intellectual power of resisting the elemental action of nature, may, perhaps, sufficiently explain the differences we note in the complexion of the several races. If the Europeans and their American descendants were to lose all tradition of the Christain religion, as they are rapidly doing, and to take up with spiritism or some other degrading superstition, as they seem disposed to do, and to devote themselves solely to the luxuries and refinements of the material civilization of which they are now so proud, and boast so much, it is by no means improbable that in time they would become as dark, as deformed, as imbecile as the despised African or the native New Hollander. We might give very plausible reasons for regarding the negro as the degraded remnant of a once over-civilized and corrupted race; and perhaps, if recovered, Christianized, civilized, and restored to communication with the great central current of human life, he may in time lose his negro hue and features, and become once more a white man, a Caucasian. But be this as it may, we rest, as is our right, on the fact that the unity of the human species and its Adamic origin are in possession, and it is for those who deny either point to make good their denial.

But the Scriptures say mankind were originally of one speech, and we find that every species of animals has its peculiar song or cry, which is the same in every individual of the same species; yet this is not the case with the different kindred and nations of men; they speak different tongues, which the philologist is utterly unable to refer to a common original. Therefore there cannot be in men unity of species, and the assertion of the Scriptures of all being of one speech is untrue. If the song of the same species of birds or the cry of the same species of animals is the same in all the individuals of that

species, it still requires no very nice ear to distinguish the song or the cry of one individual from that of another; and therefore the analogy relied on, even if admissible, which it is not, would not sustain the conclusion. Conceding, if you insist on it, that unity of species demands unity of speech, the facts adduced warrant no conclusion against the Scriptural assertion; for the language of all men is even now one and the same, and all really have one and the same speech. Take the elements of language as the sensible sign by which men communicate with one another, and there is even now, at least as far as known or conceivable, only one language. The essential elements of all dialects are the same. You have in all the subject, the predicate, and the copula, or the noun, adjective, and verb, to which all the other parts of speech are reducible. Hence the philologist speaks of universal grammar, and constructs a grammar applicable alike to all dialects. Some philologists also contend that the signs adopted by all dialects are radically the same, and that the differences encountered are only accidental. This has been actually proved in the case of what are called the Aryan or Indo-European dialects. That the Sanskrit, the Pehlvi or old Persic, the Keltic, the Teutonic, the Slavonic, the Greek, and the Latin, from which are derived the modern dialects of Europe, as Italian, French, Spanish, Portuguese, English, Dutch, German, Scanian, Turk, Polish, Russian, Welsh, Gaelic, and Irish, all except the Basque and Lettish or Finnish, have had a common origin, no philologist doubts. That the group of dialects called Semitic, including the Hebrew, Chaldaic, Syriac, Coptic, and Ethiopic, have an origin identical with that of the Aryan group is, we believe, now hardly denied. All that can be said is, that philologists have not proved it, nor the same fact with regard to the so-called Turanian group, as the Chinese, the Turkish, the Basque, the Lettish or Finnish, the Tataric or Mongolian, &c., the dialects of the aboriginal tribes or nations of America and of Africa. But what conclusion is to be drawn from the fact that philology, a science confessedly in its infancy, and hardly a science at all, has not as yet established an identity of origin with these for the most part barbarous dialects? From the fact that philology has not ascertained it, we cannot conclude that the identity does not exist, or even that philology may not one day discover and establish it.

Philology may have also proceeded on false assumptions, which have retarded its progress and led it to false conclu-

sions. It has proceeded on the assumption that the savage is the primitive man, and that his agglutinated dialect represents a primitive state of language instead of a degenerate state. A broader view of history and a juster induction from its facts would, perhaps, upset this assumption. The savage is the degenerate, not the primeval man; man in his second childhood, not in his first; and hence the reason why he has no growth, no inherent progressive power, and why, as Niebuhr asserts, there is no instance on record of a savage people having by its own indigenous efforts passed from the savage to the civilized state. The thing is as impossible as for the old man, decrepit by age, to renew the vigor and elasticity of his youth or early manhood. Instead of studying the dialects of savage tribes to obtain specimens of the primitive forms of speech, philologists should study them only to obtain specimens of worn-out or used up forms, or of language in its dotage. In all the savage dialects that we have any knowledge of, we detect or seem to detect traces of a culture, a civilization, of which they who now speak them have lost all memory and are no longer capable. This seems to us to bear witness to a fall, a loss. Perhaps, when the American and African dialects are better known, and are studied with reference to this view of the savage state, and we have better ascertained the influence of climate and habits of life on the organs of speech and therefore on pronunciation, especially of the consonants, we shall be able to discover indications of an identity of origin where now we can detect only traces of diversity. As long as philology has only partially explored the field of observation, it is idle to pretend that *science* has established any thing against the scriptural doctrine of the unity of speech. The fact that philologists have not traced all the various dialects now spoken or extinct to a common original amounts to nothing against faith, unless it can be proved that no such original ever existed. It may have been lost and only the distinctions retained.

Naturalists point to the various species of plants and animals distributed over the whole surface of the globe, and ask us if we mean to say that each of these has also sprung from one original pair, or male and female, and if we maintain that the primogenitors of each species of animal were in the garden of Eden with Adam and Eve, or in the Ark with Noah. If so, how have they become distributed over the several continents of the earth and the islands of the

ocean? *Argumentum a specie ad speciem non valet*, as say the books on logic. And even if it were proved that in case of plants and animals God duplicates, triplicates, or quadriplicates the parents by direct creation, or that he creates anew the pair in each remote locality where the same species is found, as prominent naturalists maintain or are inclined to maintain, it would prove nothing in the case of man. For we cannot reason from animals to man, or from flora to fauna. Nearly all the arguments adduced from so-called science against the faith are drawn from supposed analogies of men and animals, and rest for their validity on the assumption that man is not only generically, but specifically, an animal, which is simply a begging the question.

Species again, it is said, may be developed by way of selection, as the florist proves in regard to flowers, and the shepherd or herdsman in regard to sheep and cattle. That new varieties in the lower orders of creation may be attained by some sort of development is not denied, but as yet it is not proved that any new species is ever so obtained. Moreover, facts would seem to establish that, at least in the case of domestic animals, horses, cattle, and sheep, the new varieties do not become species and are not self-perpetuating. Experiments in what is called crossing the breed have proved that, unless the crossing is frequently renewed, the variety in a very few generations runs out. There is a perpetual tendency of each original type to gain the ascendency, and of the stronger to eliminate the others. Cattle-breeders now do not rely on crossing, but seek to improve their stock by selecting the best breed they know, and improving it by improved care and nourishment. The different varieties of men may be, perhaps, improved in their physique by selection, as was attempted in the institutions of Lycurgus; but, as the moral and intellectual nature predominates in man and is his characteristic, all conclusions as to him drawn from the lower orders of creation, even in his physical constitution, are suspicious and always to be accepted with extreme caution. The church has defined what no physiologist has disproved, that *anima est forma corporis*. The soul is the informing or vital principle of the body, which modifies all its actions, and enables it to resist, at least to some extent, the chemical and other natural laws which act on animals, plants, and unorganized matter. The physiological and medical theories based on chemistry, which were for a time in vogue and are not yet wholly abandoned,

contain at best only a modicum of truth, and can never be safely followed, for in the life of man there is at work a subtiler power than a chemical or any other physical agent.

We do not deny that man is through his body related to the material world, or that many of the laws of that world, mineral, vegetable, and animal, are in some degree applicable to him; but, as far as science has yet proceeded, they are so only with many limitations and modifications which the physician—we use the word in its etymological as well as in its conventional sense—can seldom determine. The *morale* every physician knows has an immense power over the *physique*. The higher the morale, the greater the power of the physical system to resist physical laws, to endure fatigue, to bear up against and even to throw off disease. Physical disease is often generated by moral depression, and not seldom thrown off by moral exhilaration. What is called strength of will at times seems not only to subject disease to its control, but to hold death itself at bay. In armies the officer, with more care, more labor, more hardship, and less food and sleep, will survive the common soldier, vastly his superior as to his mere physical constitution. These facts and innumerable others like them justify a strong protest against the too common practice of applying to man without any reservation the laws which we observe in the lower orders of creation, and arguing from what is true of them what must be true of him. Tear off the claw of a lobster, and a new one will be pushed out; cut the polypus in pieces, and each piece becomes a perfect polypus, at least so we are told, for we have not ourselves made or seen the experiment. But nothing of the sort is true of man, nor even of the higher classes of animals in which organic life is more complex. We place little confidence in conclusions drawn from the assumed analogies between man and animals, and even the developments of species in them by selection or otherwise, if proved, would not prove to us the possibility of a like development in him. We must see a monkey by development grow into a man before we can believe it.

But why, even in the case of animals that can be propagated only by the union of male and female, we should suppose the necessity of duplicating the parents of the species is more than we are able to understand. The individuals of the species could go where man could go. Suppose we find a species of fish in a North American lake, and the same species in a European or Asiatic lake which has no

water communication with it, can you say the two lakes have never been in communication, you who claim that the earth has existed for millions of ages? Much of what is now land was once covered with water, and much now covered with water it is probable was once land inhabited by plants, animals, and men. Facts even indicate that the part of the earth now under the Arctic and Antarctic circles once lay nearer to the Equator, if not under it, and that what are now mountains were once islands dotting the surface of the ocean. No inductions which exclude these probabilities or indications are scientific, or can be accepted as conclusive.

Take, then, all the facts on which the naturalists support their hypotheses, they establish nothing against faith. The facts really established either favor faith or are perfectly compatible with it; and if any are alleged that seem to militate against it, they are either not proved to be facts, or their true character is not fully ascertained, and no conclusion from them can be taken as really scientific. We do not pretend that the natural sciences, as such, tend to establish the truth of revelation, and we think some over-zealous apologists of the faith go further in this respect than they should. The sciences deal with facts and causes of the secondary order; and it is very certain that one may determine the quality of an acorn as food for swine without considering the first cause of the oak that bore it. A man may ascertain the properties of steam and apply it to impel various kinds of machinery, without giving any direct argument in favor of the unity and Adamic origin of the race. The atheist may be a good geometrician; but, if there were no God, there could be neither geometry nor an atheist to study it. All we contend is, that the facts with which science deals are none of them shown to contradict faith or to warrant any conclusions incompatible with it.

Hence it may be assumed that, while the sciences remain in their own order of facts, they neither aid faith nor impugn it, for faith deals with a higher order of facts, and moves in a superior plane. The order of facts with which the sciences deal no doubt depends on the order revealed by faith; and no doubt the particular sciences should be connected with science or the explanation and application of the ideal formula or first principles, what we call philosophy, as this formula in turn is connected with the faith; but it does not lie within the province of the particular sciences as such to show this dependence or this connection, and our *savants*

invariably blunder whenever they attempt to do it, or to rise from the special to the general, the particular to the universal, or from the sciences to faith. Here is where they err. What they allege that transcends the particular order of facts with which the sciences deal is only theory, hypothesis, conjecture, imagination, or fancy, and has not the slightest scientific value, and can warrant no conclusions either for or against faith. There is no logical ascent from the particular to the universal, unless there has been first a descent from the universal to the particular. Jacob saw, on the ladder reaching from heaven to earth, the angels of God descending and ascending, not ascending and descending. There must be a descent from the highest to the lowest before there can be an ascent from the lowest to the highest. God becomes man that man may become God. The sciences all deal with particulars and cannot of themselves rise above particulars, and from them universal science is not obtainable.

He who starts from revelation, which includes the principles of universal science, can, no doubt, find all nature harmonizing with faith, and all the sciences bearing witness to its truth, for he has the key to their real and higher sense; but he who starts with the particular only can never rise above the particular, and hence he finds in the particulars, or the nature to which he is restricted, no immaterial and immortal soul, and no God, creator, and upholder of the universe. His generalizations are only classifications of facts, with no intuition of their relation to an order above themselves; his universal is the particular, and he sees in the plane of his vision no steps by which to ascend to science, far less to faith. Saint-Simon and Auguste Comte both understood well the necessity of subordinating all the sciences to a general principle or law, and of integrating them in a universal science; but starting with the special sciences themselves, they could never attain to a universal science, or a science that accepted, generalized, and explained them all, and hence each ended in atheism, or, what is the same thing, the divinization of humanity. The positivists really recognize only particulars, and only particulars in the material order, the only order the sciences, distinguished from philosophy and revelation, do or can deal with. Alexander von Humboldt had, probably, no superior in the sciences, and he has given their *résumé* in his *Cosmos*; but, if we recollect aright, the word God does not once appear in that work, and yet, except when he ventures to theorize beyond the order of facts on which

the sciences immediately rest, there is little in that work that an orthodox Christian need deny. Herbert Spencer, really a man of ability, who disclaims being a follower of Auguste Comte or a positivist, excludes from the *knowable*, principles and causes, all except sensible phenomena; and although wrong in view of a higher philosophy than can be obtained by induction from the sensible or particular facts, yet he is not wrong in contending that the sciences cannot of themselves rise above the particular and the phenomenal.

Hence we do not agree with those Christian apologists who tell us that the tendency of the sciences is to corroborate the doctrines of revelation. They no more tend of themselves to corroborate revelation than they do to impair it. They who press them into the cause of infidelity, and hence conclude that science explodes faith, mistake their reach, for we can no more conclude from them against faith than we can in favor of faith. The fact is, the sciences are not science, and lie quite below the sphere of both science and faith. When arrayed against either, their authority is null. Hence we conclude, *a priori*, against them when they presume to impugn the principles of science as expressed in the ideal formula, or against faith which is, considered in itself objectively, no less certain than the formula itself; and we have shown, *a posteriori*, by descending to the particulars, that the sciences present no facts that impugn revelation or contradict the teachings of faith. The conclusions of the *savants* against the Christian dogmas are no logical deductions or inductions from any facts or particulars in their possession, and therefore, however they may carry away sciolists, or the half-learned, or little minds, greedy of novelties, they are really of no scientific account.

All that faith demands of the sciences as such is their silence. She does not demand their support, she only demands that they keep in their own order, that the cobbler should stick to his last, *ne sutor ultra crepidam*. Faith herself is in the supernatural order, and proceeds from the same source as nature herself; it presupposes science indeed, and elevates and confirms it, but no more depends upon it than the creator depends on the creature. The highest science needs faith to complete it, and in all probability never could have been attained to without revelation; but neither science nor the sciences, however they may need revelation, could ever, without revelation, have risen to the conception of a divine and supernatural revelation. It is idle, then, to suppose that

without revelation we could find by the sciences the demonstration or evidence of revelation. Lalande was right when he said he had never seen God at the end of his telescope, and his assertion should weigh with all natural theologians, so-called, who attempt to prove the existence of God by way of induction from the facts which naturalists observe and analyze; but he was wrong and grossly illogical when he concluded from that fact, with the fool of the Bible, there is no God, as wrong as those chemists are who conclude against the real presence in holy eucharist, because by their profane analysis of the consecrated host they find in it the properties of bread. The most searching chemical analysis cannot go beyond the visible or sensible properties of the subject analyzed, and the sensible properties of the bread and wine nobody pretends are changed in transubstantiation. None of the revealed dogmas are either provable or disprovable by any empirical science, for they all lie in the supernatural order, above the reach of natural science, and while they control all the empirical sciences they can be controlled by none.

But when we have revelation and with it, consciously or unconsciously, the ideal formula, which gives us the principles of all science and of all things, and descend from the higher to the lower, the case is essentially different. We then find all the sciences so far as based on facts, and all the observable facts or phenomena of nature, moral, intellectual, or physical, both illustrating and confirming the truths of revelation and the mysteries of faith. We then approach nature from the point of view of the Creator, read nature by the divine light of revelation, and study it from above, not from below; we then follow the real order of things, proceed from principles to facts, from the cause to the effect, from the universal to the particular, and are, after having thus descended from heaven to earth, able to reascend from earth to heaven. In this way we can see all nature joining in one to show forth the being and glory of God, and to hymn his praise. This method of studying nature from high to low by the light of first principles and of divine revelation enables us to press all the sciences into the service of faith, to unite them in a common principle, and do what the Saint-Simonians and positivists cannot do, integrate them in a general or universal science, bring the whole intellectual life of man, as we showed in our article on Rome or Reason, into unison with faith and the real life and order of things, leaving to rend our bosoms only that moral struggle symbolized by Rome

and the World, of which we have heretofore treated at length.*

But this can never be done by induction from the facts observed and analyzed by the several empirical or inductive sciences. We think we have shown that the pretension, that these sciences have set aside any of the doctrines of Christianity, or impaired the faith, except in feeble and uninstructed minds, is unfounded; we think we have also shown that they not only have not, but cannot do it, because they lie in a region too low to establish any thing against revelation. Yet as the sciences are insufficient, while restricted to their proper sphere, to satisfy the demand of reason for apodictic principles, for unity and universality, there is a perpetual tendency in the men devoted exclusively to their culture to draw from them conclusions which are unwarranted, illogical, and antagonistic both to philosophy and to faith. Against this tendency, perhaps never more strongly manifested than at this moment, there is in natural science alone no sufficient safeguard, and consequently we need the supernatural light of revelation to protect both faith and science itself. With the loss of the light of revelation we lose, in fact, the ideal formula, or the light of philosophy; and with the light of philosophy, we lose both science and the sciences, and retain only dry facts which signify nothing, or baseless theories and wild conjectures, which, when substituted for real science, are far worse than nothing.

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* Vol. III., pp. 298 and 324.

PROFESSOR DRAPER'S BOOKS.*

[From the Catholic World for May, 1868.]

PROFESSOR DRAPER'S works have had, and are having, a very rapid sale, and are evidently very highly esteemed by that class of readers who take an interest, without being very profoundly versed, in the grave subjects which he treats. He is, we believe, a good chemist and a respectable physiologist. His work on Human Physiology, we have been assured by those whose judgment in such matters we prefer to our own, is a work of real merit, and was, when first published, up to the level of the science to which it is devoted. We read it with care on its first appearance, and the impression it left on our mind was, that the author yields too much to the theory of chemical action in physiology, and does not remember that man is the union of soul and body, and that the soul modifies, even in the body, the action of the natural laws; or rather, that the physiological laws of brute matter, or even of animals, cannot be applied to man without many important reserves. The professor, indeed, recognizes, or says he recognizes, in man a rational soul, or an immaterial principle; but the recognition seems to be only a verbal concession, made to the prejudices of those who have some lingering belief in Christianity, for we find no use for it in his physiology. All the physiological phenomena he dwells on he explains without it, that is, as far as he explains them at all. Whatever his personal belief may be, his doctrine is as purely materialistic as is Mr. Herbert Spencer's, which explains all the phenomena of life by the mechanical, chemical, and electrical changes and combinations of matter.

It is due to Professor Draper to say, that in this respect he only sins in common with the great body of modern physiologists. Physiology—indeed, all the inductive sciences—

*1. *Human Physiology, Statical and Dynamical; or, Conditions and Course of the Life of Man.* By J. W. DRAPER, M. D., LL. D., Professor of Chemistry and Physiology in the University of New York. New York: 1856. 2. *History of the Intellectual Development of Europe.* By the same. Fifth edition. 1867. 3. *Thoughts on the Civil Policy of America.* By the same. Third edition. 1867. 4. *History of the American Civil War.* By the same. In three volumes. Vol. I. 1867.

have been for a long time cast in a materialistic mould, and men of firm faith, and sincere and ardent piety, are materialists, and, therefore, atheists, the moment they enter the field of physical science, and deny in their science what they resolutely affirm and would die for in their faith. Hence the quarrel between the theologians and the *savants*. The *savants* have not reconciled their so-called science with the great theological truths, whether of reason or revelation, which only the fool doubts, or in his heart denies. This proves that our physicists have made far less progress in the sciences than they are in the habit of boasting. That cannot be true in physiology which is false in theology; and a physiology that denies all reality but matter, or finds no place in it for God and the human soul, is no true physiological science. The physiologist has far less evidence of the existence of matter than we have of the existence of spirit; and it is only by spirit that the material is apprehensible, or can be shown to exist. Matter only mimics or imitates spirit.

The continual changes that take place from time to time in physiology show—we say it with all deference to physiologists—that it has not risen as yet to the dignity of a science. It is of no use to speak of progress, for changes which transform the whole body of a pretended science are not progress. We may not have mastered all the facts of a science; we may be discovering new facts every day; but if we have, for instance, the true physiological science, the discovery of new facts may throw new light on the science—may enable us to see clearer its reach, and understand better its application, but cannot change or modify its principles. As long as your pretended science is liable to be changed in its principles, it is a theory, an hypothesis, not a science. Physiologists have accumulated a large stock of physiological facts, to which they are daily adding new facts. We willingly admit these facts are not useless, and the time spent in collecting them is not wasted; on the contrary, we hold them to be valuable, and appreciate very highly the labor, the patient research, and the nice observation that has collected, classified, and described them; but we dare assert, notwithstanding, that the science of physiology is yet to be created; and created it will not be till physiologists have learned and are able to set forth the dialectic relations of spirit and matter, soul and body, God and nature, free-will and necessity. Till then there may be known facts, but there will be no physiological

science. As far as what is called the science of human life, or human physiology, goes, Professor Draper's work is an able and commendable work; but he must permit us to say that the real science of physiology he has not touched, has not dreamed of; nor have any of his brethren who see in the human soul only a useless appendage to the body. The soul is the *forma corporis*, its informing, its vital principle, and pervades, so to speak, and determines, or modifies, the whole life and action of the human body, from the first instant of conception to the very moment of death. The human body does not exist, even in its embryonic state, first as a vegetable, then as an animal, and afterward as united to an immaterial soul. It is body united to soul from the first instant of conception, and man lives, in any stage of his existence, but one and the same human life. There is no moment after conception when the wilful destruction of the fœtus is not the murder of a human life.

Man, though the ancients called him a microcosm, the universe in little, and he contains in himself all the elements of nature, is neither a mineral nor a vegetable, nor simply an animal, and the analogies which the physiologist detects between him and the kingdoms below him, form no scientific basis of human physiology, for like is not same. There may be no difference that the microscope or the crucible can detect between the blood of an ox and the blood of a man; for the microscope and chemical tests are in both cases applied to the dead subject, not the living, and the human blood tested is withdrawn from the living action of the soul, an action that escapes the most powerful microscope, and the most subtile chemical agent. Comparative physiology may gratify the curiosity, and, when not pressed beyond its legitimate bounds, it may even be useful, and help us to a better understanding of our own bodies; but it can never be the basis of a scientific induction, because between man and all animals there is the difference of species. Comparative physiology is, therefore, unlike comparative philology; for, however diverse may be the dialects compared, there is no difference of species among them, and nothing hinders philological inductions from possessing, in the secondary order, a true scientific character. Physiological inductions, resting on the comparative study of different individuals, or different races or families of men, may also be truly scientific; for all these individuals, and all these races or families belong to one and the same species. But the comparative

physiology that compares men and animals, gives only analogies, not science.

We do not undervalue science; on the contrary, what we complain of is, that our physiologists do not give us science; they give us facts, theories, or hypotheses. Facts are not science till referred to the principles that explain them, and these principles themselves are not science till integrated in the principles of that high and universal science called theology, and which is really the science of the sciences. The men who pass for *savants*, and are the hierophants and lawgivers of the age, sin not by their science, but by their want of science. Their ideal of science is too low and grovelling. Science is vastly more than they conceive it; is higher, deeper, broader than they look; and the best of them are, as Newton said of himself, mere boys picking up shells on the shores of the great ocean of truth. They, at best, remain in the vestibule of the temple of science; they have not entered the penetralia and knelt before the altar. We find no fault with Professor Draper's science, where science he has; we only complain of him for attempting to palm off upon us his ignorance for science, and accepting, and laboring to make us accept as science what is really no science. Yet he is not worse than others of his class.

The second work named in our list is the professor's attempt to extend the principles of his human physiology to the human race at large, and to apply them specially to the intellectual development of Europe; the third is an attempt to apply them to the civil policy of America, and the fourth is an attempt to get a counter-proof of his theories in the history of our late civil war. Through the four works we detect one and the same purpose, one and the same doctrine, of which the principle *data* are presented in his work on human physiology, which is cast in a purely materialistic mould. They are all written to show that all philosophy, all religion, all morality, and all history are to be physiologically explained, that is, by fixed, inflexible, and irreversible natural laws. He admits, in words, that man has free-will, but denies that it influences events or any thing in the life and conduct of men. He also admits, and claims credit for admitting, a Supreme Being, as if there could be subordinate beings, or any being but one who declares himself I AM THAT AM; but a living and ever-present God, Creator, and upholder of the universe, finds no recognition in his physiological system. His God, like the gods of the old Epicure-

ans, has nothing to do, but, as the witty author of the *Ointment for the Bite of the Black Serpent*, happily expresses it, to "sleep all night and to doze all day." He is a superfluity in science, like the immaterial soul in the author's *Human Physiology*. All things, in Professor Draper's system, originate, proceed from, and terminate in, natural development, with a most superb contempt for the *ratio sufficiens* of Leibnitz, and the first and final cause of the theologians and philosophers. The only God his system recognizes is natural law, the law of the generation and death of phenomena, and distinguishable from nature only as the *natura naturans* is distinguishable from the *natura naturata* of Spinoza. His system is, therefore, notwithstanding his concessions to the Christian prejudices which still linger with the unscientific, a system of pure naturalism, and differs in no important respect from the *Religion Positive* of M. Auguste Comte.

The Duke of Argyll, a man well versed in the modern sciences, in his *Reign of Law*, sought, while asserting the universal reign of law, to escape his system of pure naturalism, by defining law to be "will enforcing itself with power," or making what are called the laws of nature the direct action of the divine will. But this asserted activity only for the divine being, therefore denied second causes, and bound not only nature, but the human will fast in fate, or rather, absorbed man and nature in God; for man and nature do and can exist only in so far as active, or in some sense causative. The passive does not exist, and to place all activity in God alone is to deny the creation of active existences or second causes, which is the very essence of pantheism. Professor Draper and the positivists, whom he follows, reverse the shield, and absorb not man and nature in God, but both God and man in nature. John and James are not Peter, but Peter is James and John. There is no real difference between pantheism and atheism; both are absurd, but the absurdity of atheism is more easily detected by the common mind than the absurdity of pantheism. The one loses God by losing unity, and the other by losing diversity, or every thing distinguishable from God. The God of the atheist is not, and the God of the pantheist is as if he were not, and it makes no practical difference whether you say God is all or all is God.

To undertake a critical review of these several works would exceed both our space and our patience, and, more-

over, were a task that does not seem to be called for. Professor Draper, we believe, ranks high among his scientific brethren. He writes in a clear, easy, graceful, and pleasing style, but we have found nothing new or profound in his works. His theories are almost as old as the hills, and even older, if the hills are no older than he pretends. His work on the *Intellectual Development of Europe*, is in substance, taken from the positivists, and the positivist philosophy is only a reproduction, with no scientific advance on that of the old physiologers or hylozoists, as Cudworth calls them. He agrees perfectly with the positivists in the recognition of three ages or epochs, we should rather say stages, in human development; the theological, the metaphysical, and the scientific or positivist. In the theological age, man is in his intellectual infancy, is filled with sentiments of fear and wonder; ignorant of natural causes and effects, of the natural laws themselves, he sees the supernatural in every event that surpasses his understanding or experience, and bows before a God in every natural force superior to his own. It is the age of ignorance, wonder, credulity, and superstition. In the second the intellect has been, to a certain extent, developed, and the gross fetichism of the first age disappears, and men no longer worship the visible apis, but the invisible apis, the spiritual or metaphysical apis; not the bull, but, as the North American Indian says, "the manitou of bulls;" and instead of worshipping the visible objects of the universe, as the sun, moon, and stars, the ocean and rivers, groves and fountains, storms and tempests, as did polytheism in the outset, they worship certain metaphysical abstractions into which they have refined them, and which they finally generalize into one grand abstraction, which they call Zeus, Jupiter, Jehovah, Theos, Deus, or God, and thus assert the Hebrew and Christian monotheism. In the third and last age there is no longer fetichism, polytheism, or monotheism; men no longer divinize nature, or their own abstractions, no longer believe in the supernatural or the metaphysical or any thing supposed to be supramundane, but reject whatever is not sensible, material, positive as the object of positive science.

The professor develops this system with less science than its inventor or reviver, M. Auguste Comte and his European disciples; but as well as he could be expected to do it, in respectable English. He takes it as the basis of his *History of the Intellectual Development of Europe*, and attempts

to reconcile with it all the known and unknown facts of that development. We make no quotations to prove that we state the professor's doctrine correctly, for no one who has read him, with any attention, will question our statement; and, indeed, we might find it difficult to quote passages which clearly and expressly confirm it, for it is a grave complaint against him, as against nearly all writers of his school, that they do not deal in clear and express statements of doctrine. Had Professor Draper put forth what is evidently his doctrine in clear, simple, and distinct propositions, so that his doctrine could at once be seen and understood, his works, instead of going through several editions, and being commended in reviews and journals, as scientific, learned, and profound, would have fallen dead from the press, or been received with a universal burst of public indignation; for they attack every thing dear to the heart of the Christian, the philosopher, and the citizen. Nothing worse is to be found in the old French Encyclopedists, in the *Système de la Nature* of D'Holbach, or in *l'Homme-Plante*, and *l'Homme-Machine* of La Mettrie. His doctrine is nothing in the world but pure materialism and atheism, and we do not believe the American people are as yet prepared to deny either God, or creation and providence. The success of these authors is in their vagueness, in their refusal to reduce their doctrine to distinct propositions, in hinting, rather than stating it, and in pretending to speak always in the name of science, thus: "Science shows this," or "Science shows that;" when, if they knew any thing of the matter, they would know that science does no such thing. Then, how can you accuse Professor Draper of atheism or materialism; for does he not expressly declare his belief, as a man of science, in the existence of the Supreme Being, and in an immaterial and immortal soul? What Dr. Draper believes or disbelieves, is his affair, not ours; we only assert that the doctrine he defends in his professedly scientific books, from beginning to end, is purely physiological, and has no God or soul in it. As a man, Dr. Draper may believe much; as an author, he is a materialist and an atheist, beyond all dispute: if he knows it, little can be said for his honesty; if he does not know it, little can be said for his science, or his competency to write on the intellectual development of Europe, or of any other quarter of the globe.

But to return to the theory the professor borrows from

the positivists. As the professor excludes from his physiology the idea of creation, we cannot easily understand how he determines what is the infancy of the human race, or when the human race was in its infancy. If the race had no beginning, if, like Topsy, "it didn't come, but grow'd," it had no infancy; if it had a beginning, and you assume its earliest stage was that of infancy, then it is necessary to know which stage is the earliest, and what man really was in that stage. Hence, chronology becomes all-important, and, as the author's science rejects all received chronology, and speaks of changes and events which took place millions and millions of ages ago, and of which there remains no record but that chronicled in the rocks, but, as in that record exact dates are not given, chronology, with him, whether of the earth or of man, must be very uncertain, and it seems to us that it must be very difficult for science to determine, with much precision, when the race was, or what it was, in its infancy. Thus he says:

"In the intellectual infancy of the savage state, man transfers to nature his conceptions of himself, and, considering that every thing he does is determined by his own pleasure, regards all passing events as depending on the arbitrary volition of a superior but invisible power. He gives to the world a constitution like his own. The tendency is *necessarily* to superstition. Whatever is strange, or powerful, or vast, impresses his imagination with dread. Such objects are only the outward manifestations of an indwelling spirit, and, therefore, worthy of his veneration.' (*Intellect. Devel.* p. 2.)

We beg the professor's pardon, but he has only imperfectly learned his lesson. In this which he regards as the age of fetich worship, and the first stage of human development, he includes ideas and conceptions which belong to the second, or metaphysical age of his masters. But let this pass for the present. The author evidently assumes that the savage state is the intellectual infancy of the race. But how knows he that it is not the intellectual old age and decrepitude of the race? The author, while he holds, or appears to hold, like the positivists, to the continuous progress of the race, does not hold to the continuous progress of any given nation.

"A national type," he says (ch. xi.), "pursues its way physically and intellectually through changes and developments answering to those of the individual represented by infancy, youth, manhood, old age, and death respectively."

How, then, say scientifically that your fetich age, or the age of superstition, the theological age of the positivists, instead of being the infancy of the nation, is not its last stage next preceding death? How determine physiologically or scientifically that the savage is the infant man and not the worn-out man? Then how determine that the superstition of which you have so much to say, and which, with you, means religion, revelation, the church, every thing that claims to be, or that asserts, any thing supernatural, is not characteristic of the last stage of human development, and not of the first?

Our modern physiologists and anti-christian speculators seem all to take it for granted that the savage gives us the type of the primitive man. We refuted this absurd notion in our essay on *Faith and the Sciences*. There are no known historical facts to support it. Consult the record chronicled in the rocks, as read by geologists. What does it prove? Why, in the lowest and most ancient strata in which human remains are found, along with those of extinct species of animals, you find that the men of that epoch used stone implements, and were ignorant of metals or unable to work them, and, therefore, must have been savages. That is, the men who lived then, and in that locality. Be it so. But does this prove that there did not, contemporary with them, in other localities or in other quarters of the globe, live and flourish nations in the full vigor of the manhood of the race, having all the arts and implements of civilized life? Did the savages of New England, when first discovered, understand working in iron, and used they not stone axes, and stone knives, many of which we have ourselves picked up? And was it the same with Europeans? From the rudeness and uncivilized condition of a people in one locality, you can conclude nothing as to the primitive condition of the race.

The infancy of the race, if there is any justice in the analogy assumed, is the age of growth, of progress; but nothing is less progressive, or more strictly stationary, in a moral and intellectual sense, than the savage state. Since history began, there is not only no instance on record of a savage tribe rising by indigenous effort to civilization, but none of a purely savage tribe having ever, even by foreign assistance, become a civilized nation. The Greeks in the earliest historical or semi-historical times, were not savages, and we have no evidence that they ever were. The Homeric poems

were never the product of a savage people, or of a people just emerging from the savage state into civilization, and they are a proof that the Greeks, as a people, had juster ideas of religion, and were less superstitious in the age of Homer than in the age of St. Paul. The Germans are a civilized people, and if they were first revealed to us as what the Greeks and Romans called *barbarians*, they were never, as far as known, savages. We all know how exceedingly difficult it is to civilize our North American Indians. Individuals now and then take up the elements of our civilization, but rarely, if they are of pure Indian blood. They recoil before the advance of civilization. The native Mexicans and Peruvians have, indeed, received some elements of Christian civilization along with the Christian faith and worship; but they were not, on the discovery of this continent, pure savages, but had many of the elements of a civilized people, and that they were of the same race with the savages that roamed our northern forests, is not yet proved. The historical probabilities are not on the side of the hypothesis of the modern progressivists, but are on the side of the contrary doctrine, that the savage state belongs to the old age of the race—is not that from which man rises, but that into which he falls.

Nor is there any historical evidence that superstition is older than religion, that men begin in the counterfeit and proceed to the genuine,—in the false, and proceed by way of development to the true. They do not abuse a thing before having it. Superstition presupposes religion, as falsehood presupposes truth; for falsehood being unable to stand by itself, it is only by the aid of truth that it can be asserted. "Fear made the gods," sings Lucretius; but it can make none where belief in the gods does not already exist. Men may transfer their own sentiments and passions to the divinity; but they must believe that the divinity exists before they can do it. They must believe that God is, before they can hear him in the wind, see him in the sun and stars, or dread him in the storm and the earthquake. It is not from dread of the strange, the powerful, or the vast, that men develop the idea of God, the spiritual, the supernatural; the dread presupposes the presence and activity of the idea. Men, again, who, like the professor's man in the infancy of the savage state, are able to conceive of spirit and to distinguish between the outward manifestation and the indwelling spirit, are not fetich-worshippers, and for them

the fetich is no longer a god, but if retained at all, it is as a sign or symbol of the invisible. Fetichism is the grossest form of superstition, and obtains only among tribes fallen into the grossest ignorance, that lie at the lowest round of the scale of human beings; not among tribes in whom intelligence is commencing, but in whom it is well-nigh extinguished.

Monotheism is older than polytheism, for polytheism, as the author himself seems to hold, grows out of pantheism, and pantheism evidently grows out of theism, out of the loss or perversion of the idea of creation, or of the relation between the creator and the creature, or cause and effect, and is and can be found only among a people who have once believed in one God, creator of heaven and earth and all things visible and invisible. Moreover, the earliest forms of the heathen superstitions are, so far as historical evidence goes, the least gross, the least corrupt. The religion of the early Romans was pure in comparison with what it subsequently became, especially after the Etruscan domination or influence. The Homeric poems show a religion less corrupt than that defended by Aristophanes. The earliest of the Vedas, or sacred books of the Hindoos, are free from the grosser superstitions of the latest, and were written, the author very justly thinks, before those grosser forms were introduced. This is very remarkable, if we are to assume that the grossest forms of superstition are the earliest!

But we have with Greeks, Egyptians, Indians, no books that are of earlier date than the books of Moses, at least none that can be proved to have been written earlier; and in the books of Moses, in whatever light or character we take them, there is shown a religion older than any of the heathen mythologies, and absolutely free from every form of superstition, what is called the patriarchal religion, and which is substantially the Jewish and Christian religion. The earliest notices we have of idolatries and superstitions are taken from these books, the oldest extant, at least none older are known. If these books are regarded as historical documents, then what we Christians hold to be the true religion has obtained with a portion of the race from the creation of man, and, for a long series of years, from the creation to Nimrod, the mighty hunter or conqueror, was the only religion known; and your fetichisms, polytheisms, pantheisms, idolatries, and superstitions, which you note among the heathen, instead of being the religion of the in-

fancy of the race, are, comparatively speaking, only recent innovations. If their authenticity as historical documents be denied, they still, since their antiquity is undeniable, prove the patriarchal religion obtained at an earlier date than it can be proved that any of the heathen mythologies existed. It is certain, then, that the patriarchal, we may say, the Christian religion, is the earliest known religion of the race, and therefore that fetichism, as contended by the positivists and the professor after them, cannot be asserted to have been the religion of the human race in the earliest stage of its existence, nor the germ from which all the various religions or superstitions of the world have been developed.

But we may still go further. The attempt to explain the origin and course of religion by the study of the various heathen mythologies, and idolatries, and superstitions, is as absurd as to attempt to determine the origin and course of the Christian religion by the study of the thousand and one sects that have broken off from the church, and set up to be churches themselves. They can teach us nothing except the gradual deterioration of religious thought, and the development and growth of superstition or irreligion among those separated from the central religious life of the race. In the ancient Indian, Egyptian, and Greek mythologies, on which the author dwells with so much emphasis, we trace no gradual purification of the religious idea, but its continual corruption and debasement. As the sects all presuppose the Christian Church, and could neither exist nor be intelligible without her, so those various heathen mythologies presuppose the patriarchal religion, are unintelligible without it, and could not have originated or existed without it. The professor having studied these mythologies in the darkness of no-religion, understands nothing of them, and finds no sense in them—as little sense as a man ignorant of Catholicity would find in the creeds, confessions, and religious observances of the several Protestant sects; but if he had studied them in the light of the patriarchal religion, which they mutilate, corrupt, or travesty, he might have understood them, and have traced with a steady hand their origin and course, and their relation to the intellectual development of the race.

We have no space to enter at length into the question here suggested. In all the civilized heathen nations, the gods are divided into two classes, the *dii majores* and the *dii*

minores. The *dii majores* are only the result of a false effort to explain the mysterious dogma of the Trinity, and the perversion of the Christian doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son, and the eternal procession of the Holy Ghost. The type from which these mythologies depart, not which they realize, is undeniably the mystery of the Trinity asserted, more or less explicitly, by the patriarchal religion; and hence, we find them all, from the burning South to the frozen North, from the East to the West, from the Old World to the New, asserting in some form, in the Divinity the sacred and mysterious Triad. The *dii minores* are a corruption or perversion of the Catholic doctrine of saints and angels, or that doctrine is the type which has been perverted or corrupted, by substituting heroes for saints, and the angels that fell for the angels that stood, and taking these for gods instead of creatures. The enemies of Christianity have sufficiently proved that the common type of both is given in the patriarchal religion, hoping thereby to get a conclusive argument against Christianity; but they have forgotten to state that, while the one conforms to the type, the other departs from it, perverts or corrupts it, and that the one that conforms is prior in date to the one that corrupts, perverts or departs from it. No man can study the patriarchal religion without seeing at a glance that it is the various forms of heathenism that are the corrupt forms, as no man can study both Catholicity and Protestantism without seeing that Protestantism is the corruption, or perversion—sometimes even the travesty of Catholicity. The same conclusion is warranted alike by Indian and Egyptian gloom and Greek gayety. The gloom speaks for itself. The gayety is that of despair—the gayety that says: "Come, let us eat, drink, and be merry, for to-morrow we die." Through all heathendom you hear the wail, sometimes loud and stormy, sometimes low and melodious, over some great and irreparable loss, over a broken and unrealized ideal, just as you do in the modern sectarian and unbelieving world.

But why is it that the professor and others, when seeking to give the origin and course of religion, as related to the intellectual development of the race, pass by the patriarchal, Jewish or Christian religion, and fasten on the religions or superstitions of the gentiles? It is their art, which consists in adroitly avoiding all direct attacks on the faith of Christendom, and confining themselves, in their dissertations on the natural history of the pagan superstitions, to establishing

principles which alike undermine both them and Christianity. It is evident to every intelligent reader of Professor Draper's *Intellectual Development of Europe*, that he means the principles he asserts shall be applied to Christianity as well as to Indian, Egyptian, Greek, and Roman mythology, and he gives many broad hints to that effect. What then? Is he not giving the history of the intellectual development of Europe? Can one give the history of that development without taking notice of religion? If, in giving the natural history of religion, showing whence and how it originates, what have been its developments, its course, its modifications, changes, decay, and death, by the influence of natural causes, science establishes principles which overthrow all religions, and render preposterous all claims of man to have received a supernatural revelation, to be in communion with the Invisible, or to be under any other providence than that of the fixed, invariable, and irresistible laws of nature, or purely physiological laws, whose fault is it? Would you condemn science, or subordinate it to the needs of a crafty and unscrupulous priesthood, fearful of losing their influence, and having the human mind emancipated from their despotism? That is, you lay down certain false principles, repudiated by reason and common sense, and which all real science rejects with contempt, call these false principles science, and when we protest, you cry out with all your lungs, aided by all the simpletons of the age, that we are hostile to science, would prevent free scientific investigation, restrain free manly thought and would keep the people from getting a glimpse of the truth that would emancipate them, and place them on the same line with the baboon or the gorilla! A wonderful thing, is this modern science; and always places, whatever it asserts or denies, its adepts in the right, as against the theologians and the anointed priests of God!

The mystery is not difficult to explain. The physiologists, of course, are good Sadducees, and really, unless going through a churchyard after dark, or caught in a storm at sea, and in danger of shipwreck, believe in neither angel nor spirit. They wish to reduce all events, all phenomena, intellectual, moral, and religious, to fixed, invariable, inflexible, irreversible, and necessary laws of nature. They exclude in doctrine, if not in words, the supernatural, creation, providence, and all contingency. Every thing in man and in the universe is generated or developed by physiological or natural laws, and follows them in all their variations and changes.

Religion, then, must be a natural production, generated by man, in conjunction with nature, and modified, changed, or destroyed, according to the physical causes to which he is subjected in time and place. This is partially true, or, at least, not manifestly false in all respects of the various pagan superstitions, and many facts may be cited that seem to prove it; but it is manifestly not true of the patriarchal, Jewish, and Christian religion, and the only way to make it appear true, is not to distinguish that religion from the others, to include all religions in one and the same category, and conclude that what they prove to be partially true of a part, is and must be true of the whole. That this is fair or logical, is not a matter that the physiologists, who, where they detect an analogy, conclude identity, trouble themselves at all about; besides, nothing in their view is illogical or unfair that tends to discredit priests and theologians. Very likely, also, such is their disdain or contempt of religion, that they really do not know that there is any radical difference between Christianity and Gentooism. We have never encountered a physiologist, in the sense we use the term here, that is, one who maintains that all in the history of man and the universe proceeds from nature alone, who had much knowledge of Christain theology, or knowledge enough to be aware that in substance it is not identical with the pagan superstitions. Their ignorance of our religion is sublime.

We have thus far proceeded on the supposition that the professor means by the infancy of the savage state the infancy of the race; we are not sure, after all, that this is precisely his thought, or that he means any thing more than the infancy of a particular nation or family of nations is the savage state. He, however, sums up his doctrine in his table of contents, chapter i., of his *Intellectual Development*, in the proposition: "Individual man is an emblem of communities, nations, and universal humanity. They exhibit epochs of life like his, and like him are under the control of physical conditions, and therefore of law;" that is, physical or physiological law, for "human physiology" is only a special department of universal physiology, as we have already indicated. It would seem from this that the author makes the savage state, as we have supposed, correspond, in the race, in universal humanity, as well as in communities, to the epoch of infancy in the individual. But does he mean to teach that the race itself has its epoch of infancy, youth, manhood, old age, and death? He can, perhaps, in a loose sense,

predicate these several epochs of nations and of political or civil communities; but how can he predicate them of all the race? "Individuals die, humanity survives," says Seneca; and are we to understand that the professor means to assert that the race is born like the individual, passes through childhood, youth, manhood, to old age, and then dies? Who knows what he means?

But suppose that he has not settled in his own mind his meaning on this point, as is most likely the case; that he has not asked himself whether man on the earth has a beginning or an end, and that he regards the race as a natural evolution, revolving always in the same circle, and takes, therefore, the infancy he speaks of as the infancy of a nation or a given community. Then his doctrine is, that the earliest stage of every civilized nation or community is the savage state, that the ancestors of the civilized in every age are savages, and that all civilization has been developed under the control of physical conditions from the savage state. The germ of all civilization then must be in the savage, and civilization must then be evolved from the savage as the chicken from the egg, or the egg from the sperm. But of this there is no evidence; for, as we have seen, there is no nation known that has sprung from exclusively savage ancestors, no known instance of a savage people developing, if we may so speak, into a civilized people. The theory rests on no historical or scientific basis, and is perfectly gratuitous. In the savage state we detect reminiscences of a past civilization, not the germs of a future civilization, or if germs—germs that are dead, and that never do or can germinate. There are degrees of civilization; people may be more or less civilized; but we have no evidence, historical or scientific, of a time when there was no civilized people extant. There are civilized nations now, and contemporary with them are various savage tribes, and the same may be said of every epoch since history began. The civilized nations whose origin we know have all sprung from races more or less civilized, never from purely savage tribes. The physiologists overlook history, and mistake the evening twilight for the dawn.

But pass over this. Let us come to the doctrine for which the professor writes his book, namely, individuals, communities, nations, universal humanity, are under the control of physical conditions, therefore of physical law, or law in the sense of the physiologists or the physicists. If this means any

thing, it means that the religion, the morality, the intellectual development, the growth and decay, the littleness and the grandeur of men and nations depend solely on physical causes, not at all on moral causes—a doctrine not true throughout even in human physiology, and supported by no facts, except in a very restricted degree, when applied to nations and communities. In the corporeal phenomena of the individual the soul counts for much, and in morbid physiology the moral often counts for more than the physical; perhaps it always does, for we know from revelation that the morbidity of nature is the penalty or effect of man's transgression. It is proved to be false as applied to nations and communities by the fact that the Christian religion, which is substantially that of the ancient patriarchs, is, at least as far as science can go, older than any of the false religions, has maintained itself the same in all essential respects, unvaried and invariable, in every variety of physical change, and in every diversity of physical condition, and absolutely unaffected by any natural causes whatever.

The chief physical conditions on which the professor relies are climate and geographical position. Yet what we hold to be the true religion, the primitive religion of mankind, has prevailed in all climates, and been found the same in all geographical positions. Nay, even the false pagan religions have varied only in their accidents with climatic and geographical positions. We find them in substance the same in India, Central Asia, on the banks of the Danube, in the heart of Europe, in the ancient Scania, the Northern Isles, in Mexico and Peru. The substance of Greek and Roman or Etrurian mythology is the same with that of India and Egypt. M. Renan tells us that the monotheism so firmly held by the Arabic branch of the Semitic family, is due to the vast deserts over which the Arab tribes wander, which suggests the ideas of unity and universality; and yet for centuries before Mohammed, these same Arabs, wandering over the same deserts, were polytheists and idolaters; and not from contemplating those deserts, but by recalling the primitive tradition of mankind, preserved by Jews and Christians, did the founder of Islamism attain to the monotheism of the Koran. The professor is misled by taking, in the heathen mythology he has studied, the poetic imagery and embellishments, which indeed vary according to the natural aspects, objects, and productions of the locality, for their substance, thought or doctrine. The poetic illustrations, imagery,

and embellishments of Judaism are all oriental; but the Jew in all climates and in all geographical positions holds one and the same religious faith even to this day; and his only real difference from us is, that he is still looking for a Christ to come, while we believe the Christ he is looking for has come, and is the same Jesus of Nazareth who was crucified at Jerusalem, under Pontius Pilate.

We know the author contends that there has been from the beginning a radical difference between the Christianity of the East and that of the West; but we know that such is not and never has been the fact. The great Eastern fathers and theologians are held in as high honor in Western Christendom as they ever were in Eastern Christendom. Nearly all the great councils that defined the dogmas held by the Catholic Church throughout the whole world were held in the East. The Greeks were more speculative and more addicted to philosophical subtilties and refinements than the Latins, and therefore more liable to originate heresies; but nowhere was heresy more vigorously combated, or the one faith of the universal church more ably, more intelligently, or more fervently defended than in the East, before the Emperors and the Bishop of Constantinople drew the Eastern Church, or the larger part of it, into schism. But the united Greek Church, the real Eastern Church, the church of St. Athanasius, of the Basils, and the Gregories, is one in spirit, one in faith, one in communion with the Church of the West.

The author gravely tells us that Christianity had three primitive forms, the Judaical, which has ended; the Gnostic, which has also ended; the African, which still continues. But he has no authority for what he says. Some Jewish observances were retained for a time by Christians of Jewish origin, till the synagogue could be buried with honor; but there never was a Jewish form of Christianity, except among heretics, different from the Christianity still held by the church. There are some phrases in the Gospel of St. John, and in the Epistles of St. Paul that have been thought to be directed against the gnostics; and Clemens of Alexandria writes a work in which he uses the terms *gnosis*, knowledge, and *gnostic*, a man possessing knowledge or spiritual science, in a good sense; but, we suspect, with a design of rescuing these from the bad sense in which they were beginning to be used, as some of our European friends are trying to do with the terms *liberal*

and *liberalist.* Nevertheless, what Clemens defends under these terms is held by Catholics to-day in the same sense in which he defends it. There never was an African form of Christianity distinct from the Christianity either of Europe or Asia. The two great theologians of Africa are St. Cyprian and St Augustine, both probably of Roman, or, at least, of Italian extraction. The doctrine which St. Cyprian is said to have maintained on baptism administered by heretics, the only matter on which he differed from Rome, has never been, and is not now, the doctrine of the church. St. Augustine was converted in Milan, and had St. Ambrose, a Roman, for his master, and differed from the theologians either of the East or the West only in the unmatched ability and science with which he defended the faith common to all. He may have had some peculiar notions on some points, but if so, these have never been received as Catholic doctrine.

The professor might as well assert the distinction, asserted in Germany a few years since, which attracted some attention at the time, but is now forgotten, between the Petrine gospel, the Pauline gospel, and the Johannine gospel, as the distinction of the three primitive forms of Christianity which he asserts. We were told by some learned German, we forget his name, that Peter, Paul, and John represent three different phases or successive forms of Christianity. The Petrine gospel represents religion, based on authority; the Pauline, religion as based on intelligence; and the Johannine, religion as based on love. The first was the so-called Catholic or Roman Church. The reformation made an end of that, and ushered in the Pauline form, or Protestantism, the religion of the intellect. Philosophy, science, Biblical criticism, and exegesis, the growth of liberal ideas, and the development of the sentiments and affections of the heart, have made an end of Protestantism, and are ushering in the Johannine gospel, the religion of love, which is never to be superseded or to pass away. The advocate of this theory had got beyond authority and intelligence. whether he had attained to the religion of love or not; yet the theory was only the revival of the well-known heresy of the Eternal Evangel of the thirteenth century. So hard is it to invent a new heresy. It were a waste of words to attempt to show that this theory has not the slightest foundation in fact. Paul and John assert authority as strenuously as Peter; Peter and John give as free scope to the intellect

as Paul; and Peter and Paul agree with John in regard to love or charity. There is nothing in the Gospel or Epistles of John to surpass the burning love revealed, we might almost say concealed, so unostentatious is it, by the inflamed Epistles of Paul. As for Protestantism, silence best becomes it, when there is speech of intelligence, so remarkable is it for its illogical and unintellectual character. Protestants have their share of native intellect, and the ordinary degree of intelligence on many subjects; but in the science of theology, the basis of all the sciences, and without which there is, and can be, no real science, they have never yet excelled.

Nor did the reformation put an end to the so-called Petrine gospel, the religion of authority, the church founded on Peter, prince of the apostles. It may be that Protestantism is losing what little intellectual character it once had, and developing in a vague philanthropy, a watery sentimentality, or a blind fanaticism, sometimes called Methodism, sometimes Evangelicalism; but Peter still preaches and governs in his successor. The Catholic Church has survived the attacks of the reformation and the later revolution, as she survived the attacks of the persecuting Jews and pagans, and the power and craft of civil tyrants who sought to destroy or to enslave her, and is to-day the only religion that advances by personal conviction and conversion. Mohammedanism can no longer propagate itself even by the sword; the various pagan superstitions have reached their limits, and are recoiling on themselves; and Protestantism has gained no accession of territory or numbers since the death of Luther, except by colonization and the natural increase of the population then Protestant. The Catholic Church is not only a living religion, but the only living religion, the only religion that does, or can, command the homage of science, reason, free thought, and the uncorrupted affections of the heart. The Catholic religion is at once light, freedom, and love—the religion of authority, of the intellect, and of the heart, embracing in its indissoluble unity Peter, Paul, and John.

The professor's work on the intellectual development of Europe proves that religion in some form has constituted a chief element in that development. It always has been, and still is, the chief element in the life of communities and nations, the spring and centre of intellectual activity and progress. Even the works before us revolve around it, or

owe their existence to their relation to it, and would have no intelligible purpose without it. The author has written them to divest religion of its supernatural character, to reduce it to a physiological law, and to prove that it originates in the ignorance of men and nations, and depends solely on physical conditions, chiefly on climate and geographical position. But in this patriarchal, Jewish, Christian religion there is something, and that of no slight influence on the life of individuals and nations, on universal humanity, that flatly contradicts him, that is essentially one and the same from first to last, superior to climate and geographical position, unaffected by natural causes, independent of physical conditions, and in no sense subject to physiological laws. This suffices to refute his theory, and that of the positivists, of whom he is a distinguished disciple; for it proves the uniform presence and activity in the life and development of men and nations, ever since history began, of a power, a being, or cause above nature and independent of nature, and therefore supernatural.

The theory that the rise, growth, decay, and death of nations, depend on physical conditions alone, chiefly on climate and geographical position, seems to us attended with some grave difficulties. Have the climate and geographical positions of India, Persia, Assyria, Egypt, Greece, and Rome, essentially changed from what they were at the epoch of their greatness? Did not all the great and renowned nations of antiquity rise, grow, prosper, decline, and die, in substantially the same physical conditions, under the same climate, and in the same geographical position? Like causes produce like effects. How could the same physical causes cause alike the rise and growth, and the decay and death of one and the same people, in one and the same climate, and in one and the same geographical position? Do you say, climate and even physical geography change with the lapse of time? Be it so. Be it as the author maintains, that formerly there was no variation of climate on this continent, from the equator to either pole; but was there for Rome any appreciable change in the climate and geography from the time of the third Punic war to that of Honorius, or even of Augustulus, the last of the emperors? Or what change in the physical conditions of the nation was there when it was falling from what there was when it was rising?

Nations, like individuals, have, according to the professor,

their infancy, youth, manhood, old age, and death. But why do nations grow old and die? The individual grows old and dies, because his interior physical machinery wears out, and because he must die in order to attain to the end for which he lives. But why should this be the case with nations? They have no future life to which death is the passage. The nation does not rise or fall with the individuals that found it. One generation of individuals passes away, and another comes, but the nation survives; and why, if not destroyed by external violence, should it not continue to survive and thrive to the end of time? There are no physical causes, no known physiological laws, that prevent it. Why was not Rome as able to withstand the barbarians, or to drive them back from her frontiers, in the fourth century, as she was in the first? Why was England so much weaker under the Stuarts than she had been under the Tudors, or was again under the Protector? Or why have we seen her so grand under Pitt and Wellington, and so little and feeble under Palmerston and Russell? Can you explain this by a change of climate and geographical position, or any change in the physical conditions of the nation, that is, any physical changes not due to moral causes?

We see in several of the states of the Union a decrease, a relative, if not a positive decrease, of the native population, and the physical man actually degenerating, and to an extent that should alarm the statesman and the patriot. Do you explain this fact by the change in the climate and the geographical position? The geographical position remains unchanged, and if the climate has changed at all, it has been by way of amelioration. Do you attribute it to a change in the physical condition of the country? Not at all. There is no mystery as to the matter, and though the effects may be physical or physiological, the causes are well known to be moral, and chief among them is the immoral influence of the doctrine the professor and his brother physiologists are doing their best to diffuse among the people. The cause is in the loss of religious faith, in the lack of moral and religious instruction, in the spread of naturalism, and the rejection of supernatural grace—without which the natural cannot be sustained in its integrity—in the growth of luxury, and the assertion of material goods or sensible pleasures, as the end and aim of life. There is always something morally wrong where prizes need to be offered to induce the young to marry, and to induce the married to suffer their children to be born and reared.

So, also, do we know the secret of the rise, prosperity, decline, and death of the renowned nations of antiquity. The Romans owed the empire of the world to their temperance, prudence, fortitude, and respect for religious principle, all of them moral causes; and they owed their decline and fall to the loss of these virtues, to their moral corruption. The same may be said of all the ancient nations. Their religion, pure, or comparatively pure, in the origin, becomes gradually corrupt, degenerates into a corrupt and corrupting superstition, which hangs as a frightful nightmare on the breasts of the people, destroying their moral life and vigor. To this follows, with a class, scepticism, the denial of God or the gods, an Epicurean morality, and the worship of the senses; the loss of all public spirit—public as well as private virtue, and the nation falls of its own internal moral imbecility and rottenness, as our own nation, not yet a century old, is in a fair way of doing, and most assuredly will do, if the atheistic philosophy and morality of the physiologists or positivists become much more widely diffused than they are. The church will be as unable, with all her supernatural truth, grace, life, and strength, to save it, as she was to save the ancient Græco-Roman Empire, for to save it would require a resurrection of the dead.

The common sense of mankind, in all ages of the world, has uniformly attributed the downfall of nations, states, and empires, to moral causes, not to physiological laws, climatic influences, or geographical position. The wicked shall be turned into hell, and all the nations that forget God. Righteousness exalteth a nation, and sin is a reproach to any people. This is alike the voice of inspiration and of universal experience. The traveller who visits the sites of nations renowned in story, now buried in ruins, of cities once thronged with a teeming population, the marts of the world, in which were heard, from morning till night—till far into night—the din of industry, and marks the solitude that now reigns there; the barren waste that has succeeded to once fruitful fields and vineyards, and observes the poor shepherd that feeds a petty flock on the scanty pasturage, or the armed robber that watches for a victim to plunder, receives a far less vivid impression of the dependence of nations on physical causes and conditions, than of the influence of the moral world on the natural, and reads in legible characters the meaning of that fearful penalty which God pronounced, when he said to the man: "And the earth for

thy sake shall be cursed." The physical changes that have come over Assyria, Syria, Lybia, Egypt, and Palestine, are the effects of the moral deterioration of man, not the cause of that deterioration.

The professor, after dilating almost eloquently, and as a sage, on the changeability, the transitoriness, the evanescent nature of all visible forms of things, says: "If from visible forms we turn to directing law, how vast the difference! We pass from the finite, the momentary, the incidental, the conditional, to the illimitable, the eternal, the necessary, the unshackled. It is of law I am to speak in this book. In a world composed of vanishing forms, I am to vindicate the imperishability, the majesty of law, and to show how man proceeds in his social march in obedience to it." (*Ibid.* p. 16.) This sounds well; but, unhappily, he has told us that communities and nations, like individuals, are under the control of physical conditions, and *therefore* of law. If *therefore* of law, then under the law of physical conditions, and consequently of a physical or physiological law. He dwells on the grandeur of this conception, and challenges for it our deepest admiration. But we see not much to admire in a purely physical law manifesting itself in ceaseless instability, metamorphosis, and death. Will the author forgive us, if we hint that he possibly does not very well understand himself, or know precisely what it is that he says? Hear him. "I am to lead my reader, perhaps in a reluctant path, from the outward phantasmagorial illusions which surround us and so ostentatiously obtrude themselves on our attention, to something that lies in silence and strength behind. I am to draw his thoughts from the tangible to the invisible, from the limited to the universal, from the changeable to the invariable, from the transitory to the eternal; from the expedients and volitions so largely *amusing* in the life of man, to the predestined and resistless issuing of law from the fiat of God." (*Ibid.* p 16, 17.) Very respectable rhetoric, but what does it mean? If it means any thing, it means that the visible universe is unreal, an illusion, a phantasmagoria; that nothing is real, stable, permanent, but law, which lies in silence and strength behind the phantasmagoria, and that this law producing the illusion, dazzling us with mere sense-shows, is identically God, from whose fiat the phantasmagorial world issues. Is not this grand? is it not sublime? The scientific professor forgets that he may find readers, who can perceive through his

rhetoric that he makes law or God the reality of things, instead of their creator or maker, simply their *causa essentialis*, the *causa immanens* of Spinoza, and therefore asserts nothing but a very vulgar form of pantheism, material pantheism, indistinguishable from naked atheism; for his doctrine recognizes only the material, the sensible, and by law he can mean only a physiological law like that by which the liver secretes bile, the blood circulates through the heart, seeds germinate, or plants bear fruit—a law which has and can have no indivisible unity.

If the professor means simply that in the universe all proceeds according to the law of cause and effect, he should bear in mind that there are moral causes and effects as well as physical, and supernatural as well as natural; but then he might find himself in accord with theologians, some of whom, perhaps, in his own favorite sciences are able to be his masters. It is not always safe to measure the ignorance of others by our own. No theologian denies, but every one asserts the law of cause and affect, precisely what no atheist, pantheist, or naturalist does do, for none of them ever rise above what the schools call *causa essentialis*, the thing itself, that which, as we say, *makes* the thing, makes it itself and not another, or constitutes its identity. Every theologian believes that God is logical, logic in itself, and that all his works are dialectical and realize a divine plan, which as a whole and in all its parts is strictly and rigidly logical. If the professor means simply to assert not only that all creatures and all events are under the control of the law of cause and effect, but also under the law of dialectic, there need be no quarrel between him and us; but in such case, if he had known a little theology, he might have spared himself and us a great deal of trouble, for we believe as firmly in the universal reign of law as he or his Grace of Argyll. But he would have gained little credit for original genius, depth of thought, profound science, or rare learning, and most likely would not have lived to see any one of his volumes reach a fifth edition.

But we must not be understood to deny in the development of nations or individuals all dependence on physical conditions, or even of climate and geographical position. Man is neither pure spirit, nor pure matter; he is the union of soul and body, and can no more live without communion with nature, than he can without communion with his like and with God. Hence he requires the three great institu-

tions of religion, society, and property, which, in some form, are found in all tribes, nations, or civil communities, and without which no people ever does or can subsist. Climate and geographical influences, no doubt, count for something, for how much, science has not yet determined. There is a difference in character between the inhabitants of mountains and the inhabitants of plains, the dwellers on the sea-coast and the dwellers inland, and the people of the north and the people of the south; yet the Bretons and the Irish have not lost perceptibly any thing, in three thousand years, of their original character as a southern people, though dwelling for that space of time, we know not how many centuries longer, far to the north. Among the Irish you may find types of northern races, some of whom have overrun the Island as conquerors; but amid all their political and social vicissitudes, the Irish have retained, and still retain, their southern character. The English have received many accessions from Ireland and from the south, but they remain, the great body of them, as they originally were, essentially a northern people, and hence the marked difference between the Irish character and the English, though inhabiting very nearly the same parallels of latitude, and subject to much the same climatic and geographical influences. The character of both the English and the Irish is modified on this continent, but more by amalgamation, and by political and social influences, than by climate or geography. The Irish type is the most tenacious, and is not unlikely in time to eliminate the Anglo-Saxon. It has a great power of absorption, and the American people may ultimately lose their northern type, and assume the characteristics of a southern race, in spite of the constant influx of the Teutonic element. What we object to is not giving something to physical causes and conditions, but making them exclusive, and thus rejecting moral causes, and reducing man and nature to an inexorable fatalism.

In the several volumes of the professor, except the first named, we are able to detect neither the philosophical historian nor the man of real science. The respectable author has neither logic nor exact, or even extensive, learning, and the only thing to be admired in him, except his style, is the sublime confidence in himself with which he undertakes to discuss and settle questions, of which, for the most part, he knows nothing, and perhaps the sublimer confidence with which he follows masters that know as little as himself.

We own we have treated Professor Draper's work with very little respect, for we have felt very little. His *Intellectual Development of Europe* is full of crudities from beginning to end, and for the most part below criticism, or would be were it not that it is levelled at all the principles of individual and social life and progress. The book belongs to the age of Leucippus and Democritus, and *ignores*, if we may use an expressive term, though hardly English, Christian civilization and all the progress men and nations have effected since the opening of the Christian era. It is a monument not of science, but of gross ignorance.

Yet in our remarks we have criticised the class to which the author belongs, rather than the author himself. Men of real science are modest, reverential, and we honor them, whatever the department of nature to which they devote their studies. We delight to sit at their feet and drink in instruction from their lips; but when men, because they are passable chemists, know something of human physiology, or the natural history of fishes, undertake to propagate theories on God, man, and nature, that violate the most sacred traditions of the race, deny the Gospel, reduce the universe to matter, and place man on the level with the brute, theories, too, which are utterly baseless, we cannot reverence them, or listem to them with patience, however graceful their elocution or charming their rhetoric.

PRIMEVAL MAN.*

[From the Catholic World for September, 1869.]

THERE are few more active or able members of the English House of Lords or of the British ministry than the Scottish Duke of Argyll, and, if we could forget the treason to the Stuarts and the Scottish nation of some of his ancestors, there are few scholars and scientific men in the United Kingdom whom we should be disposed to treat with greater respect. He is at once a statesman, ascientist, and a the-

* *Primeval Man.* An Examination of some recent Speculations. By the DUKE OF ARGYLL. New York: 1869.

ologian; and in all three capacities has labored earnestly to serve his country and civilization. In politics, he is, of course, a whig, or, as is now said, a liberal; as a theologian, he belongs to the Kirk of Scotland, and may be regarded as a Calvinist; as a man of science, his aim appears to be to assert the freedom and independence of science, without compromising religion. His work on the *Reign of Law*, reviewed and sharply criticised by us,* was designed to combat the atheistic tendencies of modern scientific theories, by asserting final causes, and resolving the natural laws of the physicists into the direct and immediate will of God.

In the present work, quite too brief and sketchy, he treats of the primeval man, and maintains man's origin in the creative act of God, against the developmentists and natural selectionists, which is well, as far as it goes. He treats, also, of the antiquity of man, and of his primeval condition. He appears disposed to allow man a higher antiquity than we think the facts in the case warrant; but, though he dissents, to some extent, from the theory of the late Anglican Archbishop of Dublin, we find him combating with great success the savage theory of Sir John Lubbock, who maintains that man began in the lowest form of barbarism in which he can subsist as man, and has risen to his present state of civilization by his own spontaneous and unassisted efforts—a theory just now very generally adopted in the non-Catholic world, and assumed as the basis of the modern doctrine of progress—the absurdest doctrine that ever gained currency among educated men.

The noble duke very properly denies the origin of species in development, and the production of new species by "natural selection," as Darwin holds, and acceded to by Sir Charles Lyell and an able writer in *The Quarterly* for last April. The duke maintains that man was created man, not developed from the lower species, from the tadpole or monkey. But, while he asserts the origin of species in the creative act of God, he supposes God supplies extinct species by creating new species by successive creative acts; thus losing the unity of the creative act, placing multiplicity in the origin of things, and favoring that very atheistical tendency he aims to war against. His *Reign of Law*, though well-intended, and highly praised by our amiable friend, M. Augustin Cochin, of *Le Correspondant*, showed us that the noble author has failed both in his theology and philosophy.

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*Vol. III., p. 375.

In resolving the natural laws into the will of God enforcing itself by power, he fails to recognize any distinction between first cause and second cause, and, therefore, between the natural and the supernatural. God does all, not only as first cause, or *causa eminens*, as say the theologians, but as the direct and immediate actor, which, of course, is pantheism, itself only a form of atheism. Yet we know not that his grace could have done better, with Calvinism for his theology, and the Scottish school, as finished by Sir William Hamilton, for his philosophy. To have thoroughly refuted the theories against which he honorably protests, he must have known Catholic theology, and the Christian view of the creative act. We have no disposition, at present, to discuss the antiquity either of man or the globe. If the fact that God, *in the beginning*, created heaven and earth, and all things therein, visible and invisible, is admitted and maintained, we know not that we need, in the interest of orthodoxy, quarrel about the date when it was done. Time began with the externization of the divine creative act, and the universe has no relation beyond itself, except the relation of the creature to the creator. Considering the late date of the Incarnation, we are not disposed to assign man a very high antiquity, and no geological or historical facts are, as yet, established that require it for their explanation. We place little confidence in the hasty inductions of geologists.

But the primitive condition of man has for us a deeper interest; and we follow the noble duke with pleasure in his able refutation of the savage theory of Sir J. Lubbock. Sir John evidently holds the theory of development, and that man has been developed from a lower species. He assumes that his primitive human state was the lowest form of barbarism in which he could subsist as man. With regard to man's development from lower animals, it is enough to say that development cannot take place except where there are living germs to be developed, and can only unfold and bring out what is contained in them. But we find in man, even in the lowest form of savage life, elements, language or articulate speech, for instance, of which there are no germs to be found in the animal kingdom. We may dismiss that theory and assume at once that man was created, and created man. But was his condition in his primitive state that of the lowest form of barbarism? Is the savage the primitive man, or the degenerate man? The former is

assumed in almost every scientific work we meet; it is defended by all the advocates of the modern doctrine that man is naturally progressive. Saint-Simon, in his *Nouveau Christianisme*, asserts that paradise is before us, not behind us; and even some who accept the Biblical history have advanced so little in harmonizing their faith with what they call their science, that they do not hesitate to suppose that man began his career, at least after the prevarication of Adam, in downright savagism. Even the learned Döllinger so far falls in with the modern theory as to make polished gentilism originate in disgusting fetichism.

The noble duke sufficiently refutes the theory of Sir John Lubbock, but does not seem to us to have fully grasped and refuted the assumptions on which it is founded. "His two main lines of argument," he says, "connect themselves with the two following propositions, which he undertakes to prove, First, that there are indications of progress even among savages; and second, that among civilized nations there are traces of barbarism."

The first proposition is not proved or provable. The characteristic of the savage is to be unprogressive. Some tribes may be more or less degraded than others. The American Indian ranks above the New Hollander; but, whether more or less degraded, we never find savages lifting themselves, by their own efforts into even a comparatively civilized state. Niebuhr says there is no instance on record of a savage tribe having become a civilized people by its own spontaneous efforts; and Heeren remarks that the description of the tribes eastward of the Persian Gulf along the borders of the Indian Ocean, by the companions of Alexander, applies perfectly to them as we now find them. No germs of civilized life are to be found among them, or, if so, they are dead, not living germs, incapable of development. The savage is a thorough routinist, the slave of petrified customs and usages. He shows often great skill in constructing and managing his canoe, in making and ornamenting his bow or his war-club; but one generation never advances on its predecessor, and the new generation only reproduces the old. All the arts the savage has have come, as his ideas, to a stand-still. He is stern, sad, gloomy, as if oppressed by memory, and exhibits none of the joyousness or frolicsomeness which we might expect from his fresh young life, if he represented the infancy or childhood of the race, as pretended.

Even in what are called civilized heathen nations we find a continual deterioration; but no indication of progress in civilization, or in those elements which distinguish civilized from barbaric or savage life. Culture and polish may be the concomitants of civilization, but do not constitute it. The generations that built the pyramids, Babylon, Nineveh, Thebes, Rome, were superior to any of their successors. No subsequent Greek poet ever came up to Homer, and the oldest of the Vedas surpass the powers of the Indian people in any generation more recent than that which produced them. The Chinese cannot to-day produce new works to compare with those of Confucius. Where now are the once renowned nations of antiquity whose ships ploughed every sea, and whose armies made the earth tremble with their tread? Fallen, all have fallen, and remain only in their ruins, and the page of the historian or song of the bard. If these nations, so great and powerful, with so many elements of a strong civilization, could not sustain themselves from falling into barbarism, how pretend that the lowest and most degraded savages can, without any foreign assistance, lift themselves into a civilized state?

The second proposition, that civilized nations retain traces of barbarism, proves nothing to the purpose. These traces, at most, prove only that the nations in which we detect them have passed through a state of barbarism, as we know modern nations have; not that barbarism was, in any form, the primitive condition of the race. It is not pretended that no savage tribe has ever been civilized; what is denied is, that the race began in the savage state, or that, if it had so begun, it could ever have risen by its own natural forces alone to civilization. There is no evidence that the cruel and bloody customs, traces of which we find in civilized nations, were those of the primeval man. The polished and cultivated Romans were more savage in their customs than the northern barbarians who overthrew their civilization, much to the relief of mankind. When the late Theodore Parker drew a picture of the New Zealander in order to describe Adam, he proceeded according to his theory of progress, but without a shadow of authority. We find a cruelty, an inhumanity, an oppression, bloody and obscene rites, among polished nations—as Rome, Syria, Phœnicia, and modern India—that we shall look in vain for among downright savages; which shows that we owe them to cultivation, to development, that is, to "development," as the noble duke well says, "in corruption."

But these traces of so-called barbarism among civilized nations are more than offset by remains of civilization which we find in savage tribes. Sir J. Lubbock and others take these remains as indications of progress among savages; but they mistake the evening twilight deepening into darkness, for that of the morning ushering in the day. This is evident from the fact that they are followed by no progress. They are reminiscences, not promises. If germs, they never germinate; but have been deprived of their vitality. To us, paganism bears witness in all its forms that it has degenerated from its *norma*, or type; not that it is advancing toward it. We see in its incoherence, its incongruities and inequalities, that it is a fall or departure from something higher, more living and more perfect. Any one studying Protestantism, in any of its forms, may see that it is not an original system of religion; that it is a departure from its type, not an approach to it; and, if we know well the Catholic Church, we see at once that in her is the type that Protestantism loses, corrupts, or travesties. So paganism bears unmistakable evidence of what we know from authentic history, that, whether with polished gentiles or with rude savages and barbarians, its type, from which it recedes, is the patriarchal religion. We know that it was an apostasy or falling away from that religion, the primitive religion of the race, as Protestantism is an apostasy or falling away from the Catholic Church. Protestantism, in the modern world, is what gentilism was in the ancient; and as gentilism is the religion of all savage or barbarian tribes, we have in Prottestantism a key for explaining whatever is dark or obscure in their history. We see in Protestant nations a tendency to lose or throw off more and more of what they retained when they separated from the church, and which, before the lapse of many generations, if not arrested, will lead them to a hopeless barbarism. The traces of Catholic faith we find in them are reminiscences, not prophecies.

We find with the lowest and most degraded savages, language, and often a language of great richness, singular beauty and expressiveness. Terms for which savages have no use may sometimes be wanting, but it is rare that the language cannot be made to supply them from its resources. In the poorest language of a savage tribe, there is always evidence of its having been the language of a people superior in ideas and culture to the present condition of those who speak it. Language, among savage tribes, we take to be always indic-

ative of a lost state far above that of barbarism; and it not only refutes the theory of natural progress, but, as far as it goes, proves the doctrine of primitive instruction by the Creator, maintained by Dr. Whately, and only partially accepted by his Grace of Argyll.

Language is no human invention, nor the product of individual or social progress. It requires language to invent language, and there is no individual progress out of society, and no society is possible without language. Hence, animals may be gregarious, but not sociable. They do not, and never can, form society. Max Müller has disposed of the bow-wow theory, or the origin of language in the imitation of the cries of animals, and also of the theory that supposes it to originate in the imitation of the sounds of nature, as buzz, rattle, &c.; for if a few words could originate in this way, language itself could not, since there is much more in language than words. The more common theory, just now, and which has respectable names in its favor, is that God is indeed the author of language, but as *causa eminens*, as he is of all that nature does; that is, he does not directly teach man language, but creates him with the power or faculty of speaking, and making himself understood by articulate speech. But this theory will not bear examination.

Between language and the faculty of using it there is a difference, and no faculty creates its own object. The faculty of speaking could no more be exercised without language, than the faculty of seeing without a visible object. Where there is no language, the faculty is and must be inoperative. The error is in supposing that the faculty of using language is the faculty of creating language, which it cannot be; for, till the language is possessed and held in the mind, there is nothing for the faculty of speech to operate on or with. To have given man the faculty of speech, the Creator must have begun by teaching him language, or by infusing it with the meaning of its words into his mind. We misapprehend the very nature and office of language, if we suppose it can possibly be used except as learned from or taught by a teacher. Man, as second cause, can no more produce language than he can create something from nothing. If God made us as second causes capable of creating language, why can we not do it now, and master it without a long and painful study? Since the faculty must be the same in all men, why do not all men speak one and the same dialect?

We will suppose man had language from the first. But there is no language without discourse of reason. A parrot or a crow may be taught to pronounce single words, and even sentences, but it would be absurd to assert that either has the faculty of language. To have language and be able to use it, one must have knowledge, and the sense of the word must precede, or at least be simultaneous with the word. Both the word and its meaning must be associated in the mind. How then could the Creator give man the faculty of language, without imparting to him in some way the ideas and principles it is fitted to express, and without expressing which it cannot be language? He must do so, or there could be no *verbum mentis*, and the word would be spoken without meaning. Moreover, all language is profoundly philosophical, and conforms more nearly to the reality of things than any human system yet attained to, not only by savages, but by civilized and cultivated men; and whenever it deviates from that reality, it is when it has been corrupted by the false systems and methods of philosophers. In all languages, we find subject, predicate, and copula. The copula is always the verb *to be*, teaching those who understand it that nothing existing can be affirmed except by being and in its relation to being, that is God, who is QUI EST. Were ignorant savages able distinctly to recognize and embody in language the ideal formula, when no philosopher can ever apprehend and consider it unless represented to him in words? Impossible.

We take language, therefore, as a reminiscence among savages of a previous civilization, and a conclusive proof that, up to a certain point at least, the primeval man, as Dr. Whately maintains, was and must have been instructed by his Maker. As language is never known save as learned from a teacher, its existence among the lowest and most degraded barbarians is a proof that the primeval man was not, and could not have been an untutored savage. The Anglican archbishop, having, as the Scottish duke, no proper criterion of truth, may have included in the primitive instruction more than it actually contained. An error of this sort in an Anglican should surprise no one. Truth or sound philosophy from such a source would be the only thing to surprise us. We do not suppose Adam was directly instructed in all the mechanic arts, in the whole science and practice of agriculture, or in the entire management of flocks and herds, nor that he had steam-engines, spinning-

jennies, power-looms, steamboats, railroads, locomotives, palace-cars, or even lightning-telegraphs. We do not suppose that the race, in relation to the material order, received any direct instructions, except of the most elementary kind, or in matters of prime necessity, or high utility to its physical life and health. The ornamental arts, and other matters which do not exceed man's natural powers, may have been left to man to find out for himself, though we have instances recorded in which some of them were taught by direct inspiration, and many modern inventions are only the reproduction of arts once known, and subsequently lost or forgotten.

It is not difficult to explain how our modern advocates of progress have come to regard the savage as the primeval man, and not as the degenerate man. Their theory of natural progress demands it, and they have always shown great facility in accommodating their facts to their theories. They take also their starting-point in heathenism of comparatively recent origin, and study the law of human development in the history of gentilism. They forget that gentilism originated in an apostasy from the patriarchal or primitive moral and religious order, and that, from the first, there remained, and always has remained, on earth a people that did not apostatize, that remained faithful to tradition, to the primitive instruction and wisdom. They fail to consider that, language confounded and the race dispersed, those who remained nearest the original seats of civilization, and were separated by the least distance from the people that remained faithful, became the earliest civilized or polished gentile nations, and that those who wandered further into the wilderness—receding further and further from light, losing more and more of their original patrimony, cut off from all intercourse with civilization by distance, by difference of language, and to some extent, perhaps, by physical changes and convulsions of the globe, degenerated gradually into barbarians and savages. Occasionally, in the course of ages, some of these wandering and degenerate tribes were brought under the influence of civilization by the arts, the arms, and the religion of the more civilized gentile nations. But in none has the gentile civilization, in the proper sense of the term, ever risen above what the gentiles took with them from the primitive stock, when they apostatized. Protestant nations are below, not above, what they were at the epoch of the reformation. The reformers were greatly superior to any of their successors.

But our philosophic historians take no account of these things, nor of the fact that history shows them no barbaric ancestors of the Egyptians, Indians, Assyrians, Babylonians, Syrians, Phœnicians, etc. They find, or think they find, from the Greek poets and traditions, that the ancestors of the Greeks and Romans, each a comparatively modern people, were really savages, and that suffices them to prove that the savage state is the primeval state of the race! They find, also, that a marvellous progress in civilization, under Christianity has been effected, and what hinders them from concluding that man is *naturally* progressive, or that the savage is able, by his own efforts, to lift himself into civilized life? Have not the northern barbarians, who overthrew the Roman empire of the west, and seated themselves on its majestic ruins, become, under the teachings and the supernatural influences of the church, the great civilized nations of the modern world? How, then, pretend to deny that barbarians and savages can become civilized by their own spontaneous efforts and natural forces alone?

Whether any savage tribe was ever civilized under gentilism is, perhaps, doubtful; but if the philosophers of history would take the right line, instead of a collateral line or bastard branch of the human family, and follow it from Adam down, through the patriarchs, the synagogue, and the Catholic Church, they would find that there has always been a believing, a faithful, an enlightened, and a civilized people on earth, and they never would and never could have imagined any thing so untrue as that man began "in the lowest form of barbarism in which he can subsist as man." We have no indication of the existence of any savage or barbarous tribes before the flood; nor after the flood, till the confusion of language at Babel, and the consequent dispersion of the human race; that is, till after the gentile apostasy, of which they are one of the fruits. Adam, by his fall, lost communion with God, became darkened in his understanding, enfeebled in his will, and disordered in his appetites and passions; but he did not lose all his science, forget all his moral and religious instruction, and become a complete savage. Besides, his communion with God was renewed by repentance and faith in the promised Messiah, or incarnate Son of God, who should come to redeem the world, and enable man to fulfil his destiny, or attain to his end.

We do not by any means deny progress. We believe in

it with St. Paul, and struggle for it in individuals and in society. We only do not believe in progress or perfectibility by the simple forces of nature alone, or that man is naturally progressive. Existences have two movements or cycles: the one, their procession, by way of creation, from God as first cause; the other, their return, without absorption in him, to God as their final cause or beatitude, as we have on several occasions very fully shown. In the first cycle, man is explicated by natural generation, and his powers are determined by his nature, or the physical laws of his existence. In the second cycle, his explication is by regeneration, a supernatural act; and his progress is directed and controlled by the moral law prescribed by God as final cause, and is limited only by the infinite, to which he aspires and, by the assistance of grace, may attain. The first cycle is initial, and in it there is no moral, religious, or social progress; there is only physical development and growth. It is under the natural laws of the physicists, who never look any further. The second cycle is teleological, and under the moral law, or the natural law of the theologians and the legists. In this teleological cycle lies the whole moral order, as distinguished from the physical; the whole of religion; its means, influences, and ends; and, consequently, civilization, in so far as it has any moral or religious character, aims, or tendency.

Civilization, we are aware, is a word that has hardly a fixed meaning, and is used vaguely, and in different senses. It is derived from a word signifying the city—in modern language, the state—and relates to the organization, constitution, and administration of the commonwealth or republic. It is used vaguely for the aggregate of the manners, customs, and usages of city life, and also for the principles and laws of a well-ordered and well-governed civil society. We take it chiefly in the latter sense, and understand by it the supremacy of the moral order in secular life, the reign of law, or the subjection of the passions and turbulent elements of human nature in the individual, the family, and society to the moral law; or, briefly, the predominance of reason and justice over passion and caprice in the affairs of this world, and therefore coincident with liberty, as distinguished from license. The race began in civilization, because it began with a knowledge of the law of human existence, man's origin and destiny, and of the means and conditions of gaining the end for which he exists; and be-

cause he was placed in the outset by his Maker in possession of these means and conditions, so that he could not fail except through his own fault. Those who reject, neglect, or pervert the moral order, follow only the natural laws, separate from the communion of the faithful, and remain in the initial cycle, gradually become barbarians, superstitious, the slaves of their own passions, cruel and merciless savages, even if still cultivated, refined, and mild-mannered.

We place civilization, then, in the second cycle or movement of existences, under the moral law, and must do so or deny it all moral basis or moral character. What is not moral in its aims and tendencies, or is not in the order of man's return to God as his last end, we exclude from civilization, as no part of it, even if called by its name. There is no civilization where there is no state or civil polity; and there can be no state or civil polity, though there may be force, tyranny, and slavery, out of the moral order. The state lies in the moral or teleological order, and is under the moral law—the law prescribed by God as final cause. It derives all its principles from it, and is founded and governed by it. Its very mission is the maintenance of justice, freedom, and order; and, as far as it goes, to keep men's faces towards the end for which they are created. And hence the concord there is, or should be, between the state and the church.

Most of those things, it will be seen from this, after which the gentiles seek, and which the moderns call civilization, may be adjuncts of civilization, in the sense of our Lord, when he says, "Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and *all these things shall be added* unto you;" but they do not constitute civilization, are not it, nor any part of it. Here is where modern gentilism errs, no less than did the ancient. Take up any of the leading journals of the day, and you will find what with great emphasis is called modern civilization is in the initial order, not the teleological; and is only a development and application of the natural laws of the physicists, not the natural or moral law of the theologians and legists. The press and popular orators called, a few years ago, Cyrus W. Field, who had taken a leading share in laying a submarine telegraph from the western coast of Ireland to the eastern coast of Newfoundland, a "second Messiah." When, after much urging and some threats, President Lincoln proclaimed, as a war meas-

ure, the emancipation of the slaves in certain states and parts of states then at war with the general government, the press and orators that approved, both at home and abroad, forthwith pronounced him also a "second Messiah," and without stopping to inquire whether the emancipation would be any thing more than the exchange of one form of compulsory physical labor for another, perhaps no better. Now, when a new Atlantic cable is laid from France to Massachusetts, we are told in flaring capitals and lofty periods that it is another and a glorious triumph of modern civilization—of mind over matter, man over nature. If our San Francisco friend succeeds in constructing an aerial ship, with which he can navigate the air, it will be a greater triumph still of modern civilization, and the theologians and moralists will have to hide their heads. All this shows that civilization, by the leaders of public opinion in our day, is placed wholly in the physical order, and consists in the development and application of the natural laws to the accomplishment of certain physical ends or purposes of utility only in the first cycle of our existence, and without the least moral significance. So completely have we become devoted to the improvement of our condition in the initial order, that we forget that life does not end with it, or that the initial exists only for the teleological, and that our development and application of the physical laws of nature imply no progress in civilization, or the realization of a moral ideal.

But whatever success we may have in developing and applying to our own purposes the physical laws of man and the globe he inhabits, we must remember that no success of that sort initiates us into the second cycle, or the life of our return to God. To enter that life we must be regenerated, and we can no more regenerate than we can generate ourselves. Here, we may see why even to civilization the incarnation of the Word is necessary. The hypostatic union of the divine and human natures in the divine person of the Word carries the creative act to its summit, completes the first cycle, and initiates the second, into which we can enter only as we are reborn of Christ, as we were born in the first cycle of Adam. Hence, Christ is called the second Adam, the Lord from heaven. Civilization, morality, salvation, are in one sense in the same order and under one and the same law.

Progress being possible, except in the sense of physical

development, only in the movement of return to God as final cause, and that movement originating in the Incarnation only, it follows that those nations alone that are united to Christ by faith and love, either united to him who was to come, as were the patriarchs and the synagogue, before the Incarnation, or to him in the church or the regeneration, as are Catholics since, are or can be progressive, or even truly civilized nations. They who assert progress by our natural forces alone, confound the first cycle with the second, generation with regeneration, and the natural laws, which proceed from God as first cause, with the natural or moral law which is prescribed by God as final cause. It is a great mistake, then, to suppose, as many do, that the mysteries of faith, even the most recondite, have no practical bearing on the progress of men and nations, or that it is safe, in studying civilization, to take our point of departure in gentilism.

In accordance with our conclusion, we find that gentile nations, ancient or modern, are really unprogressive, save in the physical or initial order; which is of no account in the moral or teleological order. We deny not the achievements of Protestant nations in the physical order; but, in relation to the end for which man exists, they not only do not advance beyond what they took with them from the church, but are constantly deteriorating. They have lost the condition of moral and spiritual progress, individually and collectively, by losing communion with Christ in his church; they have lost Christ, in reality, if not in name; and by losing the infallible word preserved by the church alone, they have lost or are losing the state, civil authority itself, and finding themselves reduced to what St. Paul calls "the natural man." They place all their hopes in physical success, always certain to fail in the end, when pursued for its own sake.

We have raised and we raise here no question as to what God might have done, or how or with what powers he might have created man, had he chosen. We only take the plan he has chosen to adopt; and which, in his providence and grace, he carries out. In the present decree, as say the theologians, he has subjected the whole teleological order to one and the same law; and civilization, morality, and Christian sanctity are not separable in principle, and depend on one and the same fundamental law. Gentilism divorces religion and the state from morality; and modern heresy rec-

ognizes no intrinsic relation between them. It tells us religion is necessary to the stability of the political order; that Christianity is the basis of morality, and that it is the great agent of progress; but it shows us no reason why it is or should be so, and in its practical doctrine it teaches that it is not so. Every thing, as far as it informs us, depends on arbitrary appointment, and without any reason of being in the system of things which God has seen proper to create. Hence, people are unable to form to themselves any clear view of the relation of religion and morality, of morality and civilization, or to arrive at any satisfactory understanding of the purpose and law of human existence; and they either frame to themselves the wildest, the most fanciful, or the most absurd theories, or give the whole up in despair, sink into a state of utter indifference, and say, "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." They simply vegetate in vice or crime, or, at best, only take themselves to the study of the physical sciences, or the cultivation of the fine arts. We have shown that their difficulties and discouragements are imaginary, and arise from ignorance of the divine plan of creation, and the mutual relation and dependence of all its parts. One divine thought runs through the whole, and nothing does or can stand alone. We study things too much in their analysis, not enough in their synthesis.

SPIRITISM AND SPIRITISTS.*

[From the Catholic World for June, 1869.]

WORCESTER, in his dictionary, gives as the second meaning of the word *spiritualism*, "the doctrine that departed spirits hold communication with men," and gives as his authority

*1. *Planchette; or, the Despair of Science.* Being a full Account of Modern Spiritualism, its Phenomena, and the various Theories regarding it. With a Survey of French Spiritism. Boston: 1869.

2. *Des Rapports de l'Homme avec le Démon.* Essai Historique et Philosophique. Par JOSEPH BIZOUARD, Avocat. Paris: 1863 et 1864.

3. *Spiritualism Unveiled, and shown to be the Work of Demons.* By MILES GRANT. Boston.

O. A. Brownson. We think this must be a mistake; for Dr. Brownson uses in his *Spirit-Rapper*, the term *spiritism*, which is the more proper term, as it avoids confounding the doctrine of the spiritists with the philosophical doctrine which stands opposed to materialism, or, more strictly, sensism, and the moral doctrine opposed to sensualism. We generally use the word *spiritual* in religion as opposed to natural, or for the life and aims of the regenerate, who walk after the spirit, in opposition to those who walk after the flesh, and are carnal-minded. To avoid all confusion or ambiguity which would result from using a word already otherwise appropriated, we should use the terms *spiritism*, spiritists, and spirital.

The author of *Planchette* has availed himself largely of the voluminous work of the learned Joseph Bizouard, the second work named on our list, and gives all that can be said, and more than we can say, in favor of spiritism. He has given very fully one side of the question, all that need be said in support of the reality of the order of phenomena which he describes, while the French work gives all sides; but he passes over, we fear knowingly and intentionally, the dark side of spiritism, and refuses to tell us the sad effects on sanity and morality which it is known to produce. A more fruitful cause of insanity and immorality and even crime does not exist, and cannot be imagined.

We have no intention of devoting any space specially to *Planchette*, or the "little plank," which so many treat as a harmless plaything. It is only one of the forms through which the phenomena of spiritism are manifested, and is no more and no less the "despair of science," than any other form of alleged spirital manifestations. Contemporary science, indeed, or what passes for science, has shown great ineptness before the alleged spirit-manifestations; and its professors have, during the twenty years and over since the Fox girls began to attract public attention and curiosity, neither been able to disprove the alleged facts, nor to explain their origin and cause; but this is because contemporary science recognizes no invisible existences, and no intelligences above or separate from the human, and because it is not possible to explain their production or appearance by any of the unintelligible forces of nature. To deny their existence is, we think, impossible without discrediting all human testimony; to regard them as jugglery, or as the result of trickery practised by the mediums and those asso-

ciated with them, seems to us equally impossible. Mr. Miles Grant in his well-reasoned little work on the subject, says very justly, it "would only show that we know but little about the facts in the case. "We think," he says, p. 3,

"No one, after a little reflection, would venture to say of the many thousands and even millions of spiritualists, among whom are large numbers of men and women noted for their intelligence, honesty, and veracity, that they are only playing tricks on each other! . . . Can any one tell what object all these fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, children, dear friends, and loved companions can have in pretending that they have communications from spirits, when they know, at the same time, that they are only deceiving each other by means of trickery?"

In our judgment such an assumption would be a greater violation of the laws of human nature or the human mind and belief, than the most marvellous things related by the spiritists, especially since the order and form of the phenomena they relate are nothing new, but have been noted in all lands and ages, ever since the earliest records of the race, as is fully shown by M. Bizouard.

The author of *Planchette* says the Catholic Church concedes the facts alleged by spiritists. This, as he states it, may mislead his readers. The church has not, to our knowledge, pronounced any official judgment deciding whether these particular facts are real facts or not; for we are not aware that the question has ever come distinctly before her for decision. She has had before her, from the first, the class of facts to which the alleged spirit-manifestations belong, and has had to deal with them, in some place, or in some form, every day of her existence; but we are not aware that she has examined and pronounced judgment on the particular facts the modern spiritists allege. She has, undoubtedly, declared the practice of spiritism, evocation of spirits, consulting them, or holding communication with them—that is, necromancy—to be unlawful, and she prohibits it to all her children in the most positive manner, as may be seen in the case of the American, or rather Scotchman, Daniel Home, the most famous of modern mediums, and the most dangerous.

For ourselves, we have no doubt of the order of facts to which in our view the spirit-manifestations so called belong; we have no difficulties, *a priori*, in admitting them, though we do not accept the explanation the spiritists give of them; but when it comes to any particular fact or manifestation alleged, we judge it according to the generally received

rules of evidence, and we require very strong evidence to convince us of its reality as a fact. We adopt, in regard to them, the same rule that we follow in the case of alleged miracles. We have not a doubt, nor the shadow of a doubt, that miracles continue to be wrought in the church, and are daily wrought in our midst; but we accept or reject this or that alleged miracle according to the evidence in the case; and, in point of fact, we are rather sceptical in regard to most of the popularly received miracles we hear of. Credulity is not a trait of the Catholic mind. It is the same with us in relation to this other class of alleged facts. We believe as firmly in the fact that prodigies are wrought as we do that miracles are; but do not ask us to believe this or that particular prodigy, unless you are prepared with the most indubitable evidence. We are far from believing every event which we know not how to explain is either a miracle or a prodigy.

We have examined with some care the so-called spirit-manifestations which the spiritists relate, and we have come, according to our best reason, to the conclusion that much in them is trickery, mere jugglery; that much is explicable on natural principles, or is to be classed with well-known morbid or abnormal affections of human nature; but, after all abatements, that there is a residuum inexplicable without the recognition of a superhuman intelligence and force. We say *superhuman*, not *supernatural*. The supernatural is God and what he does immediately or without the intermediation of natural laws, as we have more than once explained. The creation of Adam was supernatural; the generation of men from parents is not supernatural, for it is done by the Creator through the operation of natural laws or second causes. What is done by created forces or intelligences, however superior to man, is not supernatural, nor precisely preternatural, but simply superhuman, angelic, or demoniac. There is a smack of paganism in calling it, as most contemporary literature does, supernatural; for it carries with it the notion that the force or intelligence is not a creature, but an uncreated *numen*.

Now, what is this superhuman intelligence and force revealed by these spirit-phenomena? We know that many who admit the phenomena refuse to admit that they reveal any superhuman force or intelligence. They explain all by imagination or hallucination. These, no doubt, play their part, and explain much; but the author of *Planchette*, as

well as M. Bizouard, has, it seems to us, fully proved that they do not and cannot explain all, even if they themselves did not need explanation; others again, to explain them, have recourse to what they call animal magnetism, or to a force which they call od, odyle, odyllic, or odic force; but these explain nothing, for we know not what animal magnetism or what odic force is, nor whether either has any real existence. These terms do but cover our ignorance. Mr. Grant ascribes them to demons, and endeavors to show that the demon mesmerizes the medium who wills with his will, and acts with his force and intelligence; but our modern science denies the existence of demons.

The spiritists themselves pretend that the phenomena are produced by the presence of departed spirits. But of this there is no proof. It is acknowledged on all hands that the spirits can assume any outward form or appearance at will. What means, then, have we, or can we have, of identifying the individuals personated by the pretended spirits? The author of *Planchette* says, in a note, p. 62:

"If spirits have the power, attributed to them by many seers, of assuming any appearance at will, it is obvious that some high spiritual sense must be developed in us before we can be reasonably sure of the identity of any spirit, even though it come in bearing the exact resemblance of the person it may claim to be. We think, therefore, that the fact that the spirit . . . bore the aspect of Franklin, and called itself Franklin, is no sufficient reason for dismissing all doubts as to its identity. It may be that we must be in the spiritual before we can really be wisely confident of the identity of any spirit."

That is, we must be ghosts ourselves before we can identify a ghost, or die in the flesh, and enter the spirit-land, before we can be sure of the identity of the spirits, or of the truth of any thing they profess to communicate not otherwise verifiable!

It is pretended that the spirits have latterly rendered themselves visible and tangible. Mr. Livermore, of this city, sees and embraces his deceased wife, who caresses and kisses him, and he feels her hands as warm and fleshlike as when she was living. Suppose the phenomena to be as related, and not eked out by Mr. Livermore's imagination; the visible body in which she appeared to him could have been only assumed, and no real body at all, certainly not her body during life—that lies mouldering in the grave. And all the spirits teach that the body thrown off at death does not rise again. They nowhere, that we can find, teach the resurrec-

tion of the flesh, but uniformly deny it. If the spirits, then, do really render themselves visible and tangible to our senses, it must be in a simulated body; and why may they not simulate one form as well as another? The senses of sight and touch furnish, then, of themselves, no proof that a departed spirit or a human spirit once alive in the flesh, is present, communicating through the medium with the living.

The assertion of the pretended spirit of its identity counts for nothing, whether made by knocks or table-tipping, by writing or by audible voice and distinct articulation; for the spiritists themselves concede that some of the spirits, at least, are great liars, and that they have no criterion by which to distinguish the lying spirits from the others, if others there are, that seek to communicate with the living. Conceding all the phenomena alleged, there is, then, absolutely no proof or evidence that there are any departed spirits present, or that any communication from them has ever been received. The spirit of a person may be simulated as well as his voice, features, form, handwriting, or any thing else characteristic of him. Spiritism, then, contrary to the pretensions of the spiritists, proves neither that the dead live again, nor that the spirit survives the body. It does not even prove that there is in man a soul or spirit distinct from the body. We call the special attention of our readers to this point, which is worthy of more consideration than it has received.

The spiritists claim that the alleged spirit-manifestations have proved the spirituality and immortality of the soul, in opposition to materialism. This is their boast, and hence it is that they call their doctrine spiritualism, and seek to establish for it the authority of a revelation, supplementary to the Christian revelation. Their whole fabric rests on the assumption that the manifestations are made by human spirits that have once lived in the flesh, and live now in the spirit-world, whatever that may be. Set aside this assumption, or show that nothing in the alleged spirit-manifestations sustains it, and the whole edifice tumbles to the ground. There is nothing to support this assumption but the testimony of spirits that often prove themselves lying spirits, and whose identity with the individual they personate, or pretend to be, we have no means of proving. Unable to prove this vital point, the spiritists can prove nothing to the purpose. The spirits all say there is no resurrection of the dead, and therefore deny point-blank the doctrine that the dead live again. If we are unable, as we are, to identify them with spirits

that once lived united with bodies that have mouldered or are mouldering in their graves, what proof have we, or can they give, that they are, or ever were, human spirits at all? If they are not proved to be or to have been human spirits, they afford no proof that the soul is distinct from the body, or that it is not material like the body, and perishes not with it. If, then, the men of science have shown themselves little able to explain the origin and cause of the phenomena, the spiritists have shown themselves to be very defective as inductive reasoners.

"But the phenomena warrant the induction that they are produced by spirits of some sort, or that there are intelligences not clothed with human bodies between whom and us there is more or less communication." Of themselves alone they warrant no induction at all, but are simply inexplicable phenomena, the origin and cause of which lie beyond the reach of scientific investigation; but, taken in the light of what we know *aliunde*, they warrant the conclusion that they proceed from a superhuman cause, and that there are spirits which are, in some respects, stronger and more intelligent than men; but whether the particular spirits to whom the spirit-manifestations in question are to be ascribed are angelic or demoniac, must be determined by the special character of the manifestations themselves, the circumstances in which they are made, and the end they are manifestly designed to effect.

We make here no attack on the inductive method followed in constructing the physical sciences. We only maintain that the validity of the induction depends on a principle which is not itself obtained or obtainable from induction. Hence Herbert Spencer and the positivists who follow very closely the inductive method, relegate principles and causes to the "unknowable." The principle on which the inductive process depends cannot be attained to by studying the phenomena themselves, but must be given immediately, either in *a priori* intuition or in revelation. Books have been written, like Paley's *Natural Theology* and the *Bridgewater Treatises*, to prove, by way of induction, from the phenomena of the universe, the being and attributes of God, and it is very generally said that every object in nature proves that God is, and that no man ever is or can be really an atheist; but no study of the phenomena of nature could originate the idea or the word in a mind that had it not. Men must have the idea expressed

in language of some sort before they can find proofs in the observable phenomena of nature that God is. Hence, those *savants* who confound the origination of the idea or belief with the proofs of its truth, and who see that the idea or belief is not obtainable by induction, are really atheists, and say with the fool in his heart, God is—not. We do not assert that God is, on the authority of revelation; for we must know that he is before we have or can have any means of proving the fact of revelation; yet if God had not himself taught his own being to the first man, and given him a sign signifying it, the human race could never have known or conceived that he exists. The phenomena or the facts and events of the universe which so clearly prove that God is, and find in his creative act their origin and cause, would have been to all men, as they are to the atheist, simply inexplicable phenomena.

So it is with the spirit-manifestations, whether angelic or demoniac. The existence of spirits must be known to us, either by intuition or revelation, before we can assign these phenomena a spiritual origin and cause. We do not and cannot know it intuitively; and therefore, without recurring to what revelation teaches us, these manifestations, however striking, wonderful, or perplexing they might be, would be to us and to all men inexplicable, and we could not assign them any origin or cause. Revelation—become traditionary, and so embodied in the common intelligence through language as to control, unconsciously and unsuspected, the reasonings even of individuals who pride themselves on denying it—furnishes the principle needed as the basis of the induction of the principle and cause of the spirit-manifestations. Revelation teaches that God has created an order of intelligences superior to man, called angels, to be the messengers of his will. Some of these remained faithful to their Creator, always obedient to his command; others kept not their first estate, rebelled against their sovereign Lord, were, with their chief, cast out of heaven into the lower regions, and became demons or evil spirits.

The spiritists complain of our scientific professors, but without just reason; for, on the principles of modern science, the proofs they offer of their doctrines prove nothing but their own logical ineptness. Science, if it will accept no revelation, and recognize no principle not obtained by the inductive method, has no alternative but to deny the manifestations as facts, or to admit them only as inexpli-

cable phenomena. The class of facts are as well authenticated, as facts, as any facts can be; but the explanation of them by the spiritists is utterly inadmissible, and sound inductive reasoners, who exclude all revealed principles, must reject it. The professors are not wrong in rejecting that explanation as unscientific; for it would be even more unscientific to admit it; and perhaps, if compelled to do one or the other, we should hold it more unreasonable to admit it than to deny outright the facts themselves.

The fault of the professors is in denying the necessity to the validity of induction of principles neither obtainable nor provable by induction, and in supposing that we can construct an adequate science of the universe without the principles which are given us only by divine revelation. Without these principles we can explain nothing, and the universe is a vast assemblage of inexplicable phenomena; for it is only in those principles we do or can obtain a key to its meaning. Hence, modern science, which excludes both revelation and intuition *a priori*, explains nothing, reduces nothing to its principle and cause, and only generalizes and classifies observable phenomena, which, we submit, is no science at all. Certainly, we do not pretend that science is built on faith, as the traditionalists do, or are accused of doing; but we do say that, without the light of revelation, we cannot construct an adequate science of the universe, or explain the various facts and events of history. If we did not know from revelation that the devil and his angels exist, we might observe the facts of satanophany, but we should not know whence they came, or what they mean. We might be tempted, vexed, harassed, besieged, possessed, by evil spirits as the spiritists are; but we should be ignorant of the cause, and utterly unable to explain our trouble, or to ascribe it to any cause, far less to satanic invasion. The prodigies would be for us simply inexplicable prodigies. But, taught by revelation that the air swarms with evil spirits, the enemies of man, and enemies of man because enemies of God, we can see at once the explanation of the spirit-manifestations, and assign them their real principle and cause.

We know that many who call themselves Christians are disposed to doubt, if not to deny, the personal existence of Satan, and to maintain that the word, which means an enemy or adversary, is simply a general term for the sum of the evil influences to which we are exposed, if not subjected. As if a generalization were possible where there is

nothing concrete! We get rid of no difficulty by this explanation. Influence supposes some person or principle from whom or from which proceeds the influence or inflowing. If you deny Satan's personal existence, you have no option but either to deny evil altogether or to admit an original eternal principle of evil warring against the principle of good, that is, Manicheism, or Persian dualism, which, though Calvinism, indeed, in teaching that evil or sin is something positive, may imply it, is neither good philosophy nor sound Christian theology. According to sound philosophy and theology, God alone hath eternity, and by his word has created heaven and earth, and all things therein, visible and invisible. All the works of God are good, very good; and as there is nothing in existence except himself that he hath not made, it follows necessarily that evil is not a positive existence, but is simply negative, the negation or absence of good. It originates and can originate only in the abuse of his faculties by a creature whom God hath created and endowed with intelligence and free-will, and therefore capable of acting wrong as well as right. To assert that man is subjected or exposed to evil influences leads necessarily to the assertion of a personal devil who exerts it. You must, then, either deny all evil influences from a source foreign to or distinguishable from man's own intrinsic nature, or else admit the personal existence of Satan and his hosts.

Satan and his hosts having rebelled against God, and in refusing to worship the incarnate Son as God, were cast out of heaven, and became the bitter enemies of him and the human race. Satan, as the chief of the fallen angels, evil demons, or devils, carries on incessant war against God, and seeks to draw men away from their allegiance to him, and to get himself worshipped by them in his place. Hence, he seeks by lying wonders to deceive them; by his prodigies to rival in their belief real miracles; and, by his pretended revelations of the spirit-world, to substitute belief in his pretended communications for faith in divine revelation, and thus reëstablish in lands redeemed by Christianity from his dominion the devil-worship which has never ceased to obtain in all heathen countries. The holy Scriptures assure us that all the gods of the heathen are demons or devils. These took possession of the idols made of wood or stone, gold or silver,* had their temples, their priests and priest-

* This explains Planchette, which is a step toward the revival of heathen idol-worship.

esses, their service, and were worshipped as gods. They gave forth oracles, and were consulted, through their mediums, in all great affairs of state, and their omens and auguries, which the people consulted to learn the future, as the spiritists do their mediums. Spiritism belongs to the same order. The spirits, as Mr. Grant well proves, are demons, and the whole thing has for its object to reëstablish, perhaps in a modified form, the devil-worship which formerly obtained among all nations but the Jews or chosen people of God, and still obtains among all nations not yet Christianized. It began in the grand apostasy of the gentiles from the patriarchal religion, which followed the confusion of tongues at Babel; and the spiritists are doing their best to revive it in the grand apostasy from the Christian church, which took place in the sixteenth century, and of which we have such clear and unmistakable predictions in the New Testament. So adroitly has Satan managed, that, if it were possible, the very elect would be deceived. So much we say of the origin and cause of the spirit-manifestations.

If we examine more closely these manifestations, we shall find evidence enough of their satanic character. All satanic invasions bring trouble or perturbation, while the angelic visitations always bring calm, peace, and order. The divine oracles are clear, precise, distinct, free from all ambiguity; for he who gives them knows all his works from their beginning to their end. Satan's oracles are always ambiguous, stammering, and usually deceive or mislead those who trust them. Satan is a creature, and his power and intelligence, though superhuman, are not unlimited. The universe has secrets he cannot penetrate, and he can do no more than his and our Creator permits. He has no prophetic power, for God keeps his own counsels. He can only guess or infer the future from his knowledge of the present. He has no creative power, and can never produce any thing as first cause. Hence, he can operate only with materials fitted to his hand. The spiritists tell us that it is not every one that can be a medium. It is only persons of a certain temperament, found much oftener among women than among men, and, among men, only with those of a feminine character, and wanting alike in manly vigor and robust health. The spirits can communicate only through such as nature or habit has fitted to be mediums, and the communications have always something

of the character of the medium through which they are made. The limited power of Satan, his inability to know the future, which exists only in the divine decree, and his lack of power to form his own medium, render the spirit-communications extremely vague, uncertain, obscure, and feeble.

The dependence of Satan on the medium is manifest. The spirits will not communicate if any thing disturbs the medium, or puts the pythoness out of humor, like the presence of hard-headed sceptics, or a too critical examination by keen-sighted scientific professors determined not to be deceived. Their communications, oral or written, from the pretended spirits of distinguished authors, poets, philosophers, statesmen, are by no means creditable to Satan as a scholar or a gentleman. Then again, the spirits really tell us nothing that amounts to any thing of the spirit-world. Their representations make it a dim and shadowy region, in which the spirits of the departed wander about hither and thither, without end or aim, apparently worse off than in the Elysian fields of the ancients, which resemble more the Christian hell than the Christian's heaven. There is an air of unreality about them; they are the umbræ of heathen philosophy, not living existences; and their region, or, more properly, their state, would be distressing, if one believed at all in the representations given by them. One thing is evident—the spirits know or can say nothing of the beatific vision, which proves that they are not blessed angels. They do not see God, and are clearly banished from his presence. He forms not the light nor the blessedness of their state. They seem, like troubled ghosts, to linger around the places where they lived in the body, pale, thin, shadowy, miserable, anxious to communicate with the living but only occasionally permitted to do so, and even then only to a feeble extent. Friends and acquaintances in this life may recognize, we are told, each other in the spirit-world, but whether with pleasure or pain, it is difficult to say. The picture of their disembodied life is very sad, and the Christian soul finds it dark, hopeless, cheerless, and depressing; as the condition of those doomed to take up their abode with the devil and his angels must necessarily be.

The doctrines the spirits teach and confirm with lying wonders are what the apostle calls "the doctrines of devils." They are unanimous in declaring that there is no devil and

no hell. God may not be absolutely denied, but his personality is obscured, and he appears only in the distance, as an infinite abstraction, being only in the sense in which, Hegel might say, being and not-being are identical—remote from all contemplation, indifferent to what is going on in the world below him, asking neither prayers nor worship, love nor veneration, praise nor thanksgiving, and receiving none. The spirits echo the dominant sentiments of the age, and especially of the circle with which they communicate. They are, where they are not held in check by the lingering respect of the circle for Christianity, furious radicals, great sticklers for progress without divine aid, and of development without a created germ. Yet the doctrines they teach are such as they find in germ, if not developed, in the minds of their mediums. They sometimes deny every distinctively Christian doctrine, and are sure to pervert what of the faith they do not expressly deny. In general, they assert that the form of religion called Christianity has had its day, and that there is a new and sublimer form about to be developed, and that they come to announce it, and to prepare the way for it. The new form of religion will free the world from the old church, from bondage to the Bible, to creeds and dogmas, the old patriarchal systems and governments, and place the religious, social, and political world on a higher plane, and moved by a more energetic spirit of progress. This is the mission of spiritism. It is destined to carry on and complete the work commenced by Christ, but which he left unfinished, and inchoate.

The special object of the spirits, it is pretended, is to convince the world of the immortality of the soul; but in what form, what condition, what sense? The immortality of the soul, or its survival of the body, was generally believed by the heathens, however addicted to demon-worship they might be; but the life and immortality brought to light by the Gospel they did not believe, and the spirits do not teach it or affirm it. The spirits seem to know nothing of immortal life in God, and into which the sanctified soul enters when it departs this life, and is purified from all the stains it may have contracted in the flesh.

The only immortality they offer is the immortality of evil demons or the angels who kept not their first estate. But even of such an immortality for the human soul, they offer no proof. They are lying spirits, and their word is worthless, and their identity with human souls once united

to human bodies which they personate, is not and cannot be established. They deny the resurrection of the dead, which St. Paul preached at Athens, and they give, as we have seen, no proofs that the soul does not die and perish with the body. Their doctrines are simply calculated to deceive the unwary, to draw them away from their allegiance to the Lord of heaven, and to drag them down to the region where dwell the angels that fell.

The ethical doctrines of the spirits are as bad as can be imagined, and the morals of the advanced spiritists would appear to be of the lowest and most revolting sort. It matters not that the spirits give, now and then, some good advice, and say some true things; for the object of satan is to deceive, and his practice is usually to lie and deceive by telling the truth. The truth he tells gains him credit, and secures confidence in him as a guide. But he takes good care that the truth he tells shall have all the effect of falsehood. He gives good moral advice, but he removes all motives for following it, and takes away all moral restraints. He wars against authority in matters of faith and morals, as repugnant to the rights of reason, and in political and domestic life as repugnant to liberty and the rights of women and children. All should do right and seek what is good, but no one should be constrained; only voluntary obedience is meritorious; forced obedience is no virtue. The sentiments and affections should be as free as the air we breathe, and to attempt to restrain them is to war against nature herself. They are not voluntary either in their origin or nature, and therefore are not and should not be subjected to an outward law. Love, the apostle tells us, is the fulfilling of the law, the bond of perfection. How wrong, then, to undertake to put gyves on love, to constrain it, or to subject it to the petty conventionalities of a moribund society, or the rules of an antiquated morality! Taking no note of the distinction between the supernatural love, which Christians call charity, and love as a natural sentiment, and as little of the distinction between the different sorts of love even as a natural sentiment, as the love of parents for children and children for parents, the love of friends, the love of country, the love of truth and justice, and the love of the sexes for each other, or simply sexual love, Satan lays the foundation, as we can easily see, if not blinded by his delusions, for the grossest corruption and the most beastly immorality.

Hence the spiritists very generally look upon the marriage law as tyrannical and absurd, and assert the doctrine of free love. The marriage is in the love, and when the love is no more, the marriage is dissolved. None of our sentiments depend on the will; hence, self-denial is unnatural, and immoral. Prostitution is wrong, for no love redeems and hallows it; and for the same reason it is immoral for a man and woman to live together as husband and wife, after they have ceased to love each other. It is easy to see to what this leads, and we cannot be surprised to find conjugal fidelity not reckoned as a virtue by spiritists; to find wives leaving their husbands, and husbands their wives, or the wife choosing a new husband as often as she pleases or wills; and the husband taking a new wife when tired of the old, or an additional wife or two, Mormon-like, when one at a time is not enough. Indeed, Mormonism is only one form and the most strictly organized form, of contemporary spiritism, and woman's-rightism is only another product of the same shop, though doubtless many of the women carried away by it are pure-minded and chaste. But the leaders are spiritists or intimately connected with them. The *animus* of the woman-movement is hostility to the marriage law, and the cares and drudgery of maternity and home life. It threatens to be not the least of the corrupting and dangerous forms of spiritism.

Mr. Grant, who is a stanch Protestant, and hates Catholicity with a most hearty hatred, gives, on adequate authority, a sketch of the immorality of spiritists which should startle the community: we make an extract:

"We pass to notice some further facts relative to the *moral* tendency of spiritualism. We have read its *claims*, and found them very high; but there is abundant proof to show that, instead of its being 'ancient Christianity revived,' it is the worst enemy Christianity ever had to meet. We believe it to be satan's last grand effort to substitute a false for the true Christianity. His snares are laid most ingeniously; and, unless very watchful, ere people are aware of it, they will be caught in some of his traps. Thousands and millions are already his deluded victims, and, like a terrible tornado, he is sweeping with destruction on every side. Occasionally we hear a warning voice from one who has escaped from his power, like a mariner from the sinking wreck; but most, after they once get into the spiritualist 'circle,' are like the boat man under the control of the terrible whirlpool on the coast of Norway —destruction is sure.

"The next witness we introduce is Mr. J. F. Whitney, editor of the

New York *Pathfinder*. He was formerly a warm advocate of spiritualism, and published much in its favor. He says:

"'Now, after a long and constant watchfulness, seeing for months and years its progress and its practical workings upon its devotees, its believers, and its mediums, we are compelled to speak our honest conviction, which is, that the manifestations coming through the acknowledged mediums, who are designated as rapping, tipping, writing, and entranced mediums, have a baneful influence upon believers, and create discord and confusion; that the generality of these teachings inculcate false ideas, approve of selfish, individual acts, and endorse theories and principles which, when carried out, *debase* and make them *little better than the brute*.'

"Again he says: 'Seeing as we have the gradual progress it makes with its believers, particularly its mediums, from lives of *morality* to those of *sensuality* and *immorality*, gradually and cautiously undermining the foundation of good principles, we look back with amazement to the radical change which a few months will bring about in individuals.'

"He says in conclusion: 'We desire to send forth our warning voice; and if our humble position as the head of a public journal, our known advocacy of spiritualism, our experience, and the conspicuous part we have played among its believers; the honesty and the fearlessness with which we have defended the subject, will weigh any thing in our favor, we desire that our opinions may be received, and those who are moving passively down the rushing rapids to destruction, should pause, ere it be too late, and save themselves from the blasting influence which those manifestations are causing.'

"FORBIDDING TO MARRY.

"Among other instructions of the spirits, the apostle Paul has assured us that they will be opposed to the marriage laws, 'forbidding to marry.' 1 Tim. iv. 3.

"At the Rutland (Vt.) Reform Spiritualist Convention, held in June, 1858, the following resolution was presented and defended:

"'*Resolved*, That the only true and natural marriage is an exclusive conjugal love between one man and one woman; and the only true home is the isolated home, based upon this exclusive love.'

"The careless reader may see nothing objectionable in the resolution; but please read it again and observe what constitutes *marriage*, according to the resolution, 'an exclusive conjugal LOVE between one man and one woman.' The poison sentiment is covered up by the word '*one*.' What constitutes marriage now, according to the laws of the land? Do we understand that, when we see a notice of a marriage in a paper, which took place at a certain time and place, that then the parties began to love each other exclusively? Certainly not; but at that time their love was sanctioned by the proper authorities, and thus they became husband and wife. But the resolution states that the *marriage* should consist in the 'exclusive conjugal *love*.' Then it follows, when either party loves

another *exclusively*, the first marriage is dissolved, and they are married again; and if the other one does not happen to find a spiritual 'affinity,' then there is no alternative left but to make the best of it, as many have been compelled to do. According to this resolution, one is married as often as his love becomes '*exclusive*' for any particular individual. This is one item in the boasted 'new social order,' which the spirits propose to establish when the political power is in their hands. It is called by them the 'Divine Law of Marriage.' A large number of spiritualists are already carrying out this resolution practically, regardless of the laws of the land.

"A similar resolution was presented at the National Spiritual Convention held in Chicago, from Aug. 9th to 14th, 1864. It was offered by Dr. A. G. Parker, of Boston, chairman of the committee on social relations. This point is strongly urged by the spirits and spiritualists.

"At the Rutland Reform Convention, which closed June 27th, 1858, the resolution under consideration was earnestly advocated by able men and women. Said Mrs. Julia Branch, of New York, as reported in *The Banner of Light*, July 10th, 1858, when speaking on the resolution: 'I am aware that I have chosen almost a forbidden subject; forbidden from the fact that any one who *can* or *dare* look the marriage question in the face, candidly and openly denouncing the institution as the sole cause of woman's degradation and misery, are objects of suspicion, of scorn, and opprobrious epithets.'

"She further remarked in the defence of the resolution, and the rights of women, 'She must demand her freedom; her right to receive the equal wages of man in payment for her labor; *her right to have children when she will, and by whom.*'"

Much more to the same effect, and even more startling, we might quote; we might give the account of the spiritist community at Berlin, Ohio; but we have no wish to disgust our readers, and this is enough for our purpose; it is sufficient to prove to all, not under the delusion, that spiritism is of satanic origin, and to be eschewed by all who wish to remain morally sane, and to lead honest and upright lives. We are not disposed to be alarmists, and, like the majority of our countrymen, are more likely to err on the side of optimism than of pessimism; but we cannot contemplate the rapid spread of spiritism since 1847, when it began with the Fox girls, without feeling that a really great danger threatens the modern world, and that there is ample reason for all who do not wish to see demon-worship supplanting the worship of God throughout the land, to be on their guard. Mr. Grant, who seems to be well informed on the subject, tells us that since that period, spiritism "has become world-wide in its influence, numbering among its ardent supporters

many of the first men and women of both continents. Ministers, doctors, lawyers, judges, congressmen, governors, presidents, queens, kings, and emperors, of all religions, are bowing to its influence, and showing their sympathy with its teachings."

Mr. Grant should not say, "of all religions;" some Catholics may have become spiritists, but they cannot become so, and persist in following spiritism without severing themselves from the church. Some spiritists have been told by the spirits to become Catholics; but the church has required them to give up spiritism, and they have either done so, or left her communion, like Daniel Home, and returned to their communion with the demons. The church forbids her children to have any dealings with devils. But with this rectification the statement is not exaggerated. The spread of spiritism has been prodigious, and proves not only the power and cunning of Satan, but that the way for his success had been well prepared, and that no small portion of the modern world were in the moral condition of the old world at the epoch of the great gentile apostasy, and ready to return to the heathen darkness and superstition, the vice and corruption, from which the Gospel had rescued them, or, at least, had rescued their ancestors.

We know not the number of spiritists in our country. We have seen it stated that they reckon their numbers by millions; but there can be no doubt that they include a very large portion of our whole population. Has this fact any thing to do with the astounding increase of vice and crime in our country within the last few years, the undeniable corruption of morals and manners, and the growing frequency of murder and suicide? Senator Sprague, an honorable and an honest man and a true patriot, stated, the other day, in his place in the Senate of the United States, that our country is morally and politically more corrupt than any other country in the civilized world. We hope he is mistaken, but we are afraid that he is not wholly wrong. It is idle to attribute this corruption to the influences of the late civil war, and still idler or worse than idle, to attribute it, as some do, to the heavy influx of foreigners; for, though among those are many old-world criminals, the great body of the foreigners, when they land here, are far more moral, honest, upright, conscientious, than the average of native Americans; and though they soon prove that "evil communications corrupt good manners," much of the patriot's

hope for the future depends on them, especially the Catholic portion of them, if, in due season, their children can be brought under the influence of the church, and receive a proper Catholic training.

Unhappily, the simple, natural virtues of former times, such as existed in ancient Greece and Rome, and exist even now in some pagan and Mohammedan countries, have, to a fearful extent, been lost with us, and the sects have nothing with which to supply their place, or which to oppose to this terrible satanic invasion. They have indeed done much to prepare the way for it, and are doing still more, by their opposition to the church, to render it successful. But, though the danger is great and pressing, we are not disposed to think, with Mr. Grant, that we are in what he calls the "world's crisis." The danger is far less than it was; because the satanic origin and character of the so-called spirit-manifestations are widely suspected, and are beginning to be exposed. Satan is powerless in the open day. He is never dangerous when seen and known to be Satan. He must always disguise himself as an angel of light, and appear as the defender of some cause which, in its time and place, is good, but, mistimed and misplaced, is evil. He has done wonders in our day as a philanthropist, and met with marvellous success as a humanitarian, and will, perhaps, meet with more still as the champion of free love and women's rights. But he has no power over the elect, and, though he may besiege the virtuous and the holy, he can captivate only the children of disobedience, who are already the victims of their own pride, vanity, lust, or unbelief.

The end of the world may be at hand, and these lying signs and wonders may be the precursors of Antichrist; but we do not think the end is just yet. Faith has not yet wholly died out, and the church has seen, perhaps, darker days than the present. The power of Christ, or his patience, is not yet exhausted; the gospel of the kingdom has not yet been preached to all nations; three-fourths of the human race remain as yet unconverted, and we cannot believe that the church has as yet fulfilled her mission, and Christianity done its work. Too many of the sentinels have slept at their posts, and there has been a fearful lack of vigilance and alertness of which the enemy has taken advantage. The sleepers in Zion are many; but these satanic knocks and raps, and these tippings of tables, and this horrid din and racket of the spirits to indicate their presence, can hardly

fail to awaken them, unless they are really sleeping the sleep of death. The church is still standing, and if her children will watch and pray, she can battle with the enemy as successfully as she has done so many times before.

Many Catholics have had their doubts of the reality of the alleged spirit-manifestations, and, even conceding them as facts, have been slow to recognize their satanic origin and character. But those doubts are now generally removed. The fearful moral and spiritual ravages of spiritism have dispelled or are fast dispelling them, and it will go hard but here and now as always and everywhere, what Satan regards as a splendid triumph shall turn out against him and bring him to shame. Thus far in his war against the Son of God all his victories have been his defeats.

One thing is certain, that the only power there is to resist this satanic invasion is the Catholic Church; and there is, unless we greatly deceive ourselves, a growing interest in the Catholic question far beyond any that has heretofore been felt. Thinking and well-disposed men see and feel the impotence of the sects; that they have no divine life, and no divine support; that they stand in human folly, rather than even in human wisdom. Eminent Protestant ministers eloquently proclaim and conclusively show that Protestantism was a blunder, and has proved a failure; and there springs up a growing feeling among the more intelligent and well-disposed of our non-Catholic countrymen, that the judgment rendered against the church by the reformers in the sixteenth century was hasty, and needs revision, perhaps a reversal. This feeling, if it continues to grow, can augur but ill for the ultimate success of Satan and his followers.

OWEN ON SPIRITISM.*

[From the Catholic World, for March, 1873.]

Mr. Owen, though he has since been a member of Congress, and an American minister at Naples, was formerly well known in this city as associated with Frances Wright in editing the *Free Enquirer*, as the author of an infamous work on moral physiology, and as an avowed atheist. He now claims to be a believer in the existence of God, and in the truth of the Christian religion; but his God has no freedom of action, being hedged in and bound hand and foot by the laws of nature, and his Christianity is a Christianity without Christ, and indistinguishable from unmitigated heathenism. How much he has gained by his conversion, through the intervention of the spirits, from atheism to demonism and gross superstition, it is not easy to say, though it is better to believe in the devil, if one does not mistake him for God, than it is to believe in nothing.

Mr. Owen makes, as do hundreds of others, a mistake in using the word *spiritualism* for *spiritism*, and spiritual for spirital or spiritalistic. Spiritualism is appropriated to designate a system of philosophy opposed to sensism or materialism, and spiritual stands opposed to sensual or carnal, and is too holy a term to be applied to spirit-rapping, table-tipping, and other antics of the spirits. Mr. Owen is unhappy in naming his books. He holds that the universe is governed by inflexible, immutable, and imperishable physical laws; that all events or manifestations take place by the agency of these laws; that the future is only the continuation and development of the present; and that death is only the throwing off of one's overcoat, and the life after death is the identical life, without any interruption, that we now live. We see not well how he can assert another world, or a debatable land between this world and the next. If all things and all events are produced by the agency of natural laws, and those laws are universal and

*1. *The Debatable Land between this World and the Next.* With Illustrative Narratives. By Robert Dale Owen. New York: 1872.

2. *Footfalls on the Boundary of Another World.* With Narrative Illustrations. By Robert Dale Owen. Philadelphia: 1860.

unchangeable, we are unable to conceive any world above or beyond nature, or any world in any sense distinguishable from the present natural world. His books are therefore decidedly misnamed, and so named as to imply the existence of another world and a world after this, which cannot on his principles be true.

Mr. Owen's first book was mainly intended to establish the fact and to show the character of the spirit-manifestations; in his last work, his design is to show that these manifestations take place by virtue of the physical law of the universe, that they are of the same nature and origin with the Christian miracles, inspiration, and revelation, and are simply supplementary to them, or designed to continue, augment, and develop them; and to show, especially to Protestants, that, if they mean to make theology a progressive science, and win the victory over their enemy the Catholic Church, they must call in the spirits to their aid, and accept and profit by their inspirations and revelations.

This shows that the author leans to Protestantism, and seeks its triumph over Catholicity; or that he regards Protestantism as offering a more congenial soil for the seed he would sow than the old church with her hierarchy and infallibility. Certainly, he holds that, as it is, Protestantism is losing ground. In 1580 it held the vast majority of the people of Europe, but is now only a feeble minority. Even in this country, he says, if Catholics continue to increase for a third of a century to come in the same ratio that they have for the last three-fourths of a century, they will have a decided majority. As things now go, the whole world will become Catholic, and the only way to prevent it, he thinks, is to accept the aid of the spirits. We are not so sure that this aid would suffice, for Satan, their chief, has been the fast friend of Protestants ever since he persuaded Luther to give up private masses, and has done his best for them, and it is difficult to see what more he can do for them than he has hitherto done.

Mr. Owen, since he holds the spirit-manifestations take place by a natural law, always operative, and always producing the same effects in the same or like favorable circumstances, of course cannot recognize in them any thing miraculous or supernatural; and, as he holds the alleged Christian miracles, the wonderful things recorded in the Old and New Testaments, are of the same order, and pro-

duced by the same agency, he, while freely admitting them as facts, denies their miraculous or supernatural character. He thinks that the circumstances when these extraordinary events occurred were favorable to spirit-manifestations; the age was exceedingly ignorant, superstitious, and semi-barbarous, and needed new accessions of light and truth, and the spirits, through our Lord and his apostles as medium—God forgive us for repeating the blasphemy—made such revelations as that age most needed or could bear or assimilate. This age also needs further revelations of truth, especially to enable it to throw off the incubus of a fixed, permanent, non-progressive, infallible church, and secure an open field, and a final victory for the rational religion and progressive theology implied in the Protestant reformation. So the spirits once more kindly come to our assistance, and reveal to us such further portions of truth as man is prepared for and especially needs. Very generous in them.

This is the doctrine, briefly and faithfully stated, of Mr. Owen's *Debatable Land*, which he sets forth with a charming *naïveté*, and a self-complacency little short of the sublime. There is this to be said in his favor: the devil speaks better English through him than through the majority of the mediums he seems compelled to use; yet not much better sense. But what new light have the spirits shed over the great problems of life and death, time and eternity, good and evil, or what new revelations of truth have they made? Here is the author's summary of their teaching:

"1. This is a world governed by a God of love and mercy, in which all things work together for good to those who reverently conform to his eternal laws.

"2. In strictness there is no death. Life continues from the life which now is into that which is to come, even as it continues from one day to another; the sleep which goes by the name of death being but a brief transition-slumber, from which, for the good, the awakening is immeasurably more glorious than is the dawn of earthly morning, the brightest that ever shone. In all cases in which life is well-spent, the change which men are wont to call death is God's last and best gift to his creatures here.

"3. The earth-phase of life is an essential preparation for the life which is to come. Its appropriate duties and callings cannot be neglected without injury to human welfare and development, both in this world and in the next. Even its enjoyments, temperately accepted, are fit preludes to the happiness of a higher state.

"4. The phase of life which follows the death-change is, in strictest sense, the supplement of that which precedes it. It has the same variety

of avocations, duties, enjoyments, corresponding, in a measure, to those of earth, but far more elevated; and its denizens have the same variety of character and of intelligence; existing, too, as men do here, in a state of progress. Released from bodily earth-clog, their periscope is wider, their perceptions more acute, their spiritual knowledge much greater, their judgment clearer, their progress more rapid, than ours. Vastly wiser and more dispassionate than we, they are still, however, fallible; and they are governed by the same general laws of being, modified only by corporal *disenthralment*, to which they were *subjected* here.

"5. Our state here determines our initial state there. The habitual promptings, the pervading impulses, the life-long yearnings, in a word the moving spirit, or what Swedenborg calls the 'ruling loves' of man—these decide his condition on entering the next world: not the written articles of his creed, nor yet the incidental errors of his life.

"6. We do not, either by faith or works, *earn* heaven, nor are we sentenced, on any day of wrath, to hell. In the next world we simply gravitate to the position for which, by life on earth, we have fitted ourselves; and we occupy that position *because* we are fitted for it.

"7. There is no instantaneous change of character when we pass from the present phase of life. Our virtues, our vices; our intelligence, our ignorance; our aspirations, our grovellings; our habits, propensities, prejudices even—all pass over with us, modified, doubtless (*but to what extent we know not*), when the spiritual body emerges, divested of its fleshly encumbrance; yet essentially the same as when the death slumber came over us.

"8. The sufferings there, natural sequents of evil-doing and evil-thinking here, are as various in character and in degree as the enjoyments; but they are mental, not bodily. There is no escape from them, except only, as on earth, by the door of repentance. There as here, sorrow for sin committed and desire for an amended life are the indispensable conditions-precedent of advancement to a better state of being.

"9. In the next world love ranks higher than what we call wisdom; being itself the highest wisdom. There deeds of benevolence far outweigh professions of faith. There simple goodness rates above intellectual power. There the humble are exalted. There the meek find their heritage. There the merciful obtain mercy. The better denizens of that world are charitable to frailty, and compassionate to sin far beyond the dwellers in this: they forgive the erring brethren they have left behind them, even to seventy times seven. There, is no respect of persons. There, too, self-righteousness is rebuked and pride brought low.

"10. A trustful, childlike spirit is the state of mind in which men are most receptive of beneficent spiritual impressions; and such a spirit is the best preparation for entrance into the next world.

"11. There have always existed intermundane laws, according to which men may occasionally obtain, under certain conditions, revealings from those who have passed to the next world before them. A

certain proportion of human beings are more sensitive to spiritual perceptions and influences than their fellows; and it is usually in the presence, or through the medium, of one or more of these, that ultramundane intercourse occurs.

"12. When the conditions are favorable, and the sensitive through whom the manifestations come is highly gifted, these may supply important materials for thought and valuable rules of conduct. But spiritual phenomena sometimes do much more than this. In their highest phases they furnish proof, strong as that which Christ's disciples enjoyed—proof addressed to the reason and tangible to the senses—of the reality of another life, better and happier than this, and of which our earthly pilgrimage is but the novitiate. They bring immortality to light under a blaze of evidence which outshines, as the sun the stars, all traditional or historical testimonies. For surmise they give us conviction, and assured knowledge of wavering belief.

"13. The chief motives which induce spirits to communicate with men appear to be—a benevolent desire to convince us, past doubt or denial, that there *is* a world to come; now and then, the attraction of unpleasant memories, such as murder or suicide; sometimes (in the worldly-minded) the earth-binding influence of cumber and trouble: but, far more frequently, the divine impulse of human affections, seeking the good of the loved ones it has left behind, and, at times, drawn down, perhaps, by their yearning cries.

"14. Under unfavorable or imperfect conditions, spiritual communications, how honestly reported soever, often prove vapid and valueless; and this chiefly happens when communications are too assiduously sought or continuously persisted in: brief volunteered messages being the most trustworthy. Imprudence, inexperience, supineness, or the idiosyncrasy of the recipient may occasionally result in arbitrary control by spirits of a low order; as men here sometimes yield to the infatuation exerted by evil associates. Or, again, there may be exerted by the inquirer, especially if dogmatic and self-willed, a dominating influence over the medium, so strong as to produce effects that might be readily mistaken for what has been called possession. As a general rule, however, any person of common intelligence and ordinary will can, in either case, cast off such mischievous control: or, if the weak or incautious give way, one who may not improperly be called an exorcist—if possessed of strong magnetic will, moved by benevolence, and it may be aided by prayer, can usually rid, or at least assist to rid, the sensitive from such abnormal influence."—(*Debatable Land*, pp. 171-176.)

We have no intention of criticising this creed of the spirits as set forth by their learned medium. It is heathen, not Christian, and we have discovered in it nothing new, true or false. It denies the essential points of the Christian faith, and what few things it affirms that Christianity denies

are affirmed on no trustworthy or sufficient authority. A man must have little knowledge of human nature, and have felt little of the needs, desires, and aspirations of the human soul, who can be satisfied with this spirits-creed. In it all is vague, indefinite, and as empty as the shades the heathen imagined to be wandering up and down on this side the Styx. But in it we find a statement that dispenses us from the necessity of examining and refuting it. In Article 4 we find it said: "Vastly wiser and more dispassionate than we, they [the spirits] are still, however, *fallible*."

Whether the spirits are wiser and more dispassionate than we or not may be questioned; they do not seem to be so in the author's illustrative narrations, and the fact that they have undergone no essential change by throwing off their overcoat of flesh, and living the same life they lived here, and are in the sphere for which they were fitted before entering the spirit-land, renders the matter somewhat doubtful, to say the least. But it is conceded that they are *fallible*. Who or what, then, vouches for the fact that they are not themselves deceived, or that they do not seek to deceive us? By acknowledging the fallibility of the spirits, Mr. Owen acknowledges that their testimony, in all cases, when we can have nothing else on which to rely, is perfectly worthless. We can bring it to no crucial test, and we have no vouchers either for their knowledge or their honesty. Even supposing them to be what they profess to be, which we by no means concede, it were sheer credulity to take their word for any thing not otherwise verifiable.

Mr. Owen and all the spiritists tell us that the spirit-manifestations prove undeniably the immortality of the soul; but they prove nothing of the sort. We need, in the first place, no ghost from hell to assure us that the immortality of the soul follows necessarily from the immateriality of the soul; for that is demonstrable from reason, and was generally believed by the heathen. What was not believed by the heathen, and is not provable by reason, is the Christian doctrine of the resurrection; and this, and supernatural life and immortality, the spirits do not even pretend to teach. Look through Mr. Owen's statement of their teaching, and you will find no hint of the "resurrectionem carnis" or "vitam æternam" of the apostolic symbol. Are we to reject the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, and the life and immortality brought to light through the Gospel—which is something far different

from a simple continuation of the soul's physical existence —a doctrine so necessary to virtue, and so dear and consoling to the afflicted, on the authority of fallible spirits, whose knowledge or veracity nothing vouches for, and who prove themselves not seldom to be lying spirits?

In the second place, what proof have we that those rapping or table-tipping spirits are the spirits of men and women once in the flesh? Mr. Owen undertakes to establish their identity, but he does not do it and cannot do it; for no proof in the case is possible except by a miracle, and miracles the author rejects, and declares the argument from them in all cases a *non-sequitur*. The spirit-manifestations of which the spiritists make so much, and in which they fancy they have a new inspiration and revelation, are nothing new in history, and are not more frequent now than they have been at various other epochs. They were more common amongst the polished pagan Greeks and Romans than they are in any really or nominally Christian nation now. They are nothing new or peculiar to our times. Tertullian speaks of them, the author of the *Clementine Recognitions* was acquainted with them, and so was St. Augustine. The trance was one of the five faculties or states of the soul recognized by the Neo-Platonists, and was the principle of the Alexandrine theurgy. The church has in every age encountered them, been obliged to deal with them, and she has uniformly ascribed them to Satan and his angels. She has had from the first, and still has, her forms of exorcism against them, to cast them out, and relieve those who are troubled by them. Every day she in some locality even now exorcises them, compels them to acknowledge the power of the name of Jesus, and sends them back discomfited to hell.

The spiritists cannot say the doctrine of the church is impossible or prove that it is not true. It certainly is a possible hypothesis, if nothing more. Then spiritists cannot say that Satan does not personify the spirits of the departed, or that it is not Satan or some one of his angels that speaks in those pretending to be the spirit of Washington, of Jefferson, of Franklin, of Shakespeare, of Milton, of Byron, or of some near and dear deceased relative? You must prove that it is not so, before you can affirm the identity claimed. The great Tichborne case now before the English courts proves that it is no easy matter to establish one's own identity even while in the flesh, and it must be much more difficult for a ghost, which is not even visible.

The spiritists admit that the spirits are fallible; that there are among them lying, malevolent spirits. A gentleman with whom we were well acquainted, a firm believer in the spirits, and himself a medium, holding frequent communications with them, assured us that he held them to be evil spirits, and knew them to be lying spirits. "I asked them," he said, "at an interview with them, if they could tell me where my sister then was. 'Your sister,' I was answered, 'has some time since entered the spirit-world, and is now in the third circle.' It was false: my sister was alive and well, and I knew it. I told them so, and that they lied; and they laughed at me: and then I asked whose spirit was speaking with me. I was answered, 'Voltaire.' 'That is a lie, too, is it not?' Another laugh, or chuckle rather. I assure you," said our friend, "one can place no confidence in what they say. In my intercourse with them, I have found them a pack of liars."

This pretension of the spiritists that the spirits that manifest themselves through nervous, sickly, half-crazy mediums, or mediums confessedly in an abnormal or exceptional state, are really spirits who once lived in the flesh, is not sustainable; for they cannot be relied on, and nothing hinders us from holding them to be devils or evil demons, personating the spirits of deceased persons, as the church has always taught us. This, certainly, is very possible, and the character of the manifestations themselves favors such an interpretation; for only devils, and very silly devils too, dealing with very ignorant, superstitious, and credulous people, would mingle so much of the ludicrous and ridiculous in their manifestations, as the thumping, knocking, rollicking spirits, tipping over chairs and tables, and creating a sort of universal hubbub wherever they come. The spirits of the dead, if permitted at all to communicate with the living for any good purpose, we may well believe, would be permitted to do it more quietly, more gravely, and in a more open and direct way; it is only the devil or his subjects that would turn all their grave communications into ridicule by their antics or comic accompaniments. These considerations, added to the fact that the spirits communicate nothing not otherwise known or knowable, that is not demonstrably false, and that they tell us nothing very clear or definite about the condition of departed souls, nothing but what their consultors are predisposed to believe, convince us that, if they prove the existence of powers in

some sense superhuman, they prove nothing for or against the reality of a life after this life. They leave the question of life and immortality, of good and evil, rewards and punishments, heaven and hell, where they were.

Mr. Owen places the spirit-manifestations, and the Biblical miracles, and Christian inspiration and revelation, in the same category, attributes them all alike to the agency of the spirits, and thinks he has discovered a way in which one may accept the extraordinary events and doings recorded in the Old and New Testaments as historical facts, without being obliged to recognize them as miracles. This is absurd. The resemblance between the two classes of facts is far less than honest Fluellen's resemblance of Harry of Monmouth to Alexander of Macedon, "There is a river in Macedon, so is there a river also in Wales." The man who can detect any relation between the two classes of facts, but that of dissimilarity and contrast, is the very man to believe in the spirit-revelations, to mistake evil for good, darkness for light, and the devil for God. We find both classes of facts in the New Testament. The Christian miracles are all marked by an air of quiet power. There is no bluster, no rage, no foaming at the mouth, no fierceness of look or gesture, no falling, or rending, as in the case of the demoniacs; and no rapping, no table-tipping, no antics, no stammering, no half-utterances, no convulsions, no disturbance, as in the case of the spirit-manifestations described by Mr. Owen in his books. In the one case, all is calm and serene, pure and holy; there is no effort, no straining, but a simple, normal exercise of power. Our Lord rebukes the winds and the waves, and there comes a great calm; he speaks, the leper is cleansed, the blind see, the deaf hear, the lame walk, the dead live. What like this is there in Mr. Owen's ghostly or ghastly narratives of trances, thundering noises, and haunted houses? Every one of his narratives shows, so far as it shows any thing not explicable by simple psychical states and powers, the marks which the church has always regarded as signs of the presence of the devil. Some of the cases he describes are clearly cases of possession, and others are as clearly cases of obsession. Unhappily, Mr. Owen, who formerly believed in no God, now takes, knowingly or not, the devil to be God.

Mr. Owen has hardly improved on the heathen Celsus, who was refuted by Origen. Celsus charged the miracles of our Lord to magic. Mr. Owen ascribes them to necro-

mancy, and regards the apostles and saints each as a person with a familiar spirit, or, in the language of the spiritists, a medium. The Jews also ascribed the miracles of our Lord to the agency of the devil, and charged that it was by Beelzebub, the prince of devils, that he did his wonderful works. But there is a striking difference between the Jews and Celsus and our late minister to Naples. They sought to prove the satanic origin of the miracles of our Lord as a reason for rejecting him and his teaching; he attempts to do it as a reason for believing him and reverencing his doctrine and character. But they lived in an age of darkness, superstition, and semi-barbarism, and he in an age of light, reason, and civilization, and the distance between him and them is the measure of the progress the world has made since their time—a mighty progress indeed, but a progress backward. The Bible tells us all the gods of the heathen were devils, and Mr. Owen agrees and takes the devil for God, and demon-worship as true divine worship. What the Jews and Celsus falsely alleged against our Lord as an objection, he reasserts as a recommendation. He has discovered that evil is good.

The class of facts which the spirits call spirit-manifestations are recognized in the Bible from beginning to end, but always as the works of the devil or evil spirits, always as works to be condemned and to be avoided; and any communication with those who do them is forbidden. Necromancers, or those who consult the spirits of the dead, are mentioned and condemned in the book of Genesis. The Mosaic law ordained that a witch or a woman with a familiar spirit—that is, a medium, whether a rapping or a clear-seeing, a talking or a writing, medium—should not be suffered to live. The church has always condemned every thing of the sort, and requires a candidate for baptism to renounce the devil and his works, and expels the devil from him by her exorcisms, before receiving the postulant to her communion. And yet Mr. Owen would have us believe that the Bible and the church sanction his doctrine, that the Christian miracles and the spirit-manifestations are produced by one and the same agency! Verily, Mr. Owen throws a strong light on the origin of the great gentile apostasy, and shows us how easily men who break from the unity of divine tradition, and set up for themselves, can lose sight of God, and come step by step to worship the devil in his place. The thing seemed incredible, and we had some dif-

ficulty in taking the assertion of the Holy Scriptures literally, "All the gods of the gentiles are devils;" but since we see apostasy from the church running the same career, and actually inaugurating the worship of demons, actually exalting the devil above our Lord, the Mystery of Iniquity is explained, and the matter becomes plain and credible.

It is curious to see what has been the course of thought in the Protestant apostasy in regard to the class of facts in question. Having lost the power of exorcism with their loss of the true faith, the Protestant nations had no resource against the invasions of the spirits but to carry out the injunction of the Mosaic law, "Thou shall not suffer a witch" —that is, a medium—"to live." Hence we find their annals in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries blackened with accounts of the trials and cruel punishments of persons suspected of witchcraft, sorcery, or dealings with the devil, especially in England, Scotland, and the Anglo-American colonies. Having no well-defined and certain criteria, as the church has, by which to determine the presence of Satan, many persons, no doubt, were put to death who were innocent of the offences of which they were accused. This produced a reaction in the public mind against the laws and against the execution of persons for witchcraft or dealing with the devil. This reaction was followed by a denial of witchcraft, or that the devil had any thing to do with matters and things on earth, and a shower of ridicule fell on all who believed in any thing of the sort. Then came the general doubt, and then the denial of the existence of the devil and all infernal spirits, save in human nature itself. Finally came the spirit-manifestations, in which Satan is no longer regarded as Satan, but is held to be divine, and worshipped as God, by thousands and millions.

We must be excused from entering into any elaborate refutation of Mr. Owen's blasphemous attempts to bring the Christian miracles under the general law, as he regards it, of spirit-manifestations. He has proved the reality of no such law, and if he had, the spirit-manifestations themselves would prove nothing more than a gale of wind, a shower of rain, a flash of lightning, or the growth of a spire of grass. Could we prove the Christian miracles to be facts in the order of nature, or show them as taking place by a general law, and not by the immediate act of God, and therefore no miracles at all, we should deprive them of all their importance. The value of the facts is not in their being facts, but

in their being miraculous facts, which none but God can work. The author does not understand this, but supposes that he has won a victory for Christianity when he has proved the miracles as facts, but at the same time that they are no miracles.

It is clear from his pages that the author does not know what Christians understand by a miracle. He cites St. Augustine to prove that a miracle is something that may take place by some law of nature to us unknown, but St. Augustine, in the passage he cites, is not speaking of miracles at all; he is speaking of portents, prodigies, or extraordinary events, which the ignorant, and the superstitious ascribe to a supernatural agency; but which may, after all, however wonderful, be produced by a natural cause, as in our days not a few believe to be the case with the spirit-manifestations themselves, and no doubt is the case with most of the wonders the spiritists relate. The devil may work portents or prodigies, but not miracles, because he has no creative power, and can work only with materials created to his hand.

It is necessary also to distinguish between what is simply superhuman and what is supernatural. Whatever is creature is in the order of nature. Nature embraces the entire creation—whatever exists that is not God or is distinguishable from him. Whether the created powers are above man or below him in the scale of existence, they are equally natural, and so is whatever they are capable, as second causes, of doing. The angels in heaven, the very highest as the lowest, are God's creatures, distinguishable from him, and therefore included in nature. The same must be said of the devils in hell, or the ghosts, if the spirits of the departed, and hence whatever they do is within the natural order. The devil is superior, if you will, by nature to man—for man is made little lower than the angels, and the devil is an angel fallen; he may know many things beyond human intelligence, and do many things beyond the power of man; but what the devil does, is, if superhuman, not in any sense supernatural, but as natural as what man himself does. We agree with Mr. Owen, though not for the same reason, that there is nothing miraculous in the spirit-manifestations, even supposing them to be facts, and therefore they are of no value in relation to the truth or falsehood of Christianity as a revelation of and by the supernatural.

God alone, and what he does immediately by his direct and immediate act, is supernatural. God alone can work

a miracle, which is a supernatural effect wrought without any natural medium, law, or agency, in or on nature, and is, as far as it goes, a manifestation of creative power.

Miracles do what portents, prodigies, spirit-rappings, &c., do not—they manifest the supernatural, or the existence of a real order above nature. They do not indeed directly prove the truth of the Christian mysteries, but they do accredit our Lord as a teacher sent from God. As Nicodemus said when he came by night to Jesus, "Rabbi, we know that thou art come a teacher from God, for no man can do the miracles thou doest, unless God were with him." God in the miracles accredits the teacher, and vouches for the truth of what he in whose favor they are wrought teaches. What our Lord teaches, then, is true. If he teaches that he is perfect God and perfect man in hypostatic union, then he is so, and then is to be believed, on his own word, whatever he teaches, for "it is impossible for God to lie." The facts, then, are of no importance if not miracles. Hence the "natural-supernaturalism" of the *Sartor Resartus* is not only a contradiction in terms, but utterly worthless, as are most of the admired utterances of its author, and aid us not in solving a single problem for which revelation is needed.

Deprive us of the prophecies under the Old Law and the miracles under the New, and we should be deprived of all means of proving Christianity as a supernatural religion, as supernaturally inspired and revealed, and should be reduced, as Mr. Owen is, to naked rationalism, or downright demonism. The prodigies of the devil do not carry us above nature. They are indeed Satan's efforts to counterfeit genuine miracles, but at best they only give us the superhuman for the supernatural. If the author could prove the Christian miracles are not miracles, though credible as facts, or if he could bring them into the category of the spirit-manifestations, he would in effect divest Christianity of its supernatural character, and render it all as worthless as any man-constructed system of ethics or philosophy. His Christianity, as set forth in his pages, has not a trace of the Christianity of Christ, and is as little worthy of being called Christian as the bald Unitarianism of Channing, or the Deism of Rousseau, Tom Paine, or Voltaire, or the Free Religion of Emerson, Higginson, and Julia Ward Howe.

What Mr. Owen regards as a highly important fact, and which he urges Protestants to accept as the means of triumphing over the Catholic Church, namely, that the Christian

miracles and the spirit-manifestations are worthy of precisely the same respect and confidence in a Christian point of view, is far less important than he in his profound ignorance of Christianity imagines. How far he will be successful with Protestants we know not; but his success, we imagine, will be greatest among people of his own class, who, having no settled belief in any religion, who know little of the principles of Christianity, are, as all such people are, exceedingly credulous and superstitious. These people hover on the borders of Protestantism, have certain sympathies with the reformation, but it would be hardly just to call them in the ordinary sense of the term Protestants. Yet Protestantism, being substantially a revival in principle of the ancient gentile apostasy which led to the worship of the devil in the place of God before our Lord's advent, there can be no doubt that Protestants are peculiarly exposed to satanic invasions, and there is no certainty that they may not follow Mr. Owen back to the devil-worship from which Christianity rescued the nations that embraced it. But we have said enough for the present. Perhaps we may say more hereafter.

THE PHYSICAL BASIS OF LIFE.*

[From the Catholic World for July, 1869.]

We know this rather remarkable discourse only as republished in the columns of *The New York World*, where it had a sensational title which we have abridged. Professor Huxley's name stands high among English physicists or scientists, and his discourse indicates considerable natural ability, and familiarity with the modern school of science which seeks the explanation of the universe and its phenomena without recognizing a creator, or any existence but ordinary matter and its various combinations. The immediate purpose of the professor is to prove the physical or

**New Theory of Life.* Identity of the Powers and Faculties of all Living Matter. A Lecture by Professor T. H. Huxley. *New York World*, Feb. 18th, 1869.

material basis of life, and that life in all organisms is identical, originating in and depending on what he calls the protoplasm.

The protoplasm is formed of ordinary matter; say, carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen. These elements combined in some unknown way give rise to protoplasm; the protoplasm gives rise to the plant, and, through the plant, to the animal; and hence all life, feeling, thought, and reason originate in the peculiar combination of the molecules of ordinary, inorganic matter. The plant differs from the animal, and the animal from the man, only in the different combinations of the molecules of the protoplasm. We see nothing in this theory that is new, or not as old as the physics of the ancient Ionian school.

The only novelty that can be pretended is the assumption that all matter, even inorganic, is, in a certain sense, plastic, and therefore, in a rudimentary way, living. The same law governs the inorganic and the organic world. But even this is not new. Many years ago, Ralph Waldo Emerson asserted the identity of gravitation and purity of heart, and we ourselves are by no means disposed to deny that there is more or less analogy between the formation of the crystal or the diamond and the growth of the plant. It is not, perhaps, too much to say that the law of creation is one law, and we have never yet been convinced of the existence of absolutely inert matter. Whatever exists is, in its order and degree, a *vis activa*, or an active force. Matter, as the *potentia nuda* of the schoolmen, is simple possibility, and no real existence at all. There is and can be no pure passivity in nature, or purely passive existences. We would not therefore deny a certain rudimentary plasticity to minerals, or what is called brute matter, though we are not prepared to accept the plastic soul, asserted by Plato, and revived and explained in the posthumous and unfinished works of Gioberti under the term *methexis*, which is copied or imitated by the *mimesis*, or the individual and the sensible. Yet since, as the professor tells us, the animal can take the protoplasm only as prepared by the plant, must there not be in inorganic matter a preparation or elaboration of the protoplasm for the use of the plant?

The professor speaks of the difficulty of determining the line of demarcation between the animal and the plant; but is it difficult to draw the line between the mineral and the plant, or between the plant and the inorganic matter from

which it assimilates its food or nourishment? Pope sings,

> "See through this air, this ocean, and this earth,
> All matter *quick*, and bursting into birth;"

but we soould like to have the professor explain how ordinary matter, even if *quick*, becomes protoplasm, and how the protoplasm becomes the origin and basis of the life of the plant. Every plant is an organism with its central life within. Virchow and Cl. Bernard by their late discoveries have proved that every organism proceeds from an organite, ovule, or central cell, which produces, directs, and controls or governs the whole organism, even in its abnormal developments. They have also proved that this ovule or central cell exists only as generated by a pre-existing organism, or parent, of the same kind. The later physiologists are agreed that there is no well authenticated instance of spontaneous generation. Now this organite must exist, live, before it can avail itself of the protoplasm formed of ordinary matter, which is exterior to it, not within it, and cannot be its life, for that moves from within outward, from the centre to the circumference. Concede, then, all the facts the professor alleges, they only go to prove that the organism already living sustains its life by assimilating fitting elements from ordinary matter. But they do not show at all that it derives its life from them; or that the so-called protoplasm is the origin, source, basis, or matter of organic life; or that it generates, produces, or gives rise to the organite or central cell; not that it has any thing to do with vitalizing it. Hence the professor fails to throw any light on the origin, matter, or basis of life itself.

It may or it may not be difficult in the lower organisms to draw the line between the plant and the animal, and we shall urge no objections to what the professor says on that point; we will only say here that the animal organism, like the vegetable, is produced, directed, and controlled by the central cell, and that this cell or ovule is generated by animal parents. There is no spontaneous generation, and no well authenticated instance of metagenesis. Like generates like, and even Darwin's doctrine of natural selection confirms rather than denies it. It is certain that the vegetable organism has never, as far as science goes, generated an animal organism. Arguments based on our ignorance prove nothing. The protoplasm can no more produce or vitalize the central animal than it can the central vegetable cell, and,

indeed, still less; for the animal cannot, as the professor himself asserts, sustain its life by the protoplastic elements till they have been prepared by the vegetable organism. Whence, then, the animal germ, organite, or ovule? What vitalizes it and gives it the power of assimilating the protoplasm as its food, without which the organism dies and disappears?

Giving the professor the fullest credit for exact science in all his statements, he does not, as far as we can see, prove his protoplasm is the physical basis of life, or that there is for life any physical basis at all. He only proves that matter is so far plastic as to afford sustenance to a generated organic life, which every farmer who has ever manured a field of corn or grass, or reared a flock of sheep or a herd of cattle, knows, and always has known, as well as the illustrious professor.

We can find a clear statement of several of the conditions of life, both vegetable and animal, but no demonstration of the principle of life, in the professor's very elaborate discourse. Indeed, if we examine it closely, we shall find that he does not even pretend to demonstrate any thing of the sort. He denies all means of science except sensible experience, and maintains with Hume that we have no sensible experience of causes or principles. All science, he asserts is restricted to empirical facts with their law, which, in his system, is itself only a fact or a classification of facts. The conditions of life, as we observe them, are for him the essential principle of life in the only sense in which the word *principle* has, or can have, for him, an intelligible meaning. He proves, then, the physical basis of life, by denying that it has any intelligible basis at all. He proves, indeed, that the protoplasm, which he shows, or endeavors to show, is universal—one and the same, always and everywhere—is present in the already existing life of both the plant and the animal; but that, whatever it be, in the plant or animal, which gives it the power to take up the protoplasm and assimilate it to its own organism, which is properly the life or vital power, he does not explain, account for, or even recognize. With him, power is an empty word. He nowhere proves that life is produced, furnished, or generated by the protoplasm, or has a material origin. Hence, the protoplasm, by his own showing, is simply no protoplasm at all. He proves, if any thing, that in inorganic matter there are elements which the living plant or animal

assimilates, and into which when dead, it is resolved. This is all he does, and in fact, all he professes to do.

The professor makes light of the very grave objection, that chemical analysis can throw no light on the principle or basis of life, because it is or can be made only on the dead subject. He of course concedes that chemical analysis is not made on the living subject; but this, he contends, amounts to nothing. We think it amounts to a great deal. The very thing sought, to wit, life, is wanting in the dead subject, and of course cannot by any possible analysis be detected in it. If all that constituted the living body is present in the dead body, why is the body dead, or why has it ceased to perform its vital functions? The protoplasm, or what you so call, is as present in the corpse as in the living organism. If it is the basis of life, why is the organism no longer living? The fact is, that life, while it continues, resists chemical action and death, by a higher and subtler chemistry of its own, and it is only the dead body that falls under the action of the ordinary chemical laws. There is, then, no concluding the principle or basis of life from any possible dissection of the dead body.

The professor's answer to the objection is far from being satisfactory.

"Objectors of this class," he says, "do no seem to reflect . . . . that we know nothing about the composition of any body as it is. The statement that a crystal of calc-spar consists of carbonate of lime is quite true, if we only mean that, by appropriate processes, it may be resolved into carbonic acid and quicklime. If you pass the same carbonic acid over the very quicklime thus obtained, you will obtain carbonate of lime again; but it will not be calc-spar, nor any thing like it. Can it therefore be said that chemical analysis teaches nothing about the chemical composition of calc-spar? Such a statement would be absurd; but it is hardly more so than the talk one occasionally hears about the uselessness of applying the results of chemical analysis to the living bodies which have yielded them. One fact, at any rate, is out of reach of such refinements and this is, that all the forms of protoplasm which have yet been examined contain the four elements, carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen, in very complex union, and that they behave similarly toward several reagents. To this complex combination, the nature of which has never been determined with exactness, the name of protein has been applied. And if we use this term with such caution as may properly arise out of comparative ignorance of the things for which it stands, it may be truly said that all protoplasm is proteinaceous; or, as the white, or albumen, of an egg is one of the commonest examples of a

nearly pure proteine matter, we may say that all living matter is more or less albuminoid. Perhaps it would not yet be safe to say that all forms of protoplasm are affected by the direct action of electric shocks; and yet the number of cases in which the contraction of protoplasm is shown to be affected by this agency increases every day. Nor can it be affirmed with perfect confidence that all forms of protoplasm are liable to undergo that peculiar coagulation at a temperature of 40 degrees—50 degrees centigrade, which has been called "heat-stiffening," though Kuhne's beautiful researches have proved this occurrence to take place in so many and such diverse living beings, that it is hardly rash to expect that the law holds good for all."

This long extract proves admirably how long, how learnedly, how scientifically, a great man can talk without saying any thing. All that is here said amounts only to this: the conclusions obtained by the analysis of the dead body cannot be denied to be applicable to the living body, because we know nothing of the composition of any body organic or inorganic, as it is. Therefore all life has a physical basis! Take the whole extract, and all it tells you is, that we know nothing of the subject it professes to treat. "All the forms of protoplasm, which have yet been examined contain the four elements, carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen in very complex union." When chemically resolved into these four elements, is it protoplasm still? Can you by a chemical process reconvert them into protoplasm? No. Then what does the analysis show of the nature of your physical basis of life? "To this complex union, the nature of which *has never yet been determined*, the name of protein has been applied." Very important to know that. Yet this name protein names not something known, but something the nature of which is unknown. What then does it tell us? "If we use this term [protein] with such caution as may properly arise out of our comparative *ignorance* of the things for which it stands, it may truly be said that all protoplasm is proteinaceous." Be it so, what advance in knowledge, since we are ignorant of what protein is? It is wonderful what a magnificent structure our scientists are able to erect on ignorance as the foundation.

The professor, after having confessed his ignorance of what the alleged protoplasm really is, continues:

"Enough has, perhaps, been said to prove the existence of a general uniformity in the character of the protoplasm, or physical basis of life, in whatever group of living beings it may be studied. But it will be understood that this general uniformity by no means excludes any

amount of special modifications of the fundamental substance. The mineral, carbonate of lime, assumes an immense diversity of characters, though no one doubts that under all these protean changes it is one and the same thing. And now, what is the ultimate fate, and what the origin, of the matter of life? Is it, as some of the older naturalists supposed, diffused throughout the universe in molecules, which are indestructible and unchangeable in themselves; but, in endless transmigration, unite in innumerable permutations, into the diversified forms of life we know? Or is the matter of life composed of ordinary matter, differing from it only in the manner in which its atoms are aggregated. Is it built up of ordinary matter, and again resolved into ordinary matter when its work is done? Modern science does not hesitate a moment between these alternatives. Physiology writes over the portals of life,

'Debemur morti nos nostraque,'

with a profounder meaning than the Roman poet attached to that melancholy line. Under whatever disguise it takes refuge, whether fungus or oak, worm or man, the living protoplasm, not only ultimately dies and is résolved into its mineral and lifeless constituents, but is always dying, and, strange as the paradox may sound, could not live unless it died."

Suppose all this to be precisely as asserted, it only proves that there is diffused through the whole material world elements which in certain unknown and inexplicable combinations, afford sustenance to plants, and through plants to animals, or from which the living organism repairs its waste and sustains its life. It does not tell us how carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen are or must be combined to form the alleged protoplasm, whence is the living organism, nor the origin or principle of its life. It, in fact, shows us neither the origin nor the matter of life, for it is only an actually living organism that uses or assimilates the alleged protoplasm. There is evidently at work in the organism a vital force that is distinguishable from the irritability or contractility of the protoplasm, and not derived from or originated by it. Undoubtedly, every organism that falls under our observation, whether vegetable or animal, has its physical conditions, and lives by virtue of a physical law; but this, even when we have determined the law and ascertained the conditions, throws no light on the life itself. The life escapes all observation, and science is impotent, if it leaves out the creative act of God, to explain it, or to bring us a step nearer its secret. Professor Huxley tells us no more, with all his science and hard words, than any cultivator of the soil, any shepherd or herdsman, can tell us, and knows as well as he, as we have already said.

In the last extract, the professor evidently prefers, of the two alternatives he suggests, the one that asserts that "the matter of life [protoplasm] is composed of ordinary matter, is built up of ordinary matter, and resolved again into ordinary matter when its work is done." This the professor applies to man as well as to plants and animals. Hence, he cites the Roman poet,

"Debemur morti nos nostraque."

But we have conceded the professor more than he asks. We have conceded that all matter is, in a certain sense, plastic, and living, in the sense of being active, not passive. But the professor does not ask so much. We inferred from some things in the beginning of his discourse that he intended to maintain that his protoplasm is itself elemental, and pervading all nature. But this is not the case; he merely holds it to be a chemical compound formed by the peculiar chemical combination of lifeless components. Thus he says:

"But it will be observed that the existence of the matter of life depends on the pre-existence of certain compounds, namely, carbonic acid, water, and ammonia. Withdraw any one of these three from the world, and all vital phenomena come to an end. They are related to the protoplasm of the plant, as the protoplasm of the plant is to that of the animal. Carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen are all lifeless bodies. Of these, carbon and oxygen unite in certain proportions and under certain conditions, to give rise to carbonic acid; hydrogen and oxygen produce water; nitrogen and hydrogen give rise to ammonia. These new compounds, like the elementary bodies of which they are composed, are lifeless. But when they are brought together, under certain conditions they give rise to the still more complex body, protoplasm, and this protoplasm exhibits the phenomena of life. I see no break in this series of steps in my secular complication, and I am unable to understand why the language which is applicable to any one term of the series may not be used in any of the others."

But here is a break or a bold leap from a lifeless to a living compound. No matter how different are the several chemical compounds known from the simple components, the new compound is always, as far as known, as lifeless as were the several components themselves. Hydrogen and oxygen compounded give rise to water, but water is lifeless. Hydrogen and nitrogen, brought together in certain proportions, give rise to ammonia, still a lifeless compound. No chemist has yet, by any combination of the minerals, car-

bon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen, the constituents of protoplasm, been able to produce a living plant or a living organism of any sort. How then conclude that their combination produces the matter of life, or gives rise to the living organism? There seems to us to be a great gulf between the premises and the conclusion. Certain combinations of carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen produce certain lifeless compounds different from themselves, *therefore* a certain other combination of these same elements produces the living organism, plant, or animal, or originates the matter, and forms the physical basis of life. If the professor had in his school days reasoned in this way, his logic-master, we suspect, would have set a black mark against his name, or, more likely, have rapped him over the knuckles, if not over his head, and told him that an argument that has no middle term, is no argument at all, and that *transitio a genere ad genus*, as from the lifeless to the living, is a sophism.

The professor is misled by his supposing that what is true of the dead body must be true of the living. Because chemical analysis resolves the dead body into certain lifeless elements, he concludes that the living body is, while living, only a compound of these same lifeless elements. That is, from what is true of death, he concludes what must be true of life. But for this fallacy, he could never have fallen into the other fallacy of concluding life is only the result of a certain aggregate or amalgam of lifeless minerals. Our scientists are seldom good logicians, and we have rarely found them able, when leaving traditional science, to draw even a logical induction from the facts before them. This is wherefore they receive so little respect from philosophers and theologians, who are always ready to accept their facts, but, for the most part, unable to accept their inductions. The professor has given us some valuable facts, though very well known before; but his logical ineptness is the best argument he has as yet offered in support of his favorite theory that man is only a monkey developed.

In the extract next before the last, the professor revives an old doctrine long since abandoned, that life is generated from corruption. "Under whatever disguise it takes refuge, whether fungus or oak, worm or man, the living protoplasm not only ultimately dies and is resolved into its mineral and lifeless constituents, but is *always dying, and, strange as the paradox may sound, could not live unless it*

died." We know that some physiologists regard the waste of the body, which in life is constantly going on, and which is repaired by the food we take, as incipient death; but this is only because they confound the particles or molecules of matter of which the body is externally built up, and which change many times during an ordinary life, with the body itself, and suppose the life of the body is simply the resultant of the aggregation of these innumerable molecules or particles. But the life of the organism, we have seen, is within it, and its action from the centre, and it is only its life, not its death, that throws off or exudes as well as assimilates the material particles. The exudation as well as the assimilation is interrupted by death. Why the protoplasm could not live unless it died is what we do not understand.

The professor, of course, not only denies the immortality of the soul, but the existence of soul itself. There is for him no soul but the protoplasm formed of ordinary matter. All this we understand very well. We understand, too, that on his theory the protoplasm assimilated by the organism to repair its waste, renews literally, not figuratively, the life of the organism. But how he extracts life from death, and concludes that the protoplasm must die, as the condition of living, passeth our comprehension. We suppose, however, the professor found it necessary to assert it in order to be able to reason from the dead subject to the living. If the protoplasm were not dead, he could not by chemical analysis determine its constituents; and if the death of the protoplasm were not essential to its life, he could not conclude the constituents of the living protoplasm from what he finds to be the constituents of the dead protoplasm. But this does not help him. In the first place, the waste of the living organism is not death nor dying, though death may result from it. And the supply of protoplasm in the shape of food does not originate new life, nor replenish a life that is gone, but supplies what is needed to sustain and invigorate a life that is already life. In the second place, the vital force is not built up by protoplastic accretions, but operates from within the organism, from the organite or central cell, without which there could be no accretions or secretions. The food does not give life; it only ministers sustenance to an organism already living. No chemical analysis of the food can disclose or throw any light on the origin, nature, or constitution of the organic life itself.

It is this fact that prevents us from having much confi-

dence in chemical physiology, which is still insisted on by our most eminent physiologists. In every organism there is something that transcends the reach of chemical analysis, and which no chemical synthesis can reproduce. Take the professor's protoplasm itself. He resolves it into the minerals, carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen: but no chemist can by any possible recombination of them reproduce protoplasm. How then can one say that these minerals are its sole constituents, or that there are not other elements entering it which escape all chemical tests and, indeed, are not subject to chemical laws? Chemistry is limited, and cannot penetrate the essence of the material substance any more than the eye can. It never does and never can go beyond the sensible properties of matter. Life has its own laws, and every physiologist knows that he meets in the living organism phenomena or facts which it is impossible to reduce to any of the laws which are obtainable from the analysis of inorganic or lifeless matter. It is necessary then to conclude that there is in the living organism present and active some element which, though using lifeless matter, cannot be derived from it, or explained by physical laws, be they mechanical, chemical, or electrical. The law of life is a law *sui generis*, and not resolvable into any other. We must even go beyond the physical laws themselves, if we would find their principle.

As far as human science goes, there is, where the nucleus of life is wanting, no conversion of lifeless matter into living matter. The attempt to prove that living organisms, plants, animals, or man are developed from inorganic and lifeless matter, though made as long ago as Leucippus and Democritus, systematized by Epicurus, sung in rich Latin verse by Lucretius, and defended by the ablest of modern British physico-philosophers, Mr. Herbert Spencer, in his *Biology*, has by the sane part of the human race in all times and everywhere been held to be foolish and absurd. It has no scientific basis, is supported by no known facts, and is simply an unfounded, at least, an unsupported hypothesis.

Life to the scientist is an insolvable mystery. We know no explanation of this mystery or of any thing else in the universe, unless we accept the creative act of God; for the origin and cause of nature are not in nature herself. We have no other explanation of the origin of living organisms or of the matter of life. God created plants, animals, and man, created them living organisms, male and female cre-

ated he them, and thus gave them the power to propagate and multiply each its own kind, by natural generation. The scientist will of course smile superciliously at this old solution, insisted on by priests and accepted by the vulgar; but though not a scientist, we know enough of science to say from even a scientific point of view that there is no alternative: either this or no solution at all. The ablest men of ancient or modern times, when they reject it, only fall into endless sophisms and self-contradictions.

Professor Huxley admits none but material existences, concedes that the terms of his proposition are unquestionably materialistic, and yet denies that he is individually a materialist.

"It may seem a small thing to admit that the dull vital actions of a fungus, or a foraminifer, are the properties of their protoplasm, and are the direct results of the nature of the matter of which they are composed. But if, as I have endeavored to prove to you, their protoplasm is essentially identical with, and most readily converted into, that of any animal, I can discover no logical halting place between the admission that such is the case, and the further concession that all vital action may, with equal propriety, be said to be the result of the molecular forces of the protoplasm which displays it. And if so, it must be true, in the same sense and to the same extent, that the thoughts to which I am now giving utterance, and your thoughts regarding them, are the expression of molecular changes in the matter of life which is the source of other vital phenomena. Past experience leads me to be tolerably certain that, when the propositions I have just placed before you are accessible to public comment and criticism, they will be condemned by many zealous persons, and perhaps by some of the wise and thoughtful. I should not wonder if 'gross and brutal materialism' were the mildest phrase applied to them in certain quarters. And most undoubtedly the terms of the propositions are distinctly materialistic. Nevertheless, two things are certain: the one, that I hold the statement to be substantially true; the other, that I, individually, am no materialist, but on the contrary believe materialism to involve grave philosophical error."

If what he has been from the first endeavoring to prove, and here distinctly asserts, is not materialism and consequently by his own confession, "a grave philosophical error," we know not what would be. "This union of materialistic terminology with the repudiation of the materialistic philosophy," he says, further on, "I share with some of the most thoughtful men with whom I am acquainted." His terminology is, then, better fitted to conceal his thought than to express it. He may repudiate this or that material-

istic system; he may repudiate all philosophy, which he, of course does, yet not his terminology only, but his thought, as far as thought he has, is materialistic. Nothing can be more materialistic than the conception of life, sense, sentiment, affection, thought, reasoning, all the sensible, intellectual, and moral phenomena we are conscious of, as the product of the peculiar arrangement or combination of the molecules of the protoplasm, itself resolvable into the minerals, carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen.

The scientific professor defends himself from materialism, by asserting that both materialism and spiritualism lie without the limits of human science, and by denying the necessity of a substance, whether spirit or matter, to underlie and sustain—we should say, produce—the phenomena, and the necessary relation of cause and effect, or that we do or can know things under any relation but that of juxtaposition in space and time. He falls back on the scepticism of Hume, and takes refuge behind his ignorance. He is too ignorant either to assert or to deny the existence of spirit, and though he may not be able to prove the phenomena in question are the product of material forces, nobody knows enough of the nature and essence of matter to say that they are not; and in fine, he in the first part of his discourse is only stating the direction in which physiology has for some time been moving. After all, what is the difference, or rather, what matters "the difference between the conception of life as the product of a certain disposition of material molecules, and the old notion of an Archæus governing and directing blind matter within each living body?"

But if matter lies out of the limits of science, and the professor is unable to say whether it exists or not, what right has he to call any thing material, to speak of a material basis of life, or to represent life and its phenomena as the product of "a certain disposition of material molecules"? What, indeed, has he been laboring to prove through his whole discourse, but that the phenomena of life are the product of ordinary matter? After this, it will hardly answer to plead ignorance of the existence and properties of matter. If matter be relegated to the region of the unknowable, his whole thesis, terminology and all, must be banished with it, for it retains, and can retain, no meaning.

Nor will it answer for the professor to take refuge in Hume's scepticism, and say he is not a materialist, because he admits no necessary relation between cause and effect, nor

that there is within the limits of science, any power or force, or *vis activa*, which men in their ignorance call "cause," actually producing something which men call "effect." If he says this, what becomes of his thesis, that life and even mind are the *product* of a certain disposition of material molecules, or of "the peculiar combination of the molecules of the protoplasm"? If he denies the existence, or even the knowledge of causative, that is, productive force, his thesis has no meaning, and all his alleged proofs of a physical basis of the vital and mental phenomena must count for nothing. Every proof, every argument, presupposes the relation of cause and effect. When that relation is denied, and the two things are assumed to have with each other only the relation of juxtaposition, no proposition can be either proved or disproved. The professor, after having asserted and attempted to prove his materialistic thesis, cannot, without gross self-contradiction, plead the scepticism of Hume, he should have kept his mouth shut, and never stated or attempted to prove his thesis.

Whether we are or are not able to prove that life, sense, and reason do not originate in the peculiar "combination of the molecules of the protoplasm," is nothing to the purpose. It is for the professor to prove that they do. He must not base his science on our ignorance, any more than on his own.

But taken, as we have taken him, on what he must concede to be purely scientific ground, and brought to a strictly scientific test, the professor's thesis must be declared not proven, and to be destitute of all scientific value. We have met him on his own ground, and have urged no arguments against him drawn from religion or metaphysics; we have simply corrected one or two mistakes in his science, and assailed his inductions with pure logic. If he has not reasoned logically, that is his fault, not ours, and neither he nor his friends have any right to complain of us for showing that his inductions are illogical, and therefore unscientific. Yet we are bound to say that the professor reasons as well as any of his class of scientists that we have met with. No man can reason logically who rejects the λογος, that is, logic itself, and nothing better than Professor Huxley's discourse can be expected from a scientist who discards all causes and seeks to explain the existence and phenomena or facts of the universe, without rising from second causes to the first and final cause of all.

Two questions are raised by this discourse, of great and vital importance. The one as to the *nexus* between cause and effect, in answer to Hume's scepticism, and the other as to spirit and matter, and their reciprocal relation. We have not attempted the discussion of either in this article; but should a favorable occasion offer, we may hereafter treat them both at some length.

SPIRITUALISM AND MATERIALISM.

[From the Catholic World for August, 1869.]

PROFESSOR HUXLEY, as we saw in a late number of this magazine, in the article on *The Physical Basis of Life*, while rejecting spiritualism, gives his opinion that materialism is a philosophical error, on the ground of our ignorance of what matter is, or is not. There is some truth in the assertion of our ignorance of the essence or real nature of matter or material existence, though the professor had no logical right to assert it, after having adopted a materialistic terminology, and done his best to prove the material origin of life, thought, feeling, and the various mental phenomena. Yet we are far from regarding what is called materialism as the fundamental error of this age, nor do we believe that there is any necessary or irrepressible antagonism between spirit and matter, either intellectual or moral. In our belief, a profound philosophy, though it does not identify spirit and matter, shows their dialectic harmony, as revelation asserts it in asserting the resurrection of the flesh, and the indissoluble reunion of body and soul in the future life.

The fundamental error of this age is the denial of creation, and, theologically expressed, is, with the vulgar, atheism, and with the cultivated and refined, pantheism. Atheism is the denial of unity, and pantheism the denial of plurality or diversity, and both alike deny creation, and seek to explain the universe by the principle of self-generation or self-development. What is really denied is God THE CREATOR.

There are, no doubt, moral causes that have led in part to

this denial, but with them we have at present nothing to do. The assertion of moral causes is more effective in preventing men from abandoning the truth and falling into error than in recovering and leading back to the truth those who have lost it, or know not where to find it. We lose our labor when we begin our efforts, as philosophers, to convert those who are in error by assuring them that they have erred only through moral perversity or hatred of the true and the good, the just and the holy, especially in an age when conscience is fast aleep. We aim at convincing, not at convicting, and therefore take up only the intellectual causes which lead to the denial of creation. Among these causes, we shall, no doubt, find materialism and a pseudo-spiritualism both playing their part; but the real causes, we apprehend, are in the fact that the philosophic tradition, which has come down to us from gentilism, has never been fully harmonized with the Christian tradition, which has come down to us through the church.

Gentilism had lost sight of God the Creator, and confounded creation with generation, emanation, or formation. Why the gentiles were led into this error would be an interesting chapter in the history of the wanderings of the human mind; but we have no space at present for the inquiry. It is enough, for our present purpose, to establish the fact that the gentiles did fall into it. The conception of creation is found in none of the heathen mythologies, learned or unlearned, of which we have any knowledge; and that they do not recognize a creative God, may be inferred from the fact that in them all, so far as known, were worshipped, under obscure symbols, the generative forces or functions of nature. In no gentile philosophy, not even in Plato or Aristotle, do you find any conception of God the Creator. Père Gratry, indeed, thinks he finds the fact of creation recognized by Plato, especially in the *Timæus*; but though we have read time and again that most important of Plato's dialogues, we have never found the fact of creation in it; all we can find in it bearing on this point is what Plato, as we understand him, uniformly teaches, the identity of the idea with the essence or *causa essentialis* of the thing. As, for instance, the idea of a man is the real, essential man himself; and is simply the idea in the divine mind, impressed on a preëxisting matter, as the seal upon wax. God creates neither the idea nor the matter. The idea is himself; the matter is eternal. Aristotle does not essentially differ from Plato on this point.

The individual existence, according to him, is composed of matter and form; the form alone is substantial, and matter is simply its passive recipient. The substantial forms are supplied, but not created by the divine intelligence. In no form of heathenism that existed before the Christian era have we found any conception of creation. The conception or tradition of creation was retained only by the patriarchs and the synagogue, and has been restored to the converted gentiles by the Christian church alone.

St. Augustine, and after him the great mediæval doctors —especially the greatest of them all, the Angel of the Schools—labored assiduously, and up to certain point successfully, to amend the least debased gentile philosophy so as to make it harmonize with Christian theology and tradition. They took from gentile philosophy the elements it had retained from the ancient wisdom, supplied their defects with elements taken from the Christian tradition, and formed a really Christian philosophy, which still subsists in union with theology.

This work of harmonizing faith and philosophy, or, perhaps, more correctly, of constructing a philosophy in harmony with faith and theology, was nearly, if not quite completed by the great western scholastics or mediæval doctors; but, unhappily, the East, separated from the centre of unity, or holding to it only loosely and by fits and starts, did not share in the great intellectual movement of the West. It made little or no progress in harmonizing gentile philosophy and Christian theology. It retained and studied the gentile philosophers, especially of the Platonic and Neoplatonic schools; and when the Greek scholars, after the taking of Constantinople by the Turks, in 1453, sought refuge in the West, they brought with them, not only their schism, but their unmitigated gentile philosophy, corrupted the western schools, and unsettled to a fearful extent the confidence of scholars in the scholastic philosophy. We owe the false systems of spiritualism and materialism, of atheism and pantheism, to what is called the Revival of Letters in the fifteenth century, or the Greek invasion of western Christendom.

The scholastics, especially St. Thomas, had transformed the peripatetic philosophy into a Christian philosophy; but the other Greek schools had remained pagan; and it was precisely these other schools, especially the Platonic, and Neoplatonic, or Alexandrian eclecticism, that now revived in

their unchristianized form, and were opposed to the Aristotelian philosophy as modified by the schoolmen. Some of the early fathers were more inclined to Plato than to Aristotle, but none of these, not Clemens Alexandrinus, Origen, or even St. Augustine, had harmonized throughout Plato's philosophy with Christianity, and we should greatly wrong St. Augustine, at least, if we called him a systematic Platonist.

With the study of Plato was revived in western Europe a false and exaggerated spiritualism, and a philosophy which denied creation as a truth of philosophy, and admitted it only as a doctrine of revelation. The authority of the scholastic philosophy was weakened, a decided tendency in pantheistic direction to thought was given, and the way was prepared for Giordano Bruno, as well as for the Protestant apostasy. We say *apostasy*, because Luther's movement was really an apostasy, as its historical developments have amply proved. With Plato was revived the Academy with its scepticism, Sextus Empiricus, and after him Epicurus; and before the close of the sixteenth century, Europe was overrun with false mystics, sceptics, pantheists, and atheists, who abounded all through the seventeenth century, in spite of a very decided reaction in favor of faith and the church. What is worthy of special note is, that in all this period of two centuries and a half it was no uncommon thing to find men who, as philosophers, denied the immortality of the soul, which as believers they asserted; or combined a childlike faith with universal scepticism, as we see in Montaigne.

Gradually, however, men began to see that, while they acknowledged a discrepancy between what they held as philosophy and the Christian faith, they could not retain both; that they must give up the one or the other. England, in the latter half of the seventeenth century, swarmed with freethinkers who denied all divine revelation; and France, in the eighteenth century, rejected the church, rejected the Bible, suppressed Christian worship, rebuilt the Pantheon, and voted death to be an eternal sleep. But the eighteenth century was born of the seventeenth, as the seventeenth was born of the sixteenth, as the sixteenth was born of the revival of Greek letters and philosophy, thoroughly impregnated with paganism, supposed by unthinking men to be the most glorious event in modern history, saving, always, Luther's reformation.

In the seventeenth century, Descartes undertook to reform

and reconstruct philosophy after a new method. He undertook to erect philosophy into a complete science in the rational order, independent of revelation. If he recognized the creative act of God, or God as creator, it was as a theologian, not as a philosopher; for certainly he does not start with the creative act as a first principle, nor does he, nor can he, arrive at it by his method. God as creator cannot be deduced from *cogito, ergo sum*; for, without presupposing God as my creator, I cannot assert that I exist. Gentilism had so far revived that it was able to take possession of philosophy the moment it was detached from Christian theology and declared an independent science; and as that has no conception of creation, the tradition preserved by Jews and Christians was at once relegated from philosophy to theology, from science to faith. Hence we fail to find creation recognized as a philosophical truth in the system of his disciple Malebranche, a profounder philosopher than Descartes himself. The prince of modern sophists, Spinoza, adopting as his starting point the definition of substance given by Descartes, demonstrates but too easily that there can be only one substance, and that there can be no creation, or that nothing does or can exist except the one substance and its attributes, modes, or affections. Calling the one substance God, he arrived at once at pantheism, now so prevalent.

That Descartes felt a difficulty in asserting creation in its proper sense, may be inferred from the fact that he always calls the soul *la pensée*, thought; never, if we recollect aright, a substance that thinks, which was itself a large stride towards pantheism, for pantheism consists precisely in denying all substantive existences except the one only substance, which is God. Spinoza developed his principles with a logic vastly superior to his own, and brought out errors which he probably did not foresee. Indeed, we do not pretend that Descartes intended to favor or had any suspicion that he was favoring pantheism; but he most certainly did not recognize any principle that would enable his disciples to oppose it, and in former days, before we knew the church, we ourselves found, or thought we found, pantheism flowing logically from his premises, and we escaped it only by rejecting the Cartesian philosophy.

Descartes revived in modern philosophy that antagonism between spirit and matter which was unknown to the scholastic philosophy, and which renders the mutual commerce of soul and body inexplicable. The scholastic doctors had

recognized, indeed, matter and form; but with them matter was simply possibility, existing only *in potentia ad formam*, and was never supposed to be the basis or substratum of any existence whatever. The real existence was in the form, the *forma* or the *idea*. They distinguished, certainly, between corporeal and incorporeal existences; but not, as the moderns do, between spiritual and material existences, and the question between spiritualism and materialism, as we have it today, did not and could not come up with them. The distinction with them was between sensibles and intelligibles, the only distinction that philosophy by her own light knows. *Spirit* was a term very nearly restricted to God, and *spiritual* meant partaking of spirit, living according to the spirit; that is, living a godly life begotten by the Holy Spirit, as in the inspired writings of St. Paul.

Even the ancients did not distinguish, in the modern sense, between spirit and matter. Their gods were corporeal, but ordinarily impassible. The spirit was not a distinct existence, but was the universal principle of life, thought, and action, and the spirit of man was an emanation from the universal spirit, which at death flowed back and was reabsorbed in the ocean from which it emanated. Their ghosts were not disembodied spirits, as ours are, were not departed spirits, but the umbra or shade—a thin, aerial apparition, bearing the exact resemblance of the body, and had formed during life, if I may so speak, its inner lining, or the immediate envelope of the spirit. It is the body that after death still invests the soul, accordingly to Swedenborg, who denies the resurrection of the flesh. According to ancient Greek and Roman gentilism it was not spirit, nor body, but something between the two. It hovered over and around the dead body, and it was to allay it, and enable it to rest in peace that the funeral rites or obsequies of the dead were performed, and judged to be so indispensable. The Marquis de Mirville, in his work on *The Fluidity of Spirits*, seems to think the umbra was not a pure imagination, and is inclined to assert it, and to make it the basis of the explanation of many of the so-called spirit-phenomena. He supposes it is capable of transporting the soul, or of being transported by the soul, out of the body, and to a great distance from it, and that the body itself will bear the marks of the wounds that may be given it. In this way he also explains the prodigies of bilocation.

But however this may be, the ghost of heathen supersti-

tion is never the spirit returned to earth, nor is it the spirit that is doomed to Tartarus, or that is received into the Elysian Fields, the heathen paradise. Hades, which includes both Tartarus and Elysium, is a land of shadows, inhabited by shades that are neither spirit nor body; for the heathen knew nothing, and believed nothing, of the resurrection of the flesh, and the reunion of soul and body in a future life. The spirit at death returns to its fountain, and the body, dissolved, loses itself in the several elements from which it was taken, and only the shade or shadow of the living man survives. Even in Elysium, the ghosts that sport on the flowery banks of the river, repose in the green bowers, or pursue in the fields the mimic games and pastimes that they loved, are pale, thin, and shadowy. The whole is a mimic scene, if we may trust either Homer or Virgil, and is far less real and less attractive than the happy hunting-grounds of the red men of our continent, to which the good, that is, the brave Indian is transported when he dies. The only distinction, we find, with the heathen, between spirit and matter, is the distinction between the divine substance, or intelligence, and an eternally existing matter, as the stuff of which bodies or corporeal existences, the only existences recognized, are formed or generated.

But Descartes distinguished them so broadly that he seemed to make them each independent of the other. Why, then, was either necessary to the life and activity of the other? And we see in Descartes no use that the soul is or can be to the body, or the body to the soul. Hence, philosophy, starting from Descartes, branched out in two opposite directions, the one toward the denial of matter, and the other toward the denial of spirit; or, as more commonly expressed, into idealism and materialism, but as it would be more proper to say, into intellectism and sensism. The spiritualism of Descartes, so far as it had been known in the history of philosophy, was only the Neoplatonic mysticism, which substitutes the direct and immediate vision, so to speak, of the intelligible, for its apprehension through sensible symbols and the exercise of the reasoning faculty. From this it was an easy step to the denial of an external and material world, as was proved by Berkeley, who held the external world to consist simply of pictures painted on the retina of the eye by the creative act of God; and before him by Collier, who maintained that only mind exists. It was an equally short and easy step to take the other di-

rection, assert the sufficiency of the corporeal or material, and deny the existence of spirit or the incorporeal, since the senses take cognizance of the corporeal and the corporeal only. Either step was favored by the ancient philosophy revived and set up against the scholastic philosophy. It was hardly possible to follow out the exaggerated and exclusive spiritualism of the one class without running into mystic pantheism, or the independence of the corporeal or material, without falling into material pantheism or atheism. These two errors, or rather these two phases of one and the same error, are the fundamental or mother error of this age—perhaps, in principle, of all ages.

It is no part of our purpose now to refute this error; we have traced it from gentilism, shown that it is essentially pagan, and owes its prevalence in the modern world to the revival of Greek letters and philosophy in the fifteenth century, the discredit into which the study of Plato and the Neo-platonists threw the scholastic philosophy, and especially to the divorce of philosophy from theology, declared by Descartes in the seventeenth century. Yet we do not accept either exclusive materialism or exclusive spiritualism, and the question itself hardly has place in our philosophy, as it hardly had place in that of St. Thomas. It became a question only when philosophy was detached from theology, of which it forms the rational as distinguishable but not separable from the revealed element, and reduced to a mere *Wissenschaftslehre*, or rather a simple methodology. True philosophy joined with theology is the response to the questions, What is, or exists? What are the principles and causes of things? What are our relations to those principles and causes? What is the law under which we are placed? and what are the means and conditions within our reach, natural or gracious, of fulfilling our destiny, or of attaining to our supreme good? Not a response to the question, for the most part an idle question, How do we know, or how do we know that we know?

Many of the most difficult problems for philosophers, and which we confess our inability to solve, may be eluded by a flank movement, to use a military phrase. Such is the question of the origin of ideas, of certitude, and the passage from the subjective to the objective, and this very question of spiritualism and materialism. All these are problems which no philosopher yet has solved from the point of view of exclusive psychology, or of exclusive ontology, or of any

philosophy that leaves them to be asked. But we are much mistaken if they do not cease to be problems at all, when one starts with the principles of things, or if they do not solve themselves. We do not find them, in the modern sense, raised by Plato or Aristotle, nor by St. Augustine or St. Thomas. When we have the right stand-point, if Mr. Richard Grant White will allow us the term, and see things from the point of view of the real order, these problems do not present themselves, and are wholly superseded. Professor Huxley is right enough when he tells us that we know the nature and essence neither of spirit nor of matter. We know from revelation that there is a spirit in man, and that the inspiration of the Almighty giveth him understanding, but we know neither by revelation nor by reason what spirit is. God is a spirit; but if man is a spirit, it must be in a very different sense from that in which God is a spirit. Although the human spirit may have a certain likeness to the divine spirit, it yet cannot be divine, for it is created; and they who call it divine, a spark of divinity, or a particle of God, either do not mean, or do not *know* what they literally assert. They only repeat the old gentile doctrine of the substantial identity of the spirit with divinity, from whom it emanates, and to whom it returns, to be reabsorbed in him—a pantheistic conception. All we can say of spiritual existences is, that they are incorporeal intelligences; and all we can say of man is, that he has both a corporeal and an incorporeal nature; and perhaps without revelation we should be able to say not even so much.

We know, again, just as little of matter. What is matter? Who can answer? Nay, what is body? Who can tell? Body, we are told, is composed of material elements. Be it so. What are those elements? Into what is matter resolvable in the last analysis? Into indestructible and indissoluble atoms, says Epicurus; into entelecheiæ, or self-acting forces, says Aristotle; into extension, says Descartes; into monads, each acting from its centre, and representing the entire universe from its own point of view, says Leibnitz; into centres of attraction and gravitation, says Father Boscovich; into pictures painted on the retina of the eye by the Creator, says Berkeley, the Protestant bishop of Cloyne, and so on. We may ask and ask, but can get no final answer.

Take, instead of matter, an organic body; who can tell us what it is? It is extended, occupies space, say the Car-

tesians. But is this certain? Leibnitz disputes it, and it is not easy to attach any precise meaning to the assertion "it occupies space," if we have any just notion of space and time, the *pons asinorum* of psychologists. What is called actual or real space is the relation of co-existence of creatures; and is simply nothing abstracted from the related. It would be a great convenience if philosophers would learn that nothing is nothing, and that only God can create something from nothing. Space being nothing but relation, to say of a thing that it occupies space, is only saying that it exists, and exists in a certain relation to other objects. This relation may be either sensible or intelligible; it is sensible, or what is called sensible space, when the objects related are sensible. Extension is neither the essence nor a property of matter, but the sensible relation of an object either to some other objects or to our sensible perception. It is, as Leibnitz very well shows, only the relation of continuity. Whirl a wheel with great force and rapidity, and you will be unable to distinguish its several spokes, and it will seem to be all of one continuous and solid piece. Intelligible space as distinguished from sensible space is the logical relation of things, or, as more commonly called, the relation of cause and effect. When we conform our notions of space to the real order, and understand that the sensible simply copies, imitates, or symbolizes the intelligible, we shall see that we have no authority for saying extension is even a property of body or of matter.

That extension is simply the sensible relation of body, not its essence, nor even a property of matter, is evident from what physiologists tell us of organic or living bodies. There can be no reasonable doubt that the body I now have is the same identical body with which I was born, and yet it contains, probably, not a single molecule or particle of sensible matter it originally had. As I am an old man, all the particles or molecules of my body have probably been changed some ten or twenty times over; yet my body remains unchanged. It is evident, then, since the molecular changes do not affect its identity, that those particles or molecules of matter which my body assimilates from the food I take to repair the waste that is constantly going on, or to supply the loss of those particles or molecules constantly exuded or thrown off, do not compose, make up, or constitute the real body. This fact is commended to the consideration of those learned men, like the late Professor

George Bush, who deny the resurrection of the body, on the ground that these molecular changes which have been going on during life render it a physical impossibility. This fact also may have some bearing on the Catholic mystery of Transubstantiation. St. Augustine distinguishes between the visible body and the intelligible body—the body that is seen and the body that is understood—and tells us that it is the intelligible, or, as he sometimes says, the spiritual, not the visible or sensible, body of our Lord that is present in the Blessed Eucharist. In fact, there is no change in the sensible body of the bread and the wine, in Transubstantiation. The sensible body remains the same after consecration that it was before. The change is in the essence or substance, or the intelligible body, and hence the appropriateness of the term *transubstantiation* to express the change which takes place at the words of consecration. Only the intelligible body, that is, what is non-sensible in the elements bread and wine, is transubstantiated, and yet their real body is changed, and the real body of our Lord takes its place. The non-sensible or invisible body, the intelligible body, is then, in either case, assumed by the sacred mystery to be the real body; and hence, supposing us right in our assumption that our body remains always the same in spite of the molecular changes—which was evidently the doctrine of St. Augustine—there is nothing in science or the profoundest philosophy to show that either transubstantiation or the resurrection of the flesh is impossible, or that God may not effect either consistently with his own immutable nature, if he sees proper to do it. Nothing aids the philosopher so much as the study of the great doctrines and mysteries of Christianity, as held and taught by the church.

The distinction between seeing and intellectually apprehending, and therefore between the visible body and the intelligible body, asserted and always carefully observed by St. Augustine when treating of the Blessed Eucharist, belongs to a profounder philosophy than is now generally cultivated. Our prevailing philosophy, especially outside of the church, recognizes no such distinction. It is true, we are told, that the senses perceive only the sensible properties or qualities of things; that they never perceive the essence or substance; but then the essence or substance is supposed to be a mere abstraction with no intelligible properties or qualities, or a mere substratum of sensible properties and qualities. The sensible exhausts it, and be-

yond what the senses proclaim the substance has no quality or property, and is and can be the subject of no predicate. This is a great mistake. The sensible properties and qualities are real, that is, are not false or illusory; but they are real only in the sensible order, or the mimesis, as Gioberti, after Plato and some of the Greek fathers, calls it in his posthumous works. The intelligible substance is the thing itself, and has its own intelligible properties and qualities, which the sensible only copies, imitates, or mimics. All through nature there runs, above the sensible, the intelligible, in which is the highest created reality, with its own attributes and qualities, which must be known before we can claim to know any thing as it really is or exists. We do not know this in the case of body or matter; we do not and cannot know what either really is, and can really know of either only its sensible properties.

We know that if matter exists at all, it must have an essence or substance; but what the substance really is human science has not learned and cannot learn. We really know, then, of matter in itself no more than we do of spirit, except that matter has its sensible copy, which spirit has not. Matter, as to its substance, is supersensible, and as to the essence or nature of its substance is superintelligible, as is spirit; and we only know that it has a substance; and of substance itself, we can only say, if it exists, it is a *vis activa*, as opposed to *nuda potentia*, which is a mere possibility, and no existence at all. Such being the case, we agree with Professor Huxley, that neither spiritualism nor materialism is, in his sense, admissible, and that each is a philosophical error, or, at least, an unprovable hypothesis.

But here our agreement ends and our divergence begins. The Holy See has required the traditionalists to maintain that the existence of God, the immateriality of the soul, and the liberty of man can be proved with certainty by reason. We have always found the definitions of the church our best guide in the study of philosophy, and that we can never run athwart her teaching without finding ourselves at odds with reason and truth. We are always sure that when our theology is unsound our philosophy will be bad. There is a distinction already noted between spirit and matter, which is decisive of the whole question, as far as it is a question at all. Matter has, and spirit has not, sensible properties or qualities. These sensible properties or qualities do not constitute the essence or substance of matter, which

we have seen is not sensible, but they distinguish it from spirit, which is non-sensible. This difference, in regard to sensible qualities and properties, proves that there must be a difference of substance, that the material substance and the immaterial substance are not, and cannot be one and the same substance, although we know not what is the essence or nature of either.

We take matter here in the sense of that which has properties or qualities perceptible by the senses, and spirit or spiritual substance as an existence that has no such properties or qualities. The Holy See says the *immateriality*, not *spirituality*, of the soul, is to be proved by reason. The spirituality of the soul, except in the sense of immateriality, cannot be proved or known by philosophy, but is simply a doctrine of divine revelation, and is known only by that analogical knowledge called faith. All that we can prove or assert by natural reason, is, that the soul is immaterial, or not material in the sense that matter has for its sign the mimesis, or sensible properties or qualities. We repeat, the sensible is not the material substance, but is its natural sign. So that, where the sign is wanting, we know the substance is not present and active. On the other hand, where there is a force undeniably present and operating without the sign, we know at once that it is an immaterial force or substance.

That the soul is not material, therefore is an immaterial substance, we know; because it has none of the sensible signs or properties of matter. We cannot see, hear, touch, smell, nor taste it. The very facts materialists allege to prove it material, prove conclusively, that, if any thing, it is immaterial. The soul has none of the attributes or qualities that are included, and has others which evidently are not included, in the definition of matter. Matter, as to its substance, is a *vis activa*, for whatever exists at all is an active force; but it is not a force or substance that thinks, feels, wills, or reasons. It has no sensibility, no mind, no intelligence, no heart, no soul. But animals have sensibility and intelligence; have they immaterial souls? Why not? We have no serious difficulty in admitting that animals have souls, only not rational and immortal souls. Soul, in them, is not spirit, but it may be immaterial. Indeed, we can go further, and concede an immaterial soul, not only to animals but to plants, though, of course, not an intelligent or even a sensitive soul; for if plants, or at least some plants, are contractile and slightly mimic sensibility in animals, nothing proves

that they are sensitive. We have no proof that any living organism, vegetable, animal, or human, is or can be a purely material product. Professor Huxley has completely failed, as we have shown, in his effort to sustain his theory of a physical or material basis of life, and physiologists profess to have demonstrated by their experiments and discoveries that no organism can originate in inorganic matter, or in any possible mechanical, chemical, or electrical arrangement of material atoms, and is and can be produced, unless by direct and immediate creation of God, only by generation from a preëxisting male and female organism. This is true alike of plants, animals, and man. Nothing hinders you, then, from calling, if you so wish, the universal basis of life *anima* or soul, and asserting the psychical basis, in opposition to Professor Huxley's physical basis, of life; only you must take care and not assert that plants and animals have human souls, or that soul in them is the same that it is in man.

There are grave thinkers who are not satisfied with the doctrine that ascribes the apparent and even striking marks of mind in animals to instinct, a term which serves to cover our ignorance, but tells us nothing; still less are they satisfied with the Cartesian doctrine that the animal is simply a piece of mechanism moved or moving only by mechanical springs and wheels like a clock or watch. Theologians are reluctant chiefly, we suppose, to admit that animals have souls, because they are accustomed to regard all souls, as to their substance, the same, and because it has seemed to them that the admission would bring animals too near to men, and not preserve the essential difference between the animal nature and the human. But we see no difficulty in admitting as many different sorts or orders of souls as there are different orders, genera, and species of living organisms. God is spirit, and the angels are spirits; are the angels therefore identical in substance with God? The human soul is spiritual; is there no difference in substance between human souls and angels? We know that men sometimes speak of a departed wife, child, or friend as being now an angel in heaven; but they are not to be understood literally, any more than the young man in love with a charming young lady who does not absolutely refuse his addresses, when he calls her—a sinful mortal, not unlikely—an angel. In the resurrection men are *like* the angels of God, in the respect that they neither marry nor are given in marriage; but the spirits of the just

made perfect, that stand before the throne, are not angels; they are still human in their nature. If, then, we may admit spirits of different nature and substance, why not souls, and, therefore, vegetable souls, animal souls, and human souls, agreeing only in the fact that they are immaterial, or not material substances or forces?

It perhaps may be thought that to admit different orders of souls to correspond to the different orders, genera, and species of organisms, would imply that the human soul is generated with the body; contrary to the general doctrine of theologians, that the soul is created immediately *ad hoc*. The Holy See censured Professor Frohschammer's doctrine on the subject; but the point condemned was, as we understand it, that the professor claimed *creative* power for man. But it is not necessary to suppose, even if plants and animals have souls, that the human soul is generated with the body, in any sense inconsistent with faith. The church has defined that "anima est forma corporis," that is, as we understand it, the soul is the vital or informing principle, the life of the body, without which the body is dead matter. The organism generated is a living not a dead organism, and therefore if the soul is directly and immediately created *ad hoc*, the creative act must be consentaneous with the act of generation, a fact which demands a serious modification of the medical jurisprudence now taught in our medical schools. Some have asserted for man alone a vegetable soul, an animal soul, and a spiritual soul, but this is inadmissible; man has simply a human soul, though capable of yielding to the grovelling demands of the flesh as well as to the higher promptings of the spirit.

But we have suffered ourselves to be drawn nearer to the borders of the land of impenetrable mysteries than we intended, and we retrace our steps as hastily as possible. Our readers will understand that what we have said of the souls of plants and animals is said only as a possible concession, but not set forth as a doctrine we do or design to maintain; for it lies too near the province of revelation to be settled by philosophy. All we mean is that we see on the part of reason no serious objection to it. Perhaps it may be thought that we lose, by the concession, the argument for the immortality of the soul drawn from its simplicity; but, even if so, we are not deprived of other, and to our mind, much stronger arguments. But it may be said all our talk about souls is wide of the mark, for we have not yet proved that

man is or has a soul distinguishable from the body, and which does or can survive its dissolution, and that our argument only proves that, if a man has a soul, it is immaterial. The materialist denies that there is any soul in man distinct from the body, and maintains that the mental phenomena, which we ascribe to an immaterial soul, are the effects of material organization. But that is for him to prove, not for us to disprove. Organization can give to matter no new properties or qualities, as aggregation can give only the sum of the individuals aggregated. Matter we have taken all along, as all the world takes it, as a substance that has properties and qualities perceptible by the senses, and it has no meaning except so far as so perceptible. Any active force that has no mimesis or sensible qualities, properties, or attributes, is an immaterial, not a material substance. That man is or has an active force that feels, thinks, reasons, wills, we know as well as we know any thing; indeed, better than we know any thing else. These acts or operations are not operations of a material substance. We know that they are not, from the fact that they are not sensible properties or qualities, and therefore there must be in man an active force or substance that is not material, but immaterial. Material substance is, we grant, a *vis activa*; but if it has properties or qualities, it has no faculties. It acts, but it acts only *ad finem*, or to an end, never *propter finem*, or for an end foreseen and deliberately willed or chosen. But the force that man has or is, has faculties, not simply properties or qualities, and can and does act deliberately, with foresight and choice, for an end. Hence, it is not and cannot be a substance included in the definition of matter.

That this immaterial soul, now united to body and active only in union with matter, survives the dissolution of the body and is immortal, is another question, and is not proved, in our judgment, by proving its immateriality. There is an important text in Ecclesiastes, iii, 21, which would seem to have some bearing on the assumption that the immortality of the soul is really a truth of philosophy as well as of revelation. "Who knoweth if the spirit of the children of Adam ascend upward, and if the spirit of the beasts descend downward?" The doubt is not as to the immortality of the soul, but as to the ability of reason without revelation to demonstrate it. Certainly, reason can demonstrate its possibility, and that nothing warrants its denial. The doctrine, in some form, has always been believed by the human race, whether

savage or civilized, barbarous or refined, and has been denied only by exceptional individuals in exceptional epochs. This proves either that it is a dictate of universal reason, or a doctrine of a revelation made to man in the beginning, before the dispersion of the human race commenced. In either case the reason for believing the doctrine would be sufficient; but we are disposed to take the latter alternative, and to hold that the belief in the immortality of the soul, or of an existence after death, originated in revelation made to our first parents, and has been perpetuated and diffused by tradition, pure and integral with the patriarchs, the synagogue, and the church; but mutilated, corrupted, and travestied with the cultivated as well as with the uncultivated heathen. With the heathen Satan played his pranks with the tradition, as he is doing with it with the spiritists in our own times.

But if the belief originated in revelation and is a doctrine of faith rather than of science, yet is it not repugnant to science, and reason has much to urge in its support. The immateriality of the soul implies its unity and simplicity, and therefore it cannot undergo dissolution, which is the death of the body. Its dissolution is impossible, because it is a monad, having attributes and qualities, but not made up by the combination of parts. It is the form of the body, that is, it vivifies the organic or central cell, and gives to the organism its life, instead of drawing its own life from it. Science, then, has nothing from which to infer that it ceases to exist when the body dies. The death of the body does not necessarily imply its destruction. True, we have here only negative proofs, but negative proofs are all that is needed, in the case of a doctrine of tradition, to satisfy the most exacting reason. The soul may be extinguished with the body, but we cannot say that it is without proof. Left to our unassisted reason, we could not say that the soul of the animal expires with its body. Indeed, the Indian does not believe it, and therefore buries with the hunter his favorite dog, to accompany him in the happy hunting-grounds.

The real matter to be proved is not that the soul can or does survive the body, but that it dies with the body. We have seen that it is distinguishable from the body, does not draw its life from the body, but imparts life to it; how then conclude that it dies with it? We have not a particle of proof, and not a single fact from which we can logically infer that it does so die. What right then has any one to say that it does?

The laboring oar is in the hands of those who assert that the soul dies with the body, and it is for them to prove what they assert, not for us to disprove it. The real affirmative in the case is not made by those who assert the immortality of the soul, but those who assert its mortality. The very term *immortal* is negative, and simply denies mortality. Life is always presumptive of the continuance of life, and the continuance of the life of the soul must be presumed in the absence of all proofs of its death.

We have seen that the immateriality, unity, and simplicity of the soul prove that it does not necessarily die with the body, but that it *may* survive it. The fact that God has written his promise of a future life in the very nature and destiny of the soul, is for us a sufficient proof that the soul does not die with the body. That God is, and is the first and final cause of all existences, is a truth of science as well as of revelation. He has created all things by himself, and for himself. He then must be their last end, and therefore their supreme good, according to their several natures. He has created man with a nature that nothing short of the possession of himself as his supreme good can satisfy. In so creating man, he promises him in his nature the realization of this good, that is, the possession of himself as final cause, unless forfeited and rendered impossible by man's own fault. To return to God as his supreme good without being absorbed in him, is man's destiny promised in his very constitution. But this destiny is not realized nor realizable in this life, and therefore there must be another life to fulfil what he promises, for no promise of God, however made, can fail. This argument we regard as conclusive.

The resurrection of the flesh, the reunion of the soul and body, future happiness as a reward of virtue, and the misery of those who through their own fault fail of their destiny, as a punishment for sin, &c., are matters of revelation or theology as distinguished from philosophy, and do not require to be treated here, any further than to say, if reason has little to say for them, it has nothing to say against them. They belong to the mysteries of faith which, though never contrary to reason, are above it, in an order transcending its domain.

We have thus far treated spiritualism and materialism from the point of view of philosophy, not from that of psychology, or of our faculties. The two doctrines, as they prevail to-day, are simply psychological doctrines. The partisans

of the one say that the soul has no faculty of knowing any but material objects, and therefore assert materialism; the partisans of the other say that the soul has a faculty by which she apprehends immediately immaterial or spiritual objects or truths, and hence they assert what goes by the name of spiritualism, which may or may not deny the existence of matter. Descartes and Cousin assert the cognition of both spirit and matter, but as independent each of the other; Collier and Berkeley deny that we have any cognition of matter, and therefore deny its existence, save in the mind. The truth, we hold, lies with neither. The soul has no direct intuition of the immaterial or intelligible. We use *intuition* here in the ordinary sense, as an act of the soul—knowing by looking on, or immediately beholding; that is, in the sense of intelligible as distinguished from sensible perceptions—intellection, as some say, as distinguished from sensation. This empirical intuition, as we call it, is very distinct from that intuition *a priori* by which the ideal formula is affirmed, for that is the act of the divine Being himself, creating the mind, and becoming himself the light thereof. But that constitutes the mind, and is its object, not its act. No doubt, the intellectual principles of all reality and of all science are affirmed in that intuition *a priori*, and hence these principles are ever present to the soul as the basis of all intelligible as well as of all sensible experience. Yet they are asserted by the mind's own act only as sensibly represented, according to the peripatetic maxim, "Nihil est in intellectu, quod prius non fuerit in sensu." The mind has three faculties, sensibility, intellect, and will, but it is itself one, a single *vis* or force, and never acts with one faculty alone, whether it feels, thinks, or wills; and, united as it is in this life with the body, it never acts as body alone or as spirit alone. There are then no intellections without sensation, nor sensations without intellection; purely noetic truth, therefore, can never be grasped save through a sensible medium.

We have already explained this with regard to material objects, in which the substance, though supersensible, has its sensible sign, through which the mind reaches it. But immaterial or ideal objects are, as we have seen, precisely those which have no sensible sign of their own—properties or qualities perceptible by the senses. For this order of truth the only sensible representation is language, which is the sensible sign or symbol of immaterial or ideal truth. We arrive at this order of reality or truth only through the me-

dium of language which embodies it; that is to say, only through the medium of tradition, or of a teacher. So far we accord with the traditionalists. We do not believe that, if God had left men in the beginning without any instruction or language in which the ideas are embodied, they would ever have been able to assert the existence of God, the immateriality of the soul, and the liberty or free will of man—the three great ideal truths which the Holy See requires us to maintain can be *proved* with certainty by reason; and we do not hold that, like the revealed mysteries, they are suprarational truth, and to be taken only on the authority of a supernatural revelation. If God had not infused the knowledge of them into the first of the race along with language, which he also infused into Adam, we should never by our reason and instincts alone have found them out, or distinctly apprehended them; but being taught them, or finding them expressed in language, we are able to verify or prove them with certainty by our natural reason, in which respect we accord with those whom the traditionalists call rationalists.

We have studiously avoided, as far as possible, the metaphysics of the subject we have been considering, and perhaps have, in consequence, kept too near its surface; but we think we have established our main point, that neither spiritualism nor materialism, taken exclusively, is philosophically defensible. We are able to distinguish between spirit and matter, but we can deny the existence or the activity, according to its own nature, of neither. We know matter by its sensible properties or qualities. We know spirit only as sensibly represented by language. Let language be corrupted, and our knowledge of ideal or non-sensible truth, or philosophy, will also be corrupted, mutilated, or perverted. This will be still more the case with the superintelligible truth supernaturally revealed, which is apprehensible only through the medium of language. Hence, St. Paul is careful to admonish St. Timothy to hold fast "the form of sound words," and hence, too, the necessity, if God makes us a revelation of spiritual things, that he should provide an infallible living teacher to preserve the infallibility of the language in which it is made. We may see here, too, the reason why the infallible church is hardly less necessary to the philosopher than to the theologian. Where faith and theology are preserved in their purity and integrity, philosophy will not be able to stray far from the truth, and where philosophy is sound, the sciences will not long be unsound. The aberrations of philosophy

are due almost solely to the neglect of philosophers to study it in its relation with the dogmatic teaching of the church.

Some of our dear and revered friends in France and elsewhere are seeking, as the cure for the materialism which is now so prevalent, to revive the spiritualism of the seventeenth century. But the materialism they combat is only the reaction of the mind against that exaggerated spiritualism which they would revive. Where there are two real forces, each equally evident and equally indestructible, you can only alternate between them, till you find the term of their synthesis, and are able to reconcile and harmonize them. The spiritualism defended by Cousin in France has resulted only in the recrudescence of materialism. The trouble now is, that matter and spirit are presented in our modern systems as antagonistic and naturally irreconcilable forces. The duty of philosophers is not to labor to pit one against the other, or to give the one the victory over the other; but to save both, and to find out the middle term which unites them. We know there must be somewhere that middle term; for both extremes are creations of God, who makes all things by number, weight, and measure, and creates always after the logic of his own essential nature. All his works, then, must be logical and dialectically harmonious.

Whether we have indicated this middle term or not, we have clearly shown, we think, that it is a mistake to suppose the two terms are not in reality mutually reconcilable. Nothing proves that, as creatures of God, each in its own order and place is not as sacred and necessary as the other. We do not know the nature or essence of either, nor can we say in what, as to this nature and essence, the precise difference between them consists; but we know that in our present life both are united, and that neither acts without the other. All true philosophy must then present them not as opposing, but as harmonious and concurring forces.

We do not for ourselves ever apply the term spiritualism to a purely intellectual philosophy. We do not regard the words spirit and soul as precisely synonymous. St. Paul, Heb. iv. 12, says: "The word of God is living and effectual, . . . reaching unto the division of the soul and the spirit, or, as the Protestant version has it, "quick and powerful, ... piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit." There is evidently, then, however closely related they may be, a distinction between the soul and the spirit. Hence there may be soul that is not spirit, which

was generally held by the ancients. The Greeks had their Ψυχή and Πνεῦμα, and the Latins their *anima* and *spiritus*. The term spirit, when applied to man, seems to us to designate the moral powers rather than the intellectual, and the moral powers or faculties are those which specially distinguish man from animals. St. Paul applies the term spiritual uniformly in a moral sense, and usually, if not always, to men born again of the Holy Ghost, or the regenerated, and to the influences and gifts of the Holy Spirit; that is, to designate the supernatural character, gifts, graces, and virtues of those who have been translated into the kingdom of God and are fellow-citizens of the commonwealth of Christ, or the Christian republic. Hence, we shrink from calling any intellectual philosophy spiritualism. If it touches philosophy, as it undoubtedly does—since grace supposes nature, and a man must be born into the natural order before he can be born again into the supernatural order, or regenerated by the Spirit—it rises into the region of supernatural sanctity, into which no man by his natural powers can enter; for it is a sanctity that places one on the plane of a supernatural destiny.

But even taken in this higher sense, there is no antagonism between spirit and matter. There is certainly a struggle, a warfare that remains through life; but the struggle is not between the soul and the body; it is, as is said, between the higher and inferior powers of the soul, between the spirit and concupiscence, between the law of the mind, which bids us labor for spiritual good which will last for ever, and the law in the members, which looks only to the good of the body, in its earthly relations. The saints, who chastise, mortify, macerate the body by their fastings, vigils, and scourgings, do not do it on the principle that the body is evil, or that matter is the source of evil. There is a total difference in principle between Christian asceticism and that of the Platonists, who hold that evil originates in the intractableness of matter, that holds the soul imprisoned as in a dungeon, and from which it sighs and struggles for deliverance. The Christian knows that our Lord himself assumed flesh and retains for ever his glorified body. He believes in the resurrection of the body and its future everlasting reunion with the soul. Christ, dying in a material body, has redeemed both matter and spirit. Hence we venerate the relics of our Lord and his saints, and believe matter may be hallowed. In our Lord all opposites are reconciled, and universal peace is established.

HEREDITARY GENIUS.*

[From the Catholic World for September, 1870.]

MR. GALTON is what in these days is called a *scientist*, or cultivator of the physical sciences, whose pretension is to confine themselves strictly to the field of the sciences as distinguished from science; to assert nothing but positive facts and the laws of their production and operation, ascertained by careful observation and experiment, and induction therefrom. Their aim would seem to be to explain all the facts or phenomena of the universe by means of second causes, and to prove that man is properly classed with animals, or is only an animal developed or completed, not an animal transformed and specificated by a rational soul, which is defined by the church to be *forma corporis*.

Between the scientists and philosophers, or those who cultivate not the special sciences, but the science of the sciences, and determine the principles to which the several special sciences must be referred in order to have any scientific character or value, there is a long-standing quarrel, which grows fiercer and more embittered every day. We are far from pretending that the positivists or Comtists have mastered all the so-called special sciences; but they represent truly the aims and tendencies of the scientists, and of what by a strange misnomer is called philosophy; so called, it would seem, because philosophy it is not. Philosophy is the science of principles, as say the Greeks, or of *first* principles, as say the Latins, and after them the modern Latinized nations. But Herbert Spencer, Stuart Mill, and the late Sir William Hamilton, the ablest representatives of philosophy as generally received by the English-speaking world, agree with the Comtists or positivists in rejecting first principles from the domain of science, and in relegating theology and metaphysics to the region of the unknown and the unknowable. Their labors consequently result, as Sir William Hamilton himself somewhere admits, in universal nescience, or, as we say, absolute nihilism or nullism.

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* 1. *Hereditary Genius, its Laws and its Consequences.* By FRANCIS GALTON, F. R. S., &c. New York: 1870.

2. *Hereditary Genius.* An Analytical Review. From the *Journal of Psychological Medicine*, April, 1870. New York: 1870.

This result is not accidental, but follows necessarily from what is called the Baconian method, which the scientists follow, and which is, in scholastic language, concluding the universal from the particular. Now, in the logic we learned as a school-boy, and adhere to in our old age, this is simply impossible. To every valid argument it is necessary that one of the premises, called the major premise, be a universal principle. Yet the scientists discard the universal from their premises, and from two or more particulars, or particular facts, profess to draw a valid universal conclusion, as if any conclusion broader than the premises could be valid! The physico-theologians are so infatuated with the Baconian method that they attempt, from certain facts which they discover in the physical world, to conclude, by way of induction, the being and attributes of God, as if any thing concluded from particular facts could be any thing but a particular fact. Hence, the aforenamed authors, with Professor Huxley at their tail, as well as Kant in his *Critik der reinen Vernunft*, have proved as clearly and as conclusively as any thing can be proved that a causative force, or causality, cannot be concluded by way either of induction or of deduction from any empirical facts, or facts of which observation can take note. Yet the validity of every induction rests on the reality of the relation of cause and effect, and the fact that the cause actually produces the effect.

Yet our scientists pretend that they can, from the observation and analysis of facts, induce a law, and a law that will hold good beyond the particulars observed and analyzed. But they do not obtain any law at all; and the laws of nature, about which they talk so learnedly, are not laws, but simply facts. Bring a piece of wax to the fire and it melts, hence it is said to be a law that wax so brought in proximate relation with fire will melt; but this law is only the particular fact observed, and the facts to which you apply it are the identical facts from which you have obtained it. The investigation, in all cases where the scientists profess to seek the law, is simply an investigation to find out and establish the identity of the facts, and what they call the law is only the assertion of that identity, and never extends to facts not identical, or to dissimilar facts.

Take mathematics; as far as the scientist can admit mathematics, they are simply identical propositions piled on identical propositions, and the only difference between Newton and a plough-boy is, that Newton detects identity where the

plough-boy does not. Take what is called the law of gravitation; it is nothing but the statement of a fact, or a class of facts observed, and the most that it tells us is, that if the facts are identical, they are identical—that is, they bear such and such relations to one another. But let your positivist attempt to explain transcendental mathematics, and he is all at sea, if he does not borrow from the ideal science or philosophy which he professes to discard. How will the geometrician explain his infinitely extended lines, or lines that may be infinitely extended? A line is made up of a succession of points, and therefore of parts, and nothing which is made up of parts is infinite. The line may be increased or diminished by the addition or subtraction of points, but the infinite cannot be either increased or diminished. Whence does the mind get this idea of infinity? The geometrician tells us the line may be infinitely extended—that is, it is infinitely possible; but it cannot be so unless there is an infinite ground on which it can be projected. An infinitely possible line can be asserted only by asserting the infinitely real, and therefore the mind, unless it had the intuition of the infinitely real, could not conceive of a line as capable of infinite extension. Hence the ancients never assert either the infinitely possible or the infinitely real. There is in all gentile science, or gentile philosophy, no conception of the infinite; there is only the conception of the indefinite.

This same reasoning disposes of the infinite divisibility of matter still taught in our text-books. The infinite divisibility of matter is an infinite absurdity; for it implies an infinity of parts or numbers, which is really a contradiction in terms. We know nothing that better illustrates the unsoundness of the method of the scientists. Here is a piece of matter. Can you not divide it into two equal parts? Certainly. Can you do the same by either of the halves? Yes. And by the quarters? Yes. And thus on *ad infinitum?* Where, then, is the absurdity? None as long as you deal with only finite quantities. The absurdity is in the fact that the infinite divisibility of matter implies an infinity of parts; and an infinity of parts, an infinity of numbers; and numbers and every series of numbers may be increased by addition, and diminished by subtraction. An infinite series is impossible.

The moment the scientists leave the domain of particulars or positive facts, and attempt to induce from them a law, their induction is of no value. Take geology. The geolo-

gist finds in that small portion of the globe which he has examined certain facts, from which he concludes that the globe is millions and millions of ages old. Is his conclusion scientific? Not at all. If the globe was in the beginning in a certain state, and if the structural and other changes which are now going on have been going on at the same rate from the beginning—neither of which suppositions is provable—then the conclusion is valid; not otherwise. Sir Charles Lyell, if we recollect aright, calculated that, at the present rate, it must have taken at least a hundred and fifty thousand years to form the delta of the Mississippi. Officers of the United States army have calculated that a little over four thousand years would suffice.

So of the antiquity of man on the globe. The scientist finds what he takes to be human bones in a cave along with the bones of certain long since extinct species of animals, and concludes that man was contemporary with the said extinct species of animals; therefore man existed on the globe many, nobody can say how many, thousand years ago. But two things render the conclusion uncertain. It is not certain from the fact that their bones are found together that man and these animals were contemporary; and the date when these animals became extinct, if extinct they are, is not ascertained nor ascertainable. They have discovered traces in Switzerland of lacustrian habitations; but these prove nothing, because history itself mentions "the dwellers on the lakes," and the oldest history accepted by the scientists is not many thousand years old. Sir Charles Lyell finds, or supposes he finds, stone knives and axes, or what he takes to be stone knives and axes, deeply embedded in the earth in the valley of a river, though at some distance from its present bed; and thence concludes the presence of man on the earth for a period wholly irreconcilable with the received biblical chronology. But supposing the facts to be as alleged, they do not prove any thing, because we cannot say what changes by floods or other causes have taken place in the soil of the locality, even during the period of authentic history. Others conclude from the same facts that men were primitively savages, or ignorant of the use of iron. But the most they prove is that, at some unknown period, certain parts of Europe were inhabited by a people who used stone knives and axes; but whether because ignorant of iron, or because unable from their poverty or their distance from places where they were manufactured to procure similar iron utensils, they give us no-

information. Instances enough are recorded in history of the use of stone knives by a people who possessed knives made of iron. Because in our day some Indian tribes use bows and arrows, are we to conclude that firearms are unknown in our age of the world?

What the scientists offer as proof is seldom any proof at all. If an hypothesis they invent explains the known facts of a case, they assert it as proved, and therefore true. What fun would they not make of theologians and philosophers, if they reasoned as loosely as they do themselves? Before we can conclude an hypothesis is true because it explains the known facts in the case, we must prove, 1st, that there are and can be no facts in the case not known; and, 2d, that there is no other possible hypothesis on which they can be explained. We do not say the theories of the scientists with regard to the antiquity of the globe and of man on its surface, nor that any of the geological and astronomical hypotheses they set forth are absolutely false; we only say that their alleged facts and reasonings do not prove them. The few facts known might be placed in a very different light by the possibly unknown facts; and there are conceivable any number of other hypotheses which would equally well explain the facts that are known.

The book before us on *Hereditary Genius* admirably illustrates the insufficiency of the method and the defective logic of the scientists. Mr. Galton, its author, belongs to the school of which such men as Herbert Spencer, Darwin, Sir John Lubbock, and Prof. Huxley are British chiefs, men who disdain to recognize a self-existent Creator, and who see no difficulty in supposing the universe self-evolved from nothing, or in tracing intelligence, will, generous affection, and heroic effort to the mechanical, chemical, and electrical arrangement and combination of the particles of brute matter.

Mr. Galton has written his book, he says, p. 1, to show

"that a man's natural abilities are derived from inheritance, under exactly the same limitations as are the form and the physical features of the whole organic world. Consequently, as it is easy, notwithstanding those limitations, to obtain by careful selection a permanent breed of dogs or horses, gifted with peculiar powers of running, or of doing any thing else, so it would be quite practicable to produce a highly-gifted race [breed] of men by judicious marriages during several consecutive generations."

Mr. Galton, with an air of the most perfect innocence in the world, places man in the category of plants and animals,

and in principle simply reproduces for our instruction the *Man-Plant*, from which there is but a step to the *Man-Machine* of the cynical La Mettrie, the atheistic professor of mathematics in the university of Berlin, and friend of Frederick the Great. The attempt to prove it is a subtle attempt to prove, in the name of science, that the soul, if soul there be, is generated as well as the body, and that a man's natural abilities are derived through generation from his organization. The author from first to last gives no hint that his doctrine is at war with Christian theology, with the freedom of the human will, or man's moral responsibility for his conduct, or that it excludes all morality, all virtue, and all sin, and recognizes only physical good or evil. He would no doubt reply to this that science is science, facts are facts, and he is under no obligation to consider what theological doctrines they do or do not contradict; for nothing can be true that contradicts science or is opposed to facts. That is opposed to actual facts, or that contradicts real science, conceded; for one truth can never contradict another. But the author is bound to consider whether a theory or hypothesis which contradicts the deepest and most cherished beliefs of mankind in all ages and nations, and in which is the key to universal history, is really science, or really is sustained by facts. The presumption, as say the lawyers, is against it, and for its acceptance it requires the clearest and the most irrefragable proofs, and we are not sure that even any proofs would be enough to overcome the presumptions against it, founded as they are on reasons as strong and as conclusive as it is in any case possible for the human mind to have. The assertion that man's natural abilities originate in his organization, and therefore that we may obtain a peculiar breed of men as we obtain a peculiar breed of dogs or horses, is revolting to the deepest convictions and the holiest and most irrepressible instincts of every man, except a scientist, and certainly can be reasonably received only on evidence that excludes the possibility of a rational doubt.

Mr. Galton proves, or attempts to prove, his theory by what he no doubt calls an appeal to facts. He takes from a biographical dictionary the names of a few hundreds of men, chiefly Englishmen, during the last two centuries, who have been distinguished as statesmen, lawyers, judges, divines, authors, &c., and finds that in a great majority of cases, as far as is known, they have sprung from families of more than average ability, and, in some cases, from families which

have had some one or more members distinguished for several consecutive generations. This is really all the proof Mr. Galton brings to prove his thesis; and if he has not adduced more, it is fair to conclude that it is because no more was to be had.

But the evidence is far from being conclusive. Even if it be true that the majority of eminent men spring from families more or less distinguished, it does not necessarily follow that they derive their eminent abilities by inheritance; for in those same families, born of the same parents, we find other members whose abilities are in no way remarkable, and in no sense above the common level. In a family of half a dozen or a dozen members one will be distinguished and rise to eminence, while the others will remain very ordinary people. Of the Bonaparte family no member approaches in genius the first Napoleon, except the present Emperor of the French. Why these marked differences in the children of the same blood, the same breed, the same parents and ancestors? If Mr. Galton explains the inferiority of the five or the eleven by considerations external or independent of race or breed, why may not the superiority of the one be explained by causes alike independent of breed? Why are the natural abilities of one brother inferior to another's, since they are both born of the same parents? If a man's natural abilities are derived by inheritance from organization, why is one superior to the other? Every day we meet occasion to ask similar questions. This fact proves that there are causes at work, on which man's eminence or want of eminence depends, of which Mr. Galton's theory takes no note, which escape the greatest scientists, and at best can be only conjectured. But conjecture is not science.

This is not all. As far as known, very eminent men have sprung from parents of very ordinary natural abilities, as of social position. The founders of dynasties and noble families have seldom had distinguished progenitors, and are usually not only the first but the greatest of their line. The present Sir Robert Peel cannot be named alongside of his really eminent father, nor the present Duke of Wellington be compared with his father, the Iron Duke. There is no greater name in history than that of St. Augustine, the eminent father and doctor of the church, a man beside whom in genius and depth, and greatness of mind as well as tenderness of heart, your Platos and Aristotles appear like men of

ordinary stature; yet, though his mother was eminent for her sanctity, his parents do not appear to have been gifted with any extraordinary mental power. Instances are not rare, especially among the saints, of great men who have, so to speak, sprung from nothing. Among the popes we may mention Sixtus Quintus, and Hildebrand, St. Gregory VII.; and among eminent churchmen we may mention St. Thomas of Canterbury, Cardinal Ximenes, and Cardinal Wolsey. The greatest and most gifted of our own statesmen have sprung from undistinguished parents, as Washington, the elder Adams, Jefferson, Madison, Jackson, Webster, Calhoun. Who dares pretend that every saint has had a saint for a father or mother; that every eminent theologian or philosopher has had an eminent theologian or philosopher for his father; or that every eminent artist, whether in painting, architecture, sculpture, or music, has been the son or grandson of an eminent artist?

Then, again, who can say how much of a great man's greatness is due to his natural abilities with which he was born, and how much is due to the force of example, to family tradition, to education, to his own application, and the concurrence of circumstances? It is in no man's power to tell, nor in any scientist's power to ascertain. It is a common remark that great men in general owe their greatness chiefly to their mothers, and that, in the great majority of cases known, eminent men have gifted mothers. This, if a fact, is against Mr. Galton's theory; for the father, not the mother, transmits the hereditary character of the offspring, the hereditary qualities of the line, if the physiologists are to be believed. Hence nobility in all civilized nations follows the father, not the mother. The fact of great men owing their greatness more to the mother is explained by her greater influence in forming the mind, in moulding the character, in stimulating and directing the exercise of her son's faculties, than that of the father. It is as educator in the largest sense that the mother forms her son's character and influences his destiny. It is her womanly instincts, affection, and care and vigilance, her ready sympathy, her love, her tenderness, and power to inspire a noble ambition, kindle high and generous aspirations in the breast of her son, that do the work.

Even if it were uniformly true that great men have always descended from parents remarkable for their natural abilities, Mr. Galton's theory that genius is hereditary could

not be concluded with scientific certainty. The hereditary transmission of genius might indeed seem probable; but, on the empirical principles of the scientists, it could not be asserted. All that could be asserted would be the relation of concomitance or of juxtaposition, not the relation of cause and effect. The relation of cause and effect is not and cannot, as the scientists tell us, be empirically apprehended. How can they know that the genius of the son is derived hereditarily from the greatness of his progenitors? From the juxtaposition or concomitance of two facts empirically apprehended there is no possible logic by which it can be inferred that the one is the cause of the other. Hence, Herbert Spencer, Stuart Mill, Hamilton, Huxley, and the positivists follow Hume, and relegate, as we said, causes to the region of the unknowable. In fact, the scientists, if they speak of the relation of cause and effect, mean by it only the relation of juxtaposition in the order of precedence and consequence. Hence, on their own principles, though the facts they assert and describe may be true, none of their conclusions from them, or hypotheses to explain them, have or can have any scientific validity. For, after all, there may be a real cause on which the facts depend, and which demands an entirely different explanation from the one which the scientists offer.

We refuse, therefore, to accept Mr. Galton's hypothesis that genius is hereditary, because the facts he adduces are not all the facts in the case, because there are facts which are not consistent with it, and because he does not show and cannot show that it is the only hypothesis possible for the explanation even of the facts which he alleges. Even his friendly and able reviewer, Dr. Meredith Clymer, concludes his admirable analysis by saying, "A larger induction is necessary before any final decision can be had on the merits of the question." This is the verdict of one of the most scientific minds in the United States, and it is the Scotch verdict, not proven. Yet Mr. Galton would have us accept his theory as science, and on its strength set aside the teachings of revelation and the universal beliefs of mankind. This is the way of all non-Christian scientists of the day, and it is because the church refuses to accept their unverified and unverifiable hypotheses, and condemns them for asserting them as true, that they accuse her of being hostile to modern science. They make certain investigations, ascertain certain facts, imagine certain hypotheses, which are nothing but

conjectures, put them forth as science, and then demand that she accept them, and give up her faith so far as incompatible with them. A very reasonable demand indeed!

Press these proud scientists closely, and they will own that *as yet* their sciences are only tentative, that *as yet* they are not in a condition to prove absolutely their theories, or to verify their conjectures, but they are in hopes they soon will be. At present, science is only in its infancy, it has only just entered upon the true method of investigation; but it is every day making surprising progress, and there is no telling what marvellous conclusions it will soon arrive at. All this might pass, if it did not concern matters of life and death, heaven and hell. The questions involved are too serious to be sported with, too pressing to wait the slow and uncertain solutions of the tentative science which, during six thousand years, has really made no progress in solving them. The scientists retard science when they ask from it the solution, either affirmative or negative, of questions which confessedly lie not in its province, and dishonor and degrade it when they put forth as science their crude conjectures, or their unverified and unverifiable hypotheses. They, not we, are the real enemies of science, though it would require a miracle to make them see it. Deluded mortals! they start with assumptions that exclude the very possibility of science, and then insist that what they assert or deny shall be accepted by theologians and philosophers as established with scientific certainty! Surely the apostle must have had them in mind when he said of certain men that, "esteeming themselves wise, they became fools."

Genius is not hereditary in Mr. Galton's sense, nor are a man's natural abilities derived by inheritance in the way he would have us believe; for both belong to the soul, not to the body; and the soul is created, not generated. Only the body is generated, and only in what is generated is there natural inheritance. All the facts Mr. Galton adduces we are prepared to admit; but we deny his explanation. We accept, with slight qualifications, his views as summed up by Dr. Clymer in the following passage:

"The doctrine of the pretensions of natural equality in intellect, which teaches that the sole agencies in creating differences between boy and boy, and man and man, are steady application and moral effort, is daily contradicted by the experiences of the nursery, schools, universities, and professional careers. There is a definite limit to the muscular powers of every man, which he cannot by any training or exertion overpass. It is

only the novice gymnast who, noting his rapid daily gain of strength and skill, believes in illimitable development; but he learns in time that his maximum performance becomes a rigidly-determinate quantity. The same is true of the experience of the student in the working of his mental powers. The eager boy at the outset of his career is astonished at his rapid progress; he thinks for a while that every thing is within his grasp; but he too soon finds his place among his fellows; he can beat such and such of his mates, and run on equal terms with others, while there will be always some whose intellectual and physical feats he cannot approach. The same experience awaits him when he enters a larger field of competition in the battle of life; let him work with all his diligence, he cannot reach his object; let him have opportunities, he cannot profit by them; he tries and is tried, and he finally learns his guage—what he can do, and what lies beyond his capacity. He has been taught the hard lesson of his weakness and his strength; he comes to rate himself as the world rates him; and he salves his wounded ambition with the conviction that he is doing all his nature allows him. An evidence of the enormous inequality between the intellectual capacity of men is shown in the prodigious differences in the number of marks obtained by those who gain mathematical honors at the University of Cambridge, England. Of the four hundred or four hundred and fifty students who take their degrees each year, about one hundred succeed in gaining honors in mathematics, and these are ranged in strict order of merit. Forty of them have the title of 'wrangler,' and to be even a low wrangler is a creditable thing. The distinction of being the first in this list of honors, or 'senior wrangler' of the year, means a great deal more than being the foremost mathematician of four hundred or four hundred and fifty men taken at haphazard. Fully one half the wranglers have been boys of mark at their schools. The senior wrangler of the year is the chief of these as regards mathematics. The youths start on their three years' race fairly, and their run is stimulated by powerful inducements; at the end they are examined rigorously for five and a half hours a day for eight days. The marks are then added up, and the candidates strictly rated in a scale of merit. The precise number of marks got by the senior wrangler, in one of the three years given by Mr. Galton, is 7634; by the second wrangler, 4123; and by the lowest man in the list of honors, 237. The senior wrangler, consequently, had nearly twice as many marks as the second, and more than thirty-two times as many as the lowest man. In the other examinations given, the results do not materially differ. The senior wrangler, may, therefore, be set down as having thirty-two times the ability of the lowest men on the lists; or, as Mr. Galton, puts it, 'he would be able to grapple with problems more than thirty-two times as difficult; or, when dealing with subjects of the same difficulty, but intelligible to all, would comprehend them more rapidly in, perhaps, the square root of that proportion.' But the mathematical powers of the ultimate man on the honors-list, which are so low when compared with

those of the foremost man, are above mediocrity when compared with the gifts of Englishmen generally; for, though the examination places one hundred honor-men above him, it puts no less than three hundred 'poll-men' below him. Admitting that two hundred out of three hundred have refused to work hard enough to earn honors, there will remain one hundred who, had they done their possible, never could have got them.

"The same striking intellectual differences between man and man are found in whatever way ability may be tested, whether in statesmanship, generalship, literature, science, poetry, art. The evidence furnished by Mr. Galton's book goes to show in how small degree eminence in any class of intellectual powers can be considered as due to purely special faculties. It is the result of concentrated efforts made by men widely gifted—of grand human animals; of natures born to achieve greatness."

We are far from pretending that all men are born with equal abilities, and that all souls are created with equal possibilities, or that every child comes into the world a genius in germ. We believe that all men are born with equal natural rights, and that all should be equal before the law, however various and unequal may be their acquired or adventitious rights; but that is all the equality we believe in. No special effort or training in the world, under the influence of the most favorable circumstances, can make every child a St. Augustine, a St. Thomas, a Bossuet, a Newton, a Leibnitz, a Julius Cæsar, a Wellington, a Napoleon. As one star differeth from another in glory, so does one soul differ from another in its capacities on earth as in its blessedness in heaven. Here we have no quarrel with Mr. Galton. We are by no means believers in the late Robert Owen's doctrine, that you can make all men equal if you will only surround them from birth with the same circumstances, and enable them to live in parallelograms.

We are prepared to go even further, and to recognize that the distinction between noble and ignoble, gentle and simple, recognized in all ages and by all nations, is not wholly unfounded. There is as great a variety and as great an inequality in families as in individuals. Aristocracy is not a pure prejudice; and though it has no political privileges in this country, yet it exists here no less than elsewhere, and it is well for us that it does. No greater evil could befall any country than to have no distinguished families rising, generation after generation, above the common level; no born leaders of the people, who stand head and shoul-

ders above the rest; and the great objection to democracy is, that it tends to bring all down to a general average, and to place the administration of public interests in the hands of a low mediocrity, as our American experience, in some measure, proves. The demand of the age for equality of conditions and possessions is most mischievous. If all were equally rich, all would be equally poor; and if all were at the top of society, society would have no bottom, and would be only a bottomless pit. If there were none devoted to learning, no strength and energy of character above the multitude, society would be without leaders, and would soon fall to pieces, as an army of privates without officers.

There is no doubt that there are noble lines, and the descendants of noble ancestors do, as a rule, though not invariably, surpass the descendants of plebeian or undistinguished lines. The Stanleys, for instance, have been distinguished in British history for at least fifteen generations. The present Earl Derby, the fifteenth earl of his house, is hardly inferior to his gifted father, and nobly sustains the honors of his house. We expect more from the child of a good family than from the child of a family of no account, and hold that birth is never to be decried or treated as a matter of no importance. But we count it so chiefly because it secures better breeding, and subjection to higher, nobler, and purer formative influences, from the earliest moment. Example and family traditions are of immense reach in forming the character, and it is not a little to have constantly presented to the consideration of the child the distinguished ability, the eminent worth and noble deeds of a long line of illustrious ancestors, especially in an age and country where blood is highly esteemed, and the honorable pride of family is cultivated. The honor and esteem in which a family has been held for its dignity and worth through several generations is a capital, an outfit for the son, secures him, in starting, the advantage of less well-born competitors, and all the aid in advance of a high position and the good-will of the community. More is exacted of him than of them; he is early made to feel that *noblesse oblige*, and that failure would in his case be dishonor. He is thereby stimulated to greater effort to succeed.

Yet we deny not that there is something else than all this in blood. A man's genius belongs to his soul, and is no more inherited than the soul itself. But man is not all soul, any more than he is all body; body and soul are in close and

mysterious relation, and in this life neither acts without the other. The man's natural abilities are psychical, not physical, and are not inherited, because the soul is created, not generated; but their external manifestation may depend, in a measure, on organization, and organization is inherited. Mr. Galton's facts may, then, be admitted without our being obliged to accept his theory. The brain is generally considered by physiologists as the organ of the mind, and it may be so, without implying that the brain secretes thought, will, affection, as the liver secretes bile, or the stomach secretes the gastric juice.

The soul is distinct from the body, and is its *form*, its life, or its vivifying and informing principle; yet it uses the body as the organ of its action. Hence, De Bonald defines man, an intelligence that serves himself by organs, not an intelligence served by organs, as Plato said. The activity is in the soul, not in the organs. The organ we call the eye does not see; the soul sees by means of the eye. So of the ear, the smell, the taste, the touch. We speak of the five senses; but we should speak more correctly if we spoke, not of five senses, but of five organs of sense; for the sense is psychical, and is one like the soul that senses through the organs. In like manner, the brain appears to be the organ of the mind, through which, together with the several nerves that centre in it, the mind performs its various operations of thinking, willing, reasoning, remembering, reflecting, &c. The nature of the relation of the soul, which is one, simple, and immaterial, with a material body with its various organs, nervous and ganglionic systems, is a mystery which we cannot explain. Yet we cannot doubt that there is a reciprocal action and reaction of the soul and body, or, at least, the bodily organs can and do offer, at times, an obstacle to the external action of the soul. We cannot by our will raise our arm, if it be paralyzed, though our psychical power to will to raise it is not thereby effected. If the organs of seeing and hearing, the eye and the ear, are injured or originally defective, our external sight and hearing are thereby injured or rendered defective; but not in other psychical relations, as evinced by the fact that when the physical defect is removed, or the physical injury is cured, the soul finds no difficulty in manifesting its ordinary power of seeing or hearing. So we may say of the other organs of sense, and of the body generally, in so far as it is the organ of the soul, or used by the soul in its external display or manifestation of its powers.

No doubt the organization may be more or less favorable to this external display or manifestation, or that, under certain conditions, and to a certain extent, the organization is hereditary, or transmitted by natural generation. There may be transmitted from parents or ancestors a healthy or diseased, a normal or a more or less abnormal organization; and so far, and in this sense, genius may be hereditary, and a man's natural abilities may be derived by inheritance, as are the form and features; but only to this extent, and in this sense—that is, as to their external display or exercise; for a man may be truly eloquent in his soul, and even in writing, whose stammering tongue prevents him from displaying any eloquence in his speech. The organization does not deprive the soul of its powers. A man's power to will to raise his arm is not lessened by the fact that his arm is paralyzed. And in all ordinary cases, the soul is able, at least by the help of grace, freely given to all, to overcome a vicious temperament, control, in the moral order, a defective organization, and maintain her moral freedom and integrity. It has been proved that the deaf-mute can be taught to speak, and that idiots or natural-born fools can be so educated as to be able to exhibit no inconsiderable degree of intelligence.

We do not believe a word in Darwin's theory of natural selection, for all the facts on which he bases it admit of a different explanation; nor in its kindred theory of development or evolution of species. One of our own collaborators has amply refuted both theories, by showing that what these theories assume to be the development or evolution of new species, whether by natural selection or otherwise, is but a reversion to the original type and condition, in like manner as we have proved, over and over again, that the savage is the degenerate, not the primeval man. It is not improbable that your African negro is the degenerate descendant of a once over-civilized race, and that he owes his physical peculiarities to the fact that he has become subject, like the animal world, to the laws of nature, which are resisted and modified in their action by the superior races. We do not assert this as scientifically demonstrated, but as a theory which is far better sustained by well-known facts and incontrovertible principles than either the theory of development or of natural selection.

Yet the soul as *forma corporis* has an influence, we say not how much, on organization; and high intellectual and moral culture may modify it, and, other things being equal,

render it in turn more favorable to the external manifestation of the inherent powers of the soul. This more favorable organization may be transmitted by natural generation from parents to children, and, if continued through several consecutive generations, it may give rise to noble families and to races superior to the average. Physical habits are transmissible by inheritance. This is not, as Darwin and Galton suppose, owing to natural selection, but to the original mental and moral culture become traditional in certain families and races, and to the voluntary efforts of the soul, as is evident from the fact that when the culture is neglected, and the voluntary efforts cease to be made, the superiority is lost, the organization becomes depraved, and the family or race runs out or drops into the ranks of the ignoble. The blood, however blue, will not of itself alone suffice to keep up the superiority of the family or the race; nor will marriages, however judicious, through no matter how many consecutive generations, without the culture, keep up the nobility, as Mr. Galton would have us believe; for the superiority of the blood depends originally and continuously on the soul, its original endowments, and its peculiar training or culture through several generations.

It is in this same way we explain the origin and continuance of national characteristics and differences. Climate and geographical position count, no doubt, for something; but more in the direction they give to the national aims and culture than in their direct effects on bodily organization. It is not probable that the original tribes of Greece had any finer organic adaptation to literature and the arts than had the Scythian hordes from which they sprang; but their climate and geographical position turned their attention to cultivation of the beautiful, and the continual cultivation of the beautiful through several generations gave the Greeks an organization highly favorable to artistic creations. Then, again, Rome cultivated and excelled in the genius of law and jurisprudence. But under Christian faith and culture, the various nations of Europe became assimilated, and the peculiar national characteristics under gentilism were in a measure obliterated. They also revive as the nations under Protestantism recede from Christianity and return to gentilism, and are held in check only by the reminiscences of Catholicity, and by the mutual intercourse of nations kept up by trade and commerce, literature and the arts.

The facts alleged by Mr. Galton and his brother material

ists are, therefore, explicable without impugning the doctrine of the simplicity and immateriality of the soul, and that the soul is created, not generated as is the body. They are perfectly explicable without supposing our natural abilities originate in or are the result of natural organization. They can be explained in perfect consistency with revelation, with the teachings of the church, and with the universal beliefs of mankind. Thus it would be supreme unreason to require us to reject the Gospel, or our holy religion, on the strength of the unverified and unverifiable hypotheses of the scientists, and degrade man, the lord of this lower creation, to the level of the beasts that perish. The quarrel we began by speaking of is in no sense a quarrel between faith and reason, or revelation and science; but simply a quarrel between what is certain by faith and reason on the one side, and the unverified and unverifiable hypotheses or conjectures of the so-called scientists on the other. We oppose none of the real facts which the scientists set forth; we oppose only their unsupported theories and unwarranted inductions. We conclude by reminding the scientists that others have studied nature as well as they, and are as familiar with its facts and as able to reason on them as they are, and yet have no difficulty in reconciling their science and their faith.

ORIGIN OF CIVILIZATION.*

[From the Catholic World for July, 1871.]

SIR JOHN LUBBOCK, though his name is not euphonious, is, we understand, an English scientist, highly distinguished and of no mean authority in the scientific world, as his father was before him. He certainly is a man of large pretensions, and of as much logical ability and practical good sense as we have a right to expect in an English scientist. He, of course, adopts the modern theory of progress, and maintains that the savage is the type of the primitive man, and that he has emerged from his original barbarism and superstition to his present advanced civilization and religious belief and worship by his own energy and persevering efforts at self-evolution or development, without any foreign or supernatural instruction or assistance.

One, Sir John contends, has only to study and carefully ascertain the present condition of the various contemporary savage tribes, or what he calls the "lower races," to know what was the original condition of mankind, and from which the superior races started on their tour of progress through the ages; and one needs only to ascertain the germs of civilization and religion which were in their original condition, to be able to comprehend the various stages of that progress and the principles and means by which it has been effected and may be carried on indefinitely beyond the point already reached. Hence, in the volume before us the author labors to present us a true picture of the present mental and social condition of contemporary savages as that of the primeval man. He assumes that the mental and social condition is that of the infancy of the human race, and by studying it we can attain to the history of "pre-historic" times, assist, as it were, if we may be pardoned the Gallicism, at the earliest development of mankind, and trace step by step the progress from their first appearance on the globe upward to the sublime civilization of the nineteenth century—the civilization of the steam-engine, the cotton spinner

**The Origin of Civilization and the Primitive Condition of Man: Mental and Social Condition of Savages.* By Sir JOHN LUBBOCK, Bart., M. P., F. R. S., &c. New York: 1871.

and weaver, the steamboat, the steam-plough, the railway, and the lightning-telegraph.

This theory, that finds in the savage the type of the primitive man, is nothing very new. It was refuted by the late Archbishop Whately, by the Duke of Argyll in his *Primeval Man*, and on several occasions by ourselves. The facts Sir John adduces in the support of this theory, as far as facts they are, had been adduced long ago, and were as well known by us before we abandoned the theory as untenable, as they are by Sir John Lubbock or any of his compeers. They may all, so far as they bear on religion, be found summed up and treated at length in the work of Benjamin Constant, *La Religion considérée dans sa Source, ses Développements, et ses Formes*, published in 1832, as well as in a mass of German writers. Sir John has told us nothing of the mental and social condition of savages that we had not examined, we had almost said, before he was born, and which we had supposed was not known by all men with any pretension to serious studies. In fact, we grow rather impatient as we grow old of writers who, because they actually have learned more than they knew in their cradles, imagine that they have learned so much more than all the rest of mankind. No men try our patience more than our scientific Englishmen, who speak always in a decisive tone, with an air of infallibility from which there would seem to be no appeal, and yet utter only the veriest commonplaces, old theories long since exploded, or stale absurdities. We have no patience with such men as Herbert Spencer, Huxley, and Darwin. We are hardly less impatient of the scientists who in our own country hold them up to our admiration and reverence as marvellous discoverers, and as the great and brilliant lights of the age. We love science, we honor the men who devote their lives to its cultivation, but we ask that it *be* science, not hypothesis piled on hypothesis, nor simply a thing of mere conjectures or guesses.

The modern doctrine of progress or development, which supposes man began in the lowest savage, if not lower still, is not a doctrine suggested by any facts observed and classified in men's history, nor is it a logical induction from any class of known facts, but a gratuitous hypothesis invented and asserted against the Biblical doctrine of creation, of Providence, of original sin, and of the supernatural instruction, government, redemption, and salvation of men. The

hypothesis is suggested by hostility to the Christian revelation, prior to the analysis and classification of any facts to sustain it, and the scientists who defend it are simply investigating nature, not in the interests of science properly so-called, but, consciously or unconsciously, to find facts to support an hypothesis which may be opposed to both. Any facts in nature or in history, natural or civil, political or religious, that seem to make against Christian teaching, are seized upon with avidity, distorted or exaggerated, and paraded with a grand fanfaronade, sounding of trumpets, beating of drums, and waving of banners, as if it were a glorious triumph of man to prove that he is no better than the beasts that perish; while the multitude of facts which are absolutely irreconcilable with it are passed over in silence or quietly set aside, as of no account, or simply declared to be anomalies, which science is *not yet* in a condition to explain, but, no doubt, soon will be, since it has entered the true path, has found the true scientific methods, and is headed in the right direction. Science is yet in its infancy. In its cradle it has strangled frightful monsters, and, when full-grown, it will not fail to slay the hydra, and rid the world of all its "chimeras dire." But while we do not complain that your infantile or puerile science has not done more, we would simply remind you, men of science, that it is very unscientific to reason from what you confess science has not yet done as if it had done it. Wait till it has done it, before you bring it forward as a scientific achievement.

We confess to a want of confidence in this whole class of scientists, for their investigations are not free and unbiassed; their minds are prejudiced; they are pledged to a theory in advance, which makes them shut their eyes to the facts which contradict it, and close their intelligence to the great principles of universal reason which render their conclusions invalid. There are other scientists who have pushed their investigations as far into nature and history as they have, perhaps even further, who know and have carefully analyzed all the facts they know or ever pretended to know, and yet have come to conclusions the contrary of theirs, and find nothing in the facts or phenomena of the universe that warrant any induction not in accordance with Christian faith, either as set forth in the Holy Scriptures or the definitions of the church. Why are these less likely to be really scientific than they? They are biassed by their Christian

faith, you say. Be it so: are you less biassed by your anti-christian unbelief and disposition? Besides, are you able to say that these have not in their Christian faith a key to the real sense or meaning of the universe and its phenomena which you have not, and therefore are much more likely to be right than you? Do you know that it is not so? There is no science where knowledge is wanting.

The unchristian scientists forget that they cannot conclude against the Biblical or Christian doctrine from mere possibilities or even probabilities. They appeal to science against it, and nothing can avail them as the basis of argument against it that is not scientifically proved or demonstrated. Their hypothesis of progress, evolution, or development is unquestionably repugnant to the whole Christian doctrine and order of thought. If it is true, Christianity is false. They must then, before urging it, either prove Christianity untrue or an idle tale, or else prove absolutely, beyond the possibility of a rational doubt, the truth of their hypothesis. It is not enough to prove that it may, for aught you know, be true; you must prove that it is true, and cannot be false. Christianity is too important a fact in the world's history to be set aside by an undemonstrated hypothesis. And it is any thing but scientific to conclude its falsity on the strength of a simply possible or even probable hypothesis, not as yet indeed proved, and of which the best you can say is that you trust science will be able to prove it when once it is out of its nonage. You cannot propose it at all, unless you have scientifically demonstrated it, or previously disproved *aliunde* the Christian revelation. So long as you leave it possible for me to hold the Christian faith without contradicting what is demonstrated to be true, you have alleged nothing to the purpose against it, and cannot bring forward your theory even as probable, far less as scientific; for, if it is possible that Christianity is true, it is not possible that your hypothesis can be true, or even scientifically proved. The scientists seem not to be aware of this, and seem to suppose that they may rank Christianity with the various heathen superstitions, and set it aside by an unsupported theory or a prejudice.

Let the question be understood. Christianity teaches us that in the beginning God created heaven and earth, and all things therein, visible and invisible, that he made man after his own image and likeness, placed him in the garden of Eden, gave him a law, that is, made him a revelation of his

will, instructed him in his moral and religious duty, established him in original justice, in a supernatural state, under a supernatural providence, on the plane of a supernatural destiny; that man prevaricated, broke the law given him, lost his original justice, the integrity of his nature attached thereto, and communion with his Maker, fell under the dominion of the flesh, became captive to Satan, and subject to death, moral, temporal, and eternal; that God, of his own goodness and mercy, promised him pardon and deliverance, redemption and salvation, through his own Son made man, who in due time was born of the Virgin Mary, suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, was dead and buried, and on the third day rose again, ascended into heaven, whence he shall come again, to judge the living and the dead. This doctrine, in substance, was made to our first parents in the garden, was preserved in the tradition of the patriarchs, in its purity in the synagogue, and in its purity and integrity in the Christian church founded on it, and authorized and assisted by God himself to teach it to all men and nations.

According to this doctrine, the origin of man, the human species, as well as of the universe and all its contents, is in the creative act of God, not in evolution or development. The first man was not a monkey or a tadpole developed, nor a savage or barbarian, but was a man full grown in the integrity of his nature, instructed by his Maker, and the most perfect man of his race, and as he is the progenitor of all mankind, it follows that mankind began not in "utter barbarism," as Sir John asserts, but in the full development and perfection of manhood, with the knowledge of God and providence, of their origin and destiny, and of their moral and religious duty. Ignorance has followed as the penalty or consequence of sin, instead of being the original condition in which man was created; and this ignorance brought on the race by the prevarication of Adam, the domination of the flesh, and the power of Satan acquired thereby, are the origin and cause of barbarism of individuals and nations, the innumerable moral and social evils which have afflicted mankind in all times and places.

Now, to this doctrine Sir John opposes the hypothesis of the origin of man in "utter barbarism," and his progress by natural evolution or self-development. But what facts has he adduced in its support, or that conflict with Christain teaching, that prove that teaching false or even doubtful?

He has adduced, as far as we can see, none at all, for all the facts that he alleges are, to say the least, as easily explained on the supposition of man's deterioration as on the supposition of progress, development, or continuous melioration. Some of the facts he adduces *might*, perhaps, be explained on his hypothesis, if there were no reason for giving them a contrary explanation; but there is not one of them that must be so explained. This is not enough for his purpose, though it is enough for ours. He must go further, and prove that his facts not only *may* but *must* be explained on his hypothesis, and can be explained on no other. If we are able to explain, or he is unable to show positively that we cannot explain, all known facts in accordance with the Christian doctrine, he can conclude nothing from them against Christianity or in favor of his naturalism. We do not, he must remember, rely on those facts to prove the Christian doctrine, but he relies on them to disprove it, by proving his hypothesis; and if he cannot show that they absolutely do disprove it, or positively prove his hypothesis, he proves nothing to his purpose.

Sir John dwells at great length on the real or supposed rites, forms, and barbarous customs observed by outlying savage tribes or nations, but, before he can draw any conclusion from them in favor of his theory of progress, he must prove that they were primitive. He knows them only as contemporaneous with what he would himself call civilized marriage: how then, without having first proved that the race began in "utter barbarism," conclude from them that they preceded civilized marriage? One thing is certain, we never find them without finding somewhere in the world contemporary with them the civilized marriage. There is no history, historical intimation, or tradition of any custom or conception of marriage older than we have in the Book of Genesis, and in that we find the true idea of marriage was already in the world at the earliest date of history, and the vices against it are plainly condemned in the decalogue, contemporary with these very usages, customs, and notions of savages on which Sir John dwells with so much apparent delight, and which are barbarous, and lax enough to satisfy even our women's rights men; and, so far as history goes, preceding them, the true idea of marriage as something sacred, and as the union of one man with one woman, was known and held, and therefore could not have been, at least so far as known, a development of barbarian marriages.

The same answer applies to the question of religion. Contemporary with the savage and barbarous superstitions of the heathen, and even prior to them, we find practised in its fervor and purity the true worship of the true God. True religion is not developed from the impurities and absurd superstitions of the heathen, and is by no means the growth of the religious sentiment becoming gradually enlightened and purifying itself from their grossness, for it is historically as well as logically older than any of them. Men worshipped God the creator of heaven and earth before they worshipped the fetish, the elements, or the hosts of heaven. Religion is older than superstition, for superstition is an abuse of religion, as the theologians say, by way of excess, as irreligion is its abuse by way of defect; but a thing must exist and be entertained before it can be abused. Nothing can be more certain than that true religion has never been developed from false religions, or truth from falsehood; for the true must precede the false, which is simply the negation of the true. Christianity is, if you will, a development, the fulfilment of the synagogue or the Jewish religion; Judaism was also, if you will, a development of the patriarchal religion; but in neither case a self-development; and in neither case has the development been effected except by supernatural intervention. It would be absurd to suppose the patriarchal religion was a development of heathenism, since it is historically prior to any form of heathenism, and every known form of heathenism supposes it, and is intelligible only by it. So far was Judaism from being self-evolved from the superstitions of the heathen, that it was with the greatest difficulty that the Israelites themselves, as their history shows, were kept from adopting the idolatry and superstition of the surrounding nations, which shows that their religion was not self-evolved, and that it was above the level of the moral and religious life of the people. Christianity develops and perfects Judaism, but by supernatural agency, not by the natural progress or self-development of the Jewish people; for if it had been, the bulk of the nation would have accepted it, and we know that the bulk of the Jewish people did not accept it, but rejected it, and continue to reject it to this day.

We know, also, that the progress of the heathen nations was very far from raising them to the level of the Christian religion. Traces of some of its principles and several of its moral precepts may be found with the gentile philosophers, as we should expect, since they pertained to the primitive

revelation; but these philosophers were not the first, but rather the last to accept it. Nowhere amongst the heathen did any Christain communities spring up spontaneously or were of indigenous origin. Christianity sprang out of Judea, and the nations adopted it, in the first instance, only as it was carried to them by Jewish missionaries. And who were these missionaries? Humble fishermen, publicans, and mechanics. Who first received them, and believed their message? Principally the common people, the unlettered, the poor, and slaves of the rich and noble. "For see your vocation, brethren," says St. Paul (1 Cor. iv. 26), "that not many are wise according to the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble." Were the fishermen of the Lake Genesareth, and the slaves of the Roman Empire, we may ask with Mgr. Maret, "the most enlightened and advanced portion of mankind?" Who dare maintain it, when it is a question of natural development or progress? Had Christianity been the natural evolution of the human mind, or the product of the natural growth of human intelligence and morality, we should have first encountered it not with the poor, the ignorant, the unlettered and wretched slaves, but with the higher and more cultivated classes, with the philosophers, the scientists, the noble, the great generals and the most eminent orators and statesmen, the *élite* of Greek and Roman society, those who at the time stood at the head of the civilized world. Yet such is not the fact, but the fact is the very reverse.

The Biblical history explains the origin of the barbarous superstitions of heathendom in a very satisfactory way, and shows us very clearly that the savage state is not the primitive state, but has been produced by sin, and is the result of what we call the great gentile apostasy, or falling away of the nations from the primitive or patriarchal religion. When language was confounded at Babel, and the dispersion of mankind took place, unity of speech or language was lost, and with it unity of ideas or of faith, and each tribe or nation took its own course, and developed a tribal or national religion of its own. Gradually each tribe or nation lost the conception of God as creator, and formed to itself gods made in its own image, clothed with its own passions, and it bowed down and worshipped the work of its own hands. It was not that they knew or had known no better. St. Paul has settled that question. "For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all impiety and injustice of those men

that detain the truth of God in injustice. Because that which is known of God is manifest in them. For God hath manifested it to them. For the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made: his eternal power also and divinity; so that they are *inexcusable*. Because when they had known God, they glorified him not as God, nor gave thanks; but became vain in their thoughts, and their foolish heart was darkened; for, professing themselves wise, they became fools. And they changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of a corruptible man, and of birds, and of four-footed beasts, and of creeping things. Wherefore God gave them up to the desires of their hearts, to uncleanliness; to dishonor their own bodies among themselves, who changed the truth of God into a lie, and worshipped and served the creature rather than the Creator, who is blessed for ever. Amen." (Rom. i. 18–25.)

St. Paul evidently does not believe Sir John Lubbock's doctrine that the race began in "utter barbarism," and have been slowly working their way up to the heights of Christian civilization. He evidently ascribes the superstitions, and consequently the barbarism, of the heathen to apostasy. Sir John, of course, does not accept the authority of St. Paul; but, if he cannot prove St. Paul was wrong, he is debarred from asserting his own hypothesis, even as probable. If it is possible to explain the facts of the savage state on the ground of apostasy or gradual deterioration, the hypothesis of development, of self-evolution or natural and unaided progress, falls to the ground as wholly baseless. His hypothesis becomes probable only by proving that no other hypothesis is possible.

But all the known facts in the case are against our scientific baronet's hypothesis. Take Mohammedanism. It sprang up subsequently to both Moses and the Gospel. It is a compound of Judaism and Christianity, more Jewish than Christian, however, and is decidedly inferior to either. How explain this fact, if the several races of men never fall or retrograde, but are always advancing, marching through the ages onward and upward? Many of the ancestors of the present Mussulmans belonged to highly civilized races, and some of them were Christians, and not a few of them Jews. Yet there is always progress, never deterioration.

But we need not go back to the seventh century. There

has been a modern apostasy, and we see right before our eyes the process of deterioration, of falling into barbarism, going on among those who have apostatized from Christianity. The author regards as an evidence of the lowest barbarism what he calls "communal marriage," that is, marriage in which the wife is common to all the males of her husband's family. We do not believe this sort of marriage was ever any thing more than an exceptional fact, like polyandry; but suppose it was even common among the lowest savage tribes, how much lower or more barbarous is the state it indicates, than what the highly civilized Plato makes the magistrates prescribe in his imaginary Republic? How much in advance of such a practice is the free love advocated by Mary Wolstonecroft and Fanny Wright; the recommendation of Godwin to abolish marriage and the monopoly by one man of any one woman; than the denunciation of marriage by the late Robert Owen as one of the trinity of evils which have hitherto afflicted the race, and his proposal to replace it by a community of wives, as he proposed to replace private property by a community of goods; or, indeed, than we see actually adopted in practice by the Oneida Community? Sir John regards the gynocracy which prevails in some savage tribes as characteristic of a very low form of barbarism; but to what else tends the woman's-rights movement in his country and ours? If successful, not only would women be the rulers, but children would follow the mother's line, not the father's, for the obvious reason that, while the mother can be known, the father cannot be with any certainty. Does not free love, the mainspring of the movement, lead to this? And are not they who support it counted the advance party of the age, and we who resist denounced as old fogies or as the defenders of man's tyranny?

Sir John relates that some tribes are so low in their intelligence that they have none or only the vaguest conceptions of the divinity, and none at all of God as creator. He need not go amongst outlying barbarians to find persons whose intelligence is equally low. He will search in vain through all gentile philosophy without finding the conception of a creative God. Nay, among our own contemporaries he can find more who consider it a proof of their superior intelligence and rare scientific attainments that they reject the fact of creation, relegate God into the unknown and the unknowable, and teach us that the universe is self-evolved, and

man is only a monkey or gorilla developed. These men regard themselves as the lights of their age, and are so regarded, too, by no inconsiderable portion of the public. Need we name Auguste Comte and Sir William Hamilton, among the dead; E. Littré, Herbert Spencer, J. Stuart Mill, Professor Huxley, Charles Darwin, not to say Sir John himself, among the living? If these men and their adherents have not lapsed into barbarism, their science, if accepted, would lead us to the ideas and practices which Sir John tells us belong to the lowest stage of barbarism. Sir John doubts if any savage tribe can be found that is absolutely destitute of all religious conceptions or sentiments, but, if we may believe their own statements, we have people enough among the apostate Christians of our day who have none, and glory in it as a proof of their superiority to the rest of mankind.

Sir John sees a characteristic of barbarism or of the early savage state in the belief in and the dread of evil spirits, or what he calls demonism. The Bible tells us all the gods of the heathens are devils or demons. Even this characteristic of barbarism is reproduced in our civilized communities by spiritism, which is of enlightened American origin. This spiritism, which is rapidly becoming a religion with large numbers of men and women in our midst, is nothing but demonism, the necromancy and witchcraft or familiar spirits of the ancient world. Men who reject Christianity, who have no belief in God, or at least do not hold it necessary to worship or pay him the least homage or respect, believe in the spirits, go to the medium, and consult her, as Saul in his desperation consulted the Witch of Endor. If we go back a few years to the last century, we shall find the most polished people on the globe abolishing religion, decreeing that death is an eternal sleep, and perpetrating, in the name of liberty, virtue, humanity, and brotherly love, crimes and cruelties unsurpassed if not unequalled in the history of the most savage tribes; and we see little improvement in our own century, more thoroughly filled with the horrors of unprincipled and needless wars than any other century of which we possess the history. Indeed, the scenes of 1792–3–4 are now in process of reproduction in Europe.

We must remember that all these deteriorations have taken place or are taking place in the most highly civilized nations of the globe, whose ancestors were Christians, and

with persons many of whom were brought up in the belief of Christianity. Take the men and women who hold, on marriage and on religion, what are called "advanced views" —free-lovers and free-religionists—remove them from the restraints of the church and of the state, not yet up to their standard, and let them form a community by themselves in which their views shall be carried out in practice; would they not in two or three generations lapse into a state not above that of the most degraded and filthy savages? We see this deterioration going on in our midst and right before our eyes, as the effect of apostasy from our holy religion. This proves that apostasy is sufficient to explain the existence of the savages races, without supposing the human race began in "utter barbarism." If apostasy in modern times, as we see it does, leads to "utter barbarism," why should it not have done so in ancient times?

We might make the case still stronger against the author's hypothesis, if necessary, by referring to the great and renowned nations of antiquity, that in turn led the civilization of the world. Of the nations that apostatized or adhered to the great gentile apostasy, not one has survived the lapse of time. To every one of them has succeeded barbarism, desolation, or a new people. The Egypt of antiquity fell before the Persian conqueror, and the Egypt of the Greeks was absorbed by Rome, and fell with her. Assyria leaves of her greatness only long since buried and forgotten ruins, while the savage Kurd and the predatory Arab roam at will over the desert that has succeeded to her once flourishing cities and richly cultivated fields. Syria, Tyre, Carthage, and the Greek cities of Europe and Asia have disappeared or dwindled into insignificance, and what remains of them they owe to the conservative power of the Christianity they adopted and have in some measure retained. So true is it, as the Psalmist says, "the wicked shall be turned into hell, and all the nations that forget God." How explain this fact, if these ancient nations could by their own inherent energy and power of self-development raise themselves from "utter barbarism" to the civilization they once possessed, that they could not preserve it; that, after having reached a certain point, they began to decline, grew corrupt, and at length fell by their own internal rottenness? If men and nations are naturally progressive, how happens it that we find so many individuals and nations decline and fall, through internal corruption?

Another fact is not less conclusive against Sir John's hypothesis, that in all the nations of the heathen world their least barbarous period known to us is their earliest after the apostasy and dispersion. The oldest of the sacred books of the Hindus are the profoundest and richest in thought, and the freest from superstition and puerilities so characteristic of the Hindu people to-day. The earliest religion of the Romans was far more spiritual, intellectual, than that which prevailed at the establishment of the empire and the introduction of Christianity. Indeed, wherever we have the means of tracing the religious history of the ancient heathen nations, we find it is a history of almost uninterrupted deterioration and corruption, becoming continually more cruel, impure, and debasing as time flows on. The mysteries, perhaps, retained something of the earlier doctrines, but they did little to arrest the downward tendency of the national religion; the philosophers, no doubt, retained some valuable traditions of the primitive religion, but so mixed up with gross error and absurd fables that they had no effect on the life or morals of the people. One of the last acts of Socrates was to require Crito to sacrifice a cock to Esculapius. If Sir John's hypothesis were true, nothing of this could happen, and we should find the religion of every nation, as time goes on, becoming purer and more refined, less gross and puerile, more enlightened and intellectual, and more spiritual and elevating in its influence.

The traditions of some, perhaps of all heathen nations, refer their origin to savage and barbarian ancestors, and this may have been the fact with many of them. Horace would seem to go the full length of Sir John's theory. He tells us that the primitive men sprang like animals from the earth, a mute and filthy herd, fighting one another for an acorn or a den. Cicero speaks somewhat to the same purpose, only he does not say it was the state of the *primeval* man. Yet the traditions of the heathen nations do not in general favor the main point of Sir John's hypothesis, that men came out of barbarism by their own spontaneous development, natural progressiveness, or indigenous and unaided efforts. They rise, according to these traditions, to the civilized state only by the assistance of the gods, or by the aid of missionaries or colonies from nations already civilized. The goddess Ceres teaches them to plant corn and make bread; Bacchus teaches them to plant the vine and to make wine; Prometheus draws fire from heaven and

teaches them its use; other divinities teach to keep bees, to tame and rear flocks and herds, and the several arts of peace and war. Athens attributed her civilization to Minerva and to Cecrops and his Egyptian colony; Thebes, hers to Orpheus and Cadmus, of Phœnician origin; Rome claimed to descend from a Trojan colony, and borrowed her laws from the Athenians—her literature, philosophy, her art and science, from the Greeks. The poets paint the primitive age as the age of gold, and the philosophers always speak of the race as deteriorating, and find the past superior to the present. What is best and truest in Plato he ascribes to the wisdom of the ancients, and even Homer speaks of the degeneracy of men in his days from what they were at the siege of Troy. We think the author will search in vain through all antiquity to find a tradition or a hint which assigns the civilization of any people to its own indigenous and unassisted efforts.

Sir John Lubbock describes the savages as incurious and little given to reflection. He says they never look beyond the phenomenon to its cause. They see the world in which they are placed, and never think of looking further, and asking who made it, or whence they themselves came or whither they go. They lack not only curiosity, but the power of abstraction and generalization, and even thought is a burden to them. This is no doubt in the main true; but it makes against their natural progressiveness, and explains why they are not, as we know they are not, progressive, but remain always stationary, if left to themselves. The chief characteristic of the savage state is in fact its immobility. The savage gyrates from age to age in the same narrow circle—never of himself advances beyond it. Whether a tribe sunk in what Sir John calls "utter barbarism," and which he holds was the original state of the human race, has ever been or ever can be elevated to a civilized state by any human efforts, even of others already civilized, is, perhaps, problematical. As far as experience goes, the tendency of such a tribe, brought in contact with a civilized race, is to retire the deeper into the forest, to waste away, and finally become extinct. Certain it is, no instance of its becoming a civilized people can be named.

In every known instance in which a savage or barbarous people has become civilized, it has been by the aid or influence of religion, or their relations with a people already civilized. The barbarians that overthrew the Roman Em-

pire of the West, and seated themselves on its ruins, were more than half romanized before the conquest by their relations with the Romans and service in the armies of the empire, and they rather continued the Roman order of civilization in the several kingdoms and states they founded than destroyed it. The Roman system of education, and even the imperial schools, if fewer in number and on a reduced scale, were continued all through the barbarous ages down to the founding of the universities of mediæval Europe. Their civilization was carried forward, far in advance of that of Greece or Rome, by the church, the great civilizer of the nations. The northern barbarians that remained at home, the Germans, the Scandinavians, the Sclaves, were civilized by the labors of Christian monks and missionaries from Rome and Constantinople, from Gaul, England, and Ireland. In no instance has their civilization been of indigenous origin and development.

Sir John Lubbock replies to this as he does to Archbishop Whately's assertion that no instance is on record of a savage people having risen to a civilized state by its own indigenous and unassisted efforts, that it is no objection, because we should not expect to find any record of any such an event, since it took place, if at all, before the invention of letters, and in "prehistoric times." We grant that the fact that there is no *written* record of it is not conclusive proof that no instance of the kind ever occurred; but if so important an event ever occurred, we should expect some trace of it in the traditions of civilized nations, or at least find some tendencies to it in the outlying savage nations of the present, from which it might be inferred as a thing not improbable in itself. But nothing of the sort is found. The author's appeal to our ignorance, and our ignorance only, cannot serve his purpose. He arraigns the universal faith of Christendom, and he must make out his case by positive, not simply negative proofs. Till his hypothesis is proved by positive evidence, the faith of Christendom remains firm, and nothing can be concluded against it.

But how really stands the question? Sir John finds in the various outlying savage tribes numerous facts which he takes to be the original germs of civilization, and hence he concludes that the primitive condition of the human race was that of "utter barbarism," and the nations, or, as he says, the races, that have become civilized, "have become so by their indigenous and unaided efforts, by their own inherent energy

and power of self-development or progress." But the facts he alleges may just as well be reminiscences of a past civilization as anticipations of a civilization not yet developed; and in our judgment—and it is not to-day that for the first time we have studied the question—they are much better explained as reminiscences than as anticipations, nay, are not explicable in any other way. The facts appealed to, then, can at best count for nothing in favor of the hypothesis of natural progress or development. They do not prove it or render it probable.

He is able, and he confesses it, to produce no instance of the natural and unassisted progress of any race of men from barbarism to civilization, and even his own facts show that barbarous or savage tribes are not naturally progressive, but stationary, struck with immobility. Where, then, are the proofs of his hypothesis? He has yet produced none. Now, on the other hand, we have shown him that, in all known instances, the passage from barbarism into civilization has been effected only by supernatural aid, or by the influence of a previously civilized race or people. We have shown him also that the gentile apostasy, which the Bible records and our religion asserts, sufficiently explains the origin of barbarism. We have also shown him nations once civilized falling into barbarism, and, in addition, have shown him the tendency of an apostate people to lapse into barbarism existing and operating before our very eyes, in men whose ancestors were once civilized and even Christians. The chief elements of barbarism he describes exist and are encouraged and defended in our midst by men who are counted by themselves and their contemporaries as the great men, the great lights, the advanced party of this advanced age. Let the apostasy become more general, take away the church or deprive her of her influence, and eliminate from the laws, manners, and customs of modern states what they retain of Christian doctrine and morality, and it is plain to see that nations the loudest in their boast of their civilization would, if not supernaturally arrested, in a very short space of time, sink to the level of any of the ancient or modern outlying savage tribes.

Such is the case, and so stands the argument. Sir John Lubbock brings forward an hypothesis, not original with him indeed, and the full bearing of which we would fain believe he does not see, for which he adduces and can adduce not a single well-authenticated fact, and which would not be favored for a moment by any one who understands it, were it

not for its contradiction of the Biblical doctrine and Christian tradition. But while there is absolutely no proof of the hypothesis, all the known facts of history or of human nature, as well as all the principles of religion and philosophy, with one voice pronounce against it as untenable. Is not this enough? Nothing is more certain than Christian faith; no fact is or can be better authenticated than the fact of revelation; we might then allege that the hypothesis is disproved, nay, not to be entertained, because it is contrary to the Christian revelation, than which nothing can be more certain. We should have been perfectly justified in doing so, and so we should have done; but as the author appeals to science and progress to support himself on facts, we have thought it best, without prejudice to the authority of faith, to meet him on his own ground, to show him that science does not entertain his appeal, and that his theory of progress is but a baseless hypothesis, contradicted by all the known facts in the case and supported by none; and therefore no science at all.

Sir John's theory of progress is just now popular, and is put forth with great confidence in the respectable name of science, and the modern world, with sciolists, accept it, with great pomp and parade. Yet it is manifestly absurd. Nothing cannot make itself something, nor can any thing make itself more than it is. The imperfect cannot of itself perfect itself, and no man can lift himself by his own waistbands. Even Archimedes required somewhere to stand outside of the world in order to be able to raise the world with his lever. Yet we deny not progress; we believe in it, and hold that man is progressive even to the infinite; but not by his own unaided effort or by his own inherent energy and natural strength, nor without the supernatural aid of divine grace. But progress by nature alone, or self-evolution, though we tried to believe it when a child, we put away when we became a man, as we did other childish things.

Thus much we have thought it our duty to say in reply to the theory that makes the human race begin in utter barbarism, and civilization spring from natural development or evolution, so popular with our unchristian scientists or—but for respect to the public we would say—sciolists. We have in our reply repeated many things which we have said before, and which have been said by others, and better said. But it will not do to let such a book as the one before us go unanswered in the present state of the public mind, debauched as it is by false science. If books will repeat the error, we can only repeat our answer.

HERBERT SPENCER'S BIOLOGY.*

[From the Catholic World for June, 1866.]

We have omitted from the title page the long list of works of which Herbert Spencer is the author, works of rare ability in their way, but essentially false in the philosophical principles on which they are based. Mr. Herbert Spencer is naturally one of the ablest men in Great Britain, far superior to the much praised Buckle, and not surpassed, if equalled, by John Stuart Mill, now Member of Parliament. We have heretofore considered him as belonging to the positivist school of philosophy, founded by Auguste Comte, and the ablest man of that school; abler, and less absurd than even M. Littré. But in a note to the work before us he disclaims all affiliation with positivism, declares that he does not accept M. Comte's system, and says that the general principles, in which he agrees with that singular man, he has drawn not from him, but from sources common to them both. This we can easily believe, for in the little we have had the patience to read of M. Comte's unreadable works, we have found nothing original with him but his dryness, dulness, and wearisomness, in which, if he is not original, he is at least superior to most men. Yet we have not been able to detect any essential difference of doctrine or principle between the Frenchman and the Englishman, and to us who are not positivists, M. Comte, M. Littré, George H. Lewes, Herbert Spencer, John Stuart Mill, Miss Evans, and Harriet Martineau belong to one and the same school.

It is but simple justice to Herbert Spencer to say that he writes in strong, manly, and for the most part classical English, and has made himself master of the best philosophical style that we have met with in any English or American writer. He understands, as far as a man can with his prin-

* *The Principles of Biology.* By Herbert Spencer. Author of "First Principles," &c., New York: 1866. [This short article appeared among the notices of "New Publications," and was not intended to be an elaborate review of Herbert Spencer's book; but as it is referred to in the next article, and on account of the matter it contains, it has been inserted here. A further criticism of the cosmic philosophy may be found in the *Refutation of Atheism*, in the second volume of these works.—Ed.]

ciples, the philosophy of the English tongue, and writes it with the freedom and ease of a master, though not always with perfect purity. He must have been a hard student and evidently is a most laborious thinker and industrious writer. But here ends, we are sorry to say, our commendation. It is the misfortune, perversity, or folly of Herbert Spencer to spend his life in attempting to obtain, or at least to explain, effects without causes, properties without substance, and phenomena without noumena or being. In his *Principles of Philosophy*, he divides the real and unreal into the knowable and the unknowable, without explaining, however, how the human mind knows there is an unknowable; and to the unknowable he relegates the principles, origin, and causes of things; that is, in plain English, the principles, origin, and causes of things are unreal, at least to us, and are not only unknown, but absolutely unknowable, and should be banished as subjects of investigation, inquiry, or thought. Hence the knowable, that to which all science is restricted, includes only phenomena, that is to say, the sensible or material world.

Biology, which is the subject of the volume before us, is the science of life, but, on the author's principles, is necessarily confined to the statement, description, and classification of facts, or phenomena of organic as distinguished from inorganic matter. He can admit, on his philosophy, no vital principle, but must explain the vital phenomena without it, by a combination, brought about nobody knows how, of chemical, mechanical, and electric changes, forces, action, and reaction—as if there can be changes, forces, action, or reaction where there is no relation of cause and effect! But after all his labor, and it is immense, to show what chemical, mechanical, and electric changes and combinations, binary, tertiary, &c., are observed in a living subject, he explains nothing; for life, while it lasts, is neither mechanical, chemical, nor electrical, but to a certain extent resists and counteracts all these forces, and the human body falls completely under their dominion only when it has ceased to be a living body, when by chemical action it is decomposed, and returns to the several elements from which it was formed.

Mr. Spencer describes very scientifically the entire process of assimilation; but what is that living power within that assimilates the food we eat, and converts it into chyle, blood, and flesh and bone? You see here a principle operating of which no element is found in mechanics, chemistry, or electricity, or any possible combination of them. The muscles

of my arms and shoulder may operate on mechanical principles in raising my arm when I will to raise it, but on what mechanical, chemical, or electrical principles do I will to raise it? That I will to raise it, and in willing to do so perform an immaterial act, I know better than you know that "percussion produces detonation in sulphide of nitrogen," or that "explosion is a property of nitro-mannite," or "nitro-glycerine."

The simple fact is that the physical sciences are all good and useful in their place and for purposes to which they are fitted; but they are all secondary sciences, and without principles higher than themselves to give dialectic validity to their inductions, they are no sciences at all. There is no approach to the science of life in Herbert Spencer's Biology; there is only a painfully elaborate statement of the principal external facts which usually accompany it and depend on it. Indeed, we had the impression that our most advanced physiologists, while admitting in their place chemical and electric forces as necessary to the phenomena of organic life, had abandoned the attempt to expound the science of physiology on chemical, electric, or mechanical principles, or any possible combination of them. Even Dr. Draper, if he makes no great use of it in his physiology, recognizes a vital principle, even an immaterial soul, in man. We had also the impression that the medical profession were abandoning the chemical theory of medicine, so fashionable a few years ago. We may be wrong, but as far as we have been able to keep pace with modern science, Mr. Spencer is a quarter of a century behind his age.

The chapter on genesis, generation, multiplication, or reproduction, is as unscientific as it is unchristian. We merely note that the author insists on metagenesis as well as parthenogenesis, that is, that the offspring may differ in kind from the parents, and that there are virgin, or rather sexless, mothers. Some years ago, in conversing with a scientific friend, I ventured to deny this alleged fact, on the strength of the theological and scriptural doctrine that every kind produces its like. He laughed in my face, and brought forward certain well-known facts in the reproduction of the aphid, or cabbage-louse. I assured him that, if he would take the pains to observe more closely, he would find that his metagenesis and parthenogenesis are only different stages in the entire process of the reproduction of the aphid. Of course he did not believe a word of it; but a few days af-

terwards he came and informed me that he had seen his friend, Dr. Burnham, of Boston, a naturalist of rare sagacity, who told him that naturalists were wrong in asserting metagenesis in the case of aphids. "I have," said he, "been making my observations for some years on these little organisms, and I find that what we have taken for metagenesis is only one of the different stages in the process of reproduction, for I have discovered the young aphid properly formed and enveloped in the so-called virgin or sexless mother." The naturalist is dead, but his friend, my informant, is living.

We have no space to enter into any detailed review of this very elaborate volume. It contains many curious materials of science, but the author rejects the doctrine of creation, generation, formation, and emanation, and adopts that of evolution. Life is evolved from various elements which are reducible to gases, and, upon the whole, he gives us a gaseous sort of life. His theory seems to be that of Topsy, who declared she didn't come, but *growed*. We cannot perceive that Mr. Herbert Spencer has made any serious advance on Topsy. The universe is evolution, and evolution is growth, and he must say of himself with Topsy, "I didn't come, I growed." At any rate, he must be classed with those old philosophers who evolved all things from matter, some from fire, some from air, and some from water, and made all things born from change or corruption; or rather, with Epicurus, who evolved all from the fortuitous motion, change, and combination of atoms. Those old philosophers were unjustly ridiculed by Hermias, or our recent philosophers have less science than they imagine. Verily, there is nothing new under the sun, and false science only travels a narrow circle, constantly coming round to the absurdities of its starting-point. Yet Herbert Spencer's book has profited us. It has made us feel more deeply than ever the utter impotence of the greatest man to explain any thing in nature without recognizing God and creation.

THE COSMIC PHILOSOPHY.*

[From the Catholic World for February, 1872.]

HERBERT SPENCER has often been alluded to in our pages, and one of his works, that on *Biology*, has been specially noticed by us. He is usually classed with the positivists, and we have ourselves so classed him; but he protests against this classification, and, after studying carefully, or as carefully as our patience would permit, the volume before us, we confess the classification appears to be inexact, and even unjust to the positivists. There are considerable differences between his philosophy and the *Philosophie Positive* as we find it set forth by M. E. Littré, its greatest living chief; for, as set forth by its founder, M. Auguste Comte, in his own works, we would rather not speak, for, to confess the truth, we have never had the patience to read them so as to master their doctrines. Yet, as far as we do know the system, it differs on several points, and much to its advantage, from the cosmic philosophy set forth in Mr. Spencer's *First Principles*, especially as to the relativity of knowledge and the theory of evolution. It is the product of a higher order of mind than Mr. Spencer can boast, and of a mind originally trained in a better school.

Mr. Herbert Spencer is a man of considerable native ability, of respectable attainments in what is called modern science, and a fair representative of contemporary English thought and mental tendencies; but he has made a sad mistake in attempting to be a philosopher, for he lacks entirely the *ingegno filosofico*, and we have not discovered a single trace of a philosophic principle, thought, or conception in any or all of his several works. He is or might be a physicist, or what old Ralph Cudworth terms a *physiologer*, perhaps not much inferior to old Leucippus or Democritus, but he has not in him the makings of a philosopher, and his cosmic theories are not even plausible to a philosophic mind.

"In the kingdom of the blind, the one-eyed is king." The not inconsiderable reputation Mr. Herbert Spencer

**First Principles of a New System of Philosophy.* By HERBERT SPENCER. Second Edition. New York: 1871.

seems to have acquired is probably due not to his merits so much as to the low state into which philosophical studies have fallen in the Anglo-Saxon world, and the tendency to anti-Christian and anti-religious theories and speculations which Protestantism, when it begins to examine its own foundation and to account for itself, everywhere encourages. The party we meet here and in England, with "advanced views" as they are called, and which every day grows in numbers and strength, welcomes with enthusiasm any and every writer who helps or promises to help them to explain the problem of the universe on physical principles, without recurring to the supernatural or the fact of creation. The party, profoundly ignorant of Christian theology and philosophy, and devoted to the study of physical facts and phenomena alone, have persuaded themselves that Christianity is unscientific, and that it tends to degrade men, to enfeeble reason, and to prevent the free expansion of thought; and they regard as their benefactor whoever is able to strengthen their cosmic or atheistic tendency. Such a man they esteem Mr. Herbert Spencer. He is apparently just the man to be accepted as the chief of the sect, or the philosopher of negation. Its adherents wish not for their leader an avowed atheist or pantheist, for the world is not just yet advanced enough for that, but they do wish one who is skilful in disguising his atheism or pantheism in the forms and terms of science; and who can do this more successfully than Herbert Spencer?

Mr. Spencer divides his book into two parts. In Part I. he treats of what he calls "The Unknowable"; in Part II. he treats of what he calls "The Knowable." Under the head of "The Unknowable" he seeks the relation of science and religion, to ascertain the ultimate verity or ideas of each, and to show the ground on which they meet and are reconciled. He asserts that all knowledge is relative, is knowledge of phenomena alone, which are nothing outside of their relation to consciousness, itself phenomenal, and to a something underlying them, and of which they are the appearances or which they manifest. We are compelled to admit, he says, this something, because the phenomena cannot be thought without it; and as we can assign no limit to these manifestations, we are compelled to assert this something, power, being, or reality is infinite. But this infinite something which is the reality of the cosmos is absolutely unknowable and even unthinkable. How, then, can it be asserted?

Every religion seeks the solution of the problem of the universe, the explanation of the great cosmic mystery that surrounds us on all sides, and all religions agree that the solution is in this infinite reality or something, which is absolutely unknowable, absolutely inscrutable. The ultimate religious ideas or highest and most comprehensive generalizations of religious conceptions are, first, the assertion of this incognizable and incogitable something; and, second, that the solution of the problem exceeds all human powers.

Science deals with the same cosmic problem, and, rising by generalization to generalization of the cosmic phenomena up to the highest and broadest possible, is compelled to admit the same infinite something, and to admit that it is not cognizable nor cogitable. Consequently, the ultimate scientific ideas are identical with the ultimate religious ideas. Both religion and science are fused together, and reconciled without any compromise, and the old feud between them extinguished, in the bosom of the infinite unknowable.

"He makes a solitude, and calls it peace."

As we have no predisposition to accept the new system of philosophy, we cannot find this conclusion perfectly satisfactory. The cosmists object to the Comteans or positivists that they absorb the cosmos in man and society; the cosmists, on the other hand, seem to us to absorb man and society in the cosmos, and subject them to the same physical law Mr. Emerson does when he asserts the identity of gratitude and gravitation. By asserting that only phenomena are cognizable, and subjecting man to the common cosmic law, they include him in the cosmic phenomena, and make him simply an appearance or manifestation of the unknowable, without any real or substantive existence of his own. We thus lose in the infinite variety of the cosmic phenomena both the thinking subject and the object thought. The soul is a cosmic appearance.

Furthermore, by declaring the phenomenal cannot be thought in and by itself without the infinite something that underlies it as its ground or reality, and then declaring that something to be unknowable, unthinkable even, the new system declares that there is no knowable, and consequently no science or knowledge at all. The new system of philosophy, then, reconciles science and religion only in a universal negation, that is, by really denying both. This can hardly satisfy either a scientist or a Christian.

In the second part, Mr. Spencer defines philosophy to us, as near as we can come at his sense, to be the unification of the several religions and several sciences in their respective or special generalizations in a generalization that comprehends them all. Generalization with him means the elimination of the *differentia*, or abstraction. He therefore, in making philosophy a generalization, makes it an abstraction, and, so to speak, the abstraction of all particular abstractions. But abstractions in themselves are nullities, and consequently philosophy is a nullity, and science and religion are nullities. Mr. Spencer maintains that we have "symbolic conceptions," in which nothing is conceived—symbols which symbolize nothing. Is his "new system of philosophy" any thing but a generalization and unification of these "symbolic conceptions?"

Mr. Spencer starts with the assumption that all religions, including atheism, have a verity in common as well as an error. The verity must be that in which they all agree; the error, in their differences, or in the matters in which they do not agree. Eliminate the differences and take what is common to them all, and you will have the universal verity which they all assert. But what verity is common to truth and falsehood, to theism and atheism? The verity common to religion and science, that the solution of the cosmic mystery is unknowable? But that is not a verity; it is a mere negation, and all truth is affirmative.

Atheism is not a religion, but the negation of all religion. Exclude that, take all religions from fetichism to Christianity inclusive; eliminate the *differentia*, and take what they all agree in asserting. Be it so. All religions, without a single exception, however rude or however polished, agree in asserting the supernatural, and that, if the cosmic mystery is inexplicable by human means, it is explicable by supernatural means. A true application of Mr. Spencer's rule, the *consensus hominum*, would assert as the common verity the supernatural, that is, the supercosmic, which is precisely what the cosmic philosophy denies and is invented to deny. Mr. Spencer does not appear to be master of his own tools.

All religions concede that the cosmic mystery is inexplicable by our unassisted powers, by secondary causes, or by physical laws; but none of them admits that it is absolutely inexplicable, for each religion professes to be its explanation. Mr. Spencer is wrong in asserting that all are seeking to

solve the cosmic mystery; for each proposes itself as its solution, and it is only as such that it claims to be or can be called a religion. The question for the philosopher is, Do any of these religions give us a solution which reason, in the freest and fullest exercise of its powers, can accept, and, if so, which one is it?

Mr. Spencer tells us, p. 32: "Respecting the origin of the universe, three verbally intelligible suppositions may be made. We may assert that it is self-existent, or that it is self-created, or that it is created by an external agency." The second supposition he rejects as the pantheistic hypothesis, which is a mistake, for no pantheist or anybody else asserts that the universe creates itself. The pantheist denies that it is created at all; and the philosopher denies that it creates itself; for, since to create is to act, self-creation would require the universe to act before it existed The third supposition, which the author calls "the theistical hypothesis," he denies, because it explains nothing, and is useless. He explains it to mean that the universe is produced by an artificer, after the manner of a human artificer in producing a piece of furniture from materials furnished to his hand. "But whence come the materials?" The question might be pertinent if asked of Plato or Aristotle, neither of whom was a theist; but not when asked of a Christian theologian, who holds that God creates or created all things from nothing, that is, without pre-existing materials, by "the sole word of his power."

The first supposition, the self-existence of the universe, the author denies, not because the universe is manifestly contingent and must have had a beginning, and therefore a cause or creator; but because self-existence is absolutely inconceivable, an impossible idea. He says, p. 35: "The hypothesis of the creation of the universe by an external agency is quite useless; it commits us to an infinite series of such agencies, and then leaves us where it found us." "Those who cannot conceive of the self-existence of the universe, and therefore assume a creator as the source of the universe, take it for granted that they can conceive a self-existent creator. The mystery of the great fact surrounding them on every side they transfer to an alleged source of this great fact, and then suppose they have solved the mystery. But they delude themselves, as was proved in the outset of the argument. *Self-existence is rigorously inconceivable*, and this holds true whatever be the nature of the object [sub-

ject] of which it is predicated. Whoever argues that the atheistical hypothesis is untenable because it involves the impossible idea of self-existence, must perforce admit that the theistical hypothesis is untenable if it contains the same impossible idea." But who ever argued that the atheistical hypothesis is untenable because it involves the idea of self-existence? Atheism is denied because it asserts the self-existence of that which cannot be, and is known not to be, self-existent.

But it is evident that the author rejects alike self-existence and creation; that the cosmos is self-existent, or that it is created by an independent, self-existent, and supercosmic creator. How, then, can he assert the existence of the cosmos, real or phenomenal, at all? The cosmos either exists or it does not. If it does not, that ends the matter. If it does, it must be either created or self-existent; for the author rejects an infinite series as absurd, and self-creation as only an absurd form of expressing self-existence. But as the author denies self-existence, whatever the subject of which it is predicated, and also the fact of creation, it follows rigorously, if he is right, that the cosmos does not exist. The author cannot take refuge in his favorite *nescio*, or say we do not know the origin of the cosmos, for he has positively denied it every possible origin, and therefore has by implication denied it all existence. A moment ago, we showed that he denied by implication all science or knowledge, and now we see that, if held rigorously to his system as he explains it, he denies all existence, and, by implication at least, asserts absolute nihilism. Surely there is no occasion to apply to his new system of philosophy the *reductio ad absurdum*.

The author is necessarily led to the assertion that at least nothing is knowable by his doctrine, that all knowledge is relative. The Comtists restrict, in theory, all knowledge to sensible things, their mutual relations, dependencies, and the conditions and laws of their development and progress; but they at least admit that these may be objects of science and positively known. But our cosmic philosopher denies this, and asserts the relativity of all knowledge. We know and can know only the relative, that is, only what is relative to the absolute, and relative to our own consciousness. In this he follows Sir William Hamilton, J. Stuart Mill, and the late Dr. Mansel, Anglican Dean of St. Paul's. But relative knowledge is simply no knowledge, because in it

nothing is known. The relative is not cognizable nor cogitable in and by itself, because it in and by itself, or prescinded from that to which it is relative, does not exist, and is simply nothing. What neither is nor exists is not cognizable nor cogitable. The relativity of all knowledge, then, is simply the denial of all knowledge. It is idle, then, for Mr. Spencer to talk of science. His science is only a laborious ignorance.

Mr. Spencer labors hard to prove the relativity of all knowledge. He either proves it or he does not. If he does not, he has no right to assert it; if he does, he disproves it at the same time. If the proof is not absolute, it does not prove it; if it is abolute, then it is not true that all knowledge is relative; for the proof must be absolutely known, or it cannot be alleged. We either know that all knowledge is relative, or we do not. If we do not, no more need be said; if we do know it, then it is false, because the knowledge of the relativity of knowledge is itself not relative. The assertion of the relativity of all knowledge, therefore, contradicts and refutes itself. No man can doubt that he doubts, or that doubt is doubt, and therefore universal doubt or universal scepticism is impossible, and not even assertable. The same argument applies to the pretence that all knowledge is relative.

The relativists are misled by their dealing with the abstract and not the concrete. They regard all that is or exists either as relative or absolute. But both absolute and relative are abstract conceptions, and formed by abstraction from the concrete intuitively presented or apprehended. They exist, as St. Thomas tells us, only *in mente, cum fundamento in re.* There are no abstractions in nature or the cosmos, and there is and can be neither abstract science nor science of abstractions, for abstractions, prescinded from their concretes, are simply nullities. The absolute is, we grant, unknowable, and so also is the relative, for neither has any existence in nature, or *a parte rei.* They are both generalizations, and nature never generalizes. Whatever exists, exists *in concreto*, not *in genere.* Hence, the *ens in genere* of Rosmini is no *ens reale*, but simply *ens possibile*, like the *reines Sein* of Hegel, which is the equivalent of *das Nichtsein*; for the possible is only the ability of the real.

Now, because the abstract absolute is unknowable, unthinkable even, it by no means follows that the concrete, real and necessary being, cannot be both thought and known, or that

things cannot be both thought and known in their relations to it, without reducing it to the category of the relative. Sir William Hamilton says the absolute is the unconditioned, and is incogitable, because our thought necessarily conditions it. This would be true if the absolute is an abstraction or mental conception, but is false and absurd if applied to real, necessary, infinite, and self-existent being, which, as independent of us and of all relation, is and must be the same whether we think it or not. The thought does not impose its own conditions and limitations on the object; certainly not when the object is real and necessary being, and in every respect independent of it. We cannot, of course, think infinite being infinitely or adequately, but it does not follow that we cannot think it, though finitely and inadequately. The human mind, being finite, cannot comprehend infinite being; but, nevertheless, it may and does apprehend it, or else Mr. Spencer could not assert the infinite something, which he says we are compelled to admit underlies the cosmic phenomena and is manifested in them. The human mind can apprehend more than it can comprehend, and nothing that is apprehensible, though incomprehensible, is unthinkable or unknowable, except in Mr. Spencer's *New System of Philosophy*.

Sir William Hamilton says, in defending the relativity of all knowledge: "Only relations are cogitable. Relation is cogitable only in correlation, and the relation between correlatives is reciprocal, each is relative to the other. Thought is dual, and embraces at once subject and object in their mutual opposition and limitation." This merely begs the question. Besides, it is not true. Relations are themselves cogitable only in the related; correlatives connote each other, so that the one cannot be thought without thinking the other; but not therefore are all relations reciprocal, as the relation between phenomenon and noumenon, cause and effect, creator and creation. Here are two terms and a relation between them, but no reciprocity. When we think cause and effect, we do not think them as mutually opposing and limiting each other. The effect cannot oppose or limit the cause, or the creature the creator, for the creature depends on the creator and is nothing without his creative act, and the effect is nothing without the cause which produces and sustains it. The creature depends on the creator, but not the creator on the creature; the effect depends on the cause, but not the cause on the effect. There may, then, be relation without reciprocity.

It is true, Mr. Spencer denies creation, and relegates all causative power to the dark region of the unknowable, and calls the origin of the universe in the creative act of being or God "an hypothesis," and rejects it with ill-concealed scorn; yet creation is not "an hypothesis," but a scientific fact, and a necessary principle of all science. Without it the cosmos would not be cognizable, for it would have no dialectic constitution. It could not even be thought, for every thought is a judgment, and no judgment is possible where there is no copula that joins the predicate to the subject. Rejecting creation, the author cannot assert the relation of cause and effect; rejecting cause and effect, he cannot assert even the cosmic phenomena. They are not able to stand on their own bottom, and therefore not at all, unless the something of which they are, as he says, manifestations, is a cause producing and sustaining them. We submit, then, that Mr. Spencer's doctrine of the unknowable, and the relativity of all knowledge, estops him from asserting any thing as knowable, for it really denies all the knowable and all the real—*omne scibile et omne reale.*

The second part of Mr. Spencer's work on "The Knowable" we might well omit, but as it is that in which he claims to be original, and in which he supposes he has made most valuable contributions to the philosophy of the cosmos, an omission to examine it might seem ungracious. Besides, the inventors of new systems of philosophy must not be held too rigidly to the logical consequences of their own doctrines. *Non omnia possumus.* It is impossible for the founder to foresee all that his doctrine involves, and it is but fair, if he really has said any thing new that is true, that it should be recognized, and he receive due credit for it, even if it is an anomaly in his general system of philosophy. We proceed, therefore, to consider Part II.

In this second part, the author professes to treat the knowable, not indeed in its several details, but in its first principles, or ultimate generalizations. The generalization of a group of phenomena is science; the generalization of the several groups of phenomena observable in the cosmos constitutes the several special sciences; and the combination of these special sciences into one higher and more comprehensive generalization, which embraces them all, is philosophy. In constructing philosophy, the author, be it observed, like the coral insect, begins below and works upward, and bases the universal on the particular.

The great point, or novelty, in this second part, however, is unquestionably, as the author claims, the doctrine of Evolution. By evolution, the author does not understand evolving or unfolding, as do ordinary mortals; but the aggregation or contraction and diffusion, according to certain laws which he has determined, of matter, motion, and force. Evolution consists, therefore, of two processes, contraction and diffusion, and is either simple or compound. Simple evolution is where concentration and diffusion follow each other alternately; compound evolution is where the two processes go on simultaneously in the same subject, which may be said to be growing and decaying, or living and dying, at one and the same time.

Minerals, plants, and animals, including man, are all formed by the evolution of matter, motion, and force. The elimination or loss of motion, mechanical, chemical, or electrical, is followed by the concentration of matter and force, which may assume the form of a pebble, a diamond, a nettle, a rose, an oak, a jelly-fish, a tadpole, a monkey, a man. Life is simply the product of "the mechanical, chemical, and electrical arrangement of particles of matter." The concentration of motion is followed by a diffusion or dispersion of matter and force, and the disappearance of the several groups of phenomena we have just named; but as matter is indestructible, and as there is always the same quantity of motion and force, they disappear only to reappear in new groups or transformations. The diffusion of the mineral may be the birth of the plant; of the plant, the birth of the animal; of the ape, may be a new concentration which gives birth to man. Nothing is lost. The cosmos is a ceaseless evolution; is, so to speak, in a state of perpetual flux and reflux, in which diffusion of one group of phenomena is followed by the birth of another, in endless rotation, or life from death, and death from life. Dissolution follows concentration "in eternal alternation," or both go on together. This is not a new doctrine, but substantially the doctrine of a school of Greek philosophers, warred against both by Plato and Aristotle, that all things are in a state of ceaseless motion, of growth and decay, in which corruption proceeds from generation, and generation from corruption, in which death is born of life, and life is born of death. Our cosmic philosophers only repeat the long since exploded errors of the old cosmists. But pass over this.

The author is treating of the knowable. We ask him,

then, how he contrives to know that there is any such evolution as he asserts? He assumes that matter, motion, and force are the constituent elements of the cosmos; but he can neither know it nor prove it, since he maintains that what matter is, or what motion is, or what force is, is unknown and unknowable. He denies the relation of cause and effect, or at least that it is cognizable; how, then, can he assert the cosmic phenomena are only concentrations and diffusions of matter, motion, and force? A certain elimination of motion and a corresponding concentration of matter and force produces the rose, another produces an ape, another produces a man, says the author of this new system of philosophy. Does he know that he is only a certain concentration of matter and force, resulting from a certain diffusion or loss of motion? Can he not only think, but prove it? But all proof, all demonstration, as all reasoning, nay, sensible intuition itself, depends on the principle of cause and effect; for, unless we can assert that the sensation within is *caused* by some object without that affects the sensible organism, we can assert nothing outside of us, not even a phenomenon or external appearance. How does the author know, or can he know, that he differs from the ape only in the different combination of matter, motion, and force?

Mr. Spencer, in his work on *Biology*, asserts that life results from the mechanical, chemical, and electrical arrangement of the particles of matter. If this were so, it would, on the author's own principles, explain nothing. It would be only saying that a certain group of phenomena is accompanied by another group, which we call life, but not that there is any causal relation between them. That the supposed arrangement of the particles of matter originates the life Mr. Spencer cannot assert without the intuition of causes, and causes he either denies or banishes to the unknowable. Analytical chemistry resolves, we are told, the diamond into certain gases; but is synthetic chemistry able to recombine the gases so as to produce a diamond? Professor Huxley finds, he thinks, the physical basis of life in protoplasm. Protoplasm is not itself life, according to him, but its basis. How does he know, since he denies causality, that life is or can be developed from protoplasm? Protoplasm, chemically analyzed, is resolved into certain well-known gases; but it is admitted that synthetic chemistry is unable to recombine them and reproduce protoplasm.

Evidently, as in the case of the diamond, there is in the production of protoplasm some element which even analytic chemistry fails to detect. No synthetic chemistry can obtain the protoplasm from protein, and there is no instance in which life, feeling, thought and reason, are known, or can be proved, to result from dead matter, or from any possible combinations of matter, motion, and force. If it could so result, the fact could not be proved, and would remain for ever in the unknowable.

The new philosophy resolves all the cosmic phenomena into the concentration and diffusion of the unknowable elements called matter, motion, and force. The quantities of these elements remain always the same, but they are in a state of constant evolution, and all the cosmic phenomena result from this evolution, and are simply changes or transformations of the same force. Now, the evolution either has had a beginning or it has not. If it has not, we must assume an infinite series of evolutions, or concentrations and diffusions; but an infinite series is absurd, and the author himself denies it. Then it must have had a beginning; but no phenomenon can begin to exist without a cause independent of the phenomenon, or the *causatum*. But the author denies the cause in denying the origin of the cosmos in creation, or its production by a supercosmic creator. We are sadly at loss, then, to conceive how he contrives, consistently with his new system, to assert either the law of evolution, or even evolution itself. Will he tell us how he does it?

We need not follow the author through the alleged facts and illustrations by which he seeks to explain and sustain his system of evolution; because evolution is not assertable on his own principles, nor is it provable *aliunde* by any possible deductions or inductions of science. So far from being science, it is not even an admissible hypothesis; because it contradicts and refutes itself. Mr. Spencer has attempted to construct a system of philosophy or explication of the cosmic phenomena, and the law of their production or transformation, without recurrence to any metaphysical principles, and from physical principles alone, or by the generalization of the physical phenomena as they appear to the human consciousness in space and time, and has necessarily falled; because the physical principles themselves, and consequently the physical phenomena, are inexplicable and inconceivable even, without the principles discarded as meta-

physical. The author's whole theory of evolution depends on the assumed fact of the indestructibility of matter, the continuity of motion, and the persistence of force, not one of which can be asserted without the ideal intuition of being, substance, and cause, all three metaphysical principles, and as such relegated by the author to the region of the unknowable. The indestructibility of matter can be deduced or induced from no possible observation of sensible phenomena. The continuity of motion or the persistence of force is no fact of consciousness. Mr. Spencer himself says, to science or the explication of phenomena, the present must be linked with the past and with the future, and hence he argues the indestructibility of matter, the continuity of motion, and the persistence of force; but not one of them is a fact of consciousness. Consciousness is the recognition of one's self as subject in the present act of thought, and looks neither before nor after, takes cognizance neither of the past nor of the future, and consequently of no link connecting them with the present. Indestructibility, continuity, persistence, all of which imply cognitions of the past and future, are not and cannot be facts of consciousness, which is cognition only of the present. Matter and motion, the author says, are derivative, derived from force, which alone is primitive. The indestructibility of matter and the continuity of motion depend, then, solely on the persistence of force, and are apprehensible, therefore, only in apprehending that persistence; but that persistence is not a fact of consciousness. How, then, can it be asserted, unless force is, and is apprehended as, a persistent substance? But substance is unknowable.

The author adopts the method of the physicists, the so-called inductive method, and proceeds from particular phenomena to induce by generalization their law; but no induction is valid that is not made by virtue of a general principle, which is not itself inferable from the phenomenal, and must be given and held by the mind before any induction is possible. This is the condemnation of the method of the physicists, for, from phenomena alone, only phenomena can be obtained. A method without principles is null, and leads only to nullity. The author does not understand that the reason why the cosmic phenomena are not cogitable without the assumption of the cosmic reality underlying them, is because the mind intuitively apprehends them as dependent on something which they are not, and at

the same time, and in the same intellectual act, intuitively apprehends a reality beyond them, which by its causative act produces and sustains them. He is wrong in declaring that the something real is unknowable; it may be incomprehensible, but, as we have seen, it must be cognizable, or nothing is cognizable.

That the men who follow in the physical sciences the physical or, as they say, the inductive method, inducing general conclusions from particular facts or phenomena, have really advanced those sciences, and by their untiring labors and exhaustless patience achieved all but miracles in the application of science to the mechanical and productive arts from which trade and industry have so largely profited, we by no means deny; but they have done so because the mind, in their investigations and inductions, has all along had the intuition of the ideal principle which legitimates their generalizations, that of being or substance, and its creative or causative act, but of which they take no heed, or to which they do not advert; as St. Augustine says, the mind really has cognition of God in the idea of the perfect, but does not ordinarily advert to the fact. They suppose they obtain the law they assert by logical inference from the phenomena, because they do not observe that the mind has intuition of the causative or creative act, which is the ideal principle of the induction. The mind is superior to their philosophy, and they reason far better than they explain their reasoning. We may apply to them the advice Lord Mansfield gave to a man of good sense and sound judgment, but of little legal knowledge, who had been recently appointed a judge in one of the British colonies: "Give your decisions," said his lordship, "without fear or hesitation; but don't attempt to give your reasons." So long as they confine themselves to the proper field of scientific investigation, they are safe enough; but let them come out of that field and attempt to explain the philosophy or the principles of their physical science, and they are pretty sure to make sad work of it. *Ne sutor ultra crepidam.*

Mr. Spencer protests against being regarded as an atheist, for he denies the self-existence of the universe, and neither affirms nor denies the existence of God. But *atheist* means simply *no-theist*, and, if he does not assert that God is, he certainly is an atheist. It is not necessary, in order to be an atheist, to make a positive denial of God. His disciple, Professor John Fiske, who has been lecturing on the cosmic

philosophy before Harvard College, contends that the cosmic philosophy is not atheistical, because it asserts in the unknowable an infinite power, being, or reality, that underlies the cosmic phenomena, of which they are the sensible manifestations; yet this does not relieve it, because what is asserted is not God, and is not pretended to be the God of theism, but the reality or substance of the cosmos and indistinguishable from it. It is the real, as the phenomena are the apparent, cosmos.

The author denies that he is a pantheist, for he denies the hypothesis of self-creation; but, if he is not a pantheist, it is only because he does not call the unknowable infinite power or being he asserts as the reality of the cosmic, that is, the real cosmos, by the name of God, Deus, or Theos. But asserting that power as the reality or substance of the cosmic phenomena is precisely what is meant by pantheism. Pantheism, in its modern form, is the assertion of one only substance, which is the reality of the cosmic phenomena, and the denial of the creation of finite substances, which are the real subject of the cosmic manifestations. Pantheism denies the creation of substances or second causes, and asserts that all phenomena are simply the appearances of the one infinite and only substance; and this is precisely what Mr. Spencer undeniably does. The only difference between atheism and pantheism is purely verbal. The atheist calls the reality asserted cosmos or nature, and the pantheist calls it God, but both assert one and the same thing. The power Mr. Spencer asserts is simply the *natura naturans* of Spinoza, and that is nothing the atheist himself does not accept, and, indeed, assert. Neither asserts, nor does Mr. Spencer assert, any supercosmic being, or power on which the cosmos depends, and the power they do assert is as much cosmic as the phenomena themselves. Mr. Spencer's protest betrays rare theological and philosophical ignorance, or is a mere verbal quibble, unworthy a man who even pretends to be a philosopher.

Mr. Spencer hardly once refers to Christian theology, and, without ever having studied it, evidently would have us think that he considers it beneath his attention. Yet he, as evidently, has constructed his system for the purpose of undermining and disposing of it once for all. This may be seen in the fact that, when he refers to religion at all, it is always to some heathen superstition, which he assumes to be the type or germ of all religion, carefully ignoring the

patriarchal, Hebrew, or Christian religion. He tells us "the earliest traditions represent rulers as gods or demigods." This is not true even of heathenism, which is in fact an apostasy from the patriarchal or primitive religion, or its corruption. The apotheosis of Romulus, according to tradition, took place only after his death, and it is only at a later period that the pagan emperors were held to be gods during their lifetime. Mr. Spencer's real or affected ignorance of the whole order of religious thought is marvellous, and we cannot forbear saying:

> "There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
> Than are dreamt of in your philosophy."

There is no philosophy or science, if God and his creative act are excluded or ignored, because there is no cosmos left, and neither a subject to know nor an object to be known.

Mr. Spencer misapprehends the relations of religion and science, and consequently the conditions of their reconciliation. He says they are the two opposite poles of one and the same globe. This is a mistake. Religion and science are indeed parts of one whole; but religion, while it includes science, supplements it by the analogical knowledge called faith. The truths of faith and of science are always in dialectic harmony, and between the Christian faith and real science there is no quarrel, and can be none; for religion only supplies the defect of science, and puts the mind in possession of the solution of the problem of man and the universe, not attainable by science.

There is a quarrel only when the scientists, in the name of science deny or impugn the supplementary truths of revelation, and which are at least as certain as any scientific truths or facts are or can be; or when they reject the great principles of reason itself, which are the basis of all science.

Let the scientists confine themselves, as we have said, to the study and classification of facts, or the development and application to them of the undoubted principles of the intuitive reason, and not attempt to go beyond their province or the proper field of scientific investigation, and there will be no quarrel between them and the theologians. The quarrel arises when men like Spencer, Darwin, Huxley, and others, profoundly ignorant both of philosophy and of theology, or the teachings of revelation, ignoring them, despising them, or regarding them with sovereign contempt, put forth baseless theories and hypotheses incompatible with the truths alike of reason and faith; and it will continue

till they learn that an unproved and unprovable theory or hypothesis is not science, nor a scientific explanation of the facts either of the soul or of the cosmos, and is quite insufficient to warrant a denial of the belief of the great bulk of mankind from the first man down to our own day. Then there may be peace between the theologians and the scientists, but not till then.

We said, or intended to say, that a philosopher is known by his principles. We add that he is also known by his method. The physical method is unscientific and illogical; for it seeks through phenomena to arrive at being, and from particulars to obtain general or universal conclusions. Induction that is not based on a universal principle can never attain to any thing but the particular. Generalizations of particulars are only abstractions, and abstractions, prescinded from their concretes, are nullities, as the possible, without the real to actualize it, is nothing. There is no rising from particulars to the universal unless we start with a universal principle intuitively given. It is impossible to conclude, by logical inference, substance or being from phenomena. The reality which Mr. Spencer says we are compelled to assert, though itself unknowable, as underlying the cosmic phenomena, is no deduction or induction from these, but is given intuitively as the ideal or intelligible in the very act in which the phenomena themselves are apprehended. Mr. Spencer is wrong in asserting it, as we have said, to be unknowable, and still more so in asserting it as the subject of the cosmic phenomena, which is simply pantheism These phenomena are not the appearances or manifestations of the infinite power or being which Mr. Spencer asserts as unknowable, but of the finite and dependent substances which God, the infinite being, creates and upholds as second causes.

The universal is not contained in the particular, the infinite in the finite, the identical in the diverse, the immutable in the mutable, the persistent in the transitory, unity in plurality, or the actual in the possible, and therefore cannot be concluded from it. The two categories are not obtainable, either from the other, by any possible logical inference, and therefore must be given intuitively or neither is cognizable; for, though not reciprocal, they connote, as all correlatives, each the other, since neither is knowable without the other. This is the condemnation of the physical or inductive method, when followed as a method of obtaining the first principles either of the real or of the knowable. We

say only what Bacon himself said. He said and proved that the inductive method is inapplicable in philosophy, or out of the sphere of the physical sciences. The great error has been in attempting to follow it in philosophy, or the science of the sciences, where it is inapplicable, for no science can start without first principles.

We feel that some apology is due our readers for soliciting their attention to any thing so absurd as Herbert Spencer's *New System of Philosophy*; but they must bear in mind that Mr. Spencer is a representative man, and has only attempted to bring together and combine into a systematic whole the anti-Christian, anti-theistical, and anti-rational theories, hypotheses, and unscientific speculations which, under the name and forms of science, govern the thought of the modern non-Catholic world. Mr. Spencer's book, which is a laborious effort to give the philosophy or science of nothing, and ends only in a system of "symbolic conceptions," in which nothing, according to the author, is conceived, has, after all, a certain value, as showing that there is no medium or middle ground between Catholicity and atheism, as there is none between atheism and nihilism Mr. Spencer, we should think, is a man who has read comparatively little, and knows less, of Christian theology or philosophy; he seems to us to be profoundly ignorant of his own ignorance, as well as of the knowledge other men have. He is only carrying out the system of Sir William Hamilton or Dr. Mansel, and providing a philosophy for the Darwins, the Huxleys, the Galtons, the Lubbocks, the Tyndalls, *et id omne genus*, and has succeeded in proving that no advance has been made by the non-Catholic world on the system of old Epicurus, which is rapidly becoming the philosophy of the whole world outside of the church, and against which the Bascoms, the Hodges, and the McCoshes, with honorable intentions and a few fragments of Catholic theology and philosophy, protest in vain. This is our apology for devoting so much space to Herbert Spencer's inanities.

THE PRIMEVAL MAN NOT A SAVAGE.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for April, 1873.]

CARDINAL WISEMAN'S *Lectures on the Connection between Science and Revealed Religion*, originally written and delivered in Rome nearly forty years ago, are too well known and too highly appreciated to render any review of them by us either necessary or proper. It is to be regretted that his Eminence was not able to find time to revise them before his lamented death, and to bring them up to the level of science at the latest date possible; for the sciences treated have no fixedness, and have undergone many and important changes since these lectures were originally prepared and delivered. Yet we are not aware that any thing has been discovered and established that requires any serious modification of their principles, or that invalidates their general conclusion, that the investigations of science in its several departments tend upon the whole to confirm the historical accuracy and authenticity of the Scriptural narratives, and therefore prove a valuable auxiliary to Christian apologetics. Yet this is hardly true of the actual theories and speculations of contemporary science, though it is true, if restricted to what scientific investigations have really discovered and settled. The theories and speculations of the scientists held in highest repute, are just now decidedly antiscriptural and materialistic in their tendencies, while philosophy, adopting their inductive method, is as decidedly pantheistic or atheistic, though the Spencerians, or cosmists, concede that science is as yet in no condition to demonstrate what the fool says in his heart, *non est Deus*, or that there is no God.

His Eminence has more confidence in scientists than we

*1. CARDINAL WISEMAN'S Works. *The Connection between Science and Revealed Religion.* New York: 1872.

2. *Origin of Civilization, and the Primitive Condition of Man. The Mental and Social Condition of Savages.* By SIR JOHN LUBBOCK, Bart., M. P., F. R. S. New York: 1871.

3. *Tradition: Principally with reference to Mythology and the Law of Nations.* By LORD ARUNDEL OF WARDOUR. London: 1872.

4. *The Primeval Man: An Examination of some Recent Speculations.* By the DUKE OF ARGYLL. New York: 1869.

have, and estimates the results of their investigations more highly than we do; but we are happy to find him maintaining that the Christian faith does not depend on external evidences, that it has its internal grounds of certainty, which nothing drawn from foreign sources can shake, or is needed to confirm. Christianity is herself the key to both history and science, she is the touchstone of truth; and whatever in history or science is found in conflict with her is, by that fact alone, proved to be neither genuine science, nor authentic history. History and science must plead before her; not she before them. His Eminence knows this and insists on it, but, perhaps, with less emphasis than is desirable. We hold that Christians should plant themselves on the rights of religion, and yield in these times, even by way of argument, no advantages which they may justly claim. We think that his Eminence overrates the aid which the sciences he treats have furnished to Christian apologetics, hermeneutics, and Biblical criticism. The early commentators undersood these matters as well as we do, and they as yet stand unrivalled. But he knew infinitely more of such matters than we do; and, in a case of difference, the probabilities in the case are that he is right, and we wrong. We make no pretentions to any proficiency in the study of what passes for science. Indeed we have never been able to get any thing more than a smattering of the sciences so-called; for they have none of them remained unchanged long enough for us to master them. We have tried our hand at most of them first or last; but they all changed so rapidly, we had so often to unlearn to-day what we learned yesterday as undoubted science, that we gave the matter up in despair. Yet we are and always have been fond of the study of philology, ethnology, archæology, mythology, history, and especially that old mystic East; but we have never been able to convince ourselves that the present knows any thing of much importance that was unknown to the early fathers and great doctors of the church. We consult the scientists, they are in ecstasies over the progress they have made; we press them, each confesses that his science is as yet only in its infancy; but, for the first time in the history of the world, each has hit upon the true principles and method of investigation, and the most magnificent results are to be hereafter obtained. Well, well, so be it.

"Hope springs eternal in the human breast;
Man never is, but always to be blest."

We must wait till the infant science has become an adult, and the magnificent results are obtained. When the scientists have succeeded in extracting sunbeams from cucumbers, in showing us how nothing can make itself something, or how there can be effects without causes, or the cosmos can exist without a maker, we will listen reverently to their instructions, and confide in their speculations.

Let us not be misapprehended. Cardinal Wiseman does not rest the claims of revealed religion on what is called science. He contends not only that science raises no objection to revealed religion that science, when really science, does not itself refute; and he certainly shows that in many cases it has clearly done so. Hence he concludes, that the fears which many good people have of certain sciences on account of their supposed infidel tendencies, are unfounded; for the presumption is, that, if science in a large number of cases refutes its own objections and removes the embarrassments it creates, it will ultimately do so in all cases. We doubt it. We are not authorized to conclude, because it has done so in some important cases, it will do so in all; nor do facts tend to justify the presumption. The sciences are far more decidedly antichristian to-day, than they were when Cardinal Wiseman first delivered his lectures. The answers he gives to the scientific objections raised in his day, are for the most part quietly ignored by subsequent scientists, and the sacred books of the Jews and Christians, denied all historical value, are quietly placed in the same category with the sacred books of the Hindus, Persians, and Chinese; and Christianity is assumed to be only one form among a thousand other forms of religion which the race has developed, or with which its natural religious sentiment has clothed itself. The most honored and revered scientists in public estimation in our day are the Huxleys, Tyndalls, Lyells, Lubbocks, Darwins, Spencers, the Comteans, and the cosmists, or evolutionists, men who might make a Lamarck, a La Mettrie, or even a Cabanis, who defined man to be "a digestive tube open at both ends," die of envy.

His Eminence finds traces of the deluge everywhere, scientific, historical, traditional. His scientific arguments are based on the marks which geology discloses of a powerful cataclysm or convulsion the earth at no remote period underwent, most probably by water, displaced, perhaps, by the upheaval of the Andes. But a geologist of some note informed us the other day, that the theory of convulsions or

cataclysms, save such as are produced by causes now in operation, is at present very generally rejected by geologists. Take away the historical account of the deluge recorded in *Genesis*, and nothing, as Lord Arundel admits, could be made of the traditions of nations, which, holding the account in *Genesis* for authentic history, we refer unhesitatingly to Noah's flood. We assume the truth, as we have the right to do, of the Scriptural narratives, and content ourselves with requiring those who bring objections from science to prove, first of all, that what they allege is genuine science, not simply an induction, a theory, an hypothesis, or a conjecture; and till they do that, we sturdily refuse to reply to their objections, however specious or damaging they may seem. It is the only course that is just alike to religion, and to those who object to it. His Eminence is more condescending. He undertakes to prove to them that it is not science; we ask them to prove that it is; for we have little patience with scientists, whom we seldom find able to reason.

The second book on our list is a pretended scientific work, by Sir John Lubbock, one of the great lights of modern English science. He is a baronet, a fellow of the Royal Society, a member of parliament, and author of a history of prehistoric times, that is, history, if not evolved from his own "inner consciousness," at least written by way of induction from mutilated phenomena and unintelligible monuments. His account of the mental and social condition of savages, though it tells us little that we have not known almost from our boyhood, is not devoid of interest, and, except as to inferences and one important point, is in the main, we believe, correct. Sir John holds that the human race began its career in the lowest barbarism in which it is possible for man to exist as man, and has by its own indigenous and unassisted efforts, after ages of toil and struggle, worked its way up to the high civilization, say, of England in the nineteenth century, even to that of Sir John Lubbock himself, who stands at the summit of that civilization. This theory, which assumes that the primitive state of man as man, that is, when he by development has got rid of his monkey appendages and emerged into a man, is that of the savage state or lowest barbarism,—we propose to examine with some degree of thoroughness before we close, but must first turn our attention to the third book on our list, *Tradition*, by Lord Arundel of Wardour, which contains, in fact, a very full and satisfactory refutation of the savage theory of Sir John Lubbock and others.

Lord Arundel of Wardour aims, in this really erudite volume, to refute the Benthamites and diplomates, who substitute what they call international law for the law of nations, and which they hold to be of human and conventional origin, founded on pacts and precedents to be interpreted by each nation for itself, according to its own judgment of utility or expediency. As there is and can be no international sovereign, there can be no international law except by a figure of speech, and consequently no international court, judge, or umpire, whose judgments are legally binding on either party, or capable of execution, except by an appeal to arms. Consequently each party is his own judge and jury, and is free to do whatever under the circumstances it judges expedient or useful, if it has the power. If the king of Sardinia judges it expedient or useful to him and his people, to invade and annex the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, the Italian duchies, and the Pontifical States, and imprison their legitimate sovereign, there is nothing to prevent him if he has the power to do it. There being no law of nations, there is no law or rule of right or justice that he would violate in doing it. This practically resolves right into might, the favorite doctrine of Thomas Carlyle, and places the weaker party always in the wrong. He is always in the right who has the stronger force, and success is the test of merit.

Yet there is no "untutored" savage that would not instinctively revolt at a doctrine so favorable to tyrants and robbers, to the assassins and plunderers of nations and of individuals; for even the most degraded savage has at least a rude sense of justice, which he never confounds with simple physical force. However, the doctrine follows legitimately from Bentham's denial of the rule of right, and putting in its place the rule of utility, pleasure, or happiness. It is openly defended by Carlyle in his glorification of Mirabeau, Danton, Napoleon I., and Frederic II., miscalled the Great. It is the doctrine acted on by the Subalpine government, and by virtue of which it has effected the unity of Italy; it is the doctrine on which Prince von Bismarck has acted in creating the present German empire; and it is the doctrine approved by the diplomacy of all nations, except its victims. Russia, Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Great Britain, France, Spain, the United States, hold friendly diplomatic relations with the Subalpine robber and usurper, and not one of them has protested against his

robbery. France cannot protest against the new German empire, for she is its victim; but the diplomacy of Europe and America renders homage to the new kaiser, and adorns with the laurel wreath the brow of his unprincipled and unscrupulous chancellor. A prince wants to annex a neighboring state to his own possessions. Let him do it, if able, and diplomacy will sanction his robbery, by calling it *un fait accompli*, or justify it by "the logic of events."

Now, against this abominable doctrine which makes physical force the measure of right, and justifies the *væ victis* of the Romans, Lord Arundel protests in the name of liberty and civilization, and asserts the law of nations, or the *jus gentium* of Roman jurisprudence and universal tradition. The *jus gentium* was not simply the portion of Roman law common to all nations, but was coincident with the law of nature, natural right, superior to all municipal laws, eternal and immutable, sacred and inviolable, and held to bind the nation, not only in its intercourse and relations with others, but in its entire national action, whether relating to foreigners or to its own citizens or subjects. Any municipal legislative act in contravention of the *jus gentium*, Roman jurisprudence held to be null and void from the beginning. "Unjust laws," says St. Augustine, speaking as a Roman jurist as well as a Christian theologian, "are violences rather than laws." The Romans held the *jus gentium* to be imposed, not by men or by the nations themselves by mutual agreement, but by divine authority, and therefore binding on the conscience of the nation itself, and on the consciences of all nations. It was of divine, not of human origin, and therefore under the protection of the avenging gods. The Athenians evidently distinguished between justice and utility. Aristides, appointed to examine a project concocted by Themistocles, reported that "nothing could be more useful to Athens, but at the same time nothing could be more unjust." The Athenians, it is said, therefore refused to entertain the project. The Athenians had a higher civilization, if the anecdote may be credited, than the princes and diplomates of the last century and of the present. It would be an insult to pagan Greece or Rome to call that solemn Englishman and ethical and juridical reformer, Jeremy Bentham, a pagan. The pagans were hardly ever such utter apostates from religion, morals, and common sense, as he was. The most sophistical of the Greek sophists never became more utterly unable to distinguish between right and wrong, or befogged by their sophistry.

International law, divorced from ethics, founded on utility, and interpreted by precedent, favors only the strong, and affords no protection to the weak. The law of nations is the eternal and immutable law of justice, which binds the nation and governs the intercourse of nations with one another, and interposes the shield of sacred and inviolable right between the weak and the strong, and enables small states to subsist in peace and security by the side of great and powerful states. The pope, for Christian nations, is the divinely-appointed guardian and judge of the law of nations, and his is the only voice among sovereigns that now rings out in its defence. He presents at this moment, when past his fourscore years, a sublime example of fidelity to justice where all are faithless, and which the world must ere long admire, and yield to it the homage that is its due. He stands and speaks, and his enemies one by one drop into their graves. Palmerston is dead; Cavour is dead; Mazzini is dead; Louis Napoleon is dead; Garibaldi is sick, eaten up by chagrin, and impotent; Victor Emmanuel would make his peace to-day, if his government would let him; Bismarck alone remains in full vigor, but all does not go smooth even with him, and his turn may come soon. If men for the moment turn a deaf ear to the voice of the vicar of Christ, God hears him and avenges the violated law of nations, and summons to his own judgment-seat those who prided themselves on their power and craft, and thought that they could trample on his justice with impunity. It is not with a weak, trembling old man that they have to account, but with the omnipotent God. Let them tremble before his justice which they have despised, for he in his wrath will scatter them as the chaff of the summer threshing-floor before the wind: "I have seen the wicked highly exalted and lifted up like the cedars of Libanus. And I passed by, and lo! he was not: and I sought him, and his place was not to be found." Ps. xxxvi, 35, 36.

Lord Arundel, knowing well that man has no power to invent or to make the law of nations obligatory, aims, in the second place, to trace its origin in tradition back to Noah, and through him to Adam in whom it was infused by his Maker, and from whom it has been tradited to all the families, tribes, and nations of his posterity, spread as they are over the whole face of the earth. This leads him to an examination of the mythologies of nations, in which are embodied and preserved the traditions of the race. His lord-

ship finds that, in these mythologies, the people are represented as owing their civilization to the gods who taught them the use of fire, to plant corn and the vine, and the various arts of husbandry, to rear flocks and herds, who *gave them laws*, and raised them to a state of civilization. From the character of the principal feasts in honor of the services rendered the people by the gods, and the symbols and emblems used in them, he identifies these gods sometimes with Adam and his sons, Seth and Cain ; sometimes, and more frequently, with Noah and his three sons, Sem, Cham, and Japhet, through whom the race was continued, its traditions preserved, and the earth repeopled after the flood. Hence, he contends that the mythologies and traditions of the heathen, when properly explained, agree in ascribing the law of nations and civilization which it founds and sustains, to Adam, who received the law directly from his Maker, and its preservation and transmission through Noah and his three sons, to the several families, tribes, and nations, until their posterity became divided. This accords with the Scriptural tradition, and is the only historical sense of which the mythological traditions and symbols are susceptible.

The only point here that we are not prepared to accept is, that the heathen mythologies originated in hero-worship, as his lordship contends, and that the nucleus of the myth is a real historical personage. The Scriptures tell us that all "the gods of the gentiles are devils," and we do not find that the heathen ever raised deified kings and heroes to the rank of their greater gods or principal deities. But we agree that the devils worshipped by the heathen as gods, as they are now by the spiritists in our own country, gathered around them and appropriated to themselves, and set forth in their own distorted way, real historical traditions and events ; and it is this fact, in our judgment, that has misled the majority of our most eminent mythologists. They seem to us to overlook the fact, that all the gods of the heathen, and therefore all the mythological gods, were literally devils, which is the real key to the false religions and mythologies of the gentiles. But the point is not essential to his lordship's argument. All that it requires in order to stand firm is, that the historical events, celebrated or commemorated in the worship of the devils, should be events, though distorted and disguised, ascribed to Adam, Noah, and other scriptural personages in authentic tradition ; and

this much we think his lordship, as well as other mythologists, has sufficiently proved.

The noble author very justly rejects the practice so common of late, of writing history by induction from isolated facts and monuments, like the pretended histories of prehistoric times. He maintains that any attempted historical inductions from the facts or particulars disclosed by the analytical investigations of the various mythologies and mutilated and distorted traditions of the heathen, can give no trustworthy historical result. We can study them with advantage only when we have authentic tradition for our guide. This authentic tradition is recorded in the Scriptures, and has come down to us in its purity and integrity through the patriarchs, the synagogue, and the church. The mythologies can add nothing to it; but, studied in its light, they bear witness to its universality, and tend to confirm it. This study is not necessary to our faith as Christians, but is very useful, as Cardinal Wiseman shows, in repelling a certain class of objections urged by infidels.

The fourth work on our list, by the Duke of Argyll, is a brief examination of the theory of the origin of civilization by Sir John Lubbock, and of the speculations of Charles Darwin on the origin of species and the descent of man. It is able, but too brief and sketchy to be generally satisfactory. His Grace, as does the late Dr. Whately, Protestant archbishop of Dublin, denies that the primeval man was a savage, or that the human race began in the lowest form of barbarism, and have risen to the highest civilization as yet attained to, by their own indigenous and unaided efforts. But his Grace relies very little on tradition, which, as a Presbyterian, it might be inconvenient for him to do; he is also disposed to concede a much greater antiquity both to the earth and to man, than we think there is any reason for doing. He maintains, against Darwin's theory of the development of new species by natural selection, that, as old species become extinct, God creates new species, and that not development, but creation is constantly going on. But as we intend to pay ere long our respects especially to Mr. Darwin, we confine what more we have to say in this article to the savage theory of Sir John Lubbock.

Sir John holds that man began in the lowest barbarism in which he can exist as man, and, as we have said, has risen by force of nature or his own indigenous efforts to civilization, as he had probably previously risen from some lower

animal, the ape, perhaps, to man; though we believe he does not actually assert that man is an ape or some other animal developed, but leaves us to believe it. We are perfectly familiar with Sir John's theory. We held and defended it for years, and pronounced it "the evangel of the nineteenth century"; for if it is not the theory of progress itself, it is built on that theory, and derives all its support from it. The theory makes two assumptions: 1. That the primitive state of the human race was the savage state, or that of utter barbarism; and 2. That men have risen from that state and advanced to the highest and most refined civilization yet reached, by their own inherent energy and indigenous efforts, without any supernatural instruction or foreign assistance. The first part is refuted by Lord Arundel in his conclusive proofs, that the law of nations, which we take it is the basis of all real civilization, is and can be no human invention, but is a universal tradition, handed down from Adam through Noah to us, embodied in all languages, and borne witness to by the consciences of all men and nations. Till this fact of universal tradition is overruled, Sir John's theory cannot be even entertained; for it is condemned by a higher authority than any that can possibly be alleged in its support. There is and can be no higher authority on the question than that of *Genesis*, which we cannot suffer to be disputed.

It is alleged that science is science, and therefore certain and indisputable, and, consequently, that whatever conflicts with it is manifestly false? We reply, that nothing that conflicts with *Genesis* or Christian tradition, is or can be science. What is alleged as to the primitive state of the human race is not science, is only a theory or hypothesis. This is all that the scientists can even pretend. They must vindicate it, prove it to be science, before they can claim a hearing, or have any standing in the court.

Sir John alleges that the primitive state of the human race was that of barbarism, but he does not and can not allege this as a fact historically known or verifiable; he can and does allege it only as an inference or induction from certain isolated facts and monuments that in his judgment warrant it. But his judgment may be at fault; he may mistake the true sense of the facts and monuments on which he bases his theory, and consequently present only a baseless hypothesis. History cannot be evolved from one's "inner consciousness," or written by way of logical induction.

Indeed, without the Biblical traditions, as Lord Arundel maintains, Sir John has and can have no key to the sense of the facts and monuments on which he relies, and no test to which he can bring his inductions and inferences for verification. The common practice of those who pretend to controvert Christian tradition in the name of science, of bringing forward an unproved and unprovable theory or hypothesis, which, *if true*, might be a serious objection, and then insist on our disproving it, or else giving up Christian tradition, is not logical nor scientific, and cannot be tolerated. It is for them to prove, not for us to disprove, their theories, hypotheses, conjectures, guesses. Till they are proved, they are not science and make nothing against us, even should we be unable to disprove them. A man may assert that the dogs that licked up Jezabel's blood were ringstreaked, and we could by no means disprove it. It is for Sir John to prove his savage or barbaristic theory, not for us to disprove it; and till he proves it, he cannot make it the basis of any valid argument or statement unfavorable to Christian tradition. Unhappily, the most unscientific and illogical reasoners we have ever encountered are precisely our professed scientists. Logic is a science which they seem by common consent to eschew as not necessary or useful to them.

The theory in question is based on another theory, that of progress, or that the race or species is naturally progressive, ever advancing in its march through the ages, from the imperfect towards the perfect. This being so, it is evident that the race must have begun in the deepest ignorance and the grossest barbarism. Hence the late Theodore Parker, a champion of progress, in undertaking to give in one of his sermons an account of the state of Adam, or the primeval man, gave a graphic and not untruthful picture of the average New Zealander. The slight defect was in omitting to prove that the New Zealander is the type of the primitive man. Sir John gives a very elaborate, and, with one rather important exception, so far as our knowledge goes, a very true account of the mental and social condition of savages; but he also forgets to produce the proof that the primeval man was a savage. The conclusion drawn from the theory of progress is worthless, because that theory is itself not only unproved, but unprovable, nay, demonstrably false. It is unscientific, unphilosophical, and unhistorical.

Individual growth there is from infancy to manhood.

Progress of individuals and even nations in culture, wisdom, virtue, religion, by the study of tradition, by foreign influences, or supernatural instruction and aid, there has been and may be; but none of the species, nor of the individual even, by his own inherent energy, or unassisted indigenous efforts. As far as there is any evidence touching the question, it proves not the progress of the species, but, if any thing, its deterioration. Even in the case of the lower animals, there is, aided by the science and art of man, no permanent, if any improvement at all, of the species or even of the breed. A better breed may be selected, but a new breed is never created; for, in crossing, there is always a reversion, after a few generations, to one or another of the original types crossed: which would seem to indicate the permanence and immutability of original species against the speculations of Darwin on the origin of species by natural selection, since it proves that they cannot be originated even by intelligent artificial selection.

The theory of progress on which Sir John relies, is inadmissible; for it asserts effects without causes, that nothing can make itself something, or, what is the same thing, that the stream can rise higher than its fountain, the effect surpass the cause, that man in and of himself can make himself more than he is. All growth is by accretion and assimilation from without. The germ of the oak containing the law of its development, is in the acorn; but, without air, light, heat, and moisture derived from without, the acorn will not germinate and grow into the oak. The law is universal. The human body grows and attains its maturity only under proper external conditions, and by assimilating its appropriate food. The soul can grow or advance only by assimilating spiritual instruction and moral truth, nor elevate itself to a higher condition without assimilating a grace from a source above itself. So, if man had begun in the savage state, he could never by his own indigenous and unassisted efforts have risen above it. He could have got out of it only by the supernatural assistance of his Maker, which amounts to the same thing that Christian tradition asserts, and which the mythologies of all nations bear witness to, in ascribing the origin of their laws and civilization to the gods.

The theory is unhistorical. There is no record on instance of a savage tribe becoming by its own spontaneous and unassisted efforts a civilized people. All the historical authorities known to us agree in this; and we, who have been read-

ing history all our life, have not been able to find an instance of the kind. Theorists who assert it, do not pretend that they have any strictly historical authority for it. It is not, they will own, a strictly historical fact, but an induction. If the primeval man was a savage, how has he become civilized, if the race is not progressive? The question reveals the true spirit of our modern scientists. They imagine a theory, then imagine another, equally baseless, to prove it. They prove that man began in the savage state, by the theory of progress; and the theory of progress, by the theory that man was originally a savage, and, consequently, could not become civilized if not progressive. Save in those physical sciences, where a crucial test is practicable, what is called modern science, or science in an absolute manner, and opposed to Christian tradition, is really nothing but hypothesis piled on hypothesis. It is gravely called science, so far as we can discover, only for the reason that it is *not* science. Yet we are gravely asked to give up our faith on its authority.

There may be instances in which a savage tribe has become a civilized people; but none in which it has become so by spontaneous development. It has always been by coming into relations, more or less intimate, with a people already civilized through missionaries, colonists, or conquest. We add not *trade*, for that exhausts savage and barbarous tribes, but, so far as history goes, never civilizes them. The Greeks attributed their civilization to Egyptian and Phœnician colonies,—Cecrops in Athens, Cadmus in Thebes, &c. Modern historians have tried, indeed, to prove that both the Greek civilization and the Greek religion were indigenous; but this is more than the Greeks themselves pretended. In later times, the Grecian genius influenced the form of their civilization and of their mythology; but the Eastern origin of both is written on their very face. The ancestors of the English, that is, Britons, Kelts, and Teutons, were by no means savages. When we first catch some historical glimpse of them, they are unlettered, it is true; but they have a very copious unwritten literature, if we may use the expression, considerable cultivation, and the principal elements of civilization. Nobody can say when the Irish civilization began, and the Britons, as painted by Cæsar, might want some of the elements of Greek and Roman civilization, but were not by any means a savage people. The Teutons or Germans, the descendants, we take it, of the white Scythians of Herodotus, and known in early history as Massagetæ, Getæ,

Gettones, and later, as Gottones, Guttones, Goths, and Teutones, are never presented as pure savages, or an absolutely uncivilized people. They appear to have been, according to Ozanam, in his *Études Germaniques*, in part an agricultural and sedentary people, with cities and villages, under a regular government, and civil and religious laws; and, in part, a nomadic people of the same race, leading a pastoral life, and uniting with the sedentary population in case of military or predatory expeditions. Old Jornandes, a Christian Goth, in his history of his nation, indignantly repels the aspersion that they were uncivilized. Indeed they were not more superstitious than the Greeks and Romans, were far less cruel than the Romans, less unchaste, held marriage in greater respect, were far more truthful, and more faithful to their word, if we may credit the ecclesiastical writers who were contemporary with their invasion and conquest of the empire. Indeed, except in literary, artistic, and scientific culture, it may be doubted if the Prussians, not Christianized till the twelfth century, are to-day much in advance of the Marcomans, the Allemanni, the Franks, the Goths, and Vandals, who overthrew the Empire of the West, and seated themselves on its ruins.

History presents us, or preserves for us the memory of no savage ancestors of the oldest civilized nations, the Egyptians, Assyrians, Syrians, Phœnicians, Carthaginians, Ethiopians, Abyssinians, Chaldeans, Persians, and Indians. Where then are the people or nations, civilized to-day, whose ancestors were savages, an ignoble herd roaming in the forest, living in dens and caves, on nuts or wild roots, which they disputed with the swine; naked, without arms either of offence or defence except their fists, ignorant of the use of fire, and of the simplest agricultural or mechanical arts? The Greek and Latin poets describe their own ancestors in similar terms, it is true; but they never describe that condition as their primitive condition, or as that of the human race. It had, according to them, been preceded by the Saturnian Age of Gold. Their traditions are worth as much for the one state as for the other. Not only is there no instance on record of a savage people having attained to a civilized state by its own unaided efforts, but it is even doubtful if any tribe sunk in the *lowest* barbarism has ever by any means become a civilized people at all. We may well say Sir John Lubbock's theory is unhistorical.

Sir John, in his description of the mental and social condi-

tion of savages, fails to note that the most striking characteristic of the savage is precisely his stationariness or unprogressiveness. Ages on ages roll over him, and bring no change in his habits or in his condition. Heeren remarks truly that the description given by the companions of Alexander the Great, of the Fisheaters along the coast of Keramania, eastward of the Persian Gulf, answers equally for them to-day: a fact which affords a passable comment on the theory, that fish-eating tends to increase the power and activity of the brain on account of the phosphorus so abundant in fish. The savage is the greatest routinist in the world. Generation after generation follows in the track of its predecessor, fishes, hunts, makes war in the same manner, as regularly as the bee constructs her cell, or the beaver builds his dam, to-day as did the bee or the beaver four thousand years ago. The savage has to perfection the *nil admirari* of English high life. He has no wonder, no curiosity, no aspirations, no "inward questionings." His senses are acute, and he is a keen observer; but he never speculates or inquires into the meaning of facts beyond their direct bearing on his condition or pursuits in life,—fishing, hunting, circumventing an enemy, or eating and sleeping. His life runs from generation to generation in the same unalterable groove, unless something external to him intervenes to lift him to a higher plane and divert his course. He is in some sort a man petrified. Nothing is more absurd than to suppose him capable, without assistance from abroad or from above, of changing his state for that of civilization, which repels rather than attracts him, as all who have studied his character well know.

Sir John Lubbock seeks to gain credence for his theory of the origin of civilization, by alleging certain anticipations among savages of civilization, and certain reminiscences of previous barbarism among the civilized. But the facts he adduces as anticipations of a coming civilization, may, as the Duke of Argyll very well observes, just as easily be explained as reminiscences of a lost civilization; and there is no objection to regarding the other class of facts as reminiscences of a vanishing barbarism. Though we deny that the race began in the lowest barbarism, we hold that no small portion of the human family, after the confusion of tongues at Babel, the apostasy of the gentiles, and their dispersion in the days of Phaleg, lapsed into barbarism, into what the poets call the Iron Age. Those who wandered farthest from

the original seats of the race, when all "were of one tongue and the same speech," fell the lowest, and, perhaps, are still savages. Others who wandered less far, and remained near the original seats of the race, deteriorated indeed, but not to so great a degree, and have been recovered to civilization, though retaining traces of the barbarism or semi-barbarism into which after the apostasy and dispersion they had fallen. This explains both classes of facts noted by Sir John, and accords with Christian tradition, as well as with the gentile traditions preserved and transmitted in the heathen mythologies and by the heathen poets, as Lord Arundel, guided by the historical light of the Mosaic records, has amply proved, whether we accept the doctrine which his lordship holds in common with the most learned and generally approved mythologists, that the greater gods of the gentiles were Adam and Noah and their sons deified; or whether we reject it; for, as we have seen, these gods gather round them the Scriptural traditions, and appropriate to themselves the events and facts in the historical personages of that tradition celebrated or commemorated in their memorial festivals, sacrifices, and offerings. The devils cannot create; they can only use and corrupt what already exists.

The history of the human race on this globe is a history of deterioration rather than of progress. Progress there has been by the supernatural teaching and assistance of Christianity, and where the Christian tradition has been preserved and conformed to in its purity and integrity. There was a marvellous progress in Europe from the sixth century to the sixteenth of our era under the powerful influence of the church, the disinterested, self-denying, and persevering labors of her devoted pontiffs, clergy, missionaries, and religious. But I find deterioration rather than progress in the gentile world, both before and since the commencement of the Christian era. Great monarchies grew up, the Egyptian, the Assyrian, the Medo-Persian, the Macedonian, but by conquest, annexation, robbery, and violence, like modern Prussia, or the present so-called kingdom of Italy; not by the internal growth of intelligence and virtue, by the strict observance of justice or the law of nations, nor by any elevation of the standard of civilization. They were all great tyrannies, a curse to the human race, and have all fallen through internal weakness and decay, and have either lapsed into barbarism, or have been superseded by barbarous tribes which they once held in subjection without civilizing

them, and which now roam over the desolate sites of their former power, pitch their tents, or rob the unwary traveller among the mouldering ruins of their greatness. So, too, mighty Rome rose, became the haughty mistress of the world, but, like her predecessors, fell to pieces from her own rottenness; and it is due to the church she persecuted and sought to destroy, that her memory is not as completely lost as that of the great robber empires that once flourished in the East.

The history of these great empires that once grasped the world in their hands, is not the history of a progress in civilization, of social amelioration, nor of an advance in the arts and sciences. We find always their earliest civil constitution the most favorable to liberty and social well-being, to intelligence and individual growth. The oldest works of art are the best, the earliest literature is the richest and the soundest. The oldest of the Hindu sacred books are the freest from superstition, and approach nearest to the Biblical doctrines and traditions; the two great poets of Greece, Homer and Hesiod, are the earliest known; the soundest elements of Greek philosophy are confessedly derived from the wisdom of the ancients, and the oldest laws are the wisest, the justest, and the most salutary; and the changes introduced, which tend not to restore primitive legislation, are the effects and causes of deterioration in morals, manners, or social and political condition. The people who founded the city of Rome and gave it its renown, were less superstitious, less immoral, and had higher civic virtues as well as domestic, than the Romans under the Cæsars, whose corruption, luxury, and effeminacy, as well as cruelty and superstition, made holy men look upon their conquest by the German barbarians as a blessing to mankind.

The history of the apostate nations before the Christian era is a history of deterioration, of political and social corruption, of the progress of tyranny and oppression, of moral and religious degradation. We witness the same tendency in the modern nations that have apostatized from Christianity, and rejected the authority of Christian tradition. True religion and real civilization are inseparable; or, rather, true religion is civilization, or, at least, includes it. No people who believes and practises true religion, is or can be an uncivilized people. Adam received from his Maker the true religion, preserved by the patriarchs to Noah, and through him down to the building of the Tower of Babel; and so

long as the race remained of "one tongue and the same speech," Genesis xi, they held and, externally at least, observed the true religion, the Christian religion (for there is and never has been but one religion properly so-called), and were civilized. With Nemrod, "the stout hunter before the Lord," probably commenced the great gentile apostasy, and simultaneously the deterioration which resulted in the ignorance, superstition, devil-worship, and barbarism of the heathen. The conversion of a family, tribe, or nation to Christianity, brings it within the pale of civilization. Before the opening of the sixteenth century the church had converted and, therefore, civilized the various families, tribes, and nations of Europe, with the exception of the Turks encamped on its southeastern margin, whom the schismatic Greeks, severed from the source of Christian life and power, were impotent either to convert or to expel; she had opened the route to the East by way of the Cape of Good Hope, and had also discovered this Western Continent, and was preparing to convert and, therefore, to civilize the barbarians and savages of the other three-quarters of the globe, when came the so-called reformation, favored by the sovereign princes, to renew the great gentile apostasy, and caused that "falling away," predicted by St. Paul.

The history of these modern apostate nations is the exact counterpart of that of the ancient gentile nations. They reject the law of God, and therefore the law of nations, recognize no law that comes from a source above the nation, or which man himself does not make. They are every day losing sight of the moral order and of the divine government. They exclude God from the affairs of this world, and make either Cæsar or the people supreme and independent. They recognize no authority but that of the prince or that of the majority, and no measure of right, as we have seen, but might or physical force. They may recognize in some extramundane region a divinity that dozes all day and sleeps all night, and takes no care how the world wags. They may even admit his supreme authority, but only in a vague and indeterminate sense, as an abstraction, without visible organization or organs, and therefore without any practical efficacy in the government of men or nations. They worship Fortune as the supreme goddess, and hold Success to be the test of merit Losing causes are always wrong, and God is always on the side of the strong, just now on the side of Prince von Bismarck and Victor Emmanuel; as in

my boyhood, when the pope was held a prisoner at Savona or Fontainebleau, he was said by the preachers to be on the side of Napoleon I., who was identified with the Man-Child of the Apocalypse. These nations are laboring with might and main to make education purely secular, to exclude religion from the schools, and to train up the rising generation in atheism, which they call *science*, as they call religion superstition. They boast of their "enlightenment," but their enlightenment consists in forgetting or despising the wisdom and common sense of their ancestors; they boast of their progress, but in the moral and spiritual order, in religion and the basis of civilization, their progress, as we said years ago, is in losing, in unclothing, and reducing themselves to utter nakedness. The only progress they can boast is in the purely material and mechanical order. Their moral, social, political, and educational reforms are all failures, or rapid strides towards barbarism. But even in their mechanical and material progress, the good gained is more than counterbalanced by the evil that accompanies it. It enriches a few, but trebles the burdens of the poor. What gain is it to the poor man that he can buy a coat for one-fourth of the price paid by his great-grandfather, when he must have six coats where his great-grandfather needed but one? They boast of the progress of liberty. When was there less liberty in Germany or Italy than now? They boast of democracy, but democracy only substitutes the mob for Cæsar, or the irresistible tyranny of soulless corporations for the prince, as we see in our own country, where the cost of living for poor people is greater that in any other country on earth, and where corporations govern the government.

When the people have lost the sense of the moral order, when religion has lost its hold on them, or when it is at best only a disembodied idea, without organs through which to make known and apply the divine law, and is practically only what each one's own fancy, prejudices, interests, passions, or caprice make it, or, if organized at all, subordinated to the prince, as the imperial government of Germany and the robber government of Italy contend that it should be; when the law of nations is reduced to a mere convention, pact, or agreement between nations, which in practice is only what the will of the stronger party dictates; and when the government has no authority from God to govern, and has no powers but such as it holds from the governed,—there is no civilization, and society is undeniably on the declivity to the

lowest barbarism, whether we believe it or not. Such is the state towards which modern society is at least tending, and which it has well-nigh already reached. The modern apostate nations may not have, in all respects, as yet sunk to the lowest depths of the ancient world, but in some respects they have sunk lower than Greece or Rome.

These considerations are sufficient to refute Sir John's theory in both its parts, and to prove that man is not naturally progressive, or capable in and of himself of emerging from the savage state, and that, when left to himself, to his own strength alone, he deteriorates instead of advancing. And it must be so, for man is not in a state of pure nature, but is always either lifted above nature, or dragged by Satan below it. The moment a man abandons religion, turns his back on Christ the Lord, he does not fall back on pure nature, but he falls under the influence of Satan, becomes captive to the devil, who leads him socially into barbarism, and individually, or, as to his soul, down to hell. Hence the reason why the secular order cannot stand without the spiritual, and why educating and disciplining the natural powers in relation to a natural end never suffices to secure it. When *ex-Père* Hyacinthe represented a distinguished American priest, a convert, as denying that he had ever been a Protestant, and claiming that, prior to his conversion, he was simply a natural man, he overlooked the fact, that nature is in bondage to Satan, till liberated by regeneration in Christ. We are, *in hac providentia*, never simply natural men standing on the level of nature, but always below that level, if not raised by grace above it. Hence, as Görres writes in his *Christliche Mystik*, "Man is always either ascending under divine influence, or descending under demoniacal or satanic influence." Who does not ascend, descends. By the prevarication of Adam, as we read the Council of Trent, man lost the supernatural justice in which he was originally constituted, and the integrity of his nature annexed thereto, became darkened in his understanding, enfeebled in his will, and fell into bondage to the devil. Hence, when not liberated by grace from bondage to the devil, or when they apostatize from Christ the Liberator, men and, through them, nations cease to ascend or to aspire, and come under the power of Satan who drags them downward, downward, till they recognize and worship him as God, as did the heathen, and as do again in our own community the modern spiritists.

The modern doctrine of progress is not yet a century old, and yet we told the truth when, some thirty years ago, we pronounced it the "creed of the nineteenth century." It is held by almost everybody with unquestioning faith, or, rather, with the blind credulity of the fanatic. It pervades all popular literature, even most scientific treatises; it is iterated and reiterated *ad nauseam* by the press, from the stately quarterly, the infallible daily, down to the seven-by-nine weekly; it is in the air, it is truly the *Welt-Geist*, and who sings not its praises is outlawed, insulted, laughed at, denounced, is one of the *oscurantisti*, an old fogie with his eyes on the backside of his head, a dweller among tombs, a spectre, a shadow, not a living, breathing man. It is one of the strangest delusions that has ever seized and carried away the human mind, and in it Satan would seem to have outdone himself. With not a particle of evidence to sustain it, treading on an earth covered all over with ruins, we know not how many layers deep, with the unmistakable signs of deterioration, weakness and decay everywhere staring us in the face, we yet are deluded enough to assert that man is naturally progressive, and that the nations would pursue a steady march towards the realization of an earthly paradise, much more desirable than the heaven hoped for by Christians, but for the priests, but for the pope, just now but for the Jesuits! Well, it is rather characteristic of insane persons to be spiteful towards their best friends, and to be the most enraged at those whom they, when sane, love best and esteem the most.

What has no reason can hardly be said to admit of a rational explanation. There are men who, because conscious of knowing more than they did when first breeched, fancy that they know so much more than the rest of mankind. Mr. Herbert Spencer has hit upon the theory of evolution, and forthwith puts it out as a new system of philosophy, as a decisive fruit of progress, although it is only the revival of the flux and reflux of old Heraclitus, exploded ages ago. Men made certain discoveries in chemistry and electricity new to them and their contemporaries, and immediately proclaimed them as new discoveries in science; yet no chemist can tell us even how Titian, not a very ancient painter, compounded his colors, or of what materials. The ancients, it is probable, knew as much of electricity as we do; they certainly understood ground-lightning, of which our electricians knew nothing a few years

since. But have not the moderns discovered steam and its uses, invented the steam-engine, the steamboat, the steam spinner and weaver, the steam-mill, the railroad, the locomotive, and the lightning-telegraph? We concede it. But then they are in the material and mechanical order, an order below, not above, man. They may or may not be useful results of the application of the mind to particular branches of science bearing on material production, transit, and communication, but they do not elevate man, and are no progress in religion, sanctity, morality, truth, justice, the law of nations, which form the basis of civilization, and without which civilization would be only a polished barbarism. To worship steam is, after all, not much in advance of the worship of his fetish, Mumbo Jumbo, by the African negro.

But no matter. There has certainly been progress in one thing, of some sort; therefore man is progressive by the inherent force of his nature; therefore might, by his own indigenous and unassisted efforts, have risen from barbarism to civilization. If he might or could, he of course did. So that point is settled. Futhermore, the English in pursuit of gain opened up India and eastern Asia, and the French expedition opened up Egypt and her long-forgotten lore to the scholars of the West, who commenced creating a science of comparative religion. The examination of the Egyptian, Hindu, Chinese, and other mythologies, did not present any evidences of progress in themselves, they even gave unmistakable signs of a deterioration, and that their purest period was their earliest. But this counted for nothing; for these were evidently superior, on the one hand, to the fetishism of the lowest barbarians or savages, and inferior, on the other, to Christianity, or the sublime monotheism of the synagogue and the church. Assuming that the race began in utter barbarism, and that religion is a fact in the natural history of man, fetishism must have been the primitive religion, the earliest form with which the religious sentiment clothed itself. Thus from fetishism to the mythologies of the mystic East, Egypt, Chaldea, China, and India, there is manifestly a progress, although in them all traces or reminiscences of primitive fetish-worship are found. The religious sentiment, which is man's natural aspiration to the true, the beautiful, and the good, gradually separates as men's ideas of truth, beauty, and goodness become purified, expanded, and elevated, from these forms become too gross, too narrow, "too strait" for it, and it

clothes itself with new forms that give it more room and freedom to expand, and thus advances to polished Greek and Roman polytheism, the most graceful, the broadest, and the most advanced of the gentile religions. But still refining, purifying, and enlarging itself, the religious sentiment takes another step forward, and develops and realizes in fixed institutions Jewish and Christian monotheism, of which the Catholic Church embodies the highest ideal as yet realized. Clearly, then, man is progressive, and is for ever advancing towards the true, the beautiful, and the good, but to which he never fully attains.

This is substantially the reasoning by which men, not absolutely in need of physic and good regimen, sustain their doctrine of the natural or inherent progressiveness of the human race. But there is a difficulty in the way of this conclusion. It assumes that fetishism and the various mythologies successively developed, are all older than Christianity, and that whatever is detected in any of them coincident with Christian doctrine or practice, is an anticipation of Christianity, or an indication of the goal towards which the race is advancing with what speed it can. This difficulty, very slight, no doubt, in the estimation of modern scientists, who treat religion simply as a fact in the natural history of man, a physiological or psychological fact, but rather serious in the estimate of an old fogie like ourselves, —is, that Christianity, under the patriarchal form, is at least two thousand years older than the oldest of the heathen mythologies or superstitions, and is itself the primitive religion. The oldest historical document in existence is the Hebrew book of *Genesis*, and in it we find that the Christian religion, under the patriarchal form—differing from Christianity, as held by the church, only in the respect that the patriarchs believed in Christ who was to come, and the church in Christ who has come and done the things necessary to perfect their faith, Heb., xi, 40—was the religion of Adam and his posterity before and after the deluge, till the building of the Tower of Babel, the confusion of tongues, the dispersion of mankind, and the gentile apostasy. The earliest of these heathen mythologies and superstitions date only from a period long subsequent to Noah's flood, and consequently cannot have been the germs from which Christianity has been developed. This is established by Lord Arundel, who shows that in them all are reminiscences of Noah, the Ark, and the destruction caused by the deluge.

This chronological difficulty upsets the whole theory, that man is naturally progressive even in religion, and shows that the heathen religions in any form are not primitive, but departures from and corruptions of the primitive religion, as Protestantism is a corruption, by way of mutilation and travesty, of Christianity as taught by the church authorized by God himself to teach it. As nobody who knows both Protestantism and Catholicity can for a moment doubt that the latter is older than the former, or that Protestantism is a corruption of the Catholic type; so no one who knows the patriarchal religion and the several forms of heathenism, can have any doubt as to which is primitive, or that heathenism is a corruption of the patriarchal type.

The modern theory, that religion is a fact of the natural history of man, as carnivorousness is a fact of the natural history of the lion or tiger; or if understood to mean any thing else than that wherever and in whatever condition we find him, savage or civilized, he has some form of religion,—is untenable. The human soul does not secrete religion as the liver secrets bile, or the stomach the gastric juice, because even in the grossest superstition the human will intervenes. Man is no more capable of inventing religion than he is of inventing language, and it has been well said that, to invent language, language itself is necessary. To pretend, as it is the fashion at present to do, that man has by nature the faculty of speech, and attains to language by its spontaneous exercise, is equally unsatisfactory. The faculty of speech is simply the faculty of using language which one has learned from a teacher, not the faculty of creating or producing language; as is evident from the case of born deaf-mutes, who want neither the faculty nor the organs of speech, and who, if cured of their deafness, can learn to speak. Besides, language embodies ideas, the profoundest philosophy, which comparatively few of those who use it are capable of grasping. Men could have language only by learning it, or by its being infused into Adam along with the knowledge it embodies, or the ideas which it signifies or expresses.

Religion could not have originated as a function or a spontaneous operation of human nature, for it is objective as well as subjective. Schleiermacher, so long court-preacher at Berlin, and whose *Glaubenslehre* is yet, we believe, held in some repute, makes the essence of religion purely subjective, and defines it to be "the sense of dependence."

That man has the sense of dependence, or the consciousness that he does not suffice for himself, is unquestionably a fact; but this is not religion till it is bound to some object independent of one's nature, on which one believes himself dependent, and which he holds to be able to do him good or to do him harm. This implies the idea or conception of the objective, and therefore of something which is neither sense nor sentiment. In all religion there is an act of belief in the divine, in the relation of the soul to it, and in its obligation to adore it, as well as the act of adoration itself. Those two acts require the exercise of both intellect and will, and hence religion is not and cannot be a simple spontaneous, or a blind and indeliberate, product of human nature. The essential nature of religion is such that it could not have been a human invention, nor a spontaneous expression of human nature. The object presented is not in man, and therefore could not be developed, as say the heterodox Germans, from his "inner consciousness." It depends on an object not only independent of man, but above him; and in no case does or can the human mind seek and find its object, for in no case can it act without it. To every thought both subject and object are necessary, and both cannot concur in the production of thought, unless both are given. The object on which all religious thought depends is the divinity, and the divinity can be given only by its own act. All religion implies God, and God can be thought only through his own act affirming or revealing himself. Religion could then never have existed without God, or have had any but a divine origin. False religions are therefore impossible without the true.

The primitive religion, since divinely given, must have been not a false, but the true religion, recognizing the true God in his true character, and the true relation of man and nature to him. Men may corrupt or falsify religion or the divine tradition of religion, but could never originate it; for the inward sentiment, however you define it, can of itself attain to nothing even in conception or imagination beyond, above, or distinct from itself. The fetish-worshipper must have believed that God is and is to be worshipped, before he could have identified him with his fetish, whether an animal, a block, or a stone. He who has no conception of God cannot identify him with the wind, the storm, the elemental forces of nature, or adore him in the sun, the moon, and stars, or in images made by men's hands. Not one of

the heathen mythologies, idolatries, terrible and abominable superstitions, could have existed, if they had not been preceded by the true religion, of which they are human and satanic corruptions. The theory, then, that the race began in the lowest and grossest fetishism, and that in the various heathen mythologies, idolatries, and superstitions, we can trace the upward progress of the human mind to the Christian church,—is absolutely untenable, as unphilosophical as it is unhistorical. The very fact that it can find currency with the leaders or would-be leaders of the science and erudition of the nineteeth century, is a striking proof of its falsity, of the deterioration instead of the progressiveness of the race.

We think we have said enough to show that Sir John Lubbock's theory, that the savage is the type of the primeval man, and which is, except with those who receive the Encyclical and Syllabus of Pius IX., dated December 8, 1864, and the decrees of the Vatican, and perhaps a few laggard Protestants, the generally received theory of our times, certainly of the so-called movement party,—is as baseless as a castle in the air, and not only incapable of proof, but demonstrably false and absurd. The theory of progress to which it appeals for support, is equally baseless. We think we have shown it to be so in this article; and we had previously shown it to be so, when urged against the immobility of the church and the unchangeableness of the Catholic faith, in the little work entitled *Conversations on Liberalism and the Church*, to which we take the liberty to refer the reader, as well as to our previous articles on the same subject.

We have treated our modern scientists, sciolists they should be called, and their theories and speculations, it may be thought with scant courtesy, but we hope not with unfairness. We think it is time that the interests of truth, religion, society, civilization, should be consulted rather than the feelings or reputation of such pretended scientists as Professors Tyndall and Huxley, as Charles Darwin and Sir Charles Lyell, Sir John Lubbock and Herbert Spencer, and others who, under the honorable name of science, are doing their best to sap, in the cultivated classes as well as in the popular mind, the very foundations of religion, morality, civilization, even society itself. The earlier works of Sir Charles Lyell may be excepted from this censure; but his *Antiquity of Man*, and his acceptance of Darwin's origin

of species in natural selection, authorize us to class him with the common herd of antichristian scientists. These men, who set up what they call science as the test of revelation, or of moral and religious truth, are the enemies of both religion and science, and the friends of either should keep no terms with them. They serve neither God nor man, neither the interests of time, nor those of eternity. Christian tradition is the test of truth, and nothing can be science that is opposed to it, or incompatible with it. He who knows Christian tradition has no need to examine a theory that contradicts it, or to weigh the facts and reasons alleged in its support; he knows beforehand that it cannot be true, and is to be indignantly rejected at once.

We reverse the common way of putting the question. Of course, there can be no conflict between real science and divine revelation; therefore we say, if what you call science conflicts with revelation, it is false and no science at all; but they say, *therefore* if your alleged revelation conflicts with science, it is false, no real revelation, but a gross imposition. Some Christians consent to this way of putting it, which is making science the test of revelation, not revelation the touchstone of science. We object to this. It is so-called science, not revelation or Christian tradition, that is on trial. The thing questioned is the alleged science, and it is for it to prove that it accords with Christian tradition, or does not conflict in any respect with revelation. We do not pretend to construct science *a priori*; we leave to scientists their method of induction without any interference or obstruction, to find out all the truth they can, and set forth and defend it without let or hindrance from theology; but if any of their inductions come athwart Christian tradition, we pronounce them at once unscientific and false; for theology is the queen of the sciences. The Holy Father does not undertake to teach the sciences; he leaves the scientists themselves to do that; but he is the infallible judge of faith, and knows that no proposition, false in faith or theology, can be true in science. So when they allege as science what is false in faith or theology, he condemns it, and forbids it to be defended or even entertained by Christian men.

In answering, as we have done, certain theories and speculations of scientists, we make no war on science or scientific pursuits. We may not believe the results of science are as great or as valuable as the scientists pretend; we may even doubt whether society has upon the whole gained any thing

by the marvellous inventions of labor-saving machinery, by the various applications of steam as a motive power, or from railroads and magnetic telegraphs; but we are ourselves fond of scientific pursuits, and we honor science, and even scientists in their place, and when they do not conclude, because they know something of granite, gneiss, feldspar, mica, silex, and slate, and can talk flippantly of old red sandstone, and the different geological ages of the globe, that they are therefore qualified to judge of theology, ethics, history, and civilization; or any better qualified than simple men like ourselves who know little of such things, but who do know our catechism, and knowing that, know enough, when the scientists bring forward inductions, theories, hypotheses, and speculations that conflict with it, to know that they are not science, but are baseless and false. We know enough of science to know that a man cannot lift himself by his own waistband, or make himself more than he is, and therefore that the alleged law of progress is not science; and when one asserts the identity of gratitude and gravitation, and therefore denies all distinction between physics and ethics, we know enough to tell him that he knows less of science than he imagines.

There are some scientific men whom we love and honor; but they are men of real science and learning, modest and humble, who do not imagine that all science was born with them or their generation. They know the present and are not ignorant of the past. They believe Horace when he says, "Brave men lived before Agamemnon." They know the traditions of the race and respect them; and distrust all theories, speculations, or inductions of their own which conflict with Christian tradition, as defined by the divinely appointed and infallible authority. They try their science and erudition by authentic tradition, not this by them, feel themselves honored in doing so, and supremely blest in having an unerring standard of truth to which they can appeal, or an unfailing light to guide them in their researches, and to save them from falling into dangerous or destructive errors. These men have not less science or learning, but they have less pride and arrogance, than the men we have named; nay, surpass them in their science and learning as much as they do in their modesty and humility. We think they should take up the proud and boastful sciolism now so popular and so menacing, and not leave the task of rebuking and refuting its pretensions in such unskilful and incompetent hands as ours.

But we may say, in conclusion, we have uttered and recorded anew our protest against Sir John Lubbock's theory, which was our own in earlier years, and which we defended earnestly till the end of 1842. It was the discovery of its unscientific character, its utter untenableness, that converted us from the rabid radicalism which we had defended all our life, to conservatism, and prepared the way by divine grace for a further conversion, that to the Catholic, the Christian, faith. We learned then that the spirit of the age is not necessarily divine, nor always an infallible criterion of truth and error, or of right and wrong; that, if popular sentiment is in general on the side of justice, popular opinion is not seldom simply a popular delusion. We have in this article combated a popular delusion, not with any hope of recovering the deluded, for no one can be reasoned out of a delusion, but in the hope of guarding those yet in their senses from losing them. The recovery of the deluded can be effected only by divine grace.

DARWIN'S DESCENT OF MAN.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for July, 1873.]

MR. DARWIN'S theory of the descent of man from the ape or some other of the monkey tribe depends on his theory of the origin of species by means of natural selection. Which in its turn depends on the theory of progress, which we refuted in our review of Sir John Lubbock's theory of the origin of civilization; or, perhaps, more remotely on Herbert Spencer's theory of evolution as set forth in his *First Principles of a New System of Philosophy*, which itself depends on the theory of the correlation of forces. If Sir John's theory of the origin of civilization is untenable, or if Herbert Spencer's theory of evolution is evidently false, unproved, and unprovable, Darwin's theory of the origin of species is an untenable hypothesis, and his theory of the descent of man falls to the ground.

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* 1. *Origin of Species by means of Natural Selection.* 2. *Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex.* By CHARLES DARWIN, A.M., F.R.S., &c. New York: 1872.

We proved, in our review of Sir John Lubbock's theory, that man did not begin and could not have begun in utter barbarism, and that the savage is the degenerate, not the primitive man; for man, when deprived both of foreign and supernatural assistance, either deteriorates or remains stationary. We will only add here, that progress is motion forward, if taken literally, and is, if taken figuratively, an advance from the imperfect towards the perfect, and necessarily demands a principle or a beginning, a medium, and an end, none of which can be asserted without the supposition of the Creator, who in his creative act is at once all three. You must have a starting-point from which progress moves, an end towards which it moves, and a medium in and by which it moves. These three things are essential, and without them progress is inconceivable: and these three are all independent of the progressive subject. There can, then, be no progress without God as its first and last cause, and the divine creative act as its medium, and even then progress only in the line of the specific nature of the progressive subject, whether man or animal. The transformation of one species into another, no matter by what means, would not be progress, but the destruction of one species and the production of another, a higher species if you will, but not the progressive development of a lower species.

Herbert Spencer's doctrine of evolution is open to the same objection. In all evolution there must be motion, and then somewhere a starting-point, an evolving subject, and a medium of evolution, for there can be no motion, unless we have forgot our mechanics, without a first mover at rest. Herbert Spencer denies creation, or a creator distinct from the cosmos. He must then assume the cosmos is self-existent, eternal, then immovable, immutable, and consequently incapable of evolving any existences or forms of existence not eternal in itself. The cosmos, instead of being in a state of ceaseless flux and réflux, as old Heraclitus taught, and as Mr. Spencer holds, would be at rest and immovable, both as a whole and in all its parts. There could then be no change of phenomena any more than of substance, no new combination of matter, motion, and force, no alterations of concentration and dispersion of forces. All the forms and phenomena of the cosmos must be absolutely unchangeable and eternal as the cosmos itself. Consequently there could be no evolution, for evolution necessarily implies change of some sort, and change of no sort is admissible. If the cos-

mos is not created by God, who is distinct from the cosmos, it is eternal and, if eternal, no change of any sort is admissible in it, as theologians tell us, none is admissible in God. The theory of evolution, like the modern theory of progress, is untenable, and must be dismissed.

Yet, without assuming one or the other of these theories, Mr. Darwin cannot assert his origin of species by means of natural selection, or by any other means, except that of creation, which it is his purpose to avoid; and what is worse if he accepts either, he is still unable to assert his theory, for the evolution theory denies all change, and the origination of any new forms; and progress is predicable only of the specific subject in the line of its own specific nature. We have read Mr. Darwin's books with some care, and, though not an absolute stranger to the subjects he treats, or to the facts he narrates, we are a little surprised that even a professed scientist could put forth such a mass of unwarranted inductions and unfounded conjectures as science. Not one nor all of the facts he adduces, prove that species originate in natural or artificial selection. In all his inductions he is obliged to assume the progress of the species as the principle of his induction, while he ought to know that the assumption of the progress of the species negatives the origin of species in selection. But, and this is fatal to his theory, he nowhere adduces a single fact that proves the species is progressive, or a single instance in which a lower species by its struggles for life, as he pretends, approaches a higher species, or in which the individuals of a lower species lose any of the characteristics of their species, and acquire those of a higher or a different species.

The theory of natural selection assumes the Malthusian principle, that population has a tendency to outrun the means of subsistence, and applies the principle to every species, vegetable, animal, and human. Hence, follows with individuals of every species a struggle for life, in which the weaker go to the wall, and only the stronger survive. Well, be it so; what then? Why, these the stronger individuals give rise, or the struggle for life, in which only the stronger survive, going on for a long series of ages, gives birth to a new and higher species. Is it so? What is the proof? We have found no proof of it, and Mr. Darwin offers no proof of it. Because only the stronger survive, it by no means follows that these in any series of ages give rise to a new and distinct species, that these stronger individuals

acquire any new characteristics, or that they lose any of the characteristics of their original species.

The gardener knows that plants and flowers are affected by climate, soil, and cultivation; but he knows also that the changes or improvements produced in this way, if they give rise to new varieties in the same species, do not, so far as known, give rise to a new species. Mr. Darwin compares domestic animals with what he assumes to be wild animals of the same original species, or the species from which he assumes they have descended. But this proves nothing to his purpose; for it is impossible for him to say which is the primitive, which the derivative, whether the domestic races have sprung from the wild, or the wild from the domestic, or whether the differences noted are the result of development of the primitive type, or of reversion to it. The assumption that the domestic races have been tamed, or domesticated from the wild, is a mere assumption of which there is no historical or scientific evidence: at least Mr. Darwin adduces none. There is no authority for assuming that the domestic goose has sprung from the wild goose. Why not say the wild goose has sprung from the domestic goose? The wild duck from the tame duck? The wild boar from the domestic pig? Some naturalists contend that the several varieties of the dog family have descended from the wolf, the fox, and the jackal; but supposing them to be only varieties of the same species, of which we are not assured, why not make the dog primitive, and the wolf, fox, and jackal derivative? There are no known facts in the case that render it necessary to suppose them, rather than the dog, the parent stock of the whole species. Indeed, scientists have no criterion by which they can determine whether the tame variety or the wild represents the primitive type, and their only reason is the assumption, that all species begin at the lowest round of the ladder, and reach their perfect state only by progressive development. But this is a perfectly gratuitous assumption. Mr. Darwin adduces no facts that prove it.

So far as there are any known facts or certain principles in the case, species are immutable, and their only development is in the explication of individuals. So far as our scientists have any knowledge on the subject, there is no progress of species. Individuals may find a more or less favorable medium, and vary from one another, but the specific type remains always the same as long as it remains

at all, and is reproduced essentially unaltered in each new generation. It is even doubtful if abnormal types are ever really transmitted by natural generation. Cardinal Wiseman inclines to believe they are, at least to some extent. We doubt it, and explain the facts which seem to favor it, by the continued presence and activity of the causes which first originated them. There are monstrous births, but they are not perpetuated. The cardinal mentions a family with six fingers on each hand and six toes on each foot, and we have ourselves known at least one six-fingered and six-toed individual, but, if perpetuated through three generations, as the cardinal asserts, there did not arise from the family a distinct variety in the human species; and, in the case that came under our own observation, neither the parents of the man nor his children had more than the normal number of fingers and toes. In any case, after two or three generations, if reproductive, the abnormal individuals revert to the original type. The breed may be crossed, but not permanently improved by crossing. The crossing, as every herdsman or shepherd knows, must be kept up, or the hybrid, after a few generations, eliminates the weaker and reverts to the stronger of the original types.

There is no evidence, as we have already said, of the progress of the species. The sponge to-day does not differ from the sponge of four thousand years ago; and if the wild peach of Persia is poisonous, our cultivated peach, the fruit of which is so delicious, if neglected and suffered to become wild, would most likely, under the same conditions of climate and soil, become as poisonous as is the Persian wild peach: thereby proving that, whatever the effects of cultivation or changes of its habitat, the species remains always unchanged. Even in the cultivated peach traces of its original poisonous qualities are found, if not in its pulp, at least in its *meat*, of which it is unsafe for any to partake largely, unless proof against prussic acid. The florist produces, by culture and proper adjustment of soil, great and striking changes in the size, color, and beauty of many varieties and species of flowers, all of which, if neglected and suffered to run wild, revert, after a while, to their original type, which neither natural nor artificial selection alters or impairs.

Then the survival of the strongest, in the struggle for life, does not affect the species, far less originate a new species. There is no evidence that the rat is more intelligent to-day than was the rat any number of centuries ago,

although, according to Mr. Darwin, we must suppose only the strongest have survived, and the process of natural selection has been constantly going on. The bee constructs her cell, and the beaver his house and dam, not otherwise nor more perfectly than did either at the remotest period in which man has observed the habits of either. Wheat grown from grains deposited in Egyptian mummies three thousand years ago, is as perfect as that which is grown from the seed subject to three thousand years of additional culture and struggle for life.

These observations, which might be indefinitely extended prove that, whatever effect natural or artificial selection may have on individuals of the species, it has none on the species itself, and in no case originates, so far as human observation goes, a new species. Consequently all the facts and arguments Mr. Darwin adduces in support of his theory of the descent of man from the ape, or to prove the species *ape* by natural selection has generated or developed the species *man*, count for nothing. If no instance can be adduced of the development of a new species by natural selection, and no instance of the progress of a lower species towards a higher, there is and can be no proof that man has originated in a lower species. All the analogies between man and the lower animals, physical or intellectual, adduced by Mr. Darwin, prove simply nothing to the purpose. It was in bygone days a favorite theory with us, as it perhaps still is with many others, that man, while he is something more, is also the *résumé* of the whole lower creation, or of all orders of existences below him. When we were engrossed with the study of the comparative anatomy and physiology of the brain, we conjectured that there is a just gradation in its convolutions and relative size, from the lowest animal that has a brain distinct from mere ganglia, up to man. We regarded man, in fact, as including in himself, in his physical and animal nature, the elements of the entire creation below him, and hence rightly named its lord. So that our Lord, in assuming human nature, a human soul and a human body, assumed the elements of the entire cosmos, and, in redeeming man, redeemed the whole lower creation and delivered the earth itself, which had been cursed for man's sake, from bondage. In being made flesh and redeeming the body, he redeemed all animal and material nature, which returns to God as its last end in man for whom this lower world was made, and over which

he received the dominion from his and its Maker. But we never saw in this any evidence that man had been developed from the world below him, or that any animal race by transformation had become man. Supposing the gradation assumed, which we are rather inclined to accept even yet, it by no means follows that the higher grade is in any case the development of the next grade below. Indeed it cannot be, for development of any grade or species can only unfold or bring out what is already in it, or what it contains wrapped up, enveloped, or unexplicated. Therefore its development cannot carry it out of itself, or lift it to the grade next above it. The superior grade is a superior grade by virtue of something which it has that the highest inferior grade has not, and therefore is not and cannot be developed from it.

Say what you will, the ape is not a man; nor, as far as our observations or investigations can go, is the ape, the gorilla, or any other variety of the monkey tribe, the animal that approaches nearest to man. The rat, the beaver, the horse, the pig, the raven, the elephant surpass the monkey in intelligence, if it be intelligence, and not simply instinct; and the dog is certainly far ahead of the monkey in moral qualities, in affection for his master and fidelity to him, and so is the horse when kindly treated. But let this pass. There is that, call it what you will, in man, which is not in the ape. Man is two-footed and two-handed; the ape is four-handed, or, if you choose to call the extremity of his limbs feet, four-footed. In fact, he has neither a human hand nor a human foot, and, anatomically considered, differs hardly less from man than does the dog or the horse. I have never been able to discover in any of the simian tribe a single human quality. As to physical structure, there is some resemblance. Zoölogists tell us traces of the same original type may be found running through the whole animal world; and, therefore, the near approach of the ape to the human form counts for nothing in this argument. But here is the point we make; namely, the *differentia* of man, not being in the ape, cannot be obtained from the ape by development.

This sufficiently refutes Darwin's whole theory. He does not prove the origin of new species either by natural or artificial selection; and, not having done that, he adduces nothing that does or can warrant the induction, that the human species is developed from the quadrumanic or any other species. In reading Mr. Darwin's books before us,

while we acknowledge the vast accumulation of facts in the natural history of man and animals, we have been struck with the feebleness of his reasoning powers. He does not seem to possess, certainly does not use, the simplest elements of the logical understanding, and apparently has no conception of what is or is not proof. He does not know how to reduce his facts to their principles, and never, so far as we have been able to discover, contemplates them in the light of the principles on which they depend; but looks at them only in the light of his own theories, which they as often contradict as favor. Patient as an observer, he is utterly imbecile as a scientific reasoner. Two-thirds of his work on the "Descent of Man" is taken up with what he calls *Sexual Selection*. Many of the facts and details are curious, and neither uninteresting nor uninstructive to the student of the natural history of beasts, birds, fishes, reptiles, and insects, or even of man; but, as far as we can see, they prove nothing in favor of his theory of the origin of species by means of natural selection, nor of his theory of the descent of man from the ape or any other animal. We could concede all his alleged facts, and deny *in toto* his theory. Some of them we might be unable to explain, as for instance, the mammæ of the male; but we could explain them no better with than without his theory.

Mr. Darwin, though his theory is not original with him, and we were familiar with it even in our youth, overlooks the fact that it denies the doctrine of the creation and immutability of species, as taught in *Genesis*, where we read that God said: "Let the earth bring forth the green herb, and such as may seed, and the fruit tree yielding fruit *after its kind*, which may have seed in itself upon the earth. And it was so done." "And God created the great whales and every living and moving creature which the waters brought forth, *according to their kinds*, and every winged fowl according *to its kind*." "And God made the beasts of the earth according *to their kinds*, and cattle, and every thing that creepeth on the earth." Genesis i, 11, 21, 25. Now this doctrine, the doctrine of the whole Christian world, and which stands directly opposed to Mr. Darwin's theory, is, as say the lawyers, in possession, and therefore to be held as true till the contrary is proved. It is not enough, then, for Mr. Darwin to set forth his theory and ask us as Christians, as believers in *Genesis*, to accept it, unless able to disprove it; nor is it enough for him even to prove that it *may*

be true. The *onus probandi* is on him who arraigns the faith and convictions of the Christian world, which are the faith and convictions of enlightened and living mankind. He must prove his theory not only *may* be, but *is*, true, and prove it with scientific or apodictic certainty, for only by so doing can he oust the Christian doctrine from its possession, or overcome the presumption in its favor; and till he has ousted and made away with that doctrine, his theory cannot be legally or logically entertained even as a probable hypothesis. This he hardly pretends to have done. As far as we can discover, he does not claim apodictic certainty for his theory, or profess to set it forth for any thing more than a probable hypothesis, which he leaves us to suspect he hardly believes himself. But in the present case he must prove it to be true and indubitable, or he has no right to publish it at all, not even as probable; for probable it is not, so long as it is not certain that the Christian doctrine in possession is false.

This principle, which is the principle both of ethics and logic, is disregarded by nearly the whole herd of contemporary scientists. They make a point of ignoring Christianity, and proceed as if they were perfectly free to put forth as science any number of theories, hypotheses, conjectures, guesses, which directly contradict it, as if they were under no obligation to consult the universal faith of mankind; and theories too, not one of which, even if plausible, is proved to be true, or deserving the name of science. We by no means contend that the general belief of mankind, or the *consensus hominum*, is in itself an infallible criterion of truth; but we do maintain that it is, as the lawyers say, *prima facie* evidence, or a vehement presumption of truth, and that no man has the moral right to publish any opinions, or uncertain theories or hypotheses, that are opposed to it. It can be overruled only by science that is science, by the truth that is demonstrated to be truth, and which cannot be gainsaid. He who assails it may plead the truth, if he has it, in justification; but not an uncertain opinion, not an unproved theory, or an unverified hypothesis, however plausible or even probable it may appear to himself. Sincerity, or firmness of conviction on the part of the defenders of the adverse theory or hypothesis, is no justification, no excuse even; and no one has any right to assail or contradict the Christian faith, unless he has infallible authority for the truth of what he alleges in opposition to it. And this no scientist has or can have.

We respect science and bow to its authority, if it really be science; but the theories, hypotheses, and even the inductions of the scientists from the few facts they have observed, are not science, are at best only unverified opinions. Induction is simply generalization, and cannot of itself give any thing beyond the simple facts generalized. It can only attain to what scientists call a law, which is itself only a fact, not a principle. We can never attain the principle by induction, because without it no valid induction is possible, any more than there is a valid conclusion without a *medius terminus*. Without the principle of causality no induction is possible, and this principle is either falsified or denied by all professed scientists with whom we have any acquaintance. We therefore treat as uncertain all their inductions and theories so insolently put forth as science, whenever they go beyond the sphere in which they can be brought to a crucial test and practically verified: and such are all those which oppose the doctrines of divine revelation, as believed and taught by the Holy Scriptures and the church of God.

Men are as morally responsible for the opinions they publish as they are for any of their deeds; and no man has the moral right to publish any thing that he knows to be false, or any thing against Christianity that he does not know to be absolutely true and unquestionable. We say nothing of a man's opinions, so long as he keeps them to himself, for we know nothing of them; they are matters between his own conscience and his sovereign judge, and society can take no cognizance of them. But when a man publishes his opinions, he performs an act,—an act for which he should be held responsible in the exterior court as well as in the interior, as much as for any other act he performs. If he has not an infallible authority for his opinion, and if it is an opinion against Christian dogma or morals, he commits by publishing it a grave offence against society, whether the civil law takes cognizance of it or not. It is no excuse that he sincerely believes it, or that it is his own honest opinion, so long as he does not know it to be true, or has not infallible authority for asserting it. False or erroneous opinions, if published, are not harmless things. He who leads us into error, who robs us of the truth, or of our Christian faith, harms us more than he who picks our pocket, and commits a greater outrage on society than he who takes the life of a brother.

We are discussing the question from the point of view of ethics, not from the point of view of the civil law, though

we utterly repudiate the doctrine, that every man is and should be free to form and publish his own opinions whatever their character, and that he can do so without committing any offence against society. We utterly repudiate the doctrine, that no one is morally or socially responsible for the opinions he forms and publishes. But, where society has no infallible authority to determine what is true and what is not, what is and what is not the law of God, or the truth God has revealed and commanded us to believe, it has no right to punish any one for opinion's sake; for it can act only on opinion, and, therefore, on no higher authority than that of the opinions it punishes. What is called freedom of opinion and of publication, or, briefly, the freedom of the press, although incompatible with the rights of truth, and the safety of society, as our own experience proves, must be protected, because modern society, by rejecting the infallible authority of the church of God, has deprived itself of all right to discriminate in matters of opinion, and therefore of the right even of self-protection. The fact is, society, uninstructed by an authority that cannot err, is incompetent to deal with opinions, or to impose any restrictions on their publication; but we cannot so far stultify ourselves as to pretend that this is not an evil, or to maintain with Milton and our own Jefferson, that "error is harmless where truth is free to combat it." "Error," says the Chinese proverb, "will make the circuit of the globe while Truth is pulling on her boots." The modern doctrine is based on the assumption that truth is not ascertainable, is only an opinion.

But from the point of view of morals, or tried by a rigidly ethical standard, such scientists as Darwin, Sir Charles Lyell, Sir John Lubbock, Taine, Büchner, Professor Huxley, Herbert Spencer, and others of the same genus, who publish opinions, theories, hypotheses, which are at best only plausible conjectures under the imposing name of science, and which unsettle men's minds, bewilder the half-learned, mislead the ignorant, undermine the very bases of society, and assail the whole moral order of the universe, are fearfully guilty, and a thousand times more dangerous to society and greater criminals even than your most noted thieves, robbers, burglars, swindlers, murderers, or midnight assassins. Instead of being held in honor, fêted, and lauded as the great men of their age and country, and held up as the benefactors of their race, they richly deserve that public opinion should brand them with infamy as the enemies of

God and man, of religion and society, of truth and justice, of science and civilization. They are such men as, if we followed the injunction of St. John, the apostle of love, we should refuse to receive into our houses, or even to bid good-day: *Si quis venit ad vos, et hanc doctrinam non affert, nolite recipere eum in domum, nec* AVE *dixeritis.*—2 John, 10.

We are thus severe against these men, not because we are narrow-minded and bigoted, not because we have an overweening confidence in our own opinions or hold them to be the measure of the true and the good, nor because we dislike science that is science, or dread its light; but because they do not give us science, but their own opinions and speculations, which they can neither know nor prove to be true, and which we know cannot be true, unless the religion of Christ is false, God is not, and heaven and earth a lie. We condemn them, because the truth condemns them; because, instead of shedding light on the glorious works of the Creator, they shed darkness over them, and obscure their fair face with the thick smoke that ascends at their bidding from the bottomless pit of their ignorance and presumption. Their science is an illusion with which Satan mocks them, deludes and destroys souls for whom Christ has died, and it comes under the head of the endless "genealogies" and "vain philosophy," against which St. Paul so solemnly warns us. It is high time that they be stript of their prestige, and be treated with the contempt they deserve for their impudent pretension, and be held in the horror which all men should feel for the enemies of truth, and whose labors tend only to the extinction of civilization, the abasement of intelligence, to fix the affections on the earth, to blunt the sense of moral obligation, and to make society what we see it every day becoming. They are Satan's most efficient ministers.

TRUE AND FALSE SCIENCE.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for July, 1873.]

We have paid our respects to the professed scientists in our brief article on Darwin's "Theory of the Origin of Species and the Descent of Man," but our attention has been called further to their method and the unscientific character of their theories or pretended science, by the address of Parke Godwin, Esq., at the banquet at Delmonico's, the criticism on it in the *Popular Science Monthly*, and Mr. Godwin's remarkable letter in explanation and vindication of the address, published in the same periodical for May last. We cannot accept either Mr. Godwin's address or his letter without some reserves; but he showed, what no other of the gentlemen did who spoke at the banquet, that without the science of principles, the science of the finite and phenomenal of facts, can be only a sham science.

Mr. Godwin is not a professed scientist, but he is probably as well versed in real science as any of the gentlemen present at the banquet, unless certain specialties are to be excepted; and he has, what none of them seems to have in the slightest degree, a philosophical genius, liberal philosophical culture, and no little philosophical knowledge. He understands, what the mere scientists do not, that the inductive method demands principles as the condition of conducting the investigator to real science, and that the principles, on which the validity of the induction depends, are not obtainable by induction. He sees that the inductive

*1. *Proceedings at the Farewell Banquet to Professor Tyndall. Given at Delmonico's*: New York. February 4, 1873.

2. *Popular Science Monthly.* Conducted by E L. Youmans. May, 1873.

3. *On the Genesis of Species.* By St. George Mivart, F. R. S. New York: 1873.

4. *The Catholic World.* New York: May, 1873.

5. *First Principles of a new System of Philosophy.* By Herbert Spencer. New York: 1871.

6. *The Correlation and Conservation of Forces.* A series of Expositions by Prof. Grove, Prof. Helmholtz, Dr. Mayer, Dr. Faraday, Prof. Liebig, and Dr. Carpenter. With an Introduction and brief Biographical Notices of the chief promoters of the New Views. By Edward L. Youmans, M. D. New York: 1873.

method enables us only to classify and generalize phenomena, and that the simple classification and generalization of phenomena is not science. This is the sense of what he says in his letter in vindication of his address, as we think the following extract, if attentively read, will amply prove. After dwelling on the grand results achieved, or to be achieved, by science, Mr. Godwin proceeds:—

"But then I said—and it was the whole purport of my speech, made in the interests of science as well as religion—that we can only expect these results from true science, which investigates what Nature really *is*, and not from a hasty and presumptuous science, which pretends to give us what Nature *may be supposed to be*. And my criterion of true science, suggested in a phrase, was, that the methods and results of it bear the impress of exactitude or certainty. You remark, as if you did not receive these simple and fundamental principles, that the "exact sciences" are exact, while others are not. There I think we differ, or misunderstand each other. I am aware that none of the sciences are exact in the mathematical sense of the word, save the ideal or abstract sciences; but it is none the less true that the real or concrete sciences are exact, in the usual sense of the word, both in their methods and products. If they are not exact, where does the inexactness come in? In the observation of facts? Then the induction is vitiated. In the induction itself? Then the law arrived at is imperfect. In the deductive verification or proof? Then we have no reason for trusting our process. Biology, psychology, and sociology, you say, are sciences and certain sciences; to which my reply is, that, to the extent in which they are not precise, they are not sciences. Indeed, saving in a popular and convenient sense, I should be disposed to doubt whether they are yet to be ranked as more than inchoate sciences. They belong to the domain of science, have gathered some of the richest materials for science, and have attained to some extent a scientific value; but there is yet so much uncertainty hanging over broad regions in each, that we must await the future for the resolution of many unresolved questions, which may give a new aspect to the whole. Biology is the most advanced, but rather in its natural history and classification, than in its knowledge of the profounder laws of life, that are yet to be found. Psychology is so little of a science, that the teachers of it hardly agree on the fundamental points; or, if it be a science, whose exposition of it are we to accept, Sir William Hamilton's or Mr. Mill's, Herbert Spencer's or Dr. Porter's, who all profess to be experimental and inductive, and all disagree? As to sociology, the name for which was invented only a few years since by Comte, it is still in a chaotic condition; and, unless Mr. Spencer, whose few introductory chapters are alone made public, succeeds in giving it consistency and form, it can hardly be called more than a hope. But, be the truth what it may, in respect to these particular branches of knowledge,

I still insist that certainty is the criterion of true science, and that, if we give that criterion up, science loses its authority, its prestige, its assurance of march, and its position as an arbiter in the varying struggles of doctrine.

"Well, then the examples I gave, without mentioning names, of what I considered false science, were, first, the gross materialism of Büchner, who derives all the phenomena of life from simple combinations of matter and force; second, the atheism of Comte, whose scientific pretensions Mr. Huxley ridicules, and whose results Mr. Spencer impugns; third, the identification of mind and motion by Mr. Taine, which Tyndall, in one of his most eloquent passages, says explains nothing, and is, moreover, utterly "unthinkable;" and, fourthly, Mr. Spencer's evolutionism, which, in spite of the marvellous ingenuity and information with which it is wrought out, seems to me, after no little study, as it does to others more capable than I am of forming a judgment, after greater study, to be full of unsupported assumptions, logical inconsistencies, and explanations that explain nothing, while in its general character it tends to the sheerest naturalism. Now, was I right or wrong in regarding these systems as speculative merely, and not scientific? Am I to infer, from your objections to my remarks, that *The Popular Science Monthly* holds materialism, atheism, and naturalism to be the legitimate outcome of science? Else why am I arraigned for designating them as unworthy of science, and as having no rightful claims to the name, under which their deplorable conclusions are commended to the public?

"My object in these allusions was to indicate two capital distinctions, which it is always important to keep in view when estimating the scientific validity of a doctrine. The first is, that many questions determinable by science are not yet determined by it; and, until they are so determined, are to be regarded only as conjectural opinions, more or less pertinent or impertinent. Of this sort I hold the Nebular, the Darwinian, and the Spencerian views to be, i. e., hypotheses entirely within the domain of scientific theory, and capable, to a certain extent, of explaining the phenomena to which they refer; highly plausible and probable even at the first glance; but disputed by good authority, and not at all so verified as to be admissible into the rank of accredited science. They are suppositions to which the mind resorts to help it in the reduction of certain appearances of Nature to a general law; and, as such, they may be simple, ingenious, and even beautiful; but thus far they are no more than suppositions not proved, and therefore not entitled to the authority of scientific truth. You are probably too familiar with the history of scientific effort—which, like the history of many other kinds of intellectual effort, is a history of human error—not to know that, while hypothesis is an indispensable part of good method, it is also the part most liable to error. The records of astronomical, of geological, of physical, of chemical, and of biological research, are strewn with the *débris* of

abandoned systems, all of which once had their vogue, but none of which now survive, and many of which are hardly remembered. Recall for a moment the Ptolemaic cycles and epicycles; recall Kepler's nineteen different hypotheses, invented and discarded, before he found the true orbital motion of Mars; recall in geology Werner and Hutton, and the Plutonians and the Neptunians, superseded by the uniformitarians and the catastrophists, and now giving place to the evolutionists; recall in physics the many imponderable fluids, including Lamark's resonant fluid, that were held to be as real as the rocks only a few years ago; recall in chemistry, not to mention the alchemists and phlogistion, a dozen different modes of accounting for molecular action; recall in biology the animists and the vitalists, the devotees of plastic forces, of archei, of organizing ideas, and of central monads, all of them now deemed purely gratuitous assumptions that explained nothing, though put forth as science.

"Even in regard to the question, so much discussed at present, of the gradual progression and harmony of being, the old monadology of Leibnitz, which endowed the ultimate units with varying doses of passion, consciousness, and spontaneity, and which built up the more complex structures and functions of organisms, from the combination of these,—this theory, I say, somewhat modified and stripped of its mere metaphysical phases, could be made quite as rational and satisfactory as the more modern doctrines of development. Indeed, some eminent French *philosophs*—Renouvier, a first-class thinker, among the rest—have gone back to this notion; Darwin's suggestion of pangenesis, and Mr. Spencer's physiological units, look towards it; and its adherents maintain that, beset with difficulties as it is, though not more so than others, it has yet this merit, that it leaves a way open to speculative thought, alike removed from the vagaries of mere ontological abstraction and the entire subjection of mind to a muddy and brute extraction. They might add, also, that this theory shows that, in the interpretation of the serial progress of being, we are not altogether shut up to a choice between specific and spasmodic creations, and his own theory of evolution, as Mr. Spencer triumphantly assumes throughout his argument. Indeed, nothing is more easy than to make theories; but the difficulty is to get them adopted into Nature as the satisfactory reason of her processes. But, until they are so adopted, they are no more than the scaffolding of science—by no means the completed structure. Now, have the Darwinian and Spencerian hypotheses been so adopted? Can we say that any questions on which such cautious observers and life-long students as Darwin, Owen, Huxley, Wallace, and Agassiz, still debate, are settled questions? Prof. Tyndall, for example, says: 'Darwin draws heavily upon the scientific tolerance of the age;' and again, that 'those who hold the doctrine of evolution are by no means ignorant of the uncertainty of their data, and they yield no more to it than a provisional assent.' With what propriety, then, can a merely provisional conclusion be erected in-

to an assured stand-point whence to assail traditionary beliefs as if they were old wives' fables?

"More than that, a theory may be far more advanced than any of those; may be able to account satisfactorily for all the phenomena within its reach, as the Ptolemaic theory of the sidereal appearances did, even to the prediction of eclipses, or as the emanation theory of light did, up to the time of Dr. Young, and yet turn out altogether baseless. Nature is a prodigious quantity and a prodigious force; with all her outward uniformities, she is often more cunning than the Sphinx; and, like Emerson's Brahma, she may declare to her students—

'They know not well the subtle ways
I keep and pass and turn again.'

We have looked into her face a little, measured some of her ellipses and angles, weighed her gases and dusts, and unveiled certain forces far and near—all which are glorious things to have done, and some of them seemingly miraculous; but we are still only in her outer courts. Humboldt's 'Cosmos,' written thirty years ago, is said to be already an antiquated book; and Comte, who died but lately, and whom these eyes of mine have seen, could hardly pass a college examination in the sciences he was supposed to have classified for ever. Let us not be too confident, then, that our little systems of natural law will not, like other systems of thought spoken of by Tennyson, 'have their day.'

"The other distinction I had in mind, in my speech, was that, while there are some problems accessible to scientific methods, there are others that are not; and that any proffered scientific solution of the latter, either negative or affirmative, is most likely an imposition. What I meant was that science, according to its own confession, that is, according to the teachings of its most accredited organs, pretends to no other function than to the ascertainment of the actual phenomena of Nature and their constant relations. The sphere of the finite and the relative, i. e., of existence, not of essence, and of existence in its mutual and manifested dependencies in time and space, not in its absolute grounds, circumscribes and exhausts its jurisdiction. Was I wrongly taught, Mr. Editor? Does science assert for itself higher and broader pretensions? Does it propose to penetrate the supernatural or metaphysical realms, if there be any such? Does it intend to apply its instruments to the measurement of the infinite, and its crucibles to the decomposition of the absolute?

"You as a man of excellent sense, will promptly answer, No! But, then, I ask, is thought, whose expatiations are so restless and irrepressible, to be for ever shut up to the phenomenal and relative? Is it to be for ever stifled under a bushel-measure, or tied by the legs with a surveyor's chain? May it not make excursions into the field of the Probable, and solace itself with moral assurance when physical certainties fail? May it not, mounting the winged horse of analogy, when the

good old drudge horse induction gives out, fly through tracts of space and time, not yet laid down on the map? May not some men have insights into the workings of laws yet unexplored, such as Mozart had into the laws of music, and Shakespeare into the laws of the human heart? Assuredly you cannot say nay, in the name of science, which, as we agree, being confined to the phenomenal and relative, has no right to pronounce either one way or the other, as to what, by supposition, lies beyond the phenomenal and relative. That supposed beyond may be wholly chimerical; but it is not from science that we shall learn the fact, if it be a fact. In other words, I contend—and here I hit upon the prime fallacy of many *soi-disant* scientists—that science has no right to erect *what it does contain into a negation of every thing which it does not contain.* Still less has it a right to decide questions out of its confessed province, because it cannot reach them by its peculiar methods, or subject them to its peculiar tests.

"Fortunately for me, though you take me especially to task for it, I am sustained in this position by some of the most eminent men of science of the day, and, I may say, by great numbers of them, as I have reason to know. You yourself published, only a little while since, Dr. Carpenter's address, as President, to the British Association for the Advancement of Science, in which, after expounding very clearly man's rightful function as the 'interpreter of Nature,' he said: 'The science of modern times, however, has taken a more special direction. Fixing its attention exclusively on the order of Nature, it has separated itself wholly from theology, whose function it is to seek after its cause. . . . But, when science, passing beyond its own limits, assumes to take the place of theology, and sets up its own conception of the order of Nature as a sufficient account of its cause, it is invading a province of thought to which it has no claim, and not unreasonably provokes the hostility of those who ought to be its best friends.'

"In the same number you published Dr. Gray's address, as President of the American Association, wherein, after quoting Miss Cobbe's remark, that 'it is a singular fact, that when we find out how any thing is done, our first conclusion is, that God did not do it,' he adds that such a conclusion is 'premature, unworthy, and deplorable,' and concludes with the hope 'that, in the future, even more than in the past, faith in an order which is the basis of science will not (as it cannot be reasonably) be dissevered from faith in an ordainer which is the basis of religion. And my old friend, and honored teacher, Dr. Henry, from whose enthusiasm for natural studies I imbibed whatever taste for them I have retained, in a letter addressed to this Tyndall banquet, and published in your last number, wrote: 'While we have endeavored to show that abstract science is entitled to high appreciation and liberal support, we do not claim for it the power of solving questions belonging to other realms of thought. . . . Much harm has been done by the antagonism which has sometimes arisen between the expounders of science on the

one hand, and those of theology on the other, and we would deprecate the tendency which exhibits itself in certain minds to foster feelings antagonistic to the researches into the phenomena of Nature, for fear they should disprove the interpretations of Holy Writ made long before the revelations of physical science, which might serve for a better exegesis of what has been revealed; and also the tendency in other minds to transcend the known, and to pronounce dogmatically as to the possibility of modes of existence on which physical research has not thrown, and we think never can throw, positive light.' Now, here is precisely, though not all, my meaning, and yet you rap me over the knuckles for it, while you publish the praises of Carpenter, Gray, and Henry.

"All these illustrious men admit the limits of Science, and also the possibility of passing beyond them. As men of good common-sense, and no less as philosophers and scientists, they are perfectly aware that, while the scope of Science lies within the contents of experience, and of the inductions drawn from that experience, it is hazarding the character of it to go further. They feel too, no doubt, what I certainly do, that there are certain broad, deep, ineradicable instincts of the human mind, which, however they originated, whether implanted there by creative act, or formed by the slow growth of thousands of years, are now become the inexpugnable basis of all human credence and all human action. The convictions of the reality of Nature, of the independence of Mind, and of the being and authorship of God, in spite of every effort of Philosophy to get rid of them, either by declaring them unthinkable, or by merging one in the other, always return *as the final no less than the initial postulates of thought.* Any scheme of the universe, therefore, which leaves any of them out, declares itself impotent, like the project of an edifice which makes no provisions for the corner-stones. Innumerable such schemes have gone before, and floated as bubbles for a while, but the first touch of these Realities broke them into thin air.

"What the relations of these grand primal factors of the problem of existence are, or how they are to be harmonized with each other, we do not know; perhaps we never shall know; but I think we shall learn more and more of them, and, in due time, by the instrumentalities that are given us. We shall learn of Nature, and of Man, so far as he is a dependent and denizen of Nature by that digesting of experience which is the peculiar work of science. We shall learn of Man, so far as he has a deeper spring of life than observation reaches, from its wellings-up into consciousness at those rare moments of insight which often seem so mysterious; and we shall learn of God through both; i.e., as he works with the stupendous forces of time and space, which symbolize him, and as he inspires our feeble loves and wisdoms, which are no less symbols of him, with an intenser sense of his own supernal love and wisdom.

"But we shall learn little of either, if we haughtily and peremptorily

dismiss any of the elements out of the inquiry. Neither Nature nor Man is to be understood without God, nor can God be apprehended by pure intuition alone, or save as he writes his hieroglyphics in objects and events, or imparts new impulses of goodness to the innermost soul. Tyndall, doubtless, caught a glimpse of the inseparableness of these elements when he said, 'The passage from facts to principles is called induction, which, in its highest form is inspiration;' nor was he free from the same overshadowing truth, when, speaking of the possible solution of the ultimate physical problem, he remarks that, when it comes, 'it will be one more of spiritual insight than of observation.' For, if deity [God] be, as it is sometimes said, the Spiritual Sun, the intellectual Light, he may evade scrutiny, as the common light evades vision. It is the condition of vision, 'the light of all our seeing,' in which all objects are seen, though itself unseen. Besides, we know that, even in the common light, there are rays which the physical eyes do not see, which the inward eyes of reason alone behold, but which, if the physical eyes could be made sensitive to their swift pulsations, might disclose, according to Tyndall's exquisite suggestion, a new heaven and a new earth, immediately around us, and 'as far surpassing ours as ours sur passes that of the wallowing reptiles which once held possession of this planet.'"—*Popular Science Monthly*, pp. 106–110.

It is clear enough from this, that the writer holds that the inductive sciences are restricted to the finite and phenomenal, and that it is impossible to rise by induction above the classifications and laws, to principles, causes, or as he says, the "reality of nature, the independence of mind, and the being and authorship of God," which "always return as the *final* no less than the *initial* postulates of thought;" that is to say, no thought, therefore no induction, is possible without them; for surely there is and can be no thought where both its final and initial postulates are wanting. The final and initial postulates of thought, or principles of thought as we call them, Mr. Godwin holds transcend the finite and phenomenal, and therefore the reach of inductive science, and are grasped by "insight," not by observation and induction. Say they are given in intuition, or immediately presented or affirmed, not by, but to, the mind, as the necessary principles of all empirical thought or cognition, and you have what we hold to be the true solution of the fundamental problem of philosophy.

Professor Youmans in *The Popular Science Monthly* says:—

"We quite agree with Mr. Godwin that Science is inexorably shut up in the finite and the phenomenal—the sphere of relation and law; but she must have the liberty of the whole domain. Nor do we think there is

much danger of Science wasting her energies in trying to transcend these bounds, for she has plenty to do to get even partial possession of what confessedly belongs to her. She has won her ground, inch by inch, by hard fighting from the beginning, and even yet it is conceded to her only in name. Everybody will admit that it is the right of Science to inquire into all changes and effects in physical Nature. Yet, for suggesting that a given class of alleged physical effects be inquired into in the same manner as are other effects, Professor Tyndall has been posted through Christendom as a blasphemer. Mr. Godwin yields to Science the realm of the finite and the relative, and in the same breath he speaks of the relations of Mozart to the laws of music, and of Shakespeare to the laws of the human heart, as examples of the transphenomenal. But we thought laws and relations had been made over to Science. No reservation will here be tolerated. Science is providing for its ever-increasing army of research through a long future. Half a thousand years have been spent in getting on the track; another thousand will suffice to get under headway; she stipulates now only for room. Her sphere is the finite, but the nebulosities of ignorance must not be mistaken for the walls of the infinite. If mystics will lose themselves in the tangled recesses of unresolved phenomena, they must expect to be hunted out and have the place reclaimed to order and annexed to the provinces of all-harmonizing law. Nor can any pretext that they are nested in the unapproachable essences and subtleties of being, and ensphered in the absolute, and guarded by cunning sphinxes, avail them. The thing must inexorably be inquired of. It is the destiny of Science to pierce the unknown; if her spear is blunted upon the unknowable, she will of course accept the results of the experiment."—*Popular Science Monthly*, May, 1873, p. 18.

But the scientific professor fails to seize the point in Mr. Godwin's argument, and mistakes as a concession Mr. Godwin's acceptance of the fact asserted by the scientists, as the basis of his argument against the sufficiency of the inductive method alone for genuine science. The scientists contend that science is restricted to the finite and phenomenal, as the inductive sciences certainly are; but if science is restricted to the finite and phenomenal, science is impossible, for the final as well as the initial postulates of thought, given by insight, not obtained by induction, are in an order above the finite and phenomenal. What the professor takes as a concession to the scientists, is, in fact, a very conclusive refutation of what they present as science. If, as you say, science is restricted to the finite and the phenomenal, science is a delusion. There is no science without thought, and no thought without its initial and final postulates, neither of which can be supplied by induction from the finite and phenomenal; for there can be no induction without thought. Consequent-

ly, there can be, *on your own principles*, no science. Such is Mr. Godwin's argument, as we understand it.

The mother error of the scientists is not precisely in their giving us as science, unproved theories or unverified hypotheses, though that they often do; but in their assuming that science is restricted to the field of the finite and phenomenal, and that it can be constructed, without going out of that field, by induction from the finite and phenomenal alone. But this is impossible. The finite and phenomenal are neither cognizable nor cogitable alone, for the conclusive reason that they do not exist alone; and the non-existent is incogitable, and therefore, of course, incognizable. The phenomenal, prescinded from the substance or being that underlies it, or appears in it, is nothing, not even an appearance or a shadow. Finite things are neither self-existent nor self-sufficing, for whatever is self-existent or self-sufficing is independent, necessary, immutable, eternal, and infinite being, and therefore not finite. The finite is then contingent, dependent, and has not the reason, principle, or cause of its existence in itself, consequently is apprehensible only in the apprehension of its relation with the infinite on which it depends. It cannot be known or thought out of that relation, because it does not exist out of that relation; and relation is cognizable only in the cognition of both its terms. To think the finite and phenomenal, Mr. Godwin tells the learned professor very truly, the mind needs as its postulates that which is neither finite nor phenomenal. The professor has fallen, we repeat, into the slight error of mistaking the refutation for a concession. Perhaps he would do well to reexamine Mr. Godwin's argument, and ascertain the principles on which it rests.

The editor of *The Popular Science Monthly* swears by and defends *à outrance*, his *protégé*, Herbert Spencer, whom he has been chiefly instrumental in bringing before the American public; but it is possible, without fully understanding his *New System of Philosophy*. Mr. Spencer in his system divides the cosmos into the Knowable and the Unknowable. In the Knowable, he includes the finite and the phenomenal, or, more accurately, phenomena alone; to the Unknowable, he relegates whatever is back of the phenomenal, that is, being, substance, reality, principles, causes, God, if God there be, creation,—all that Mr. Godwin terms "the final as well as the initial postulates of thought." Yet he gravely tells us that the phenomenal is "unthinkable" with-

out the real or non-phenomenal. What is not thinkable is not knowable; consequently the Knowable is not knowable without cognition of the Unknowable! But as only the phenomenal is knowable, and as that is not knowable without knowing the reality that underlies it, which is unknowable, it would seem to follow that nothing is knowable, and science is impossible,—is, if Herbert Spencer is right, blank ignorance. Professor Youmans has great reason to be proud of his English *protégé*.

If, as Professor Youmans, Herbert Spencer, and most professional scientists maintain, "science is shut up in the finite and phenomenal," Mr. Godwin tells them, they have and can have no science. This is what Professor Youmans misapprehends. Mr. Godwin makes two points against the scientists; 1: They put forth as science, uncertain, unproved, or unverified theories and hypotheses; 2: They confine science to the field of the finite and the phenomenal, the only field in which induction or the inductive method is applicable, and exclude from science the science of principles, without which induction cannot operate, and the inductive sciences cannot be constructed. Mr. Godwin concedes, or asserts rather, that the inductive sciences, which the scientists call science, are shut up within the finite and phenomenal; but he by no means holds that science is so shut up, but asserts the science of principles, which rest on insight, which transcend the finite and phenomenal, and furnish thought both its initial and final postulates. The scientists or inductive philosophers take no note of this science of principles, which does not rest on induction,—this higher science, really the science of sciences, and without which there can be no inductive sciences, since it is precisely on this higher science that the science of the finite and phenomenal depends: as we have explained in our remarks on Professor Bascom's *Science, Philosophy, and Religion*.*

Professor Youmans does not recognize this distinction between the science of principles resting on insight, or intuition, and the science of facts and their laws, constructed by observation and induction. It is a distinction foreign to English philosophy, and is hardly conceivable by the ordinary English or American mind, which applies the Baconian method to the science of principles as well as to the science of facts and their laws; but as that method is really appli-

* Vol. II., p. 448.

cable, as Bacon himself maintained, only in the field of the finite and the phenomenal, it comes, as we find in Sir William Hamilton and the late Dr. Mansel, to restrict science to that field, and either to deny the reality of the world of principles, the subject-matter of the higher science, philosophy properly so-called, or to relegate it to the dark region of the Unknowable. It understands by science only the special sciences of the finite and the phenomenal; and, if it admits any thing beyond, it admits it as a matter of faith, not of science. The outcome of the whole is, as to science, materialism and atheism; the real, the spiritual, the ontological, the ideal, the divine, are banished from science, and admitted, if at all, only as truths of revelation. But the scientists have no right to conclude, from the fact that their science does not extend beyond the finite and phenomenal, either that nothing beyond exists, or that, if any thing beyond does exist, it is unknowable or even unknown. Mr. Godwin says truly, that "science has no right to erect what it does contain into the negation of what it does not contain."

Professor Youmans rejects the thought, that the outcome of the inductive sciences, or the inductive method applied without the principles derived from insight or intuition, and on which both the possibility and scientific validity of the induction depend, is materialism and atheism. He indignantly repels the insinuation. He says:

"Mr. Godwin says: 'Am I to infer from your objections to my remarks that the *Popular Science Monthly* holds materialism, atheism, and naturalism, to be the legitimate outcome of science?' Exactly the contrary. We do not believe that the legitimate outcome of science is materialism or atheism, and our attempt was to show that certain problems and procedures, which Mr. Godwin declared to be spurious science and obnoxious to these charges, were genuine science, and not obnoxious to them. We objected, in order to rescue a portion of science from an aspersive charge to which all science is equally liable, Büchner may be a materialist, and Comte an atheist, and Taine may be both, although it does not follow, because he affirms the correlation of mind with nervous motion, that he is either. What moved us to protest was the gross injustice of branding Mr. Spencer's expositions of the doctrine of Evolution as sham science, and then loading it with the opprobrium which its associations and the argument implied. Of Spencer's system, Mr. Godwin says on his own and higher authority, that it is "full of unsupported assumptions, logical inconsistencies, and explanations which explain nothing, while in its general character it tends to the sheerest naturalism.' We do not deny that it contains defects—it would be, indeed, surprising if

so vast and original a discussion did not; but to say that it is 'full' of the vices alleged, or that they characterize it, is a reckless exaggeration. As a set-off to this opinion, we refer the reader back to page 32, where he will find the latest estimate of Mr. Spencer's philosopy by a man who is an authority upon the question he discusses."—*Ibid.*, p. 119.

Yet, if science is restricted to the finite and phenomenal, as the professor holds, that is, to sensible facts and their laws, by what process can it escape materialism and atheism, and give us as its outcome the exact contrary? Our old logic-master taught us that a conclusion, that concludes beyond what is contained in the premises, does not avail. How from the finite and sensible, that is, the material alone, for premises, conclude the spiritual and the infinite? We know there have been attempts made by very excellent men to prove the existence of God, the spirituality of the soul, and the liberty or free will of man, by the inductive method; but we know, also, that they have not succeeded, because they begin, and are obliged to begin, by assuming, as the medium of proof, the very principle or point to be proved, or, in plain English, by begging the question. We have read Paley, the Bridgewater Treatises, and any number more of works written on the inductive method, to prove the three great fundamental principles of what is called natural religion, have read them as an unbeliever, as a Protestant, and as a Catholic, and always with the feeling that they take for granted the very point to be proved. They all proceed on the supposition that principles, being, cause and effect, or universal and necessary ideas, on which the proof or demonstration of natural theology depends, are obtained by way of induction: which is so far from being true, that no induction, as we have said, is valid or possible without them. We have found in the whole range of English science, philosophy, or literature, no scientific refutation of materialism or atheism, and the decided tendency of all English science is in a materialistic and an atheistic direction. Professor Huxley, indeed, disclaims being a materialist, but only on the ground that he knows neither what matter nor what spirit is; and yet he cannot escape the charge of atheism, for he denies that we have any cognition of the principle of causality, or of any real *nexus* between so-called cause and effect. The protests of some Englishmen are honorable to them, but are unavailing, because they are based on no scientific principle.

The cosmists, or disciples of Herbert Spencer, whose

school Professor Youmans sturdily defends, deny, indeed, that they are atheists. They tell us that the phenomenal is unthinkable without an infinite Being, Reality, or Something, which underlies the phenomena and appears in them, or of which they are phenomena; but this does not help the matter, for this infinite Something is only the substance of which the cosmic phenomena are the appearance, and is therefore only the real cosmos in distinction from the phenomenal cosmos: and besides, they declare this real cosmos to be not only unknown, but unknowable. Professor Fiske, of Harvard college, declares expressly that science—that is, the cosmic theory—is in no condition to prove or disprove a *personal* God, or God distinct from the cosmos or nature. An impersonal God is a blind force, acting from the necessity of its own nature,—is no God at all. Professor Fiske avows it, when he says this infinite Something, from the point of view of religion, may be called God; but from the point of view of science, it is nature. Atheism is not only in saying with the fool, "God is not," but, also, in failing to say with the theist, "God is." He who refuses or fails to recognize or affirm that God is, is just as much an atheist as he who positively denies his existence, for atheist says simply, non-theist. He who denies the supracosmic God, or identifies him with the cosmic substance or reality, is a pantheist, and therefore an atheist, and nothing else.

Professor Fiske confesses that science, if unable to demonstrate that God is not, is equally unable to demonstrate that God is; and his master, Herbert Spencer, confesses the same. Mr Spencer, we grant, does not in just so many words deny that God is, but he recognizes no God, and no necessity of a supracosmic God, Being, or Power, on whom or on which the cosmos is dependent for its existence. He denies creation by a supracosmic power, and declares it "absolutely inconceivable." He finds no place, no office, either for God or his creative act, and attempts to explain the cosmic facts or phenomena by evolution, the correlation of forces, or the continuous process of concentration and dispersion of matter, force, and motion, resolvable into force alone, in which the quantity and direction of force remain always the same. The concentration of force gives us a potato, a cabbage, or a rose; its dispersion and reconcentration give us the phenomenon we call a pig, a donkey, or an ape. Another dispersion and concentration give us the phenomenon we call man. It is, whatever the phenomenon,

the same matter, force, and motion, or rather, the same blind cosmic force, the quantity and direction of which, on the correlation of forces, are always the same. Suppose this theory, virtually that of the flux and reflux of old Heraclitus, reproduced in the recently invented theory of the correlation of forces, and tell us, Professor Youmans, how you contrive to show that its "outcome is the exact contrary of materialism and atheism?" Will you adopt Huxley's subterfuge, and plead ignorance of both matter and spirit? That will hardly help you, for Huxley agrees with Hume in pleading ignorance of any principle of cause and effect, and in denying that science can recognize any *nexus* between them, which excludes God and his creative act from the domain of science: and a science which excludes God and his creative act from its domain, is unquestionably atheistic.

Professor Youmans takes in high dudgeon Mr. Godwin's assertion that the Spencerian theory is only "sham science;" and his declaration, that the theory is "full of unsupported assumptions, logical inconsistencies, and explanations that explain nothing, while in its general character it tends to the sheerest naturalism." This brings us back to Mr. Godwin's first point. The second point controverts the sufficiency of the inductive method of science. This first point, which we have chosen to treat last, asserts that theories, constructed by that method alone, give, as illustrated in the Spencerian theory, only sham or false science. We do not think the professor has any right to take offence, for, to be consistent with himself, he must agree with Mr. Godwin that the Spencerian theory is not genuine science, since he holds, or says he holds, that genuine science leads to the exact contrary of "materialism and atheism." He should then join Mr. Godwin in denouncing it, as well as Darwinism, as a false or pretended science, and as a gross imposition upon honest but unscientific minds.

The professor appears to us to hold that science is not necessarily "exact or certain," and assumes that Mr. Godwin, because he admits that "the Nebular, the Darwinian, and the Spencerian hypotheses are within the domain of scientific theory, and capable, to a certain extent, of explaining the phenomena to which they refer," concedes their legitimacy, and admits them to be genuine science. But he forgets that Mr. Godwin has told him, what every philosopher knows, that a theory may explain *all* the phenomena, at least, all the known phenomena in a given case, and yet

be false; and that an hypothesis, while it remains hypothetic and unverified, is not science, though it may pertain to a field which is open to scientific investigation. Mr. Godwin admits, as we ourselves do, that these hypotheses refer to phenomena, open, in some degree, to scientific inquiry; but he denies, as we deny, that they are science, and because they are not "exact and certain," which all science is and must be, or it is not science. Professor Youmans agrees that they may as yet be inexact and uncertain, but that, nevertheless, they are truly scientific and belong to the domain of science, not simply, as Mr Godwin says, "to the domain of scientific *theory*." When a theory or hypothesis has been verified and become science, it ceases to be a theory or an hypothesis: a fact which seems to have escaped the science of Professor Youmans.

It is precisely here that the quarrel between the scientists and the philosophers and theologians arises. No philosopher, no theologian ever did or ever does object to scientific investigation in the proper field of observation and induction; nor to any science, which really is science. Thus Cardinal Bellarmine, who may be regarded as speaking with authority for both philosophers and theologians, said to Galileo's friend: "Tell your friend to pursue his mathematical studies without meddling with the interpretation of Scripture, and when he has proved his theory, it will then be time enough to consider what changes, if any, in the interpretation of the sacred text will be necessary." The trouble the Florentine experienced grew out of the fact that he insisted, while his heliocentric theory was still only a theory, an unproved hypothesis, on publishing it and having it received as science. In all the cases, in which the scientists complain of having been, or of being, persecuted by philosophers and theologians, or in which they do really encounter opposition from them or the church, it is never for their science or their scientific discoveries; but for publishing as science, theories and hypotheses opposed to the belief of mankind, and in demanding, while they are as yet unproved or unverified, and are only conjectures more or less plausible, that they shall be received as certain, and philosophy, theology, religion, politics, social order, all that has hitherto been held as settled, as true and sacred, shall be altered or modified so as to conform to them. Let their authors pursue their investigations in quiet, and not disturb the public with their hypotheses till they have proved them,

converted them into exact and certain science, and nobody will oppose them; and both the church and society, theologians and philosophers, will accept with gratitude, and generously reward, their patient labors and unwearied investigations. But this is precisely what the Huxleys, the Büchners, the Taines, the Darwins, the Spencers, the Tyndalls refuse to do; and hence they are opposed by all sensible men, not, as they would have the world believe, for their science, but for their lack of science, and their attempt to impose on society as science, what is not science, what has no scientific validity, and springs only from their own delusions or distempered brains. Professor Youmans knows as well as we do, and probably much better then we do, that "the Nebular, the Darwinian, and the Spencerian theories" have nothing like the exactness and certainty of science, and yet he insists on their being received and obeyed as genuine science, and devotes the *Popular Science Monthly* to their propagation and defence.

Professor Youmans is so wrapped up in his *protégé*, Mr. Herbert Spencer, and is so intent on defending him through thick and thin, that he even contends that his system is eminently religious. Thus he says:—

"As to the religious 'tendencies' of the system, although they are charged with being all that is bad, and although the charge would undoubtedly be sustained by a popular vote, we are of opinion that it is bound to be very differently viewed in the future. Mr. Spencer is a profound believer in religion, and at the very threshold of his system he has shown the ultimate harmony of science and faith. Yet he has not tried merely to patch up a transient truce between religion and science; but, foreseeing the intenser conflicts that are inevitable as science advances, he has labored to place their reconciliation upon a basis that no extension of knowledge can disturb. When the method of science is raised to its rightful supremacy in the human mind, and the rule of science is recognized as supreme throughout the sphere of the phenomenal, and when the distractions of theology become unbearable, it will then be found that Mr. Spencer has proved that science, so far from being its destroyer, is itself the promoter of the profoundest faith, while the central truth of all religion is saved to humanity. Malignant zealots will probably continue to secrete their vitriolic criticism, as if stopped, they would probably die of their own acridities; but there are not wanting indications that many religious men of candor and discernment are already recognizing the claims of Mr. Spencer's system upon the serious consideration of their class. For example, a late number of the *Nonconformist*, the organ of the English dissenters, and an orthodox

paper of high influence, says of Spencer: 'He is not an idealist, nor is he a materialist. Like Goethe, he believes that man is not born to solve the problem which the universe presents.' Yet the writer holds his views to be of very great importance, and speaks of it as 'an importance, in our opinion, so great, that the future, not only of English philosophy, but of practical theology, will be determined by its acceptance or rejection.'" *Ibid.*, pp. 119, 120.

The *Nonconformist* is for us no more authoritative in matters of religion than is the *Popular Science Monthly* itself; and we have no reason for respecting the judgment, in a theological question, of either. We have heard even preachers maintain that the poet Shelley was a devout worshipper of God; and the late Victor Cousin maintained that Spinoza was devout to a fault, that he was "even intoxicated with God." We should like to have Professor Youmans tell us what he himself understands by religion, and explain to us how a man can be religious, who recognizes no God distinct from nature, and who understands by God, if any thing, the unknown and unknowable being, substance, or reality, of which the cosmic phenomena are simply manifestations or appearances? Mr. Spencer's system is as decidedly atheistic as is the *De l'Esprit* of Helvetius, or the *Système de la Nature* of Baron d'Holbach. Mr. Spencer does not in words deny religion, we grant, but the only religious truth or idea he admits is a generalization, or the union of the highest generalizations of certain phenomena that man attains to, that is, an induction from finite and phenomenal, either physical or physiological. But generalizations are abstractions, and abstractions are nullities, and, consequently, Mr. Spencer admits no real basis for religion.

It is not easy to say what Mr. Spencer understands by religion, for he evidently does not very well know himself. He gives us nowhere a clear and full definition of what he means by it; he gives us only a series of statements, no one of which is complete or final, and, leaves the last summing up to the reader's own conjecture. "A religious creed," he says, "is definable as an *a-priori* theory of the universe," as if a theory could be a creed, or a creed a theory! Yet the relation of the creed to religion, he does not define; but he unquestionably holds that religion may coexist with every possible diversity of creed, therefore with every possible error. In what he places the essential principle of religion, he nowhere tells us. He asserts that all religions, as all errors, "have a soul of truth or a verity in them."

This truth or verity is common to all religions, and common alike to theism and atheism. Find by abstraction what is common to all creeds and no-creeds, to all religions and no-religions, to theism and atheism, and you will have the essential religious verity. But, after all, what is this verity? It is that "the Power the universe manifests to us is utterly inscrutable!"* That is, all religions and no-religions, theists and atheists, agree that the universe manifests a power, and that what that power is, is utterly inscrutable, unknown, and unknowable. But this is a negation, not a truth or a principle, and assumes that the soul of all religions, the universal verity which theism and atheism agree in recognizing, or which reconciles them all with one another and with science, is their common denial that the great cosmic power that underlies the cosmic phenomena, and which is their substance, is intelligible. Even supposing the cosmic power were God, and not the cosmos itself, this would found religion and science alike on ignorance. Is it possible more absolutely to deny all religions, to express a more thorough contempt for all religion and science? What sort of religion can that be which is based on ignorance, or that science which excludes from the knowable or intelligible being, reality, substances, principles, causes, and includes only appearances, revealing nothing of that which is back of the appearance? Yet Herbert Spencer is a scientist, and, if we may believe Professor Youmans, an eminently religious man, whose system is the "exact contrary of materialism and atheism!" Refutation is unnecessary.

Herbert Spencer may or may not suppose his "New System of Philosophy" is compatible with religion—we do not presume to judge the secrets of his heart; but we need hardly say that he utterly fails in his analysis to detect the universal and essential principle of religion. All religions, even the grossest, agree in recognizing a supernatural or supercosmic Power, distinct from and independent of both the cosmos and its phenomena, that intervenes in human affairs, and may be rendered propitious by prayer and sacrifice. The first part Mr. Spencer denies, in identifying the Power he asserts with the cosmos, and making it the unknowable substance that underlies its phenomena, or the reality that appears in them; the second part he denies, in denying the personality of this unknowable Power, as well

*"First Principles," p. 11, 2d ed.

as in denying its supramundane existence. His religion we have said is an abstraction, and abstractions are nullities. He professedly arrives at it by generalization, and generalization is nothing, prescinded from the particulars generalized. Theism and atheism are not of the same genus, and cannot be included in the same generalization. They are contradictories, and therefore mutually irreconcilable. If God is, atheism is false; if it is true that God is not, then theism is false. There is no medium between them, no principle common to both, in which both may be integrated and made one. The very pretence is an avowal of atheism.

Mr. Spencer seems to be ignorant of the most elementary principles of both philosophy and theology, and is certainly no master of his subject. He divides his work on First Principles, &c., into two parts; the first part is devoted to the Unknowable; the second part to the Knowable. Yet we find him attempting in the first part to give a scientific exposition of the laws of the Unknowable! If the Unknowable is unknowable, how can he know, determine, or describe its laws? This, it seems to us, goes beyond the attempt of the philosophers of Laputa to extract sunbeams from cucumbers. Is Mr. Spencer ignorant of the very obvious distinction between the incomprehensible and the unknowable? Nothing is unknowable, or unknown even, that is known to be or to exist, though a thing may be known to be or to exist, which is neither comprehended nor comprehensible by the human mind. I know Mr. Spencer's ignorance of philosophy and religion, but I do not comprehend it: it passes my comprehension. I know, but do not comprehend my own existence; I know that God is, that he is supercosmic, independent, self-existent, self-sufficing, eternal, immutable, necessary being,—being in its plentitude, therefore one and infinite, free and voluntary creator, upholder, and governor of the universe, but I cannot comprehend him; he is not unknowable, for he turns an intelligible face towards me and there is nothing I know better than that he is, and is my Creator and sovereign Lord; but he is immense and to me neither apprehensible nor comprehensible in his essence; or as he is in himself.

Mr. Spencer calls his work *First Principles* of a new system of *Philosophy*. Philosophy is the science of principles, on which the special sciences depend for their character and validity as science, and is rightly termed the science of sci-

ences. Now you will search in vain in Mr. Spencer's volume for the recognition of any philosophy in this sense; you will also search in vain for the recognition of a first principle, or any principle at all, whether of science or of things, of the real or of the knowable. You may find facts which the scientists have the vicious habit of calling phenomena, thus denying all reality to the *mimesis*, as Plato calls it, or the individual and sensible,—and the alleged laws of their evolution, appearance or disappearance, concentration or dispersion; but no principle or cause, either primary or secondary. And how should we, since principles and causes, if any there are, Mr. Spencer avowedly exiles to the Unknowable? By what right, then, does Mr. Spencer call his work the *First Principles of Philosophy*, since it treats neither of principles nor of philosophy? What the scientists call laws are not principles, but are in the domain of fact, or, as they say, the phenomenal, for with them all facts are phenomenal, and are themselves as phenomenal as the facts observed, and simply mark the order in which the facts occur, or the phenomena appear, and are arranged in relation to one another, not principles in which the facts or phenomena originate, and on which they depend. The law is only the facts generalized, for induction is only generalization. It is a law that wax in proximity to fire melts, but this is only the fact stated in general terms, and adds nothing to it; for, from the fact observed, no induction can enable you to say that wax in proximity to fire will always melt. To be able to do that, you must connect the fact with the principle of causation, and assert that the fire melts the wax when in a certain proximity to it, and, therefore, with a principle which is universal and independent of the fact, and which produces it. But principles in this sense both Huxley and Spencer, following Hume, deny; or, what is, in relation to science, the same thing, declare them to be unknowable. It is only by a manifest contradiction, then, that the so-called cosmic laws can count for any thing in the explanation of the cosmic facts or phenomena.

Herbert Spencer's whole system culminates in his theory of evolution, which, with all deference to Professor Youmans is compatible neither with religion nor with science. No theory is compatible with religion, that denies or that does not assert God and his creative act. We do not escape atheism by relegating God and his creative act to the Unknowable, for it is as much atheism to declare God to be unknow-

able, as it is to deny that he is. He is an atheist who is not a theist, and no one is a theist who does not assert and hold that God is and is creator of the heavens and the earth and all things visible and invisible: which no one can do, if God and his creative act are absolutely unknowable or even unknown. He denies God who identifies him with the cosmos or nature, and makes him the being, substance, or underlying reality of the cosmic phenomena, as do, undeniably, the cosmists, if we may take Professor John Fiske of Harvard college, or Mr. Spencer himself, as authority. Mr. Spencer recognizes only an inscrutable power, who has created the cosmos from nothing by the word of his power? No, but that is manifested or appears in the cosmic phenomena. He asserts that creation is "absolutely inconceivable,"* as we amply proved, in our review of the Spencerian system, which we pronounced "an elaborate system of ignorance."† His theory is not, as some people suppose, a system of development, or of the evolution, even by natural or secondary causes, of created germs, or the explication and completion of genera and species by the agency of second causes or natural laws, as in the case of natural generation, which nobody denies. It denies such created germs, all creation even *in potentia*, for it denies creation itself as "absolutely inconceivable." The denial of the creative act denies the possibility of science, for it is only through his creative act that we can know that God is, or that there are any existences to be known. God and creature are all that is or exists, and what is neither God nor creature is nothing, and nothing is not intelligible. As creatures are nothing except in their relation to God the creator, they can be known only as creatures in their relation to him; and therefore Mr. Godwin tells Professor Youmans, with a philosophy as profound as it is rare, that nothing can be understood without God. Mr. Spencer's theory of evolution involves, then, the reduction of science to nescience, and religion, like Comtism, to atheism, which is only another name for nihilism. Professor Youmans must be mistaken then, if he takes the Spencerian theory for science, in asserting that the outcome is "the exact contrary of materialism and atheism."

We feel it due to Mr. Godwin to thank him in the name of both religion and science for the signal service he has

* "First Principles," p. 11, 2d ed.

† See *The Cosmic Philosophy* ante p. 439.

rendered them by his timely address, and by his remarkable letter in explanation and vindication of it, which evinces a writer of rare grace and polish, lucidity and vigor, and a philosophical genius of the first order. Professional scientists, like Drs. Carpenter, Henry, and Gray, whom he cites, have made honorable protests against the admission of any discrepancy between science and religion; but, being scientists, their protests may be thought to be a not disinterested concession to popular prejudice. Besides, they do not base their protests on principles, or show any principle on which religion and science are seen to be reconcilable. Mr. Godwin is above suspicion; and in distinguishing between the science of principles resting on insight or intuition, and which supply the initial and final postulates of thought, and the sciences constructed by observation, or experiment and induction, he has given to those who understand him the true basis and method of science, and the principle of the perfect concord of science—if science—and religion.

Thus far had we written, and had, indeed, concluded all we judged it necessary to say on the subject, when our attention was called to an able article in that highly esteemed magazine, the *Catholic World*, on Evolution of Life, condensed in the main from St. George Mivart's work on the *Genesis of Species*, in which it may be thought the contrary view is taken to that which we have maintained against Professor Youmans. The writer follows in all respects, except as to the development of the human body, St. George Mivart, who says expressly that "the general theory of Evolution . . . is, without any doubt, perfectly consistent with the strictest and most orthodox Christian theology."* The writer says also: "There is nothing in the Darwinian theory, or the more general theory of Evolution *countenanced by facts* bearing on the development of life, that a Catholic may not accept if he wishes to do so."† But this only means that a Catholic is free to accept the Darwinian theory as far as it is supported by facts, and that *a* theory of evolution of life may be perfectly consistent, as St. George Mivart says, with the strictest and most orthodox Christian theology; not that the Spencerian theory of Evolution is, or that of the modern scientists who explain all the facts or phenomena of the universe, by the correlation of forces, or the ceaseless con-

* "Genesis of Species," p. 15.

† *Catholic World*, May, 1873, p. 154.

centration and dispersion of matter, force, and motion, which is the theory that we have condemned as atheistic, that is, nihilistic. The same writer tells us he does not mean to assert that "naked Darwinism is compatible with Catholic faith." All he maintains is, that the theory has a "kind of truth" in it; which is no more than can be said of every false or heretical theory, and asserts nothing in contradiction to our conclusion.

The article in the *Catholic World* is so indistinct, so indirect, and confused in its statements, that we ourselves on a first reading mistook its drift; but we find that its doctrine on the point in question is, that, "with respect to all organisms lower than man, the doctrine of the fathers is that Catholic faith does not prevent any one from holding the opinion that life, both vegetable and animal, was in the world at its creation, and afterwards developed by regular process into all the various species now on the earth; therefore, that all living things, up to man exclusively, were evolved by natural laws out of minute life-germs primarily created, or even out of inorganic matter, is an opinion which a Catholic may consistently hold if he thinks fit to do so." But the development or evolution here asserted, is the development or evolution of life-germs created by God immediately from nothing by the word of his power, which is by no means that of Darwin or Herbert Spencer, who both deny the fact of creation, since they recognize no supracosmic power, or creator.

Yet it is hardly true to say that this is "the doctrine of the fathers," or that the fathers generally agree in asserting it. Indeed, none of those cited by St. George Mivart in proof, as we understand them, assert the origination of species by natural law, or the evolution of life from inorganic matter. Here are the principal authorities, omitting for the moment the reference to Suares, which St. George Mivart cites from the fathers and theologians to sustain him, and on which the *Catholic World* appears to rely:—

"Now, St. Augustine insists in a very remarkable manner on the merely derivative sense in which God's creation of organic forms is to be understood; that is, that God created them by conferring on the material world the power to evolve them under suitable conditions. He says in his book on Genesis: 'Terrestria animalia, tanquam ex ultimo elemento mundi ultima; nihilominus *potentialiter*, quorum numeros tempus postea visibiliter explicaret.'[1]

[1] "De Genesi ad Lit.," lib. v, cap. v, No. 14. In Ben. Edition, vol. iii, p. 186.

"Again he says:

"'Sicut autem in ipso grano invisibiliter erant omnia simul, quæ per tempora in arborem surgerent; ita ipse mundus cogitandus est, cum Deus *simul omnia creavit*, habuisse simul omnia quæ in illo et cum illo facta sunt quando factus est dies; non solum cœlum cum sole et lunâ et sideribus . . . ; sed etiam illa quæ aqua et terra produxit potentialiter atque causaliter, priusquam per temporum moras ita exorirentur, quomodo nobis jam nota sunt in eis operibus, quæ Deus usque nunc operatur.'[1]

"'Omnium quippe rerum quæ corporaliter visibiliterque nascuntur, occulta quædam semina in istis corporeis mundi hujus elementis latent.'[2]

"And again: 'Ista quippe originaliter ac primordialiter in quadam textura elementorum cuncta jam creata sunt; sed acceptis opportunitatibus prodeunt.'[3]

"St. Thomas Aquinas, as was said in the first chapter, quotes with approval the saying of St. Augustine, that in the first institution of Nature we do not look for *Miracles*, but for the *laws of Nature*: 'In prima institutione naturæ non quæritur miraculum, sed quid natura rerum habeat, ut Augustinus dicit.'[4]

"Again, he quotes with approval St. Augustine's assertion that the kinds were created only derivatively, '*potentialiter tantum*.'[5]

"Also he says: 'In prima autem rerum institutione fuit principium activum verbum Dei, quod de materia elementari produxit animalia vel in actu vel *virtute*, secundum Aug. lib. 5 de Gen. ad lit. c. 5.[6]

"Speaking of 'kinds' (in scholastic phraseology 'substantial forms') latent in matter, he says: 'Quas quidam posuerunt non incipere per actionem naturæ sed prius in materia exstitisse, ponentes latitationem formarum. Et hoc accidit eis ex ignorantia materiæ, quia nesciebant distinguere inter potentiam et actum. Quia enim formæ præexistunt eas simpliciter præexistere.'[7]

"Also Cornelius à Lapide[8] contends that at least certain animals were not absolutely, but only derivatively created, saying of them, 'Non fuerunt creata formaliter, sed potentialiter.' "—*Genesis of Species*, pp. 281–282.

These citations are not fairly made, and those from St.

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[1] Lib. cit., cap. xxii, No. 44.

[2] "De Trinitate," lib. iii, cap. viii, No. 14.

[3] Lib. cit., cap. ix, No. 16.

[4] St. Thomas, Summa, i, quest. 67, art. 4, ad 3.

[5] Primæ Partis, quest. 74, art. 2.

[6] Lib. cit., quest. 71, art. 1.

[7] Lib. cit., quest. 45, art. 8.

[8] *Vide* In Genesim Comment., cap. i.

Thomas are hardly honest, for in them St. Thomas is giving simply the opinion of St. Augustine, not his own; nor does he support it, or decide in its favor against different opinions held, as he says, "by other saints," which he also gives. The question arises in the discussion of the works of the six days of Genesis. St. Augustine holds that the whole creation, heaven and earth, and all creatures were created simultaneously at once, and that the succession expressed by days, which are divisions of time, is to be understood of the origin, or nature, of created things. Thus he denies that the *materia informis*, which is simply matter *in potentia ad receptionem formæ*, precedes in time *materia formata*, or matter *in actu*, or actual matter, and contends that when the Scripture says the "earth was void and empty," or without form, it is not to be understood that the earth was first created without form and afterwards formed, but is to be understood of the origin of existence in which the possible is placed before the actual. It is so St Thomas explains St. Augustine; and, so explained, his opinion, if it does not actually exclude the opinion he is cited to sustain, certainly does not favor it. If matter, as both St Augustine and St. Thomas teach, was created *in actu*, not simply *in potentia*, that is, as actual, not simply possible matter, there can be, by natural laws, no evolution of material forms or species, but only the explication of existing species or forms.

St. Augustine, no doubt, teaches, while he holds that the creation of all things was completed simultaneously at once, in one divine creative act, without any duration or succession of time, since time begins with creation, that they were created *causaliter* or *potentialiter*, that is, in their principles or causes, and explicated in time by natural laws. But they are explicated, he says, *secundum suum genus*, an important sentence omitted by St. George Mivart, and his disciple in the *Catholic World*. This shows that the explication, development, or evolution can proceed only according to the genus or nature of the germ to be explicated or evolved. Hence it follows, according to St. Augustine, that the kind, genus, species, nature, the *differentia* of creatures, is determined, not by mediate or derivative creation, that is, by second causes, but by the primary creation of the direct act of the first cause. The evolution, then, admitted by St. Augustine, is not the evolution or production of new species, but the explication of the individuals included *causaliter* or *potentialiter* in the primary creation or the direct creation

from nothing according to their respective natures, genera, or species, which is against the *Catholic World* as well as against Darwin and Spencer. Species is evolved in the sense of the explication of the individuals contained *causaliter* in it, but not in the sense of being itself originated.

This seems to us to be taught or plainly implied by St. Thomas, in his answer to the question, "Utrum una sit materia informis omnium corporalium?" After giving the opinions of various philosophers, he says: "Sequitur de necessitate quod non sit eadem materia corporum corruptibilium et incorruptibilium. Materia enim est secundum id quod est in potentia ad formam. Oportet ergo quod materia secundum se considerata sit in potentia ad formam omnium illorum quorum est materia communis." * Which supposes that there may be other things to which the same matter is not common, or, in other words, that things of a diverse nature have not the same matter, or that the same matter is *in potentia ad formam* only in relation to those things which have a common nature, that is, are of the same kind. Mr. Mivart himself seems to hold the same view, for he holds that the evolution is not only by natural laws or causes, but is subject to law, and can take place only in a certain order and in certain fixed lines, as suggested by Dr. Asa Gray. But what is this law, this order, these lines, but precisely what is meant by genera and species, in which individuals exist *causaliter* or in principle, and are explicated by natural generation, as we ourselves contend?

St. George Mivart refers us to Suares.† We have examined the passages referred to, but find nothing in favor of the evolution, origination of *new* species by natural laws, second causes, or the plastic power of nature. The discussion referred to is of *substantial forms*, by which St. George Mivart understands species; and Suares, who undoubtedly teaches that while in immaterial existences they are created directly by God himself, holds that in material existences they are educed or developed *ex materia*, that is, generated; yet not from matter that is simply *in potentia ad formam*, but from matter which contains them *in potentia ad individuales*, that is, the species or matter specificated: at least, so we understand his distinction. To say the substantial forms are contained *potentialiter* in matter, is to assert in

* *Sum Theol.* P. 1. Q. 66. Art. 2. in c.

† *Metaphysicæ.* vol. i, disp. xv, sect. 2–9, and also sect. 13–15.

matter the power to develop or evolve, that is, generate them, and therefore to develop only the likeness of its own substantial forms, or forms of its own species, of which it contains the principles; otherwise, the eduction would not be an evolution but a creation. To suppose matter endowed with the power to produce, no matter by what process, a new and distinct species, would be to suppose in it the power to make something from nothing, which Suares tells us only God can do. Therefore we sum up his doctrine as it is in the margin of our edition of his works: *Formæ substantiales omnes, rationali excepta, ex subjecto præjacente fiunt.*"

The Schoolmen mean by "formæ substantiales" *species*, what Suares calls *causa intrinseca*, what we ourselves are accustomed to call *causa essentialis*, and which Plato calls *idea*. It is that by which any thing is what it is. The schoolmen regard all actual existences as composed of matter and form. We understand this very well in the case of Aristotle and Plato, who assert the preëxistence, and even the eternity, of matter; for they hold that matter existed *in actu* and *in potentia ad formam*, only as to this or that form impressed on it from and by the divine Intelligence. It is easy then to understand how all particular existences are composed of matter and form. But we do not very well understand how the scholastics can maintain that all actual existences are composed of matter and form, or rather, what they can mean by it. With them *materia informis* is no real existence, and exists only *in potentia ad formam*, that is to say, a pure passivity, or a mere possibility; and possibility is not in the matter, but in the power that is able to reduce it to act. It cannot be created, for in itself it is nothing; and St. Augustine denies it, and maintains that matter was created *materia formata*, as do really St. Thomas and Suares. The possible has no power to reduce itself to act, and is actual by the union with it of the substantial form. Our puzzle is how the substantial form can be united with the *materia informis*, which is only an abstraction, and therefore null. The whole existence must consequently be in the substantial form. What is meant by the union or composition? It seems to us that we have no alternative but to assume with St. Augustine that matter was created, not as *materia informis*, or mere possibility, but as *materia formata*, that is, with its substantial forms; or that all things were created at once and primarily *in actu*, that is, in principle, or, as St. Augustine says, *causaliter* or *poten-*

tialiter, which Suares takes pains to distinguish from mere possibility, or, as say the schoolmen, *in potentia ad formam.* It means, as the *Catholic World* and St. George Mivart understand it, the active power of explication or evolution, but within the limits, as we say, of the created substantial forms, not the power of evolving new substantial forms or new species from *materia informis*, or nothing, which is simply creation. In this sense we accept the authorities cited by St. George Mivart, and relied on by the *Catholic World*; but we reject their conclusion so far as it asserts the evolution of *new* species, or new substantial forms, for that contradicts the maxim, *ex nihilo nihil fit*, which is true, as Suares says, except in relation to God only. We must do so, for we can find in the authorities cited, in the scholastic philosophy, or in reason, no principle on which to assert such evolution. Substantial forms below man are generable by substantial forms as generators.

Another point in the summing up, from the *Dublin Review* by the *Catholic World*, of the theory of development or evolution, which it maintains, is, that a Catholic is free to hold if he wishes to do so, "that all living things up to man now on the face of the earth have been evolved by natural laws not only from minute life-germs directly created, but even from inorganic matter." We do not believe the fathers teach this, or any principle that permits us to hold it. Certainly neither St. George Mivart nor the *Catholic World* gives us any proof of it. If some father had emitted such an opinion, it would not be a proof that the fathers agreed in holding it, nor a sufficient authority for holding such an opinion is compatible with Catholic faith. That Suares says, in speaking of the opinion, that individuals of *kinds* like the mule, &c., must have been created from the beginning, the contrary is the more probable opinion, amounts to nothing; for they are not evolved from inorganic matter, nor do they form distinct *kinds* or species. They are hybrids, and the products by generation of two different species already existing, and cease with the first generation, showing that they do not constitute a species; as we have shown in our review of Darwin's Origin of Species. No new species is obtained from crossing. That all individuals were created from the beginning, nobody contends, for that would deny generation. But can any species generate individuals, that is not itself individualized? The mule is the product of two living individuals of differ-

ent species, and partakes through generation of the nature of both, but does not constitute or originate a hybrid species. The development or explication of genera and species, as the horse, the ass, the dog, the cow, already individualized, nobody denies. The individual hybrid was created from the beginning in the two species which have generated it, just as all men were created from the beginning in the one human species and were individualized in Adam, who was at once both the species and an individual man, as we are taught by the mystery of original sin, the Incarnation, and Redemption. Hence are we obliged as Catholics to hold the unity of the human race or species, and the oneness of the origin of all men.

There can be no evolution of life where there are no life-germs to be evolved. God can create new species if he chooses, and the Duke of Argyll maintains that he does; but not even God can *evolve* new life-forms or new species except from germs in which the life or species is already contained in principle, because it would imply a contradiction in terms. It would be creation, not evolution. Even in that Mystery of mysteries, Transubstantiation, the explanation commonly given is, that the substance of the elements is removed and that of our Lord's body substituted. We do not affirm that this explanation is orthodox; we only know that it is the one that was given us by more than one eminent theologian. No forms of life, at any rate, can be evolved by natural laws, nor even by a miracle, from inorganic matter, unless it contains them in principle, *causaliter*, or in germ; and if it does contain them, it is not inorganic, but organic. As for spontaneous generation, there is no known law by which it is possible, and as yet no well authenticulated fact of the sort has been discovered. As far as science has penetrated, all living organisms are founded by an organite or central cell, which must either be immediately created or generated by a parent organism. To hold otherwise would, it seems to us, be false in science, and, at least, an error against faith, and contrary to the Scriptures.

But the *Catholic World* and St. George Mivart object to Darwin's theory of the origin of species by means of natural selection, chiefly on the ground that it does not explain all the facts in the case, but neither gives any hint that, if it did, it would still be no proof of its truth. The inability of a theory or hypothesis to explain all that it is

required to explain, is a valid reason for rejecting it; but the fact that it does, is no valid reason for accepting it. This is one of the grand mistakes of the false scientists. It is necessary to prove not only that the theory or hypothesis explains all the facts in the case, but that no other theory or hypothesis is supposable that does, before concluding its truth. This is not observed by Darwin, nor in general by the framers of our ever-shifting geological theories. These theories explain most of the known facts in the case; but other theories or hypotheses are supposable that explain them equally well. In all cases of theoretical or hypothetical reasoning, you must remove all other possible theories or hypotheses before you can conclude the truth of your own. Mr. Darwin pays no attention to this rule, and draws conclusions he intends shall be received as apodictic, from what he takes to be "most likely," "probably," or "very probably." Herbert Spencer undertakes to remove all suppositions inconsistent with his own; but, in doing it, he is so successful as to render his own impossible.

Both the *Catholic World* and St. George Mivart commit the mistake of supposing a Catholic is free to hold any opinion that he finds emitted by some father or theologian, or authorized by the principle some father has asserted, although an isolated opinion, never accepted by the church, for which no *consensus theologorum* can be pleaded, and which has no *ratio theologica* to support it. Both seem to proceed on the supposition, that no error in science is repugnant to Catholic faith, unless it is opposed to what has been explicitly declared to be *de fide*. This is a mistake. Nothing is defined till it is controverted; and Pope St. Leo Magnus, in one of his letters, states, if we remember rightly, that the Arians were culpable heretics before the condemnation of Arianism by the Council of Nicæa, as well as afterwards. Both also seem to hold that scientists are not responsible to the church for errors which do not directly impugn the revealed truth. This again is a mistake, and smacks of Gallicanism. The pope condemns errors in science as well as in faith. The field of science is within the papal jurisdiction, as well as the field of revelation. It is well that it is so, for the enemies of the church are now waging their war against her for her extermination under the mask of science, which they pretend is independent of her authority.

The writer in the *Catholic World* has aimed to separate the

"kernel of truth," or rather, what a Catholic may hold, which he supposes to be contained in Darwin's theory of natural selection, and the more general theory of Evolution, from the mass of error in which it is enveloped; but he seems to us to be not completely successful, and to have retained some of the elements, indeed, the seminal principle of the errors of both theories. He has, probably, been misled by his confidence in St. George Mivart, who, as a scientist himself, very naturally sought to interpret the theologians in a sense as favorable to dominant scientific theories as possible. But we think the writer's aim questionable. The theories in question may contain some truth, as does every error into which the human mind can fall, for all error consists in the misapprehension, misapplication, or perversion of truth; but, as theories, both are false, irredeemably false, and are to be as unqualifiedly condemned as any erroneous theories ever broached. We, in our efforts to conciliate the professional scientists, are likely to be successful only in weakening the cause of truth, of obscuring the very truth we would have them adopt. If we are Catholics let us be Catholics, and be careful to make no compromises, and seek no alien alliances. The spirit as the tendency of the age is at enmity with God, and must be fought, not coaxed. No concord between Christ and Belial is possible.

TYNDALL'S ADDRESS.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1875.]

If any proof were wanted of the anti-Christian sentiments and tendencies of contemporary scientists, and the neglect of the higher branches of a thorough education, the general ignorance of the simplest elements of religion, and the fearful intellectual abasement, we might almost say intellectual imbecility, of the leaders of the age, we might find it in the

**Inaugural Address before the British Association.* By Prof. John Tyndall, D.C.L., L.L.B., F.R.S., President. New York: *Popular Science Monthly* for October, 1874.

fact that such an address as this by Professor Tyndall could be delivered before an association of professedly scientific men, and when published should produce a profound impression, and be received with no little favor by public opinion. The address, aside from a certain pomp of diction, an emphasis, and an air of superiority and assurance with which Englishmen usually conceal their ignorance and poverty of thought, has nothing remarkable about it. It contains nothing new or striking, and tells us nothing that we have not heard in substance over and over again, *ad nauseam*, from our very boyhood. We discover in it a passable rhetorician, but no logician, no thinker, no scholar, nor even an ordinarily well-informed gentleman, outside of certain of the special sciences, which he may have cultivated with more or less success. In regard to the subjects treated in this address, whatever he knows or thinks he has picked up at third or fourth hand; and in reality he knows simply nothing, not even that he knows nothing of them, and only makes a fool of himself in the eyes of all who have studied them and really do know something of them. Yet John Tyndall is a great man, one of the demigods of the scientific world in this nineteenth century, the inventor of a smoke respirator!

Before proceeding to any particular examination of this very pretentious, but really flimsy, address itself, whose tinsel the public mistake for solid gold, we wish to call attention to an unwarrantable assumption with regard to the religious history of mankind, on which the author and his infidel brother-scientists base their theorizing on religion and theology. This assumption is, that the gross heathen superstitions were the earliest forms with which the religious sentiment clothed itself; and that the history of the developments, changes, and modifications these superstitions undergo from nation to nation and from age to age, presents the complete religious history of the race. Deprive them of this assumption, and all their theorizing on the subject of religion falls to the ground. Yet for this assumption there is not only not one particle of historical proof, but the direct and positive testimony of history to the contrary. History shows us the human race in possession of a pure and holy religion, the worship of the one living and true God, Creator of heaven and earth, before a single trace of any of these heathen superstitions is discoverable. These superstitions are one and all of them fruits of the great gentile apostasy from the primitive and true religion; and their developments,

changes, and modifications are due to the efforts of men and nations who have lost the true system of the universe, and find themselves without clothing or shelter in this wintry world, to construct out of their reminiscences and their own "inner consciousness" some sort of covering for their nakedness, and some sort of protection from the winter's blast, just as we see individuals and nations that have apostatized from Christ and protested against the papacy, now doing. Having forsaken the Fountain of living waters, they are fain "to hew out cisterns for themselves, broken cisterns that will hold no water." The origin, developments, and changes of the heathen superstitions may be read in the origin, developments, and changes of your modern Protestant sects. The world outside of the church travels in a circle, and ever and anon comes round to its starting-point, as does the poor lad who has lost his head in the woods. There is progress only in the church; only in her does a man recover his lost head, and find his way home.

Not only do our scientists take the history of the heathen superstitions for the history of religion, but they take the theology, to which they oppose their scientific deductions or inductions, from Protestant theologians. The only class of scientists we have any acquaintance with, who give any indications even of the most superficial knowledge of Christian theology, are the positivists; and they speak of it, as of Christianity itself, with less disrespect than do the other classes of infidel scientists. There is little in Protestant theology that we can ourselves respect; and there can be no greater mistake, although it may recognize some fragments of Christian truth, than to confound it with Christian theology. Protestant theologians are floundering about to find truth as were the heathen philosophers, and are equally untrustworthy as guides, or as interpreters of the cosmos and religion. Even a victory of the scientists over Protestant theology would count for nothing with us. Professor Tyndall may batter away as much as he pleases against the Anglican bishop Butler, for whom we have not and never had the least respect. We only pray the professor not to mistake the Anglican bishop for a Catholic theologian. His much praised *Analogy* is at best only a retort of the deist's silly objection, that Christian faith asserts incomprehensible mysteries: and the retort proves nothing. When the scientist wishes to attack Christianity, he should take an authentic statement of it, and aim his blows at the very heart of the

Christian system, not at its mere accessories. Christianity is a whole and must be refuted as a whole, that is, in its principles, if refuted at all. Protestantism is not a whole, is only a jumble of fragments.

But in turning to the address itself, we are struck with its vagueness, indecision, and emptiness. It lacks method, distinctness of aim, and explicitness of doctrine. The orator seems to have a good deal of fight in him, but is not quite certain as to his enemy, or at what head he is to strike. He appears to be dealing fearful blows at some formidable, but invisible, foe; yet whether against a real foe or only a spectre of his own fancy, is more than we can determine. What he wants we know not, and what obstacles he encounters, or imagines he encounters, we see not; only this is certain, that he nowhere in his address speaks as a scientist, in the proper sense of the term; but from beginning to end he is out of the field of science and in that of philosophy or theology, both of which he professes to despise, and of both of which he is as innocent of knowing any thing as the child not yet born. He who opposes or tries to make away with philosophy and theology, is as much in their province as he who defends them. He treats of religion who seeks to overthrow it, no less than he who labors to vindicate it.

The address defies analysis. It has no unity, no principle, no thesis, which it labors to develop, elucidate, and defend; and it proves nothing but the orator's ignorance, arrogance, and hostility to religion. It sets forth no scientific truth, but simply reproduces as science—and does not understand that—the old exploded theory of materialism, as taught by the heathen Democritus, and as subsequently held by Epicurus, and sung by Lucretius. He denies the soul and its immortality, and the existence of a supercosmic, intelligent, and creative God; that is, he says with "the fool in his heart, NON EST DEUS,"—there is no God: therefore, "let us eat, drink, and be merry, for to-morrow we die." This is all we have found in this marvellous address, over which Professor Youmans, of the *Popular Science Monthly*, is in raptures, and even bewildered by the very general favor with which it has been received. But the worthy professor must be pardoned, for he does not know the difference between pantheism or atheism and theism, and believes fully that Herbert Spencer is not only a great philosopher, but a marvellously devout Christian!

The *N. Y. Herald* calls upon the theologians to give Pro-

fessor Tyndall's utterances a serious refutation. But why should it make such a call, as if Tyndall had brought forward any thing which the theologians have not refuted a hundred times over, any time during the last eighteen centuries? Then, who is this Professor Tyndall? What mighty claims has he to public consideration? In his own line, in some one or more of the special sciences, he may have been a successful student; but in this address he is not treating any one of the special sciences; he is not in his own line of study, in which he has acquired whatever distinction he has attained to in the scientific world, but trenches on the province of the theologian, of which he knows nothing. Because he has some reputation in some of the physical sciences, has invented a smoke respirator, has he thereby proved his ability to instruct us in philosophy, in theology, theogony, cosmogony, or in sciences that lie entirely above his line, and on which his studies throw not a single ray of light? We let him answer for us:—

"When the human mind has achieved greatness and given evidence of extraordinary power in any domain, there is a tendency to credit it with similar power in all other domains. Thus theologians have found comfort and assurance in the thought that Newton dealt with the question of revelation, forgetful of the fact that the very devotion of his powers, through all the best years of his life, to a totally different class of ideas, not to speak of any natural disqualification, *tended to render him less instead of more competent to deal with theological and historic questions.*"

This is his own protest against his being cited as authority in the domain in which lies his address. Whatever extraordinary power he may or may not have shown in some other domain, he has shown none in that; and, according to his own reasoning, his very studies have unfitted him, in some degree at least, to do it. We wish our scientists would heed Professor Tyndall's admonition, and especially we wish that he had heeded it himself.

Science, the *Popular Science Monthly* tells us, deals only with second causes, and leaves the first cause to religion, or the theologians. This use of the term science, which the scientists affect, is in some degree censurable, and not warranted by the genius of our mother-tongue. It is a misnomer, for what is meant is not science in its unity and universality, but the sciences, sometimes called "the inductive sciences," "the exact sciences," and sometimes "the physical sciences," as distinguished from the mental and moral sciences, that is,

from philosophical and theological science. What is meant to be asserted is, if we charitably suppose the scientists or physicists know what they mean, that the sciences treat only of second causes, not of the first cause, or of secondary, not of first, principles. We will accept this statement, if they will faithfully adhere to it. This statement, which has Professor Youmans for its authority, supposes that there is a first cause, and that there are second causes. But second causes are and can be only created causes, since necessarily dependent on the first cause; and if with Democritus, Empedocles, Epicurus, Lucretius, Herbert Spencer, and Professor Tyndall, we deny creation, or that the first cause is a creative God, there are and can be no second causes, and, consequently, no science, for then there will be no subject for the sciences to treat. Somebody has said: "An atheist may be a geometrician; but if there were no God, that is, no Creator, there could be no geometry."

But, assigning to the sciences second causes as their domain, which we are told is all they claim, we assign them simply the observation and classification of facts; for second causes are themselves only facts, not real causes or principles, except in a relative and subordinate sense, since they are created and dependent on the first cause, from whom they hold all they are, can be, or do. They are causes only in relation to their own effects. They have no original or independent causative power, no proper creative force or energy, and can only explicate the potentialities of the productions of the first cause, while, in relation to the first cause, they are neither causes nor principles, but simply facts. As long as the scientists confine themselves to the investigation of facts and their classification according to their second causes or their generic principles, which, as being only secondary or relative, are themselves in the order of facts, they are in their proper domain; and philosophers, and even theologians who deal with first or absolute principles, will maintain them in it, respect and defend their rights and independence, and count them useful and even indispensable allies or auxiliaries. But the quarrel breaks out, not from the attempt of philosophy or theology to encroach on the domain of the sciences, or to construct them by *a priori* reasoning, as Professor Tyndall falsely or ignorantly pretends; but from the persistence of the scientists to extend their inductions beyond the order of facts to the order of first principles, and thus to usurp the province of philosophy or theology.

This is precisely what Professor Tyndall attempts in this address before the British Association. He seeks to absorb the first cause in the second, the primary in the secondary, principles in the facts which proceed from them, and are dependent on them. Thus he asserts materialism, that is, denies the spiritual element in man, and maintains that life, thought, feeling, love and hatred, joy and grief, hope and fear, are produced by the mechanical combinations of material atoms, themselves without life, thought, or sense. This, of course, is a mere theory, without the slightest scientific value, for it transcends the order of facts or of second causes. It is of no more value than the astronomer Lalande's assertion, "I have never seen God at the end of my telescope." Suppose you have not, what then? What right have you to conclude, because you have not seen him, there is no God? Your conclusion is invalid; first, because it is not in the order of facts, or in the order of your premises; and second, because, from a simple negation, nothing can be concluded. Professor Tyndall must show it possible for lifeless, senseless, brute matter to generate animal motion, life, sense, thought, reason, before he can assert his materialism, or the Democritan doctrine of the origin of life and sense in the mechanical, chemical, or electric combination of lifeless and senseless atoms. *Ex nihilo nihil fit*; to which may be added that other axiom, *Nemo dat quod non habet.* You cannot in the compound get what is not in the components, as you can have in the whole only the sum of the parts. In your chemical compounds you get new forms, no doubt, but no new elements or substance, as every chemist is well aware. How, then, from your combinations of atoms, get what, confessedly, they do not contain? The professor, in his imaginary discussion between a materialist and the Anglican bishop Butler, permits the bishop, who, by the way, is no favorite of ours, to press in substance this objection; but he takes good care not to attempt to solve it, yet he pretends to oppose science to theology, and by science to explode spirit!

The professor denies creation; and yet he adduces and can adduce no facts from which the denial of the origin of all things in creation is a logical induction. The induction transcends the domain of the sciences, transcends the order of second causes, and is an hypothesis, conjecture, or guess in the order of the first cause or ultimate principles—any thing but science. The professor himself dares not pretend that he has discovered and scientifically verified any facts that

prove that there is no God; that the universe with all it contains has *not* been created from nothing; that there is no soul distinct from matter, the *forma corporis*, or that the soul is *not* immortal. The professor's doctrine of materialism and pantheism or atheism is not, then, a scientific induction, and is not scientifically verified or verifiable. It is no more a scientific induction than is the assertion, the moon is made of green cheese. The objection here is, not that the professor cultivates the field of science and investigates the facts of nature, and classifies them according to the laws of their production and changes, or their generic principles in the order of second causes; but that he makes inductions or draws conclusions which he insists we shall receive as valid, and therefore as science, in the order of the first cause or ultimate principles: that is, his conclusions are broader than his premises, and in a different order, which is very bad logic, and certainly not very good science.

We maintain that no induction from facts observed is of any scientific value beyond the order of the facts themselves. Hence we deny the validity of the argument from observation and induction for the existence of God as well as for the denial of that existence. We deny that the existence of God can be either proved or disproved by induction, and are as far from agreeing with Doctor M'Cosh as we are from agreeing with Professor Tyndall, Herbert Spencer, or Professor Fiske. We do not accept the teleological argument, or the argument from design, as of the least logical or scientific value, when taken independently, as we have shown in our *Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, under the head of *Inconclusive Proofs*.* A certain class of theologians trained in the school of the inductionists try to assimilate theology and philosophy to the physical sciences, and adopt for both the inductive method; but only to the destruction of both. God and creation can no more be proved than disproved by induction, which is of no value save in the order of facts, as Bacon himself maintained; and any induction from facts to be applied beyond the order of facts is an abstraction, a generalization, and, therefore, a sheer nullity.

We have, in our *Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, refuted Professor Tyndall's atheism and his denial of creation, by proving, we venture to say, unanswerably, the being of God and the fact of creation. No man who denies either has

* Vol. II., p. 32.

any right to pretend to any real science of principles, or of the origin or end of things. The professor's materialism needs no refutation, for no fact is adduced or can be adduced to prove it. It suffices to answer the professor, as the artist Fuseli answered a materialist in his day, who was arguing that man has no soul: "That *you* have a soul, I will not say; but by God I know *I* have a soul." If the professor believes that he has been evolved from the aphid, and differs not essentially from the pig, we see not much use in attempting to correct his belief. If he should discover that he has a soul he would hardly know what to do with it; it would be for him a great embarrassment, only disturb his serenity, and make him very discontented to lodge any longer in the sty with his brother pigs. He takes pride in belonging to "the sty of Epicurus," and we are not sure that it is not the pigs that should resent the affinity claimed. One of the strangest things in the world is to find men, educated men, held in high esteem by the leaders of public opinion, who fancy they are laboring for the honor and dignity of human nature, the emancipation, the intellectual and moral elevation of the human race, by doing their best to degrade man to the level of the beasts that perish! And this, too, under pretext of delivering society from *superstition*, as if the worst possible superstition could be a deeper degradation, sink man lower in the scale of being, than their false and infamous theories would sink him, if true or acted on. Even the most loathsome African fetichism is less degrading than the doctrine of Professor Tyndall & Co.; for fetichism leaves to the human heart something to reverence held to be superior to man, while Tyndall & Co.'s doctrine leaves it nothing.

But while we refuse to undertake a formal refutation of the materialism revived from old Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius, we may note and dispose of a few of the false charges the professor brings against the theologians. To read his address, one would suppose that the sciences had been opposed from the beginning by the theologians, and have had to fight their way at every step they have taken. Now we have been reading history all our lifetime, but we have found no evidence of this grave charge; and we challenge the professor to name an instance in which the theologians have opposed or hindered the study of nature. Socrates, we concede, was condemned to death, but not for his scientific doctrines, or his cultivation of the natural

sciences, to which in his earlier life he appears to have been devoted. He was tried and condemned for his moral and theological teachings, which, imperfect as they were, were yet purer and far more elevated, because more in accordance with the primitive traditions of the race, than those held by the Athenian state. Indeed, scientific culture received its first encouragement, unless all history is a fable, in the temples; the first developments of the sciences were due to the priests, and were continued in the heathen world, for the most part, by the sacerdotal caste. To the sacerdotal caste the world owed the study of astronomy and mathematics, mechanics and physics, for a certain degree of knowledge of all these was necessary in the temple service; and it is doubtful if our knowledge of these has much advanced beyond theirs. The heathen mythologies, although they are in part susceptible of an historical explication, as old Euhemerus maintained, yet only in part, and that a very small part, as the superstition common to them all is the worship of nature originating with the pantheists and the pseudo-philosophers, are to be explained chiefly by the facts and principles of natural science,—what the English call natural philosophy,—grouped around some prominent historical person or event, together with some distorted or mutilated traditions of the primitive religion of mankind. Whoever studies them and is capable of comprehending them, will be struck with the profound knowledge of the natural sciences they conceal, or which must have been possessed by the sacerdotal corporations in which they originated.

The professor is ill-informed when he asserts that the ancient heathen attributed the origin of the phenomena, if he means the facts, of nature to the caprices of the gods, that is, to the direct creative act of the divine power. They did no such thing. The heathen ascribed no creative power to their gods, any more than Christians do to Satan and his angels. Even the heathen philosophers never recognize the fact of creation; they recognize no creative God. The gentiles, or the nations and tribes that shortly after the confusion of tongues at Babel apostatized from the patriarchal religion, fell into idolatry, originated the various mythologies and superstitions of profane history, and completely lost the tradition of the fact of creation. The gentile philosophers explained the origin of things, as do still the Hindus, the Japanese, and Buddhists, by emanation, generation, formation, development or evolution. Democritus did not

differ from the other Greek philosophers in denying creation after a human manner, as the professor asserts, or in any other manner; but in practically denying all supernal or divine influence or interference in the government of man and nature. He was a downright atheist, and explained the origin of things, the cosmos and its contents, by the blind workings of mechanical forces—by the mechanical and fortuitous combination of lifeless and senseless atoms.

The professor is as enraged as a mad bull at sight of a red rag, at the bare mention of a personal cause, or personal causes, and he stigmatizes as anthropomorphous even Christian theology. He embraces, with all the affection of his heart old Democritus, Epicurus, Lucretius, and other materialists, because they reject all personal cause, and attribute all the facts and phenomena of nature to the workings of impersonal and blind force or energy, directed by no intelligence and moved by no will. His class of scientists, who write in English, do not like to say out bluntly, "There is no God," for, adepts in hypocrisy, the English-speaking people would hardly bear that; so they soften it, and say, "There is no *personal* or anthropomorphous God," as if personal and anthropomorphous meant one and the same thing. But an impersonal God is simply no God at all; it is a simple force operating without intelligence, reason, or volition, from the intrinsic necessity of its own nature; for the moment you add to force intelligence, or reason and will, it is a person, and such we have heretofore demonstrated, is God, the only living and eternal being, SUM QUI SUM. But he is an infinitely free, independent, divine person, not a limited, finite, dependent human person. Anthropomorphous means human-shaped, and has nothing to do with personality or impersonality; for, though the body has shape or figure, the person, that which says I am, I know, or I will, has none.

The Greeks represented their gods—not the Divinity which, in all their mythology, hovers above all the gods, and holds in its hand the destines of both gods and men—under a human form; but the Egyptians, the Assyrians, and Hindus did not, except when it concerned an avatar, or incarnation of Vishnu or of some other god; nor did the Romans represent their gods as anthropomorphous, at least not until after they took to imitating the Greeks, who worshipped the beauty of form. The professor's brother-materialists, the Mormons, make their God anthropomorphous.

One of their twelve apostles explained to us one day their theology, according to which God is material, organized of the finest part of matter, and has the human shape or figure. The Swedenborgians give to their God the human form, the configuration and all the parts of a man. But the Christian theologians, though they assert the personality, even the tri-personality of the Godhead, never represent the Divinity as anthropomorphous, for they hold him to be without body or parts, that is pure spirit. It is God in his human nature, the eternal Word incarnate, assuming flesh and becoming truly man without ceasing to be God, that bears the human form. We do not expect the professor to understand any thing of this, for the eyes of his understanding have remained closed for more than nine days from his birth. We make the remarks for our Christian readers, not for him.

According to the professor, science, that is, materialism, went on swimmingly from old Democritus, in spite of the shallow and feeble opposition of Plato and Aristotle, till it was interrupted by the rottenness and corruption of the Roman Empire, and the introduction and establishment of Christianity or ecclesiasticism suspended its culture and progress for nearly two millenniums. Christianity, which he calls ecclesiasticism, is the inveterate enemy, it would seem, of all scientific progress. Thus he says:

"What, then, stopped its victorious advance? Why was the scientific intellect compelled, like an exhausted soil, to lie fallow for nearly two millennia before it could regather the elements necessary to its fertility and strength? Bacon has already let us know one cause; Whewell ascribes this stationary period to four causes,—obscurity of thought, servility, intolerance of disposition, enthusiasm of temper; and he gives striking examples of each.

"But these characteristics must have had their causes, which lay in the circumstances of the time. Rome, and the other cities of the Empire, had fallen into moral putrefaction. Christianity had appeared, offering the Gospel to the poor, and, by moderation, if not asceticism of life, practically protesting against the profligacy of the age. The sufferings of the early Christians, and the extraordinary exultation of mind which enabled them to triumph over the diabolical tortures to which they were subjected, must have left traces not easily effaced. They scorned the earth, in view of that 'building of God, that house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens.' The Scriptures, which ministered to their spiritual needs, were also the measure of their science. When, for example, the celebrated question of antipodes came to be discussed, the Bible was with many the ultimate court of appeal.

Augustine, who flourished A. D. 400, would not deny the rotundity of the earth, but he would deny the possible existence of inhabitants at the other side, 'because no such race is recorded in Scripture among the descendants of Adam.' Archbishop Boniface was shocked at the assumption of a 'world of human beings out of the reach of the means of salvation.'

"Thus reined in, science was not likely to make much progress. Later on, the political and theological strife between the church and civil governments, so powerfully depicted by Draper, must have done much to stifle investigation. Whewell makes many wise and brave remarks regarding the spirit of the Middle Ages. It was a menial spirit. The seekers after natural knowledge had forsaken that fountain of living waters, the direct appeal to nature by observation and experiment, and had given themselves up to the remanipulation of the notions of their predecessors. It was a time when thought had became abject, and when the acceptance of mere authority led, as it always does in science, to intellectual death. Natural events, instead of being traced to physical were referred to moral causes; while an exercise of the phantasy, almost as degrading as the spiritualism of the present day, took the place of scientific speculation."

Professor Tyndall adds nothing to strengthen his cause by citing such authors as Whewell and Draper, who are no better authority than himself on the intellectual history of mankind. The historian who can characterize the period from the downfall of the Roman Empire in the sixth century to the sixteenth as a "stationary" period, a period of "servility," of abjectness, or intellectual inactivity, proves only his own ignorance of that period, and utter incapacity to write its history. There is no known period of history which less deserves the title of "stationary;" no one in which men have displayed greater physical energy, or a more marvellous moral and intellectual activity; or in which society has made in all directions such great and astonishing progress. That period, in which the barbarians who had overturned the corrupt and rotten Roman Empire, which had grown into the most oppressive despotism that ever weighed on the human race, under which freemen, to escape the burden imposed by the imperial fisc, actually sold themselves and their children into slavery, were Christianized and civilized, and formed into the great and leading nations of the modern world, could not have been a stationary period; nor could it have been remarkable for its tameness and servility, especially when it is considered that the Protestant revolt in the sixteenth century found

every European state organized with a free and vigorous constitution, which three hundred years, with a century of revolutions, have been able only partially to destroy. There can be no question that Europe was in possession of far greater political and civil freedom, as well as of a higher moral and intellectual culture, when Luther was born, than it is now, or has been since the rise of Protestantism. There is nothing witnessed now in the world to equal the enthusiasm of men in the middle ages for knowledge, and knowledge on all subjects. The curriculum of the schools was that of the great imperial schools of Rome, and was not less extensive than that of our most renowned contemporary universities. The scholars may have been inferior in purely literary grace and polish to the Ciceros, Virgils, Horaces, Sallusts, Livys, or the classical writers of Athens; but we hazard nothing when we say they were vastly superior to them in the breadth of their culture, the extent and variety of their knowledge, and in depth and vigor of thought. The scholastics may have made many unnecessary distinctions, and spent much time in discussing questions which seem to us trifling or frivolous; but no one who has studied them can deny that no philosophers ever lived who also discussed so many really important questions, or discussed them so thoroughly and well.

Undoubtedly, the mind was less taken up in those ages with the mechanical and physical sciences than with philosophical and theological sciences, in which are to be found the principles and law of the natural sciences; for in those ages men believed in revelation, in the immortality of the soul, and the reality of the spiritual world, and therefore placed the kingdom of heaven in their affections above the kingdoms of this world. But they did not neglect the study of the physical sciences, nor were they ignorant of the true method of studying them, that of observation and induction. Bacon's pretence, that they adopted the *a priori* method in the study of nature, has no foundation in fact. They recognized a first cause, *causa causarum*, and did not consider natural facts and events were fully explained by being traced to their second causes; but nothing is further from the truth than the rash assertion, that "natural events, instead of being traced to physical, were referred to moral, causes." The professor will search in vain to find a single instance to sustain him. Doubtless, the scholastics held, and rightly held, that the ultimate cause of all natural events is

God, for so Christianity teaches; yet was this never so understood as to exclude or to impair the action of physical or second causes. The error of the scientists is, that they extend the action of second causes so far as to exclude or absorb the first cause, and make their physical causes supersede the moral cause of the universe. But the study of nature was by no means neglected; and many remarkable discoveries and inventions were made during that period which have changed the face of the modern world, and are the basis of the material progress we so loudly boast. It was in these same decried middle ages that gunpowder and fire-arms, paper and printing on movable types, and the mariner's compass, were invented, the power of steam was discovered, and its use as a motive power foreseen and predicted. It was also in this alleged stationary period, this period of inactivity and "mental stagnation," that occurred the remarkable travels of Marco Polo, and the geographical discoveries of Vasco da Gama and Christopher Columbus. The period in which such inventions and discoveries were made, was not, assuredly, a period of mental inactivity and stupidity.

Yet during all this period in which these inventions and discoveries were made, and this mighty progress in civilization was effected, ecclesiasticism was in the ascendant; and the church, if often resisted and thwarted by the barbarism inherited from the empire or introduced from the forests of Germany, if she found herself obliged frequently to begin her work anew from the devastating irruptions of new hordes of barbarians from the East, the South, and the North, Huns, Saracens, and Northmen, led society in its grand work of civilization, directed its labors, and rendered them efficient. Professor Tyndall applauds Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius in maintaining materialism, because their motive was to rid the world of superstition. Yet they did not rid the world of that fearful evil; and the world was never sunk deeper in superstition than it was at the moment when their doctrine, which the professor calls science, was most in vogue. The only remedy for superstition is the predominance in society of the true religion; and under the influence of mediæval ecclesiasticism, superstition had almost entirely disappeared from Christian Europe.

Outside of the influence of ecclesiasticism there was really no scientific or other progress during the period in question; for even the professor will hardly claim as scientists the old

alchemists, astrologers, and various classes of unchristian mystics: indeed he expressly excludes them. Yet they were not subjected to ecclesiastical authority which opposed them, and were as independent in their speculations as is the professor himself. Emancipation from ecclesiasticism does not appear to insure scientific progress. The professor cites, indeed, the Arab Alhazen, of Spain, who would seem to be as true a scientist as Professor Tyndall himself, which is not saying much; for if his doctrine of materialism were true, his science would not surpass that of the ox or the horse. His account of the scientific progress of the Arabs rests on the authority of our own Dr. Draper, a good chemist for aught we know, and a passable physiologist, we believe, if we accept, as is the fashion just now, the chemical explanation of physiological facts; but, in historical matters, of no authority at all. Whoever has studied the question knows perfectly well that the accounts of the Arabic science and literature in the middle ages, widely credited and insisted on by those whose position requires them to depreciate the church and her influence, have been grossly exaggerated. They had no philosophy, and very little, if any, science, except what they borrowed from the Greeks and Hindus, conquered by the armies of the prophet or his lieutenants.

The struggle between the pope and emperor, or between the spiritual power and the secular, had, no doubt, a disastrous effect on the scientific as well as the moral progress of the middle ages; but for that struggle ecclesiasticism is not responsible. Who is ignorant, to-day, that the struggle originated in the encroachments of the secular power on the rights and independence of the spiritual, as we shall show in a subsequent article? In that long struggle, not yet ended, and renewed and rendered as fierce as ever to-day by Kaiser Wilhelm and his chancellor, Prince von Bismarck, whatever hindrances science had to encounter, must be charged, not to ecclesiasticism, but to cæsarism which warred against it.

The pretence that the church opposes, or ever has opposed, science or the study of the natural sciences, can be set up only by deplorable ignorance or satanic malice. The professor cites but two facts, and they prove nothing to the purpose. They are, that St. Augustine and St. Boniface rejected the doctrine of the antipodes, which, in their time, was supposed to imply that there is a race of men not redeemed by the blood of Christ: which was not and could

not be true. All that can be said of them is, that they, as well as those who asserted inhabitants on the other side of the earth, erred in supposing them necessarily separated from us. The church always leaves scientific questions to scientific men, even in enacting her own canons; astronomical questions to astronomers, mathematical questions to mathematicians, physiological questions to physiologists, chemical questions to chemists, and so on. When she would correct the calendar and determine the true time for keeping Easter, she relied on the calculations of astronomers and mathematicians; and every theologian knows that there are not a few questions in moral theology bearing on physiology, that are solved by the teachings of the physiologists, as in speculative theology purely rational questions are solved by *dicta* of accredited philosophers. Every reader of the "Sum" of St. Thomas will readily recollect the "dicit philosophus." There is, as we have said, no quarrel between the theologians and scientists, so long as the scientists confine themselves to the proper domain of science, and do not, by their inductions, theories, and hypotheses, attempt to invade the territory of faith, or revealed theology. The quarrel begins only when they leave their own domain, and claim, in the name of science, the right to take charge of faith and morals. So long as they remain in their own legitimate sphere, they meet from the church only honor and encouragement.

We do not feel that it is necessary to follow this pretentious, but shallow, address any further. The author does not give us, nor even profess to give us, science; he gives simply his opinions, not in the field of science, but on faith and morals, and in opposition to the beliefs and hopes, individuals here and there excepted, of the human race in all ages and nations: and we tell him very frankly that he is not a man sufficiently learned or distinguished to make his opinions on the topics he introduces worthy of the slightest consideration. He has never seriously studied one of them; and his conclusions, as given in his address, are in no instance the result of his own thorough scientific investigation. He cannot be consulted as an expert on one of them. The Scriptures classify him when they say, "Dixit insipiens in corde suo: Non est Deus." We must say of him, still in the language of Scripture, "Ephraim is joined to his idols, let him alone." He is wedded to his false science, and to it we leave him, praying God to have mercy on his soul.

The address, and the reception it has met from no small portion of the public, bear us out in the assertion we so frequently make, but which few appear to heed, that the living issue we have now to meet is between Catholicity and atheism. We have to meet it here in the form of independent morality, there in the form of cæsarism or independent politics. Secularism is only a polite name for atheism, and secularism is the enemy we have everywhere to fight,—secularism in education, secularism in science, secularism in religion, secularism in morals, in politics, in the family, and in society. "The Four Great Evils of the Times," so powerfully set forth by the illustrious Archbishop of Westminster, are only four phases of one and the same evil, namely, secularism or atheism,—the substitution of the creature for the Creator, man for God.

In this war the sects, even though professing to recognize God and Christ, and to believe in the immortality of the soul, or an eternal life beyond the grave, their belief is so uncertain and variable, so weak and timid, cannot aid us. One half of each sect never think—are, intellectually considered, mere nullities; the other half are asking, often in agony of soul, Whence come we, why are we here, whither go we, who will show us any good? Those among them who think, doubt; the problem of life rises dark and impenetrable before them, and despairing of a solution, or of arriving at any tenable life-plan, they immerse themselves in business, in politics, or in pleasure—any thing that stifles thought and memory. Then, they all start from an atheistic principle, that of PRIVATE JUDGMENT. Private judgment assumes the sovereignty of the individual, that man is supreme; and the assumption of the supremacy of man, whether individually or collectively, is the denial of the sovereignty of God, and, therefore, of God himself. The logical development of the sectarian principle, or rule of private judgment, is pure atheism. How, then, can the sects aid us in combating the atheistic tendency of contemporary scientists? In the heat of the battle they would turn against us, and fight on the side of the enemy. Do we not see that, in the estimation of the sects, a Catholic who apostatizes and turns atheist, is preferable to an Anglican even who turns Catholic? Does not this prove that the affinity of the sects with atheism is far closer than their affinity with Catholics? What, then, can be more preposterous than to suppose the sects can successfully combat, or aid in combat-

ing, atheism or the dominant secularism; or that they can maintain Christianity in its life and vigor? Indeed some of them have gone so far already as even to repudiate the Christian name, like our so-called free religionists.

This is what gives to Professor Tyndall's Address its significance. In itself it is insignificant; but, as following out the tendency of the non-Catholic world, or as the expression of the logical development of the principles held in common by all the sects and enemies of our Lord Jesus Christ, it becomes terribly significant. The secular press, if they do not openly approve its abominable doctrines, are not shocked by them, and treat the professor himself with great tenderness and respect; the sectarian press combat his doctrines indeed, but so feebly, that one can hardly help suspecting them of being in secret league with him, and quite willing to yield him the victory. President M'Cosh of Princeton, the great gun of the Presbyterians, has come to an interviewer with a tremendous flourish against the professor, but concedes so much to the atheistic school, that he reserves nothing worth defending against it. Such a friend as he to religion, whether sincere or not, is practically worse than an open enemy.

No, we Catholics, with the help of God, must fight this battle alone; and we must bear in mind that it is not against Professor Tyndall, nor against any other single professor. We have to fight the secularism of the age, the whole spirit and tendency of the entire non-Catholic world, and of not a few who are in the church of God without being of it. Catholic watchmen cannot be permitted now to sleep at their posts. The citadel is assailed from all quarters by innumerable foes, some open and avowed, some invisible and unsuspected, even disguised as friends—the most to be dreaded of all. We must be vigilant, and constantly clad in armor, in the whole armor of God, as described by St. Paul. The greatest danger of the times does not come from without, but is in our own camp, and is to be found in the large numbers in our own ranks who place the national question above the Catholic question, although most of them will swear, and, perhaps, honestly believe, they do no such thing, and are willing to strike hands with the hereditary enemies of their faith, if they show a willingness to favor their national aspirations. We count these, whatever their nationality, the real enemies of the Catholic cause. The church is catholic, not national, and Christ can have no concord

with Belial. If our human arm in this fight had to win the victory, we should despair. But ours is the cause of God, and he is on our side if we are faithful, and he will defeat and scatter our enemies.

THE CONFLICT OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for April, 1875.]

It was the elder D'Israeli, the author of the *Calamities of Authors*, if our memory is not at fault, who has, in some one of his numerous works, a chapter entitled "The History of Events which never happened." Professor Draper seems to have taken from it a hint for the title of this volume. He professes to give in it the history of the conflict between religion and science, or of a conflict that has never occurred, and never can occur. A conflict between science and superstition or various mythologies there may have been, and also between so-called scientists and the theologians; but, between religion and science, never. Such a conflict is impossible, for religion and science are simply two parts of one dialectic whole. Truth can never be in conflict with itself, nor can one truth be more or less true, if a truth at all, than another. Religion, if religion, is true, and science, if science, is also true: how, then, is it possible that there can be any conflict between them?

Dr. Draper nowhere shows in his volume any trace of the conflict of which he professes to write the history. It is worthy of note that he nowhere tells us what he means either by religion or by science, nor does he ever deign to tell us what are for him the tests by which he distinguishes science from its counterfeit, or religion from superstition. His method is as unscientific as it is possible to imagine, and bears no trace of scientific culture on the part of the author, or of any habit of scientific investigation. He seems to be incapable of a logical or scientific conception. He has a fine command of language, and a rare facility in stringing words

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**History of the Conflict between Religion and Science.* By John William Draper, M. D., LL. D., Professor in the University of New York. New York: 1874.

into sentences, without violating any of the recognized laws of syntax or rhetoric; but he appears to have considered it quite beneath his dignity to attach any meaning to them, or, when they happen to mean something, to inquire whether what they mean is true or false. His book is a jumble of not badly constructed sentences, of high-sounding words and rounded periods, but for the most part meaningless, or, when not meaningless, glaringly false.

Who are the parties to the conflict of which he professes to write the history, or what is the matter in dispute, the professor nowhere clearly and distinctly tells us; but from the general tone and drift of his remarks, we are led to conclude that the conflict is between those who recognize and assert an intelligible and spiritual, or a supersensible, world, and those who deny such world, and confine all reality, or at least all knowable reality, to the sensible or material. The assertion of the former he calls religion; and its denial, and the assertion and development of the latter, he calls science. This, in the most general point of view, we take it, is his doctrine; but the special end and aim of his book is to show the conflict between Christianity, or, more strictly, Catholicity and modern thought, or so-called modern civilization. His history, as far as history it is, is a history of the conflict of the church with the world, with infidelity, materialism, and atheism; and the author would seem to justify himself for taking sides against the church or Christianity, by assuming that she is only the continuation and development of the absurdities and abominations of the old pagan superstitions. The author ranks all religions so called, true or false, Jewish, Christian, and gentile, in one and the same category, and reasons of them and from them as if they were one and the same thing, with no radical difference between the gross fetichism of the grovelling African, and the sublime spiritualism of the Hebrew prophet, the gross polytheism of the Hindu, or the polished but equally base and debasing polytheism of the Greek and Roman, and the sublime monotheism of the Jew and Christian. If he finds an absurd fable or an obscene rite in Egyptian or Gentoo mythology or ritual, he holds Christianity responsible for it, and adduces it as an argument against the Catholic Church, and the claims of the pope to be the vicar of Christ. It is reason enough for him to deny the divine Sonship of Christ, that Alexander the Great claimed to be the son of Jupiter-Ammon; and for rejecting the incarnation of the Word,

that the Hindus assert the avatar of Vishnu. It is hard to say of a writer who confounds, or treats as identical, things so radically different, so heterogeneous, which is most to be deplored: his ignorance or his malice, his mental or his moral obliquity. In any case, he proves his utter incapacity to be a teacher of science.

It is one of the arts of our advanced thinkers, like Tyndall, Huxley, Herbert Spencer, Draper, and others, to class heathenism, varying from nation to nation, from tribe to tribe, and Christianity together, and to derive their notions of the latter from their superficial study of the former. It may be that they are led to this in part from their familiarity with what is called Protestant Christianity, itself simply a form of paganism. Nothing can be more unscientific. Christianity teaches that gentilism is apostasy from God and from his truth, and that, so far from being his worship, it is the worship of devils. We protest, therefore, against the logic that concludes that what it finds true of gentilism, is and must be true of Christianity. We protest also against concluding that, because Protestantism is a congeries of absurdities, Catholicity is unreasonable and false. Gentilism and Protestantism may stand in the same category, or be simply varieties of the same species; but they are specifically, and even generically, different from Christianity. They belong to another genus, and we were taught that "argumentum a genere ad genus non valet." Dr. Draper and the rest of our advanced thinkers appear to have never been taught logic at all: certain it is they have never learned to practise it.

Under pretence of giving a history of the alleged conflict between religion and science, Dr. Draper really makes a coarse and vulgar attack on the Catholic Church, and proves in his attack that he is alike ignorant of her doctrine, her history, and her worship. He has the temerity to charge her with hostility to science, for the conflict he speaks of, he says, is chiefly a conflict with the Catholic Church. He doubtless considers Protestantism too weak and insignificant an affair to be counted as a representative of religion. He probably does not regard it as a religion at all, and most likely feels instinctively that it can offer no obstacle to the "advanced thought of the age." It is not an organized power, and is not worth counting as an enemy; it is rather a friend, for does it not wage a deadly war against the church? But the Catholic Church is an organized power, and pre-

sents the strongest organization on earth; and when she speaks, her voice is potent, and millions listen and obey in spite of kings and kaisers, statesmen and scientists, bonds and imprisonment, exile and death. She alone is to be dreaded, she alone is to be warred against, and crushed—if possible.

Well, is it a fact that the church opposes, or ever has opposed, the cultivation of science or the sciences? Let us come to the proof. Cease your vague declamations, and come to definite and specific charges. We challenge you, we challenge the whole world, to name one single scientific truth that she opposes, or ever has opposed. The alleged conflict is, the author himself avows, between the Catholic Church and science. He himself exonerates Greek and Roman paganism in the glowing pages in which he details the marvellous victories of Greek science in Greece, the Greek Islands, the Greek colonies in Asia Minor, in Italy, and in Egypt,—victories rivalling, if not surpassing, those achieved by our modern scientists, and sending the favorite doctrine of progress to the dogs. He also exonerates from the charge of hostility to science the sublime, pure, and elevating religion of the Arabian prophet, which he holds to be a protest against Christianity in behalf of science. So it is only the Catholic religion that comes into conflict with science. The Catholic religion is not something intangible, uncertain, vague, and indefinite. We know what it teaches, what it exacts, and what it opposes. But we cannot say as much of what our advanced thinkers call science. Science is a good word, and science, if science, is always and everywhere respectable. But it is never vague, uncertain, but always certain, definite, fixed, unchangeable, and indisputable. Let us now descend to particulars. We demand of our advanced thinkers, champions of modern thought, and boasters of modern civilization, in a word, of our unbelieving scientists, the Huxleys, the Tyndalls, the Spencers, the Comtes, the Littrés, the Darwins, the Lyells, the Youmans, the Fiskes, the Drapers, to name a single doctrine the church teaches that science has demonstrated or proved to be untrue; or a single scientific truth, or truth scientifically demonstrated to be truth, that the church forbids, or has ever forbidden, to be held or taught? Let us, gentlemen, have no evasion, no subterfuge, no vague declamation, but give us a plain, frank, specific statement. We know, as we told your representative, the Metropolitan Editor, in our *Conver-*

sations on Liberalism and the Church, that you have a great dislike to descending to particulars, and to making specific and definite statements, or distinct and definite charges. But we demand a "bill of particulars;" and if you have any claim to be regarded as honorable men, as lovers of truth and fair dealing, or as friends and advocates of science, you will not refuse to render it.

Well, gentlemen, what truth of science do you allege the church prohibits, opposes, or contradicts in her teaching? We do not ask what theory, hypothesis, conjecture, or guess of so-called scientists she refuses to accept; but what fact or truth that you yourselves dare pretend is scientifically certain and unquestionable, that conflicts with her teaching, or which she anathematizes. Think, gentlemen, examine your own minds and precise your own thoughts. Can you name one? Suffer us to tell you that you cannot. We take no pride in the fact, but we belonged to your party before we became a Christian, and we find, in reading your works, nothing, no thought, no theory, no hypothesis, or conjecture even, bearing on the conflict you speak of, that we were not familiar with before any of you were heard of, and before some of you, it may be, were born. You are none of you original thinkers; you are notorious plagiarists. Our own youth was fed with the literature from which you pilfer, and our young mind was nourished with the absurd and blasphemous theories and speculations which you are putting forth at present as something new, original, and profound—as science even,—but which had become an old story with us long before you reproduced them. We know, *minus* a few details or variations of phrase, all you can say in favor of your pretended science, and all you can maintain against the church. Were we not trained in Boston, "the Hub of the Universe," at a time when it was really the focus of all sorts of modern ideas, good, bad, and indifferent? What have any of you to teach one who participated in the Boston intellectual movement from 1830 to 1844? We Bostonians were a generation ahead of you. We have the right to speak with confidence, and we tell you beforehand that you have no truth the church denies, and that you have disproved or demonstrated the falsity of no doctrine the church teaches.

But let us come to the test. The church teaches us to "believe in one God, Creator of heaven and earth and of all things visible and invisible." Have the scientists, who say with the fool in his heart, "Non est Deus," demonstrated

that her teaching in this respect is erroneous? Can they say that it is scientifically proved that God and creation are untruths? Certainly not. They confess the impotence of science to prove there is no God; and both Herbert Spencer and Professor Tyndall deny that they are atheists. The most advanced scientists or thinkers pretend to prove by their sciene, not that there is no God, but that he is the unknowable. Atheism is in no sense a proved or a provable hypothesis, and till it is scientifically established it cannot be claimed as science, that is, certain knowledge. It cannot, then, be alleged that the doctrine of the church conflicts with any truth of science. Nor has it ever been scientifically demonstrated that God is unknowable. Herbert Spencer makes the assertion indeed, but he only proves that God is incomprehensible, not that we cannot know that he is; while, on the other hand, it has been proved over and over again that the existence of God and his essential attributes are, to a certain extent at least, knowable and known. We have ourselves proved it in our brief *Essay in Refutation of Atheism*.

But the church, in asserting God as creator, denies the scientific doctrine of evolution. St. George Mivart, a scientist of no mean repute, thinks not: and certainly there can be no evolution where there is nothing to evolve. What or whence is that something which precedes the process of evolution as its necessary condition precedent, and therefore cannot be the result of evolution? Herbert Spencer evolves the universe from matter and force. But whence the matter and force? They are eternal? But that is an hypothesis, not a truth of science. So you do not get rid of the necessity of creation by your theory of evolution. But your doctrine of evolution is not science; it is only an unverified hypothesis, an unproved theory, and a very absurd theory at that. Even that prince of modern English humbugs, Herbert Spencer, did not originate it, but plagiarized it from the old Greek sophists refuted by both Plato and Aristotle, and laughed out of countenance by old Hermias. It is possible, as it often has been done, to prove the origin of the universe in the creative act of God; but it is not possible to prove the contrary, or to prove that the church in teaching it conflicts with any scientific truth, or truth scientifically established.

The advanced thinkers of the age, called *thinkers* because they do not think, and are incapable, through their own fault,

of thinking, if they are not avowed materialists, restrict all our knowledge to the material order, and exclude from the domain of science the whole supersensible world. Matter and its laws constitute for them the whole field of science. Because the church insists on the recognition, partly by science and partly by faith, of not only a supersensible, but a supernatural and superintelligible world, they cry out against her as the enemy of science. But has she ever denied matter or any of its laws scientifically established? Certainly not. The assertion of the spiritual or the intelligible does not negative the material, any more than the assertion of the supernatural denies the reality of the natural. That matter is the only reality, or that nothing but matter is or exists, is the assumption of the materialists; but nobody can pretend that it is a scientific truth. It is theory, opinion, not science. In teaching the contrary, or in asserting a spiritual or intelligible world above the material or the sensible world, and which the sensible imitates and on which it depends, the church in no sense conflicts with science.

That matter or the sensible alone is cognizable, assumed by our advanced thinkers, and therefore alone should be the object of our affections and our studies, is not a truth of science. The sensible is not cognizable without the intelligible, any more than the senses are cognitive without the intellect or mind—the noetic faculty. Matter is, to say the least, as unintelligible, as difficult to know in itself, as spirit. Berkeley and Collier deny the existence of a material world out of or distinct from the mind. Berkeley held that what we call external or material objects are simply pictures painted by the hand of God on the retina of the eye, and have no existence out of it. Fichte makes all objects, whether material or spiritual, the Ego projected or protended; Leibnitz resolves matter into force, or *vis activa*, acting always from its centre outward; Father Boscovich regards matter as centres of attraction; and Huxley denies that he is a materialist, because he does not know what matter is. From the disputes of philosophers we should conclude that nothing is less cognizable or further from being an object of science than matter, which our advanced thinkers hold to be the only thing knowable at all, nay, as the only reality. Certain it is that science has not yet demonstrated that so-called material existences are the only existences, or justified the Sadducees who believed in neither angel nor spirit.

The present article having for its object only to show

that the church in her teaching does not conflict with science, we are not required to establish the truth of her teaching, or even to raise the question whether her teaching is true or false. All we are required to do here in order to refute Dr. Draper's charge is, to show that her teaching in no instance conflicts with any scientific truth, or truth which scientific investigation has established or can establish. If the scientists can establish no truth which she denies, or which does not deny any doctrine she teaches, there obviously is no conflict between religion as she presents it, and science. There may be differences, but difference is not necessarily antagonism. Spirit and matter may differ, or be diverse; but the assertion of the one does not deny the other, for both may be real existences. We do not deny matter or its laws as far as scientifically determined; what we deny is, that science has proved or can prove that matter and its laws are the only reality, and that matter and its laws explain the existence of the universe with all its forms and phenomena, especially life, feeling, thought, reason, and moral affection, or conscience. Science has never yet shown that any possible combination of lifeless atoms can originate life, or that gravitation and gratitude are the result of one and the same physical law, as Mr. Emerson teaches. It is enough for our present purpose to say,—what cannot be denied,—that the materialism defended by Tyndall and Spencer as science, in which Dr. Draper seems to agree, is not science, and is at best only an opinion, and in our judgment, a very absurd opinion, held by some so-called scientists. We may say the same of every theory of the so-called scientists rejected by the church.

But it is the recent so-called science of geology, that affords the most ample proofs of the conflict between religion and science. But we are aware of no geological *facts* that the church denies. That there are geological theories, and deductions from those theories, which do not accord with the teachings of the church, or at least with the teaching of some theologians, is not denied. In matters of pure science, theologians are simply scientists, and have no more authority than they to bind the church by their theories. The only thing to be said in their favor is, that knowing the teaching of the church, which is rarely, if ever the case with professed scientists, they are better judges of what theories or explanation of facts do or do not conflict with that teaching. It has been attempted to show that the facts disclosed by the

investigation of geologists conflict with the account of the creation given in the first chapter of *Genesis*. We will only say here that the church has never, as far as we are informed, defined in what sense that chapter is to be understood, whether it is to be understood in a literal or an historical sense; in a philosophical sense, as Josephus tells us it was understood by the Jews; or in a moral sense, as marking the moral order of the work of creation, as it was explained by St. Augustine. But we see no conflict between it, taken historically, and any geological facts we are aware of. We are told that the earth was at first without form, and void; that is, as we understand it, was not created in its complete or perfect state, but only in its principles or elements, which gives room for its development and completion, so to speak, by the agency of second causes, though always by force of the original principle which determines the nature, the direction, and limit of the development. This gives room for all those changes, variations, and modifications geology shows the earth has undergone from physical causes. So here is no conflict, at least no necessary conflict.

But these changes could not have taken place in the brief space of time allowed by the Biblical chronology. We answer to this: 1. That many of the changes the earth is supposed to have undergone, and which are assumed to require millions of ages for effecting them, are geological theories, hypotheses, conjectures, guesses, not scientifically verified facts. The reality of the several geological periods as distinct and successive periods, remains to be proved. Several of them may have been contemporaneous, as, for instance, the so-called stone period may have been contemporary, if not in the same locality, in different localities, with the so-called bronze period or the iron period. The North-American Indians, when New England was first settled by Europeans, used stone axes, stone knives, and other implements made of stone. We have often, in our own boyhood, picked them up in the fields we were traversing. They were called Indian axes, Indian knives, &c. The discovery of stone implements in a given locality proves nothing as to the age of the world, nor either of the orgin or of the successive stages of civilization. Dr. Draper, in some one of his works, tells us as an unquestionable fact that there was a time when all parts of the North-American continent were isothermal, had one and the same mild and equable climate, which we are sure is more than he knows or can scientifically

establish. It is an unverified and an unverifiable hypothesis. We can conclude nothing against the church, if we find her teaching conflicting with such conjectures or hypotheses.

2. To the alleged "chronicles of the rocks," and the long period that the earth was in preparation for the abode of man, we have little to say till geologists prove to us that they have the key to those chronicles, and rightly interpret them. But if they demand more time than the Biblical chronology allows, we would remind them that chronology begins with the first day. How long a period elapsed between the creation of the heavens and the earth and the first day, we do not know—perhaps long enough to answer all the reasonable demands of the geologists.

3. We reply still further, that the church, we believe, has never given any authoritative decision of the question of chronology, and it rests with learned and scientific men. It is a question of science and erudition, not a question of faith, at least so far as we have been taught. For ourselves, we are content to receive the chronology of the Septuagint; but we do not regard the age of the world as very important to be known, for time began with its creation. Before it was created, there was no time to be reckoned. The important thing to be recognized is the fact itself of creation, that "God in the beginning created the heavens and the earth." *Created* we say, not evolved, generated, or projected them. He who admits the fact of creation of all things from nothing by the sole energy of the divine Word, admits what is essential, whether he counts a few centuries more or less since the world began. And that such is the mind of the church we infer from the fact, that she leaves the chronological question undetermined.

The church's teaching conflicts with the Spencerian doctrine of evolution, and so does plain common-sense, for it denies both God and creation. We have not read all the publications of Mr. Herbert Spencer, but we have read the second edition of his *Principles of a new Philosophy*, and the first volume of his *Biology*, and looked through some of his other works. When we have learned an author's principles and method, we have learned all of any importance he has to tell us. We take no interest in his elaboration of his system, or its details. No truth in the details can redeem the falsity of the principles, or atone for the viciousness of the method. Spencer may have some acquaintance with the physical sciences, but he has not a spark of philosophical

genius, and his mind is essentially unscientific. He is turgid, verbose, wearisome, and dull, as a writer; shallow, nay, imbecile, as a thinker; inept, as a reasoner; and conceited and ignorant almost beyond conception, as a man; who, because he perhaps has advanced in some respects beyond what he knew in his own childhood, fancies that he knows more than all the rest of mankind. There is not a page of his writings that we have read in which we do not discover a total lack of insight, and a most deplorable ignorance of what others know. He found a new philosophy, and revolutionize the world of thought! He become a teacher of mankind! Bah! The man is a humbug, a more unmitigated humbug than was even Jeremy Bentham.

The new philosophy divides all things into the knowable and the unknowable. To the unknowable it relegates all principles, substances, and causes, and restricts the knowable to the phenomenal. Yet it writes a volume on First Principles! First principles of the new philosophy indeed, not of the real, nor of nature. Be it so. That only confesses that the new philosophy is unreal, and has nothing to do with the explanation of the real cosmos. What is unknowable is to us as if it were not how, then, treat of the unknowable at all? Yet a whole division of Mr. Spencer's *First Principles* is devoted to the unknowable. But pass to the knowable. The knowable is restricted to the phenomenal. Phenomena have no subsistence in themselves, but are simple appearances or manifestations, and are, as Mr. Spencer, or, if not he, his disciple, a much brighter intellect, Mr. John Fiske, justly asserts, unthinkable without thinking a substance, a reality, or a Something of which they are manifestations, or which appears in them. What is thinkable is knowable, so there is no knowable without knowing the unknowable! Brave philosophers, these fellows, and worthy of the admiration and patronage of Professor Youmans and the great publication house of D. Appleton & Co. The new philosophy teaches us that science deals only with the phenomenal, and it includes in the phenomenal the entire mimetic order of Plato, the whole individual and sensible universe, thus reducing sensible facts themselves, historical events, and the results of scientific experiment and investigation, to phenomena or appearances; and then tells us very gravely that the phenomenal is unthinkable without the real, which in all cases is unknowable and, therefore, unthinkable! Suppose the church does come in conflict with this new philosophy, is it any thing to her discredit?

Both Spencer and his disciple Fiske deny that they are atheists, on the ground that they recognize a real and substantial cosmos that appears or manifests itself in the cosmic phenomena. This substance, reality, something, that is to say, the real cosmos manifested in the cosmic phenomena, Mr. Fiske says, may be called either God or nature, as looked at from the religious or from the scientific point of view. The cosmists are not aware, we suppose, that a clearer and more decided avowal of atheism it would be impossible to make. Mr. Draper is chary of professing atheism, as are most of our English and American advanced thinkers; but after commending the Mahometan Averrhoës for his successful cultivation of science and his scientific views of God, he tells us his conceptions of God were pantheistic. We suppose the professor is ignorant that pantheism is only a form of atheism. Atheism identifies God with the cosmos, pantheism identifies the cosmos with God, and both hold him to be the force, substance, or reality of the cosmic phenomena, and neither recognizes any supercosmic Being. Men who know any thing of theology know that, however our advanced thinkers may deceive themselves or try to deceive others, they are neither more nor less than pitiable atheists, and therefore both blasphemers and fools according to the Holy Scriptures.

But we have already seen that atheism is an unproved and an unprovable hypothesis, and therefore not a scientific truth. Equally removed from established science are all the theories constructed to explain the existence and various and changing forms of the universe or cosmos without the act of creation. The Orientals and the earlier Greeks, after the great gentile apostasy, or the introduction of national, or rather gentile, tribal, or family religions, appear to have held the origin of the universe in generation, and hence they represented their gods as male and female. Later we find, with the Brahmins and Buddhists, the theory of emanation. Plato and Aristotle, though failing to recognize the creative act, adopted what comes nearest to it: the theory of formation, or the formation of the cosmos and its contents, by an intelligent Mind detaching from itself ideas or substantial forms and impressing them on preëxisting matter. Spinoza made the cosmos and all existences modes or affections of one infinite and only substance. Epicurus, Leucippus, and Democritus made all things, life, thought, love, hatred, &c., originate in the fortuitous combination of material, lifeless,

and senseless atoms; but whence came the atoms, they forget to tell us. Spencer, Huxley, Tyndall, and others agree in many respects with the Epicurean cosmogony. Spencer differs from Epicurus only in the respect that the combination is not fortuitous, but by force of law; but whence came the law, he does not inform us: very likely he does not know himself. He attempts to explain the origin and all the facts of the cosmos or universe, man and nature, religion, morality, the state, and society, by what he calls evolution. Yet he confesses that the word evolution does not exactly express his meaning, and, in fact, what he attempts to express by it is no evolution at all, for it evolves nothing. Given matter and motion, he can produce the cosmos. As we understand him, there is no evolution in the case, but simple concentration and dispersion of force, in "eterne alternation," to borrow a phrase from Ralph Waldo Emerson. There is a ceaseless ebb and flood of material force in endless alternation or succession. The concentration which takes place by a fixed and invariable law is life, and its dispersion is death; as what is concentration on the one side or in one place is dispersion on the other side or in another place, so life springs from death, and death from life. What is life here is death there, and what to us is death is to others life. This is mere theory, and not even Dr. Draper will pretend that it is established science. We do not pretend that the church teaches that the world was created in the beginning precisely as we now find it, any more than she teaches that the infant is born a full-grown man. We do not deny the fact of very great physical changes, as well as moral; nor do we deny evolution or development in every sense. All we maintain is, that neither evolution nor development can operate without something to operate upon, and it can only evolve or develop the germs deposited in the matter created. Hence we reject Darwinism, not because it directly denies the creative act of God, but because it assumes that species may be originated and formed without any created germ from which they are developed. It, therefore, supposes that natural causes can do what our advanced thinkers deny that God can do,—create something from nothing. But Darwinism is a mere hypothesis, and in no sense established science. We have read Darwin on the "Origin of Species by natural Selection," and on "the Descent of Man." He presents us a considerable array of facts pertaining to natural history, some of them both interesting and important; but

they fail, as far as we can see, to warrant his inductions. They may all be conceded without those inductions, for there is no necessary connection between them and the theory they are adduced to establish.

But the real offence of the church is, not that she rejects any facts or truth of science, proved to be such, but that she steadily refuses to accept mere theories, hypotheses, conjectures, guesses, as science, because put forth in the name of science, and by men who have devoted themselves not unsuccessfully, it may be, to some one or more of the special sciences; and does not proceed forthwith to indorse them and to modify her time-honored doctrine to conform to them, that is, to change her entire doctrine to make it conform to unfounded and generally absurd assumptions. The greater part of what our advanced thinkers call science, consists not only of assumptions, but of assumptions hardly made before they are modified or rejected for others equally baseless, to be in their turn modified or rejected. We know nothing so uncertain and changeful as this so-called science, which our author holds the church very blamable for not accepting and teaching. Professor John Fiske, after setting forth with an air of perfect conviction the leading features of the cosmic or new philosophy, which he had accepted only the preceding year, adds: "Such is the teaching of science today; but what it will be fifty years hence, what changes or modifications the investigations continually going on in all quarters will necessitate, no one can say." Indeed, our scientists regard science, as our free-lovers regard marriage, as simply provisory, and would be disgusted with it if not at liberty to be constantly changing it. They regard truth as variable as their own views and moods. Then these advanced thinkers, these "prophets of the newness," as a witty friend of ours happily termed them, shrink with horror from the unchangeable, or the invariable and the permanent. They wish to be able to change their science as often as the fashionable lady changes the style of her bonnet. Their greatest and most crushing objection to the church is, that she does not change with the times or with men's opinions, but teaches the same doctrines to the nineteenth century that she did to the first, the tenth, or the thirteenth century. They hold that truth except in pure mathematics, which is a purely analytical science, is a variable quantity. Or rather, like the God of the Hegelians, it is a becoming, *das Werden*, not something that is. They never attain to

truth; they are only in hopes that by continued and more extended investigations, with more ample means and better instruments, they will—attain it? No, but solve provisorily some problems, which science is not now in a condition to solve even provisorily. Yet they insist that their theories, hypotheses, conjectures, and guesses shall be received and treated as unquestionable science. Can it be any serious objection to the church that she refuses to do so?

Many of the theories the church condemns or refuses to entertain are grossly immoral and blasphemous, and strike at the foundation of public order and social well-being. Such is the new philosophy concocted by Herbert Spencer and indorsed by Professor Youmans. The cosmists are not mere harmless theorizers and speculators. They,—and in this respect Tyndall, Huxley, Draper, and other atheistic writers are to be classed with them,—in the name of science deny science itself. They reject the principles on which all science as well as religion rests. If they are right there is and can be no truth, no right or wrong, no moral order, no society, no government, as we see in Prussianized Germany, except that of brute force, no state, no public or private virtue; for these all suppose a distinction between moral laws and physical laws, between gratitude and gravitation, between a virtuous act and a handsome face, between vice and a deformed leg, and in the cause as well as in the effect. The questions involved are not comparatively idle questions, such as, Are there inhabitants in the moon? or, Has the earth, as Dr. M'Cosh maintains, been moulded out of star dust? They strike at the very basis of all held dear and sacred by mankind in all ages and nations of the world. These men scatter firebrands and death, and would have us believe them in sport; and a shallow and unreasoning age, like this nineteenth century, decrees them its highest honors, and runs in crowds after them, and listens to them with open ears and gaping mouths. What would become of the nations, of the human race itself, if the church were not in the world to cover the great elemental truths of science and virtue with her sacred ægis, and to brand these enemies of God and man with her anathema?

The instances we have adduced are amply sufficient to prove that while there is no conflict between her and genuine science, the church has been and is fully justified in her condemnation of the immoral and false theories, assumptions, and speculations of our advanced thinkers or prophets of the

newness, who pretend to be men of science. We hold that it is false to allege that error is harmless while truth is free to combat it. "Error," says the Chinese proverb, "will make the circuit of the globe, while Truth is pulling on her boots." A man is as morally responsible for the opinions he emits as he is for any other of his acts. A thousand highway-robberies or a thousand cold-blooded murders would be but a light social offence in comparison with the publication of one such book as this before us. Men of science should honor and defend truth, not disparage and deny, or labor to undermine it. They should study the syllabus of our Holy Father, Pius IX., and try to profit by its condemnation of their more prominent errors. It unquestionably condemns much that is called, by people who have lost all conception of the spiritual life, modern civilization, but it condemns nothing that science does or can verify, and nothing but such theories, assumptions, and crude opinions as tend, in proportion as they are received and acted on, to undermine and destroy civilization itself. Civilization, as we understand it, is the predominance in society of reason over passion, knowledge over ignorance, moral power over brute force, which is not possible without the predominance of those truths the church teaches, and the influence she exerts. Her freedom and independence is the indispensable condition of all real civilization. This freedom and independence of the church is religious liberty. But the religious liberty of modern civilization, though it bears the name,—and that fact deceives many,—is a very different thing. It does not mean the freedom and independence of the church of God, but freedom of the individual, society, and the state *from* the church, and therefore from the divine sovereignty and from all the obligations and restraints of religion, that is to say, of moral truth, of reason, and eternal justice. The pope, then, in condemning this sort of religious liberty, which indirectly, as we see in Germany, Switzerland, Italy, and elsewhere, paves the way for the despotism of the state and the oppression of conscience, is not warring against civilization, but in its favor, and doing all in his power to save it from the theories and influences at work to destroy it. So with regard to all the other points on which the syllabus conflicts with modern ideas and tendencies.

The church holds that there is a higher order of reality than the sensible, and higher and more imperative interests than material interests,—the only real interests regarded with

favor by modern civilization. But it is a mistake to suppose that she has opposed or discouraged the study of nature or the cultivation of the physical sciences. She does not give them the highest rank, but she includes them in her curriculum; and we know of no Catholic college or university in which they do not hold an honorable place. They were formerly called by the general name of mathematics; and if they did not receive as much attention as they receive at present since the would-be scientists, in their theories, have narrowed the universe down to the world of matter and its laws, that is, material facts and their generalization, they were studied, and the true method of investigating nature was as well understood in the great Catholic schools of the middle ages as it is now. St. Thomas was acquainted with the teachings of Averrhoës, Dr. Draper's pet, and refutes them with a far superior science wherever they come in conflict with the teachings of the church or sound philosophy. Friar Bacon was superior as a physicist to Francis Bacon, my Lord Verulam. The pretence of the later and meaner Bacon, that the mediæval students solved all questions of natural science by *a priori* reasoning, is a pure, unmitigated falsehood, as he would have known if he had known any thing of them. Most of them studied and followed Aristotle; and Dr. Draper contends that Aristotle understood and practised the inductive method. Bacon was another and an earlier English humbug, though less of a humbug than most of those who profess to follow him. The English mind lost its integrity when it lost its Catholic faith, and it seems impossible for it since either to discern or to speak the truth where religion is in question. Dr. Draper, we are told, is an Englishman born and bred, not, we are happy to think, an American. But all nations and races have their humbugs, though no people have them in so great a profusion, or are so easily humbugged, as the apostate English.

The whole trouble with the scientists, and which brings them into conflict with religion, is their neglect to distinguish between assumptions, hypotheses, or conjectures, and what they have scientifically demonstrated or verified.

All in modern science so called, to which the church or religion objects, is assumption or unverified hypothesis. Who has ever found the church objecting to any certain knowledge in the natural order, the axioms of the mathematician, or the definitions of the geometer, for instance? We have never found her warring against the properties of

the screw or lever, as taught us in mechanics. Where there is real science, or certain knowledge in the natural order, she includes it in the preamble to faith, and censures its denial. If scientists would be careful to distinguish between fact and conjecture, knowledge and opinion, and insist only on what they have demonstrated or is scientifically verifiable, there would be no conflict between them and the theologians. Galileo's troubles arose from his demanding of the church her indorsement of his heliocentric theory, which was not then, even if it be now, any thing but an undemonstrated hypothesis. What he wanted was, not liberty to pursue his investigations as a scientist or physicist, for that he had in its plenitude, but that the church should intervene, and by her authority silence his contradictors. A very modest request!

Let the scientists pursue their investigations into every department of nature to the full extent of their means and ability, but if they wish to avoid all conflict with religion, let them scrupulously refrain from asserting as science what is not science, and from denying the teachings of the church, which they have not disproved and cannot disprove by science. There may be more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in their philosophy. Lalande proved nothing in favor of atheism when he said he "had never seen God at the end of his telescope." Nor does Herbert Spencer disprove the existence of an intelligible world, or prove that the sensible is the only reality by relegating being, substance, principles, and causes to the unknowable, especially since he is obliged to confess that the sensible, which he asserts, is knowable only by virtue of the intelligible, the physical only through the metaphysical. Huxley does not prove that protoplasm is the physical basis of life, or that life originates in dead matter, for he cannot say what other element than the chemical constituents, into which he resolves protoplasm, is operative in the production and support of life. Because the principle of life escapes all chemical analysis, he cannot say there is no such principle, or that it is identical with proteine, itself a hypothetical existence. Tyndall finds only matter, but it does not follow therefore that spirit is not as real and as intelligible as matter. The blind man, because he cannot see the light, has no right to deny the existence of light. Our advanced thinkers have no right to measure the capacity of the human mind by the narrow dimensions of their own; or, because they are pur-

blind, that no one sees or can see farther than they themselves. How do they know that they do not, in their purblindness and lack of insight, exclude from their universe the greater and more important part of reality, and, if not sensible, yet very intelligible? Nay, how do they know that there is not a supernatural order, supernaturally revealed to the human race, and taught to all who will hear her by the church? They, therefore, must not presume to deny and reject as unreal or as a fable what the race has always held, unless they have certain proof that it is false. So, on the other hand, they must take care to affirm nothing as science which is only opinion, conjecture, or mere theory; such as that the earth is constructed from a fragment of an exploded comet, or from "star dust," the existence of said star dust being itself exceedingly problematical.

The prophets of the newness, or our advanced thinkers, are greatly scandalized if any one presumes to question "modern ideas," or to doubt the infallibility of "modern civilization." Their whole labor is to draw off the affections from the heavenly, and fix them on the "earthly." They assign the highest rank to material interests or sensible goods: nay, hold them to be the only real interests, the only solid goods. They would have us live for this life alone, and this they would persuade us is the teaching of science. But experience is playing sad pranks with this sort of science. What is called modern civilization is based on it; and it is only the wilfully blind that do not see that it is as destructive to material interests as it is to spiritual interests, to the goods of this life as to the hopes of heaven. The greatest conceivable folly is that which gives up heaven for earth, the unseen and the eternal for the temporal and the perishing. All true science teaches us that the goods of this life, as religion herself teaches, are secured only by self-denial, by turning our back on them as the end of our labors, and living only for the goods of the life to come.

England is the best representative of modern civilization, and, after England or Great Britain, comes our own Republic. England is precisely the country in which we find the greatest poverty and the most squalid wretchedness; and hundreds and thousands of workingmen and women in our own country are out of work because there is no work for them to do, and must starve unless kept alive by public or private charity. Moral principles are sacrificed to material interests, and with them the material interests themselves.

The sad result of modern civilization in the material order, in relation to the well-being of the laboring classes, as evinced by the frequent strikes and destructive combinations to which they are driven, is a sad commentary on "modern civilization" and the "modern ideas."

ANSWER TO DIFFICULTIES.

[From the Catholic World for December, 1870.]

THE following letter, suggesting certain difficulties which many well-disposed and earnest-minded persons find in the way of accepting the Catholic faith speaks for itself, and deserves a respectful consideration:

"NEW YORK, October 6, 1870.

"MY DEAR SIR: Pardon me for intruding upon you, whom I have never seen. I do so in obedience to an impulse which urges me to communicate with you, by letter or otherwise. Without further preface, allow me to state a case.

"My parents and nearly all my friends are Protestants, and I never had a suspicion that I was not one until recently. Of course, I have always taken it for granted that the Roman Catholic Church was an imposition. I have often felt uneasy about my religious state, but have failed to be converted according to the Protestant formula. About two years ago, more or less, I began to feel unusual interest in these things, and, after due deliberation, I concluded to join a church, which I thought would be a certain remedy for my mental inquietude. I acted upon this resolution, and, though I felt disappointed at the result, still I hoped that all would come right in time. My views were so 'liberal' that I thought it did not make any difference which church I joined, provided only that the intention was right. I did not believe that any special church was the true church more than another, and I was careful only to select one as free as possible from restrictions of all kinds. I knew there was much diversity of opinion among Protestants, but I had always thought it was on 'minor points.' I have been much surprised, however, to find myself mistaken in this respect. I have noticed that no one sect seems to comprehend *all* that is taught by the blessed Founder of Christianity; one sect laying stress on a particular doctrine, while a rival sect insists on some other.

"Without going into tedious details, I may say at once that I discovered to my consternation that a suspicion had crept into my mind that I might be in error. I began to suspect that the Roman Catholic Church might be what it claims, namely, 'the true church,' for it seems to include and explain all. But this caused me much distress, for I had always looked upon this church as the very fountain of error and superstition. I have been looking into the subject more critically of late, and I find my suspicion, instead of being removed, is being more and more confirmed. It does really seem that the arguments are unanswerable, and yet I am loth to take the final step, and try to convince myself that it is not necessary for me to become a Catholic. I have been hesitating thus for several months, 'almost persuaded,' but not quite.

"I have always been in favor of 'progress,' so-called, and it seems to me that the doctrines of your church are incompatible with it. I ask myself: 'Suppose all the world was Catholic, what would become of nations and governments? Would not the pope become temporal ruler? And if all men were really Christians according to the Catholic standard —not nominally, but actually—what would become of science and art?' Science teaches that the way to benefit mankind is to 'find out something new.' Christianity teaches that the most important thing to learn is self-denial: 'If thou wilt be perfect, sell all. If thou wilt possess a blessed life, despise this present life.' Self-denial, therefore, and high culture—civilization, in other words—seem to be incompatible; for civilization multiplies our wants and gives us the means of gratifying them, while the highest form of Christianity reduces our wants to a minimum and is opposed to all superfluities. It is happy in a cell, clothed in haircloth. So also with learning and art. I know that the fine arts flourished before Protestantism, but those who excelled in these were not eminent as saints or even Christians, so far as I am informed.

"If one looks forward, then, to the conversion and *actual* christianization of all men according to the highest Catholic standard of Christianity, it would seem that he must also contemplate the downfall of science, literature, and art, as well as the extinction of all nationalities, leaving only the Catholic Church. This may be an extreme view, but it appears more impossible than illogical. Jesus Christ said, 'If any one will follow me, let him deny himself,' &c. Now, why should it be proper for some persons to practise self-denial, and improper for others? If there is greater virtue in *entire* devotion to religion, why should not *all* devote themselves entirely to religion? The only reason that I can see why they should not do so is that it would produce just the result I have spoken of. Would this be 'a consummation devoutly to be wished?'

"There are doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church which are by no means clear to me, of the truth of which, to speak candidly, I am not convinced; the doctrine of 'transubstantiation' being one. But I feel

that, where I have found *so much that is true*, I may safely trust in regard to those matters that I cannot comprehend.

"In conclusion, I will only say that my present condition is most unsatisfactory. As I intimated, I have found that I am not a Protestant. In fact, I am nothing unless Catholic, but I am outside of any church. Please tell me, at your earliest convenience, what I had better do. I am like a certain timid man who went to Jesus by night to seek instruction, and I beg you to excuse me for wishing to remain *incognito* for the present.

"I am, dear sir,

"Very respectfully yours."

Nothing is more important in settling any question than to define one's terms, and indeed little more than the definition of the terms in which it is expressed is needed to settle any question that reason can settle. Most disputes originate in the habit most people have of using words in a vague, loose, and indeterminate sense. There are few words used in a looser or more indeterminate sense than the word "progress." In one sense, which we hold to be the true sense, the Catholic Church not only does not oppose progress, but favors it and demands it, and is that without which no real progress is possible. In another sense, and a sense in which certain theorists and dreamers use it, the church not only does not favor it, but undoubtedly condemns it, anathematizes it, not indeed because it is progress, but because it is not progress. It is necessary, then, in order to settle the question raised by our correspondent, to agree on the meaning we are to attach to the word "progress."

Progress means literally a step forward; that is, toward the journey's end, or the goal it is proposed to reach; figuratively, or in a moral sense, it means improvement, melioration, or an advance from the imperfect toward the perfect. It is a step forward toward the end to be gained. It implies change, but always change for the better. Three things are essential to all progress: principle, medium, and end, or a starting-point, the point of arrival, or point to be gained, and the means or agencies by which it is to be gained. The denial of any one of these is the denial of progress and of the possibility of progress. Progress is always from a point to a point by the proper medium or means.

Our correspondent undoubtedly uses the word progress not in its literal sense, but in its figurative or moral sense,

as expressing not simple locomotion, but the advance of man or society toward perfection, or from the less perfect to the more perfect. Society is for man, not man for society. Progress, then, must be taken as the progress of man toward perfection. The perfection of man is in fulfilling his destiny, in attaining to the end for which he exists. Society is more or less perfect in proportion as it more or less aids man in attaining to that end. Then, to be able to determine what is or is not progress, or what does or not favor it, we must know the principle, medium, and end of man, or, more simply, man's origin, whence he begins, the end for which he exists, and the means by which that end is or can be attained to. Without this threefold knowledge, it is impossible to say what church or institution does or does not favor progress, or what are the proper means of effecting it.

The Catholic Church professes to supply by divine authority this threefold knowledge. She teaches what is the origin and end of man, whence he starts, and whither he should arrive; and not only teaches, but supplies, the means of arriving there. That is, she tells us what is true progress, and supplies to her faithful and obedient children the means of effecting it. How, then, can she be said to deny progress, or to require her children to deny that man, with the divine help, is progressive? She teaches that man not only is progressive, but that it is his duty to be constantly progressive till by the help of grace he fulfils his destiny, or attains to the end for which he exists. She claims to have been instituted solely for the purpose of conducting and assisting him in this progress, the only real progress of man that can be maintained or even conceived. How, then, can she deny progress, or any thing that can really contribute to it?

It is no proof that the church is hostile to progress that she condemns or anathematizes certain theories of progress put forth by sciolists and dreamers, and which may happen to be just now in vogue. One of these theories, at present very widely received, is that man is naturally progressive, or that by his own natural powers alone he is able to attain to his end. But this theory, whether put forth under the name of Pelagianism or semipelagianism, rationalism or naturalism, the church cannot accept, because it is not true. Man's origin and end are both supernatural, since God, who is above nature, creates him, and creates him for himself;

and nature is inadequate as the medium of a supernatural end, that is, an end above itself, and therefore beyond its reach. Man is progressive by grace obtained for him by the Incarnation, but not without it; and hence in the gentile world, ignorant alike of creation and the Incarnation, we never find even the idea or conception of progress.

Another theory of progress, that of Mistress Ann Lee, foundress of Shakerism, is that we keep travelling on, on for ever, without ever arriving at home or reaching our journey's end. This theory is generally held and taught, we believe, by the spiritists; but it is absurd, for it denies progress itself. Progress is going toward an end, and, where there is no end to be obtained, there is and can be no progress. Man may be progressive to the infinite, and the church teaches that he is, that through the Incarnation he can be united to the infinite God, and possess him as his last end; but he cannot be infinitely or even indefinitely progressive, as some pretend, for that implies progress without an end, which is a contradiction in terms.

A third theory of progress, the Topsyist theory, much favored by modern scientists, is that of progress, or growth, by self-evolution or development. Topsy, when asked who made her or whence she came, answered, "I didn't come; I grow'd." This answer is accepted as eminently scientific by the Comtists, Herbert Spencer, Darwin, Sir John Lubbock, Professor Huxley, and many other lights of science; but the church, as well as common-sense, rejects it, because it denies progress by denying it a starting-point. One gets by simple evolution or development only what is in the germ evolved or developed, and, if we have not the germ to start with, or if we are to obtain the germ by evolution or development, no evolution or development can take place. What does not exist cannot grow, evolve, or develop, and where there is no growth there is no progress. The church, in condemning the Topsyist theory and asserting the origin of man and the world in the creative act of God, does not deny progress, but asserts its possibility and the conditions of its possibility. She asserts a starting-point, namely, what man is as he comes from the hands of his Creator; and a point of arrival, or what he is when he has attained to the full perfection or complement of his nature in attaining to his end or final cause. According to the teaching of the church, progress is possible, and even necessary, if man is not to remain forever a simply initial, inchoate, or unfulfilled existence.

The Topsyists or evolutionists are like the poor wretch in a treadmill. They step, step unceasingly, but never get a step forward. They seek effects without causes, and, while denying that God by his own power creates all things from nothing, they are trying with might and main to prove that nothing can make itself something, which by evolution and development grows into this varied and beautiful universe, into man its lord, with the feeling heart and reasoning head, even into an *Être Suprême*, whom all should love and adore. That is, nothing can not only make itself something, but it can even make itself God, which they who will may find asserted or implied in Comte's *Philosophie Positive*. But nothing is more absurd than to suppose that nothing can make itself something, or that any thing can make itself more or other than it is. Even God cannot make himself, or make himself more or other than he is, and therefore theologians call him necessary, self-existent, eternal, and immutable being. The acorn is neither self-produced, nor self-developed into the oak. It must be given to start with, and then must be given also soil, light, heat, and moisture, in relation with which it is placed, or it will not germinate and grow. Professor Huxley derives all thought, feeling, will, and understanding from protoplasm, formed by the chemical and electrical combination of dead matter. But one cannot get from a thing, however it is manipulated, what is not in it. From dead matter, even supposing you have it, you can get only dead matter. How from it, then, get living protoplasm? We cannot do it now, we are told, and the professor says, organic life can now be evolved only from organic life; but in some remote and unknown period, long ages before history began, when the world was young and its juices were fresher than at present, dead matter could and did evolve living protoplasm. And this is science! The church can hardly be censured for rejecting it, and we do not think the world would suffer an irreparable loss were such science as this to become extinct.

Our correspondent thinks that, if all the world should become Catholic, christianized according to the highest standard, nationalities would be extinguished, only the Catholic Church would be left us, and the pope would become the temporal ruler; we must bid adieu to science, literature, and art, and devote our entire life to religion and spiritual exercises. The Christian maxim, Deny thy-

self, would reduce our wants to the minimum, and leave us neither room nor motive for any thing else. We do not share his apprehensions. National *hostilities*, we doubt not, would be extinguished, and the nations learn war no more; but we can see no reason why distinct nations, each with its own territorial limits and its own distinctive civil government, should not continue to exist, and with far greater security and far surer guaranties than now. As far as we can see, the reasons for national distinctions, separate governments, and different forms of government would remain unaffected; only there would then be no good reasons for the huge centralized states and empires which now exist, and which have been created by absorbing their weaker neighbors. Were it not for the sake of protection against wars from European nations, or with one another, that is, if all the world were Catholics, and there was a spiritual authority recognized by all competent to make the rights of nations or international law respected without a resort to arms, it would be far better that each one of the states of this Union should be an independent sovereign state by itself than that they should all be united under one general government. Diversities of soil, climate, geographical position, create a diversity of local interests which are better looked after and promoted by small states than by large. United Italy will never be so prolific in great men, distinguished for art, science, literature, and statesmanship, nor will she stand as high for her industry and commerce, or her people be individually as free and as manly, as when she was divided, as prior to the reformation, into a dozen or more independent states. German unity, if effected, will most likely retard instead of advancing the progress of German literature, science, and art, by suppressing the liberty of the German people, and destroying the emulation and activity created by the large number of capitals she has hitherto had.

There is no danger of the pope's becoming the temporal ruler of mankind, for his office by its very constitution is spiritual, not temporal. The papacy is instituted for the spiritual government of mankind on earth, not for their temporal government. All that would follow, if all the world were Catholic, would be that the pope as the vicar of Christ would be able to use, and would use effectively, his spiritual authority to induce all civil governments to respect the rights and independence of each other, and each

to govern its own subjects according to the law of God; that is, he would use his supreme pastoral authority to maintain, what now is nowhere done, Christian morals in politics! This was partially the case in Christian Europe after the downfall of Rome and the conversion of the barbarian conquerors, and is what many see and feel the need of now, and which is poorly substituted by Evangelical conferences, world's conventions, peace congresses, or congresses of diplomats, sovereigns, or nations. The sects may preach peace, even preach the law of God, and the necessity of maintaining Christian morals in politics, but they have no authority to enforce them by spiritual pains or ecclesiastical discipline, either on sovereigns or on subjects. They are themselves carried away, or, if not, their admonitions are unheeded, by the political passions and tendencies of the age or nation. We find them with ourselves impotent to preserve the Christian family, the necessary basis of Christian society. Marriage is becoming a farce, and binds nobody.

We see nothing in the doctrines or influence of the church that tends to relax efforts by science, literature, art, and industry to benefit mankind, or to render them less effective. The progress of society, of civilization, and the material well-being of nations and individuals, are desirable or lawful only as they contribute to man's progress toward the end for which he is created. The earth with what pertains to it is never to be sought as the ultimate end, or as in itself a good; but, as the medium of the end, it is neither to be despised nor rejected. We are only to reject it as the end for which we are to live and labor. Our correspondent fails to recognize the distinction which the Gospel makes between what is of precept and what is of counsel, or what is necessary in order to inherit eternal life and what is necessary in order to be perfect. The young man of large possessions asked our Lord, "Master, what shall I do to inherit eternal life?" He was answered, "Keep the commandments." "But all these have I kept from my youth up; what lack I yet?" "If thou *wouldst be perfect*, go sell what thou hast, give it to the poor, and come and follow me." For eternal life, it suffices to keep the commandments, that is, to do what the law prescribes; but for perfection, it is necessary to go further, and keep the evangelical counsels. But only those who freely and voluntarily accept the counsels as their rule of life are obliged to keep

them. No one is obliged or permitted to take them as the rule of life unless he choose, nor unless he has a special vocation thereto, which is not the case with the generality of mankind. The monastic state is a more perfect state, and imposes greater sacrifices and more arduous duties than the ordinary Christian state; but it is a state only for the *élite* of the race, and is not adapted to nor intended for all men. Only those who have no duties of family or society which they are bound to discharge are free to enter religion or the monastic state. No one, so long as he has any duties to his family or to the world that are incompatible with his monastic vows, is free to retire from the world and its interests, and seek perfection in the monastery or the cœnobitical life. The church does not permit it, and always takes care that the duties to our neighbor and the real interests of society shall not be neglected. No one who has any one dependent on his care or labor for support, a parent, a child, a brother, or a sister, can, so long as the dependence remains, enter religion or take the vows required by the more perfect state. That state for such a one would not be a more perfect state.

But even those who are free to enter this more perfect state, to retire from the world, and are vowed to the practice of Christianity according to the highest standard, do not cease from labors beneficial to mankind. Men, because they love God more, do not love their neighbor less. Even Adam, before he sinned, was not permitted to live in idleness, but was required to keep and dress the garden in which he was placed. The fathers of the desert made mats. The old monks themselves adopted as their motto, "Laborare est orare," and made their labor a prayer. Never was there a class of men less idle or lazy, or more industrious or thriving, than those same old monks who retired from the world and lived for God alone. We see it in the rich and costly monuments they dedicated to religion, in their finely cultivated fields, and the bountiful harvests they gathered. With the labor of their own hands, they cleared away forests, reclaimed barren wastes, subdued the most ungrateful soil, turned the wilderness into fruitful fields, and made the desert blossom as the rose. Not in the whole history of the race will you find a class of men who have done more to serve man, and advance society in agriculture, industry, the useful arts, literature, the fine arts, theology, philosophy, science, civilization, than those old religious

who were vowed to Christian perfection. The greatest theologians, philosophers, artists, popes, bishops, preachers, statesmen, and reformers the world has ever known lived and were trained in monasteries, and were eminent as religious. This should satisfy our correspondent that men need not be and are not lost to mankind because they live for God, and devote their lives to self-denial, prayer, and contemplation.

Our age forgets that earthly goods, social reform, or progress, even civilization, are never to be sought for their own sake, and that when so sought they are not gained. When we act on the principle—the old gentile principle—that man is for society, not society for man, our efforts are fruitless or worse than fruitless. The would-be religious and church reformers of the sixteenth century, the authors of the so-called glorious reformation, made a great noise, created a great commotion, but they have only reduced the nations that followed them to the condition of the Græco-Roman world before the Incarnation. In the Protestant and non-Catholic world, you find the same order of thought obtain, the same questions come up to agitate and torture men's souls, the same old problems to be solved; and men find the same darkness behind, before, and within them. There is the same old obscurity gathering over man's origin and end, and men ask now as then, in agony of soul, Whence come we? whither go we? why are we here? and find no answer. The departed are wept over as lost, and death is sung by the poets as an eternal sleep. Creation is denied, and God is either denied outright or is resolved into an irresistible, impersonal force, or identified with the universe; the scientists in vogue do little else than reproduce the long-since-exploded theories of Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus; and the more advanced philosophers only reproduce the dreams of the Buddhists or the fancies of the old Gnostics. The church is gone, and the state is going.

The political and social reformers, children of the same parentage, have gained no more for society and government than the Protestant reformers have gained for religion and the church. What has France gained by her century of infidel and anti-Catholic revolutions, her violent changes of dynasties and institutions, but to lie prostrate under the iron heel of the Prussian, and to struggle in confusion and despair, and perhaps in vain, for her very existence? Where

goes her boasted civilization, her refinement, her arts, her science, her wealth and material well-being? And Prussia, what has she gained in freedom for her people, in moral progress, or social well-being by her victory of Sadowa? What has Germany gained, but the privilege of being used by divine Providence to crush France, and, when France is crushed, of being in turn crushed herself? Even in this country, with our savage love of liberty and zeal for political and social reform of every kind and sort, we are fast losing the freedom and manliness, the purity of heart and strength of mind and body, which we inherited from our fathers. We have a general government enacting from three to five hundred, and thirty-six states, each enacting from a hundred to a thousand, new laws every year, with vice, crime, and corruption daily increasing, while it is becoming harder and harder every year for the poor man and people of small means to live.

Things good and useful in their origin or at the time they are adopted become abuses, evil and hurtful, by the changes which time and events bring with them, to individual virtue or to public liberty and social prosperity. Reforms in all things human thus, from time to time, become urgent and necessary; but, if attempted to be obtained by noise and agitation, by violence and revolution, they either are not obtained at all, or are obtained only by the introduction of other abuses or evils worse than those warred against. In general, if not always, the remedy so sought proves to be worse than the disease. All real reforms needed in political or social arrangements are quietly effected, if effected at all, by the regular development and application of the great principles essential to the existence and order of society, and the stability and efficiency of government. It is a free people that makes a free government, not the free government that makes a free people. You can get no more freedom in the state than you have in the people as individuals. A so-called popular government secures no more freedom than absolute monarchy for a people enslaved by their lusts, bent only on earthly goods, or not thoroughly imbued with the liberty wherewith the Son makes us free. There is no security for liberty, political or personal, in the heathen republic, based on the principle, "I am as good as you, and therefore I'll cut your throat if you attempt to rule over me;" the only security is in a republic based on this Christian principle, "You are my brother, as good as I,

and I will die sooner than tyrannize over or wrong you." The foundation and security of all liberty that is not license or anarchy are in the development and application to private and public life of the principles taught in the child's catechism.

All the reforms or changes beneficial to mankind or useful to man and society have been effected by earnest individuals intent only on the glory of God and the salvation of their own souls—earnest, self-denying men, working in secrecy and obscurity, unknown or unheeded, who have nothing of their own to carry out, who are moved by no splendid dream of world-reform, who sound no trumpet before them, but in their ardent charity devote themselves to the work nearest at hand, who receive Christ our Lord in the stranger, give him drink in the thirsty, feed him in the hungry, clothe him in the naked, nurse him in the sick, and visit and minister to him in the prisoner, and silently cover the land over with hospitals for the infirm, and foundations for the poor and needy. Slavery was struck a mortal blow when the solitary monk, in imitation of his Lord, ransomed the slave by making himself a slave in his place for the love of God. The priest, the Sisters of Charity, and Brothers of Mercy were on the battle-field to care for the wounded and dying, long before the International Committee were heard of.

It is a law of divine Providence that we live for man only in living for God, and serve mankind only in seeking to serve God. Our Lord says, "Be not solicitous, saying: What shall we eat: or what shall we drink, or wherewith shall we be clothed? For after all these things do the heathen seek. For your heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of these things. Seek ye therefore first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things shall be added unto you." St. Matt. vi. 31–33.

The heathen make these things, the *adjicienda*, the primary object of their pursuits, the end and aim of their life, and miss them, or gain them to their own hurt; the Christian seeks, as first and last, the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things are added unto him. We secure the good things of this life not by seeking them or living for them, but by turning our back on them, and living only for God and heaven. He that will save his life shall lose it, and he that will lose his life for Christ's sake shall find it. They who give up all for Christ are rewarded

a hundred-fold even in this world, and with life everlasting in the world to come. The principle that underlies these assertions is as true in the material order as in the spiritual. If all the world were Catholics and obeyed the Christian law to live for God and for man only in God, there would not be less, but more, well-being in the world; for all would then live a normal life, and the gains of toil and industry would not be squandered or swept away by the evil passions of men, never by the wars and fightings which originate in men's lusts, and waste in a single day the accumulations of years of peaceful labor. The world has yet to learn that the true principle of political as well as domestic economy is self-denial—precisely the reverse of what our correspondent would seem to hold.

The apprehension of our correspondent that, if all the world were Catholic, there would be no motive for the cultivation of science, we do not regard as well-founded. The love of God does not diminish, but increases, our love of man and of the Creator's works. There is nothing in the Catholic faith that induces indifference to any thing that God has made or that is really for the benefit of the individual or of society. The assumption that science benefits mankind by "finding out something new" can be taken only with important qualifications. Science does not benefit mankind by teaching new truths or new principles, but by enabling us the better to understand and apply to practical life here and now the truths or principles asserted by reason and revelation from the first. The Catholic faith does not supersede reason, the principle and medium of all human science, nor render its exercise unnecessary. Revelation gives us the principles and causes of the universe—principles and causes which lie above reason, above nature, and which must guide and assist us in our study of nature—but it leaves the whole field of nature to our observation and scientific investigation. There is, to say the least, as much work for reason under revelation as there would be if no revelation had been given. Revelation only does that which reason cannot do, and which is beyond the reach of science. What would be within the reach of science if there were no revelation is equally within its reach under revelation. The field of science is not restricted by revelation, but enlarged rather; for revelation places the mind of the Christian in a position, an attitude, that enables it to see more clearly and comprehend more fully rational or scien-

tific principles, and things as they really are in God's own world. As is often said, revelation is to reason what the telescope is to the eye. We see not, then, how faith can extinguish science or hinder us from benefiting mankind by finding out all the new things in our power, or that would or could be in our power without the Catholic faith.

The church has never discouraged science or the sciences. She approves and provides for the cultivation to the fullest extent of the science of theology, the queen of sciences, and of philosophy, the science of the sciences; and nowhere has philosophy been so successfully cultivated as in the schools founded by churchmen and religious, with her approval and authorization. Nearly all the celebrated universities of Europe were founded by Catholics before Protestantism was born, and their most eminent professors, far more eminent than are to be found in non-Catholic colleges and universities, were monks, religious men vowed to Christian perfection. The church has only encouragement for the physical sciences, for mathematics, astronomy, geography, history, geology, philology, paleontology, zoology, botany, chemistry, electricity, &c. She does not indeed teach that proficiency in these sciences is the end of man, or that they are worth any thing without proficiency in the practice of the moral and Christian virtues. She teaches us to value them only as they redound to the glory of God in a better knowledge of his works, and in honoring him serve his creature man either for time or eternity; but so far as they are true—are really science, not merely theories of science—and aid the real progress of man, she approves and encourages their cultivation, and presents the strongest motives for cultivating them.

But the sciences are never to be cultivated for their own sake. Their cultivation is desirable or lawful only for the sake of the true end of man. To cultivate them for the sake of gratifying an idle or a morbid curiosity is not by any means a virtue or a good. They should be subordinated and made subservient to the divine purpose in our existence and in the existence of the universe. And so far as so subordinated and made subservient, their cultivation cannot be carried too far; for it is a religious, a spiritual exercise, a prayer. But in our day the importance of these sciences is exaggerated, and men look to their cultivation for the discovery of new solutions of the mystery of the universe, and a new life-plan which will supersede that

given us in the Christian revelation. In these respects, science has and can have nothing new to offer; and, so far as the scientists pretend to be able to supersede or set aside revelation, they give us not science, but their theories, hypotheses, conjectures, guesses, which are warranted by no scientific induction from any real facts they do or can discover. Scientists may explode the theories of scientists, or disprove much which has passed for science; but they cannot disprove revelation or explode faith, for faith cannot be false. Faith is the gift of God, not possible without supernatural grace; and God, who is true, truth itself, can no more bestow his grace to accredit a falsehood than he can work a miracle to accredit a false prophet or a false teacher. Beliefs, opinions, theories, hypotheses, though put forth as science, may be false, and often are false; but faith, either objectively or subjectively, never.

But the applications of the sciences in our day to the mechanic and productive arts, or the scientific inventions which our age so loudly boasts, are far from being an unmixed good. They tend to materialize the mind, to fix it on second causes to the forgetfulness of the first and final cause, the cause of all causes; and to fasten the affections on things earthly and perishable instead of things spiritual and eternal. The introduction of steam as a motive-power, the invention of labor-saving machinery, by which the productive power of the race is increasing a million-fold or more, have their attendant evils. They diminish the real value in the same degree of human labor. You lessen the value of the working man or woman in the economy of life just in proportion as you supersede him or her by machinery. Machinery on an extensive scale can be set up and worked only by large capital, which reduces men of no means, of small means, or of light credit to abject dependence on capital, or those who are able to command it. How is the small cultivator to compete proportionally with the large cultivator who is able to introduce the steam-plough, the patent reaper and mower, the horse-rake, and the steam threshing and winnowing machine, which demand an outlay which the other is unable to make? How are individuals of small means to compete for travel or freight with the railroad, which can be constructed and worked only by an individual or a corporation that commands millions? These instances are enough to illustrate our meaning. The full effects of steam and machinery are not yet manifest except

to those who are able to foresee effects in their causes; but to the careful observer they prove that "all is not gold that glisters." The nations do not grow any richer under the new system than they did under the old. Hard times are of none the less frequent occurrence, the independence of the laboring classes is not increased, nor the number or the wretchedness of the poor diminished. Evidently the utility to mankind of the achievements of modern science has been greatly exaggerated by our age. Whatever diminishes the value of hand-labor or supersedes its necessity is a grave evil. Man's physical, intellectual, and moral health require that he should earn his bread by the sweat of his face. It was the penalty imposed on man for original sin, and, like all the penalties imposed by our heavenly Father, really a blessing.

There is also a knowledge which can neither benefit him who possesses it nor others, and is very properly forbidden, such as the knowledge of necromancy, spiritism, magic, and the various real or pretended arts of fortune-telling; for such knowledge is satanic, and can be used to no good purpose whatever. There are other kinds of knowledge, too, not satanic, but useful and good for those whose duty it is to teach, which are not desirable or suitable for the generality, because the generality can only partially acquire it, and a little smattering of it only serves to mislead and bewilder, to unsettle faith, to make foolish men and women wise in their own conceit, to puff them up with pride and vanity, and render them unbelieving and disobedient. Such are the mass of those who deny revelation, sneer at Christianity, make war on the church, eulogize science, denounce time-honored customs and institutions, and spout infidelity and nonsense. As these cannot know more, it would be much better for them if they knew less, and never aspired to a knowledge beyond their capacity or their state. But the Catholic faith approves all science and all knowledge that is or can be made useful to the great purposes of our earthly existence. There is room enough for the activity of the sublimest intellect to learn the great mysteries of faith in their relation to one another, and to understand their various applications to man and society in both ideal and practical life.

We are surprised that our correspondent should fear that, if all the world were Catholic, art would become extinct. The world would indeed lose profane art, all that which, if it tends to refine, tends also to corrupt, and marks the moral

decline and effeminacy of an age or nation; but no other. Art is not religion, nor is the worship of the beautiful the worship of God; but the church makes use of art in her services. She uses the highest art she can get in the constructing and adorning of her temples, her convents and abbeys, and in teaching the mysteries of her faith. The grandest architecture and the rarest sculpture, painting, music, poetry, and eloquence have been inspired by the church and pressed into her service. Most of the great artists she has employed were, like Fra Angelico and Fra Bartolomeo, saintly men, and those who were not, yet held the faith and lived in a Catholic atmosphere. On this point, we differ from our correspondent. Protestantism and modern infidelity have nothing to boast of in the way of art, and cannot have, for neither is either logical or intellectual, or has any great idea for art to embody. What of art either has is a pale and feeble imitation of ancient pagan art, or a still paler and feebler imitation of Catholic art. Nothing seems to us more strange or unfounded than our correspondent's opinion that, "if we look forward to the conversion and actual christianization of all men according to the highest standard, we must also contemplate the downfall of science, literature, and art, as well as the extinction of all nationalities, leaving only the Catholic Church." Even if this were so, it would be no proof that the church is not true; and, if she is true, it could be no damage, since nothing not true or in accordance with the church of God can really benefit mankind here or hereafter. But it is not true, as we have seen; and all that would follow were all men Catholic according to the highest standard would be not the downfall, but the christianizing of all national governments, and making science, literature, art, all that is included in the word *civilization*, subsidiary to the service of God, and of man in God. Our correspondent says there are doctrines of the church which he cannot believe, but where he has found so much that is true he feels he may safely trust for the rest. We assure him he may; but we beg him to pardon us if we remind him that faith is the gift of God, and to be able to grasp Catholic truth firmly, and hold it without doubt or wavering, we need the grace of God to incline the will and to illuminate the understanding. Without that grace we have and can have only simple human belief, which is never strong enough to exclude all doubt or difficulty. That grace may always be

obtained by prayer, and the grace of prayer is given to all men. "Ask, and ye shall receive; knock, and it shall be opened unto you." What seems obscure and doubtful to him now will then be clear and certain, and grow clearer and more certain as he advances toward the perfect day.

We think our correspondent exaggerates the difficulties he experiences. Every Catholic, if he lives according to the standard of his faith, denies himself, and devotes himself exclusively to religion; but the denial of self is not the annihilation of self. It is the moral not the physical denial of self, and means living for God, and for self only in God. Being exclusively devoted to religion does not, however, mean that we must stand on our knees from morning till night, and from night till morning, in prayer and meditation, without eating, drinking, or sleeping, or attending to our bodily wants or the wants of others. We are taught that he who provides not for his own household is worse than an infidel, and hath denied the faith. Religion covers all the duties of our state in life, and requires a strict performance of them for God's sake, whether they are the duties of husband or wife, of parent or child, of priest or religious, a lawyer or a doctor, a statesman or an artist. What God requires of us is that we give him our hearts, and, in whatever we do or refrain from doing, that we act from the intention of serving and glorifying him. Undoubtedly, Cnristianity diminishes our *material* wants to the minimum, which is a good, not an evil; but it multiplies infinitely our moral and spiritual wants, and furnishes the means of satisfying them.

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